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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the impact of the economic depression 
of the 1930s on the State of Queensland. It is primarily concerned 
with the politics of the period but economic and social factors 
are not ignored. As a political study, the thesis is concerned 
with the behaviour of Governments, political parties and interest 
groups. The formulation of public policies directed towards the 
alleviation of unemployment are also investigated. The central 
focus of the thesis is the Queensland Labor movement, which is 
defined broadly to include those individuals and groups that claimed 
to belong to a political/industrial movement that was concerned to 
advance and defend the interests of employed and tinemployed workers. 
The central arguments of the thesis are: that the medium and 
longterm effects of the depression have been exaggerated; and that, 
in certain respects, Queensland's response to the depression was 
different from that in some other States. These arguments are 
explained and expanded in the Introduction. The remainder of the 
thesis is divided into two sections. Section One includes 
Chapters One to Seven and deals mainly with general political 
developments. Chapter One seeks to explain why Queensland appears 
to have been less affected by the economic collapse than the other 
States. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Queensland economy 
experienced a severe, locally-induced recession in the late 1920s 
that was unrelated to the world-wide depression that occurred after 
1929. Chapter Two surveys the major Queensland political events 
of the twenties that were to remain relevant for the depression 
period and argues that the Australian Labor Party lost the 1929 
State election not because of internal disharmony but because of 
the condition of the State's economy-
In Chapter Three an assessment is provided of the Coxintry 
Progressive National Party Government, led by Arthur Moore, that 
was elected in 1929. The pxirpose of the chapter is to show how the 
policies and performance of the Moore administration assisted the 
re-unification of the Labor party. The details of Labor's 
reconstruction are outlined and explained in Chapter Four. Perhaps 
the most distinctive feature of the majority of State branches of the 
ALP in the 1930s was intensive and debi litating factionalism. 
Chapter Five explains why Queensland did not share this experience 
and shows how the ALP coped successfully with the challenges of 
rival groups such as Lang Labor, Douglas Credit, the Communist 
Party of Australia and tlie Protestant Labour Party. Cliapter Six 
examines the impact of the depression on the internal affairs of 
a selection of Queensland trade unions. It argues that the 
depression weakened the unions but did not alter substantially 
either their ideology or their organisational structures. 
Chapter Seven argues that the defeat of the trade unions in two 
major strikes early in the depression oriented nost of the members 
of the industrial Labor movement towards working for the re-election 
of a Labor Government in 1932. 
Section Two of the thesis contains Chapters Eight to Eleven and 
concentrates on the issue of unemployment. In Chapter Eight the 
ameliorative measures that both the CPNP and Labor Governments 
devised to provide relief for those out of work are examined. 
Chapter Nine attempts to assess the effectiveness of the Forgan Smith 
Government's expansion of the public works programme after 1932 and 
investigates why the Labor Government was so keen to seek rural 
solutions to the problem of imemployment. Chapter Ten details the 
failure of the trade unions to develop effective policies to cope 
with unemployment among their members. The chapter also includes 
an examination of relations between the rinions and the newly-
established organisations of unemployed. Chapter Eleven continues 
this theme and details the structure, behaviour and political 
affiliations of the unemployed groups. It argues that only a 
minority of the unemployed joined such bodies and that they were 
relatively non-violent in their methods and generally unsuccessful 
in the pursuit of their objectives. 
The thesis concludes with a brief examination of the notion of a 
'depression generation' and assesses the impact of the economic crisis 
on the electoral behaviour of Queenslanders and the consequent effect 
on the political party system. 
TABLE OF CONTENIS 
Acknowledgements, "^ ^ • 
Abbreviations. vii. 
Introduction, x, 
SECTION ONE 
1 The Queensland Economy. 1. 
2 Dissension and Defeat: Queensland Labor in the 1920s, 18. 
3 The Moore Government: A Non-Labor Interregniim, 49. 
4 Labor Reconstructs, 1929-1932, 82. 
5 Dissident Labor- 107-
6 The Impact of the Depression on Queensland's Trade Unions, 136. 
7 Industrial Militancy during the Depression, 157« 
SECTION TWO 
8 Unemployment Relief Policies, 181, 
9 Public Works and Rural Values: A Solution to Unemployment? 211. 
10 Trade Union Responses to Unemployment and the Unemployed, 239« 
11 The Organised Unemployed, 262, 
12 Conclusion: The 'Depression Generation' and the 
Queensland Party System, 295, 
Appendix: Biographical Notes, 307-
Bibliography. 312. 
This thesis has not been submitted previously 
for an award at Queensland or any other 
university The primary research reported 
herein was carried out solely by the undersigned 
according to the rules and regulations of the 
University of Queensland. 
' Brian J Costar 
VI, 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S 
I am indebted to the following persons who assisted me in various 
ways in the preparation of this thesis: the librarians and staff of 
the Queensland University, Fryer, Oxley, Queensland State and La Trobe 
(Victoria) libraries; Paul Wilson and his staff of the Queensland 
State Archives; the Undersecretary of the Queensland Premier's 
Department who granted access to departmental files for the period 
1930 to I94O; Michael Sac lier and the staff of the Research School 
of Social Sciences Archives at the Australian National University; 
the late Bart Loiorigan who allowed me to examine Queensland ALP 
records; Kev Hooper MIA who permitted me to peruse the minutes of 
the Queensland Parliamentary Labor Party (Caucus) for the period 
1925 to 1940; Fred Whitby who was similarly generous with the 
records of the Queensland Trades and Labor Council and to Cecily 
Cameron who assisted me in the use of those records; the Secretaries 
of the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen, the 
Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union, the Australian Railways Union and 
the Printing and Kindred Industries Union; the Secretary of the 
Queensland Social Service League; the Administrator of St Stephen's 
Cathedral (Brisbane); the Secretary of the Anglican Diocese of 
Brisbane; and to Mick Healy, Frank Waters, Jack Read and Bill Morrow 
who granted me interviews. 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Denis Miirphy, who originally 
suggested the topic and whose extensive knowledge of the Labor 
movement and Queensland political history has been invaluable. 
Thanks are also due to Jan Fraser who drew the electoral maps, 
Barbara Hannay who prepared the graphs and especially to Joan Buzzard 
of MelboTixne who typed the thesis. 
I would like to dedicate the thesis to my grandfathers -
Frederick George Costar (I884-I962) and James Joseph Connell (I87O-
1946). 
Vll. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ABTEF Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation 
ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions 
AEHR Australian Economic History Review 
AFAL All for Australia League 
AFULE Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen 
AJPH Australian Journal of Politics and History 
ALP Australian Labor Party 
AMIEU Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union 
ANZAAS Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement 
of Science 
APWU Amalgamated Postal Workers Union 
ARTWU Australian Road Transport Workers Union 
ARU Australian Railways Union 
AWU Australian Workers Union 
CDA Catholic Daughters of Australia 
CEMS Church of England Men's Society 
CPA Commxuiist Party of Australia 
CPD Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 
CPNP Coimtry Progressive National Party 
CPP Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 
CRL Civic Reform League 
ER Economic Record 
ETU Electrical Trades Union 
FCA Federated Coopers Association 
FML Fryer Memorial Library 
HSANZ Historical Studies of Australia and New Zealand 
ILR International Labour Review 
IWW Industrial Workers of the World 
JRAHS Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 
LH LaboTir H i s t o r y 
MMM Militant Minority Movement 
OBU One Big Union 
OML Oxley Memorial Library 
PIEU Printing Industries Employees Union 
V 1 1 1 
PWIU Pastoral Workers Industrial Inion 
QCE Queensland Central Executive of the ALP 
QCEL' Queensland Colliery Employees Union 
QGCi Queensland Government Gazette 
QPD Queensland Parliamentary Debates 
QPLP Queensland Parliamentary Labor Party 
QPP Queensland Pailiamentary Papers 
QRTEl' Queensland Railvay Transport Employees Union 
QSA Queensland State Archives 
QSSL Queensland Social Service League 
QIU Queensland Teachers' Union 
RILU Red International of labour Unions 
RSSSA .ANT Research School of Social Sciences .Archives 
Australian National University 
SSU State Service Union 
ILC Trades and Labor Council (Queensland) 
UAP United Australia Party 
UGA United Graziers Association (Queensland) 
L^'NI Unemployed Workers Movement 
W\vT Waterside Workers Federation 
INTRODUCTION 
XI, 
This thesis is a political study of the impact of the great 
depression on Queensland. Its central arguments are two: that the 
medium and longterm effects of the depression on Australia and 
Queensland have been exaggerated; and that, in important respects, 
Queensland's response to the depression was different from that in 
other States, notably New South Wales and Victoria. The primary 
emphasis of the thesis is on what can broadly be defined as the 
Labor movement, that is, those organisations that belonged to a 
political/industrial movement which was oriented towards the 
preservation and advancement of the interests of employed and 
unemployed workers. 
Historians generally have been unable to resist the temptation 
to exaggerate the medium and longterm consequences of the economic 
depression of the 1930s. A recent study of unemployment in Adelaide 
during the depression concludes with the statement that: 
The depression clearly had a discernible longterm 
effect on the later lives of those who were 
unemployed. However, its impact extended to the 
entire working class. .The depression profoundly 
influenced the consciousness and behaviour of a 
whole generation of Australian workers. There 
can be no doubt that the experience of the 
depression generation will remain a significant 
influence on the future development of Australian 
society, (l) 
• Broomhill has placed himself firmly within the consensus of 
depression historiography which has chosen to liken the economic 
crisis to one of the Biblical plagues of Egypt. Arnold Toynbee 
set the tone for much future writing on the depression when, in 
1932, he drew a parallel between the economic collapse and the 
(o) 
break-up of the Roman Empire. He commented that: 
1. Ray Broomhill, Unemployed Workers:A Social History of the Great 
Depression in Adelaide, Brisbane, 1979, p 184. 
2. Arnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1931-32, 
Oxford, 1932, pp 5 and I6. 
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In 1931, the members of this great and ancient 
and hitherto triumphant society were asking 
themselves whether the secular process of 
Western life and growth might conceivably be 
coming to an end in their day. (3) 
Australian historians have been prominent amongst those who have 
argued that the depression wrought deep and lasting changes on the 
(4) people and societies it touched.^ This interpretation has held 
particular appeal not only because Australia was one of the nations 
(5) 
most affected by the crisis but also because, according to Russell 
Ward, 'the depression made a deeper and certainly a more lasting 
impact on Australians than other people...' because the gap between 
normal living standards and those of the early thirties was so 
marked. A nagging difficulty with such theories is the paucity 
of evidence presented in their defence. David Potts has taken 
Ray Broomhill to task for his conclusion that the depression has had, 
and will continue to have, extensive influence on the pattern of 
Australian life. Potts' comment that 'it (Broomhill's conclusion) 
(7) goes well beyond any evidence or even discussion in the main text,...' 
can be applied to much of the writing about the depression in Australia. 
The following analysis of the depression in one Australian State 
provides few data to support the view that the economic collapse pro-
duced major longterm political, economic or social changes in Queensland. 
Before proceeding to analyse the Queensland data it is necessary 
to make some comment on why historians have been so eager to credit 
3. ibid., p 1. 
4. For example: LJ Louis and Ian Turner (eds), The Depression of the 
1930s, Melbourne, I968, pp 1 and 5-6; H Anderson, Australia in 
the Depression, Melbourne, 1972, p 8; Russell Ward, A Nation for 
a Continent: The History of Australia, 1901-1975, Melbourne, 1977, 
p 165; R Mendelsohn, The Condition of the People:SociaI Welfare 
in Australia, 1900-1975. Sydney, 1979, p 100; LJ Louis, Trade 
Unions in the Depression, Canberra, I968, p vi; R Gollan, 'Some 
Consequences of the Depression', Labour History, 17, November, 
1970, p 182f. 
5. CB Schedvin, 'The Long and Short of Depression Origins', 
Labour History, 17, November 1970, p 3. 
6. Russell Ward, op.cit., p 165. 
7. David Potts, 'Unemployed Workers in Adelaide:Assessing the Impact 
of the 1930s Depression', HSANZ, 19;74, April, 1980, p I3I. 
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the depression with producing such sweeping effects. In his essay 
on the economic consequences of the depression in the United Kingdom 
HW Richardson provides a clue when he observes that: 
To regard the post-1929 depression as a key turning 
point in the development of the British economy is in 
keeping with the historian's innate preference for 
sudden and dramatic changes. But drama and economic 
significance are not identical. (8) 
It is not surprising that the most severe economic crisis of modern 
times encouraged historians to interpret subsequent developments as 
depression consequences. Changes were highlighted, and often 
exaggerated, while the underlying continuity of events tended to be 
overlooked. 
The great depression was not an economic watershed as far as 
Queensland was concerned. Its most important contribution was to 
intensify ruralist trends that were in evidence before 1929. 
Economic historians are agreed that for Australia as a whole the 
depression had the effect of encouraging the development of 
manufacturing industry. Manufacturing production rose forty 
percent in the period 1929 to 1937, and by 1938/9 accounted for 
(9) forty-two percent of the total value of Australian production. 
This growth was stimulated by a number of factors including currency 
depreciation, tariff reductions, cheaper Australian coal and, as 
Schedvin explains, because the level of imports fell more heavily 
than did national expenditure. For reasons outlined in 
Chapter 9, Queensland did not participate in this expansion which 
was centred in New South Wales and Victoria and, to a lesser extent, 
in South Australia. Over the period 1933 to 1947 the percentage of 
the Australian workforce directly employed in primary industry fell 
by thirty percent, while the decline for Queensland was only 
8. HW Richardson, 'The Economic Significance of the Depression in 
Britain, Journal of Contemporary History, 4;4, October 1969,p 19. 
9. AGL Shaw, Economic Development of Australia, 5th ed , Melbourne, 
1966, p 155. 
10. CB Scjiedvin, Aus t r a l i a and the Great Depression, Sydney, 1970,p372 
XIV. 
twenty percent. Because of the depression, manufacturing became an 
important component in the South Australian economy and in Western 
Australia gold mining replaced wheat as the leading sector in the 
(ll) 
economy. No such changes occurred in Queensland where added faith 
and resources were placed in the State's pastoral and agricultural 
industries. In fact the nimiber of workers employed in manufacturing 
industry declined by nine percent over the decade 1925 to 1935. One 
effect of this intensified reliance on primary industry was to confirm 
Queensland as one of the poorest States in the federation. 
Similarly, the depression did not produce major changes in the 
political fabric of Queensland. The machinery of Government was 
virtually untouched by the course of economic events. Secessionist 
moves that were mooted in 1931 failed to attract anything like the 
support engendered in Western Australia. Attempts by the Moore 
Government to reintroduce the Legislative Council and to extend the 
life of the parliament to five years were unsuccessful. Queensland 
in the 1930s witnessed nothing akin to the proliferation of 
ministries, agencies and departments that characterised the New Deal 
in the United States. The only major administrative innovation 
occurred in 1932 when the Bureau of Economics and Statistics was 
re-structured as the Bureau of Industry. This was followed in 1938 
by the establishment of the Co-ordinator General's Department which 
was designed to assist the Bureau in the regulation of the public 
works programme. At the Commonwealth level and in the States of 
New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia the 1930s was a decade 
of disaster for the Australian Labor Party. The opposite was the 
case for the party in Queensland because it was fortunate to be out 
of office during the worst years of the depression. This aided the 
party electorally and organisationally because it was relieved of the 
responsibility of having to take unpopular economic decisions, 
particularly in relation to the Premiers' Plan, that proved so 
divisive for the labor movement in some other States. The extra-
parliamentary labor movement became convinced of the need to re-elect 
11. G Snooks, Depression and Recovery in Western Australia, Perth, 
1974, p 6. 
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the ALP at the State election of 1932 because of the anti-union 
activities of the Moore Government, and because the unions' defeat 
in two strikes that occurred in 1930 and 1931 illustrated the 
futility of industrial militancy under depression conditions. 
Labor nevertheless had to contend with challenges from the 
Communist party, Lang Labor, Social Credit and the Protestant Labour 
party. While the number of adversaries was formidable their long-
term impact was minimal, with the result that Labor emerged from the 
worst years of the depression organisationally strong and electorally 
successful. The most important internal effect of the depression on 
the ALP was to consolidate the authority of the Australian Workers 
Union. The strength of the AWU provided the stability upon which 
William Forgan Smith was able to base his successful premiership. 
Ideologically the ALP altered little because of the depression and 
the Forgan Smith Governments were cautious restorers rather than 
innovative reformers. When questioned on the topic, Frank Waters, 
the member for Kelvin Grove from 1932 to 1938 and later secretary 
of the Amalgamated Postal Workers Union, who was, admittedly, no 
admirer of Forgan Smith, said that 'it's pretty hard in retrospect to 
(12) 
measure any outstanding event or characteristic of the Government'. 
Labor cabinets after 1932 were keen to return Queensland to a state 
of pre-depression normalcy by reducing unemplo5Tnent through public 
works and by restoring the industrial conditions that had been eroded 
during the Moore period. Labor's vision of the preferred future for 
Queensland had been formulated during its fourteen years in Government 
before 1929. This vision was essentially a ruralist one and it was 
confirmed by the experience of the depression. 
While the depression and immediate post-depression years were 
ones of consolidation and growth for Labor, the opposite was true for 
Queensland's conservative parties. In 1929 the future looked bright 
for the non-Labor parties. The Country Progressive National Party, 
which had been formed in 1925, had just won a convincing electoral 
12. Interview with Frank Waters, 17 June, 1975, Transcript, p 6. 
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victory over a divided and dispirited Labor party. The onset of the 
depression was to cut short the hegemony of the CPNP. Moore's 
defeat in 1932 allowed Labor to claim credit for leading the State 
out of the depression; a fact that was revealed in 1935 when the 
Government was confirmed in office by an electoral victory that 
crushed the Opposition. CPNP representation was slashed to sixteen 
members in a parliament of sixty-two. This defeat activated the 
centripetal forces that were a constant feature of non-Labor politics 
(13) in Queensland,^ '^  and in 1936 the CPNP was dissolved. Moore lost 
his position as Opposition leader and Queensland party politics 
reverted to its pre-1925 alignment of a Labor party opposed by 
independent country and urban anti-Labor groupings. Another feature 
of Queensland electoral politics after 1935 was the regular appearance 
of a large number of minor party candidates and independents. The 
division of the non-Labor forces was to persist until the coalition 
agreement of 1957, and, of course, contributed to the quarter century 
of unbroken Labor rule. 
Outside parliament the trade unions were the political organisa-
tions which bore the brunt of the economic collapse. What is 
perhaps surprising is how little the depression altered the essential 
fabric of the Australian and Queensland trade union movements. 
Les Louis, in his study of Victorian tmions, has argued that 'it 
would be difficult to overestimate the significance of the depression 
(14) for the Australian labour movement,...' Yet, beyond the rather 
vague assertion that 'the Communist party was to become a real force 
(15) in trade union life', he provides scant evidence to validate this 
judgment. The vast majority of Queensland unions and unionists 
refused to endorse or follow the CPA's industrial or political 
programme in the 1930s and the dominant ideological complexion of 
the movement remained a rather mild form of democratic socialism. 
13. BJ Costar, 'Arthur Edward Moore:Odd Man In', in Miirphy, DJ and 
Joyce, RB, (eds ), Queensland Political Portraits, Brisbane, 
1978, pp 378f. 
14. Louis, op.cit., p viii. 
15. ibid. 
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Louis' broader statement about the impact of the great depression on 
the union movement is also difficult to accept. The effect of the 
economic collapse on the unions was, in the shortterm, dramatic - the 
rapid decline in membership and the low level of industrial action 
have been well documented - but there is little evidence of, for 
example, longterm structural change within the union movement. 
Peak councils, such as the Queensland Trades and Labor Council 
(TLC), were weakened by forced disaffiliations and the cause of union 
federalism was similarly retarded. Yet, these were temporary 
impediments and the growth in employment after 1932 brought with it 
a recovery of union membership and strength. By 1936 Queensland's 
trade unions had surpassed their pre-depression membership figures. 
Depression conditions did nothing to encourage moves towards union 
amalgamation and there were as many unions in Queensland after as 
before the economic crisis. The pattern of inter-union politics 
in Queensland was also little affected by the depression. Multi-
unionism continued to produce industrial and political hostilities 
and the Australian Railways Union (ARU), though much weakened since 
the mid-1920s, maintained its warring relationship with the 
Australian Workers Union (AWU). The latter, however, remained the 
dominant industrial organisation in the State. AWU hegemony was 
confirmed and expanded by the direction taken by the Queensland 
economy after 1932. Had primary industry been displaced by an 
expanded secondary industry sector this would perhaps have produced 
manufacturing industry unions sufficient in strength to rival the 
AWU on both the political and industrial fronts. 
As far as the internal structures of individual unions were 
concerned, Tom Sheridan's assessment of the Australian Engineering 
Union (AEU) is applicable to Queensland unions as a whole: 
Although the depression imposed unparalleled 
hardship on engineers its impact on the internal 
politics and machinery of the AEU were relatively 
slight. (l6) 
16. T Sheridan, Mindful Militants:The Amalgamated Engineering Union 
m Australia, 1920-1972. Cambridge, 1975, p 115-
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Depression conditions were not productive of organisational 
innovations within individual unions; simple survival was a more 
pressing objective. The Australian and Queensland experiences were 
somewhat different from that in the United States where, because of 
New Deal initiatives and the passage of the Wagner Act, the 1930s 
was a decade of major growth and development for the trade unions. 
Union membership in the USA rose 181 percent between 1932 and 1940 
and in 1935 a major new organisation, the Congress of Industrial 
Organisations, was formed in competition with the more conservative 
American Federation of Labor. 
Extensive unemployment, especially among unskilled and semi-
skilled workers, was the most distinctive feature of the depression 
years. The assumed effects of this unprecedented unemplo3Tnent are 
at the base of most generalisations about both the impact and longterm 
consequences of the depression. 
The unemployed did not become the instrument of major social or 
political changes in either Australia or Queensland during the great 
depression. Many contemporaries believed that the experience of 
widespread unemployment would lead inexorably to violence, social 
disorder and even revolution. For example, the insurance firm of 
Lloyds' of London reported that during the winter of 1930/31 they 
sold an unusually large amount of riot and civil commotion cover to 
(17) 
American clients. Such fears were unfounded and prolonged 
unemployment produced apathy and feelings of powerlessness rather 
(l8) than political militancy amongst its victims. Very few of those 
out of work chose to join unemployed unions or associations and these 
were consequently fragile and ineffective. Political demonstrations 
of unemployed workers occurred in Queensland as in other States but 
these were neither as frequent nor as well attended as some have 
assumed. Ocassionally these protests would lead to violence, such as 
the 'Cairns Riot' of 1932 (See Chapter 11), but widespread disorder 
was rare. 
17. D Wecter, The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941, New York, 
1948, p 16. 
18. SW Ginsburg, 'What Unemployment Does to People', American Journal 
of Psychiatry, 1942, p 439f 
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Frances Piven and Richard Cloward^ ' have argued that in the 
United States the authorities instituted relief work measures as a 
method of forestalling mass protest movements by the unemployed. 
Other studies suggest that if this was the case then it was 
probably unnecessary because the boredom that worklessness induced 
was itself sufficient to sap the political energies of the majority 
of the chronically unemployed. I Queensland was unique among the 
Australian States in that it operated an unemployment relief scheme 
prior to the onset of the depression. This took the form of an 
unemployment insurance system that had been established in 1922. 
Its intended purpose was to alleviate the effects of short-term 
seasonal unemployment mainly among shearers and sugar workers, and 
it proved incapable of dealing with depression level unemployment. 
When the inadequacies of the system became apparent in 1930 the 
Moore Government introduced an income tax based unemployment relief 
fund to finance intermittent relief work. Those who could not work 
or for whom work was not available were eligible to receive ration 
coupons. Dole payments were never a feature of Queensland's 
unemployment relief programme because both the CPNP and ALP 
Governments had economic and moral objections to giving cash handouts 
to the unemployed. When it returned to office in 1932, the Labor 
party continued Moore's relief scheme with only minor amendments. 
In contrast with most other States, however, the Queensland Labor 
Government promoted an extensive programme of public works to provide 
permanent, full-time jobs for the unemployed. This policy was a 
qualified success and in 1938 Queensland was one of the first States 
to be in a position to abolish its special unemployment relief 
schemes. 
One effect of the prolonged unemployment of the depression was to 
drive a wedge between those out of work and those who managed to 
(21) 
retain their jobs. This occurred at both the personal and 
organisational levels. With only a few notable exceptions, relations 
19. FF Piven and RA Cloward, Regulating the Poor, New York, 1971, 
Chapter 1. 
20. See Chapter 8. 
21. Wecter, op.cit., p 30; Broomhill, op.cit., p 57-
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between the unemployed organisations and Queensland's trade unions 
were spasmodic and often hostile. On an ideological level many 
moderate trade union officials disapproved of the militant, often 
Communist, leadership and tactics of the unemployed groups. Also 
during the depression most unions were preoccupied with their own 
financial plight and were unable to devote the time, energy and 
resources that were required to organise the unemployed. Consequently 
there was little political or industrial co-operation between employed 
and unemployed unionists in Queensland during the 1930s. 
The depression, then, did not promote major social or economic 
changes in Queensland. In the political sphere there did occur 
important but relatively unspectacular developments. The chief among 
these was the restoration of the ALP to a position of parliamentary 
dominance. Labor itself was transformed little by the depression: 
admittedly the militants were routed and the moderating influence of 
the AWU was confirmed but evidence of both phenomena can be found in 
the history of the late twenties. The Labor party dominated 
Queensland politics for a quarter of a century after 1932 partly 
because the experience of the depression prevented the CPNP from 
capitalising on its 1929 electoral gains. Chance played a part 
here, for had Labor won in 1929 it is likely that the party would 
have suffered the fate of the New South Wales, Victorian, South 
Australian and Federal branches; all of which were to spend many 
years in the political wilderness as punishment for the misfortune 
of having to govern during a period of acute economic dislocation. 
SECTION ONE 
CHAPTER 1 
THE QUEENSLAND ECONOMY 
Queensland's economy suffered less from the great depression than 
did those of the other Australian States. One group of economists 
has explained this phenomenon in the following terms: 
Its (Queensland's) unemployment level was lower 
because the manufacturing sector was relatively 
small, because it had not had the same expansion 
of public works and buildings as other States in 
the 1920's and because the Labour Government 
(which was elected in June 1932) refused to 
follow the deflationary Premier's Plan fully, (l) 
To this list must be added the important role played by the sugar 
industry in shielding the State from the full impact of the 
depression. Concentration on the 1930s as the depression decade, 
however, has obscured the fact that Queensland experienced a severe 
recession during the years I926 to 1929. The Australian economy as 
a whole underwent an economic downturn in 1927/8, but this was of 
short duration and was relatively mild compared with the recession 
(2) in Queensland which was both prolonged and intense. The primary 
deflationary impulse of this recession was drought which produced a 
severe downturn in the pastoral industry. The State's economy 
rallied in early I929 and did not feel the full blast of the world-
wide depression until the third quarter of 1930. 
The economy of Queensland in the 1920s and 1930s was particularly 
vulnerable to climatic variations because it was the most rurally 
oriented of the mainland States. Primary industries, particularly 
wool, sugar and cattle, were the leading sector of the local economy. 
The development of secondary industries, in contrast, had failed to 
keep pace with the other States. 
In the census year of 1933 Queensland was the least metropolit-
anised of the States with only 31.6 percent of its population residing 
1. Marion Gough et al, Queensland:Industrial Enigma, Melbourne, 1964, 
p 10. 
2. EA Boehm, 'Australia's Economic Depression of the 1930s', 
Economic Record, December, 1973, p 613. 
3. 
in Brisbane. It had, on the other hand, the largest percentage of 
its workforce engaged in primary industries, 32.5 percent compared 
(3) 
with a national average of 24.1 percent. 
The reasons for the predominance of the rural sector in the 
Queensland economy can be summarised as follows : the State's 
industrial sector was retarded initially by the late establishment 
of the colony; this was aggravated by the State's small population, 
the decentralised settlement pattern and the geographic location of 
the State capital. Government policy, particularly after 1915, 
reflected a ruralistic bias and gave a low priority to the 
(4) 
encouragement of manufacturing. During the 1880s there was an 
upsurge of secondary and tertiary industries as a result of the 
linkage effects of the primary sector Queensland manufacturing 
industries suffered a severe setback as a consequence of the 1890s 
depression and the federation of the colonies in I9OI. The latter 
probably had the more devastating effect because it exposed Queens-
land's manufacturers to competition from the better established 
producers of New South Wales and Victoria who benefit ed from the 
free trade provisions of Section 92 of the Federal Constitution and 
(5) 
a protective Commonwealth tariff. 
Queensland became a market for southern produced goods and 
indigenous secondary industry was concentrated in food processing. 
As a consequence CA Bernays, the early chronicler of Queensland's 
history, was able to write in 1920: 'our manufacturing industries 
are well nigh beneath contempt.' 
3. Gough, op.cit., p 24; Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
1933, Parts I, II and III. 
4. JR Laverty, 'The Queensland Economy, I860 to 1915', in DJ Murphy 
et al (eds.). Prelude to Power:The Rise of the Labour Party in 
Queensland, I885-I915, Brisbane, 1970, p 32; KW Wiltshire, 
'Portuguese Navy':The Establisliment of the Queensland Department 
of Industrial Development, Brisbane, 1973, pp 6-9. 
5. H Hughes, Federation and Industrial Development, ANZASS, 1964, 
pp 18-20. 
6. CA Bernays, Queensland Politics during Sixty (I859-I919) Years, 
Brisbane, 1920, p 383. 
TABLE 1:1 
Year 
Numbers Engaged in Factories per Thousand 
by States, 1901-1939-
N.S.W. Vic. Qld. S.A. W.A. 
of Population 
Tas. Aust. 
1901 
1911 
1921 
1929 
1939 
Source: 
49 
65 
69 
73 
84 
H Hughes 
56 
85 
89 
88 
108 
53 
61 
56 
48 
57 
: Federation and 
54 
68 
62 
63 
74 
Industr 
68 
55 
53 
50 
53 
ial 
43 
54 
48 
%S 
60 
Development, 
52 
69 
71 
70 
82 
ANZA; 
1964, p 18, table iii. 
Table 1:1 shows that during the next decade there was a further 
decline in factory employment. In common with the United States of 
America, Australian economic growth in the twenties was based largely 
on secondary industries and Queensland failed to share fully in the 
resultant prosperity because of its underdeveloped industrial 
sector. Helen Hughes argues that the stagnation of manufacturing 
industry contributed to the progressive impoverishment of Queensland 
and that by the late 1920s it was one of the poorest States in the 
(8) Commonwealth. Table 1:2 shows that real income per head of 
population was below that of the Australian average in the late 1920s! 
Year ending 
30 June 
Australia 
Queensland 
Source: Economic 
TABLE 1:2 
Real Income Per Head 
1927 1928 1929 
106 104 101 
90 96 90 
News,9 Jiuie 1932, p 10. 
1930 
86 
87 
1931 
78 
82 
1932 
78 
81 
7. G Lewis, The Ports of Queensland 1859-1939:A Study in Economic 
Nationalism, Ph D, Queensland, 1971, p 470. 
8. H Hughes, 'Federalism and Industrial Development in Australia', 
AJPH, 10;3, 1964, p 332. 
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The Queensland Bureau of Economics and Statistics explained that this 
occurred because New South Wales and Victoria had 'a larger proportion 
of the higher incomes from centrally controlled business and invest-
(9) 
ments.' This phenomenon is partly reflected in the fact that 
while Queensland had one of the lowest taxable capacities of all the 
States during the twenties, its actual rate of State taxation was the 
highest in the Commonwealth. LF Giblin calculated that in 1928/9 
the severity of taxation index number for Queensland was l64 compared 
with 96 for New South Wales and 69 for Victoria. These high 
levels of taxation were a further disincentive to the establishment 
of secondary industries in Queensland, a complaint regularly made by 
(11) the non-Labor Opposition. 
The relative weakness of secondary industry, however, produced 
an accidental benefit for Queensland when the great depression struck. 
Table 1:2 indicates that real income per head was maintained at a 
higher level than for the nation as a whole. Unemployment rates 
reveal a similar picture: 
TABLE 1:3 
Percentage of Registered Trade Union Members Unemployed 
1929-1937 
State 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 
NSW 11.5 21.7 30.8 32.5 28.9 24.7 20.6 15.4 10.9 
Vic 11.1 18.3 25.8 26.5 22.3 17.4 14.0 10.7 9.0 
Queensland 7.1 10.7 I6.I 18.8 15.3 11.7 8.7 7.8 7-3 
SA 15.7 23.3 32.5 34.0 29.9 25.6 17.6 
WA 9.9 19.2 27.3 29.5 24.8 17.8 13.4 
Tas 13.9 19-1 27.4 26.4 17.1 17.9 15-9 
Australia 11.1 I9.3 27.4 29.0 25.1 20.5 I6.5 12.2 9.3 
Source: Commonwealth Year Books, and Queensland Year Book, 2, 1938. 
10.8 
8 .1 
12.7 
8.2 
5.6 
9-8 
9- Economic News, 9 June, 1932, p 14. 
10. LF Giblin, 'A Note on Taxable Capacity', Economic Record, 5;9, 
1929, p 345. 
11. ^PD, clxv, 25 September, 1925, p 730. 
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The lower incidence of unemployment in Queensland during the great 
depression is partly explained by the fact that the State had a 
relatively low percentage of its workforce engaged in manufacturing 
industry. An analysis of the 1933 census returns shows that unem-
ployment was highest in that sector termed Industrial, which 
accounted for 52 percent of all breadwinners unemployed. Unemployment 
was relatively light in the Agricultural, Dairying and Pastoral 
(12) 
sector which accounted for only 7-4 percent of those out of work. 
The secondary industries of Victoria and New South Wales, which 
together accounted for approximately 75 percent of Australia's total 
(13) factory employment, were hard hit by the credit contraction that 
accompanied the depression and unemployment was correspondingly 
higher in those States. 
While Queensland may have suffered less from the depression of 
the 1930s than the other States, it experienced its own 'mini-
depression' in the late twenties. The major cause of Queensland's 
premature depression was a decline in the condition of the pastoral 
industry which was precipitated by a severe drought. Drought 
conditions prevailed in wide areas of the northern and western regions 
of the State throughout 1926, 1927, 1928 and the early months of 
(14) 1929. The pastoral industry bore the brunt of the drought, and 
sheep and cattle numbers dropped alarmingly- The value of wool 
exports, Queensland's major export earner, declined from £12.9ni in 
1925/6 to £8.5m in 1926/7 as a result of lack of rainfall in the wool 
(15) growing areas. When the drought finally lifted in late 1928 the 
wool industry was faced with a drop in export prices which retarded 
recovery. The strong linkage effects of the pastoral industry 
brought about a decline in economic activity not only in the country 
areas but also in the coastal ports whose viability rested on the 
economic well-being of their hinterland. For instance, value of new 
12. Census, 1933, Part xxvi, Unemployment, Tables 25 and 26. 
13. C Forster, Industrial Development in Australia, 1920-30, 
Canberra, 1964, p 8. 
14. See the Governor's speech to Parliament, QPD, cxlvii, 28 July, 
1926, p 5; CXLIX 14 August, 1927, p 2; and Department of Agricul-
tural and Stock Reports, ^ PP* ^ 2, 1926, pp 401 and 409; V 2,1927; 
V 2 1928, p 295; and V 2 1929, p 581; AWU Annual Delegates 
Meeting, Western District Report, Brisbane, January, 1928, p I7. 
15. Queensland Year Book, 2, 1938. 
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buildings approved in the Brisbane metropolitan area declined from 
£18m in 1926 to £9.5m in 1929. This fall off in economic activity 
in such key industries led to an increase in unemployment. While 
recorded unemployment in Queensland was generally lower than the 
national average during the 1920s, it reached 8.4 percent of 
registered trade unionists unemployed in 1926 and increased from 
6.4 percent in the last quarter of 1928 to 7.6 percent by May 1929. 
The national increase for tie same period was only 0.1 percent; from 
9.9 percent to 10 percent. The drought also placed pressure on 
the public finances of the State. The Treasurer had to cope with 
unanticipated deficits in 1925/6 and 1926/7 partly because of lost 
railway revenue occasioned by the weakened condition of the pastoral 
industry. 
Because of local climatic conditions, Queensland diverged from 
the trend of the national economy after 1926. The State actually 
experienced an economic recovery in 1929 and did not feel the full 
(17) impact of the depression until the third quarter of 1930. The 
recession of the late 1920s revealed the extent to which the well-
being of Queensland depended on her primary industries. Rural 
industry accounted for 60 percent of the State's net value of 
production in 1929, whereas manufacturing accounted for only 30 
(18) percent. Wool, beef and dairy cattle, and sugar were the leading 
sectors of the economy. Minerals were relatively unimportant in the 
1920s as was wheat. The Australian wheat industry was a major 
casualty of the depression and Queensland was fortunate that it was 
a wheat importer rather than an exporter in the twenties and thirties. 
Wheat was a slow growth industry in Queensland because most of the 
best land on the western Darling Downs remained tied up in pastoral 
leases until the second world war- It remained a slow growth 
industry because of transport difficulties not being solved until 
road haulage became common; and because the wet Queensland summers 
(19) 
caused initial problems with grain germination. 
16. Labour Report, 20, 1929, p 3. 
17 Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, Queensland Letter, 
54;12, 21 November, 1930. 
18. Wiltshire, op.cit., Appendix 0. 
19. Information received from Mr. I Mclntyre, wheat grower of 
Jondaryn. 
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Successive Labor Governments after 1915 were committed to 
developing Queensland as a rural rather than as an industrial economy. 
Yet those Governments were committed to agricultural rather than 
pastoral development. Closer settlement was the declared policy of 
the Government and it was summed up by the Premier, EG Theodore in 
1922 when he said that: 'Agricultural development alone can bring 
about closer settlement on which the safety and wellbeing of 
Australia must depend.' Such a view was at odds with the wool 
growers who operated in a high capital industry which required the 
use of large tracts of grazing land. Labor possessed ideological 
objections to 'squatterdom' and woolgrowers were encouraged to break 
up their large estates by the impositions of a supertax on freehold 
(21) land. The British Economic Mission that visited Australia in 
1928 was particularly critical of the Government's closer settlement 
policies as they applied to the wool industry. The Mission argued 
(22) that small holdings were uneconomical and produced inferior wool. 
Surprisingly the Premier, William McCormack, had admitted many of 
these objections in a speech to the parliament in 1927 ' 
If we were only considering the wool industry, 
a good case could be made for the keeping of the 
big areas for the more profitable working of the 
industry - I do not deny that. In that respect, 
the State loses by closer settlement. It could 
be worked more profitably as a big sheep undertaking 
than it can by small selectors. But would anybody 
tell me that progress lies in that direction?-
We have a duty to the country - a duty to all 
sections of the public, who tell us they are 
willing and anxious to develop that land in 
smaller areas; and the duty of a Government is 
to give them the opportunity. (23) 
20. Quoted in D Blackmur, The Primary Industries of Queensland, 
1919-29, unpublished B Econ Queensland, I965, p 2. 
21. ibid., p 88. 
22. Report of British Economic Mission, CPP, 2, 1929, Appendix E, 
PP 35-6. 
23. QPD, cl, 2 December, 1927, p 1515. 
9. 
In its 1938 report, the Commonwealth Grants Commission argued 
that it was 'the varied character of Queensland's primary production' 
(24) 
that protected it from the worst ravages of the depression. Just 
as important, however, was the special position occupied by the 
State's premier agricultural product - sugar. The sugar industry 
was in a privileged position vis-a-vis other Australian primary 
products. Ninety-five percent of Australia's sugar was produced 
in Queensland; the industry was protected by a total embargo on 
foreign sugar; the bulk of the sugar produced was consumed within 
Australia at a price set by Government regulation; and the sugar 
that was exported, most of which went to the United Kingdom, 
benefitted from a Commonwealth preference agreement. Because of 
these factors the sugar industry remained stable during the worst 
years of the depression and thereby buttressed the Queensland economy. 
A major reason for the strength of sugar in the 1920s and 1930s 
was the high degree of Government regulation within the industry. 
In 1923 the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments concluded what 
was to become known as the Sugar Agreement. Under the scheme the 
import of foreign sugar was prohibited and the Queensland Government 
was to acquire all sugar produced and to distribute it at an agreed 
fixed price through two companies, Colonial Sugar Refining Ltd , and 
the Millaquin Sugar Company. In announcing the agreement the Prime 
Minister, SM Bruce, explained that a viable sugar industry in north 
Queensland was essential for defence reasons and to preserve 'our 
(25) 
cherished White Australia Policy' Bruce also argued that it 
was in the interests of the consumer to establish a stable industry 
so that Australia would not have to purchase expensive foreign 
(26) 
sugar The industry took full advantage of its protected 
environment and the twenties was a decade of sustained growth 
during which sugar became a leading sector in the Queensland economy. 
Raw sugar accounted for 25 percent of the State's total income in the 
period 1925 to 1930 and in 1931 constituted almost 70 percent of 
24. Commonwealth Grants Commission, Fifth Report, 1938, p 30. 
25. CPp (HR), 5 July, 1923, p 729. 
26. ibid., pp 730-1. 
10. 
(o7) 
Queensland's total interstate exports.^ In 1930 the industry 
employed 28,000 men in the fields plus a further 7,000 in the mills 
and refineries. The annual wages bill was approximately £7m. The 
industry had very strong income multiplier effects and it was 
estimated that in 1930 it employed directly and indirectly approx-
imately 100,000 workers, which, represented 25 percent of the State's 
+ + 1 ^ f (28) 
total workforce. 
Because it was subject to such strict and comprehensive 
Government regulation, sugar managed to escape the fate that befell 
the wool, wheat and beef industries that were so \'tilnerable to 
international price fluctuations. Table 1:4 indicates that the sugar 
industry managed to weather the worst years of the depression 
relatively unscathed. It managed to achieve this however, only by 
successfully defending its privileged position against a number of 
challenges. 
TABLE 1:4 
Sugar - Net Return, etc., for Crop, Australia 
Year Percentage Net value Average Price Estimated 
exported of exports per ton for total value 
per ton whole crop of crop 
1928/29 
1929/30 
1930/31 
1931/32 
1932/33 
Source: 
% 
35-70 
37-71 
39.23 
49.84 
36.80 
Commonwealth 
£ s 
10 10 
9 17 
8 5 
9 7 
8 5 
Year Bo 
d 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9 
ok. 
£ s d 
20 17 11 
20 8 2 
19 12 11 
18 2 11 
18 17 9 
26, 1933 p 597-
£ 
11,002,000 
10,713,000 
10,196,500 
10,687,000 
10,413,000 
27- Economic News, 9 June, 1932, pp 149 and 154. 
28. Notes prepared by the Land Administration Board for the 
Governor's speech to Parliament, October 1930, item 32/3279, 
PRE/A 1007; QSA. 
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Prior to the 1923 agreement, Queensland exported overseas only 
about ten percent of its annual sugar crop. However, the protection 
afforded by the embargo together with an improved yield which was 
made possible by research carried out by the Bureau of Sugar 
(29) 
Experiment Stations allowed the industry to flourish. 
Production rose from 289,272 tons in 1926/7 to a record 581,276 tons 
in 1931/32. The Australian domestic market was unable to absorb 
this increase and the surplus sugar was exported. The United Kingdom 
provided the major market and Queensland sugar was favoured by a 
British duty against sugar imported from other countries. A crisis 
arose in July 1929 when the newly elected Labour Government of 
Ramsay McDonald announced that it intended to abolish duties against 
all imported foodstuffs in order to provide cheaper food for the 
British consumer. This meant that Australian producers would be 
required to compete on an open market with the more cheaply produced 
sugar of Cuba and Java. When news of this proposal reached 
Australia it produced panic within the sugar industry. The 
Queensland Government was bombarded with telegrams and letters from 
the sugar interests warning of the dire consequences if Britain went 
ahead with the decision. Premier Arthur Moore and the leader of the 
Opposition, William Forgan Smith, sent a jointly signed telegram to 
the Prime Minister, SM Bruce, urging the Federal Government to 
(31) intercede with the United Kingdom on behalf of the industry. 
Queensland also instructed its Agent General to make contact with the 
recently defeated Premier, William McCormack, who was on vacation in 
(32) 
London, and to lobby the British Cabinet. Initial reports were 
gloomy, but the McDonald Government then reconsidered its decision, 
not because of pressure from Queensland, but because the Treasury 
argued that the Government was in no position to forego the revenue 
produced by the duty 
29. M Carter, The Sugar Industry Since 1917, BA Queensland, 1954, p 17 
30. Commonwealth Year Book, 25, 1932, p 656; Report of the Department 
of Agriculture and Stock, ^ P^P, 2, 1933, p 525. 
31- Moore and Smith to Bruce, 12 July, 1929, item 29/5274, 
PRE/A977, QSA. 
32. Queensland Agent General to Secretary of State for the Dominions, 
26 July, 1929, ibid. 
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Barely had the sugar industry emerged from the encounter when 
it had to defend itself from a serious challenge from within 
Australia. As the depression deepened, the privileged position of 
sugar came under attack from consumers, the fruit industry, and jam, 
chocolate and confectionary manufacturers. The Scullin Labor 
Government decided in 1950 to set up a Royal Commission to inquire 
into the industry. While the Commission sat, a vigorous public 
debate raged between the industry and its political supporters and 
the Sugar Consumers Association which was established by the 
(33) 
Victorian Town and Country Union. The central issue at stake 
was whether the set domestic price of sugar should be reduced. When 
the Commission reported in March 1931 it was divided on this vexed 
question. A majority report recommended that the current price be 
retained for three years and the embargo for a further five years; 
the minority report urged a domestic price reduction of one farthing 
H (34) per pound. 
In April 1931 the Prime Minister announced that cabinet had 
(35) decided to accept the majority report. The debate that followed, 
however, revealed that those who demanded a cut in price were not 
placated by the Commission's findings. Senator Colebatch (National-
ist Western Australia) was the most unrestrained when he alleged in 
the Senate that 'Queensland is sucking the life blood of the other 
States' Urged on by the split decision of the 
Commission, the Sugar Consumers Association stepped up its campaign 
and organised a number of conferences to protest against the favoured 
position of the sugar industry. One such gathering was held in 
Adelaide in July 1932 and drew the following impassioned response 
from the Brisbane Courier: 
If the conference in Adelaide of black labour 
champions, free traders, economic cranks and 
political opportunists has had no other effect 
it has shown the Queensland people that unity 
on this point is essential for the preservation of 
the sugar industry. (37) 
33. CPD (S), 129, 13 May, 1931, p 1813. 
34. Reports, Sugar Inquiry Committee, CPP, 3, 1931. 
35. CPD (HR), 128, 14 April, 1931, p 751. 
36. CPD (S), 129, 13 May, 1931, p 1805. 
37 Brisbane Courier, 30 July, 1932. 
13. 
Unity, however, was not enough because the Lyons Government, 
which took office in January 1932, was not as sympathetic to the 
sugar interests as was its predecessor- After a series of confid-
ential conferences, the industry was forced to agree to a reduction 
(38) in price from four pence halfpenny per pound as from January 1933-
TABLE 1:5 
Sugar - Prices, Australia 
Date of 
Determination 
1923 to 1925 
1925 to 1931 
1931 to 1933 
January 1933 
Source: Coiranonwea Ith 
Raw Sugar 
Price 
and 
to grower 
miller 
Per Ton 
26 
26 
26 
23 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
Year Book, 26, 1933, 
Refined 
Wholesali 
pr 
Per 
37 
37 
37 
33 
P 598-
ice 
i» 
Ton 
11 
6 
6 
4 
4 
8 
8 
0 
Sugar 
Retail 
price 
Per lb. 
4 
H 
4i 
4 
In its 1934 report, the Department of Agriculture and Stock 
reflected the common Queensland opinion that the price reduction 
would be the ruination of both the industry and the economic well-
(39) being of the entire State. This proved to be alarmist and an 
underestimation of the strength of the industry. Queensland was 
fortunate that it was able to defend its staple agricultural 
product until 1953 by which time the general economic recovery had 
commenced. As a consequence, the healthy state of the sugar 
industry nursed the Queensland economy through the worst years 
of the depression. 
Boris Schedvin agrees with the ameliorative role played by sugar 
during the thirties, but he also argues that Queensland was more 
prudent in its loan expenditure in the twenties than some of the 
38. Queensland Bureau of Economics and Statistics, The Story of 
Sugar, Brisbane, 1932, p 9-
39. Report of the Department of Agriculture and Stock, QPP, 2, 1934, 
p 424. 
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other States and that the accimiulation of a £3ra surplus in the loan 
account softened the impact of the economic collapse. This 
prudence was fortuitous rather than the product of far-sighted 
economic appraisal. The drought induced recession brought about 
a slowing do\\Ti in loan expenditure after 1925/6. Railways underwent 
a spectacular period of growth in Queensland after world war one and 
were a major consumer of loan money- In 1925/6 railways accounted 
(4l) for 56 percent of the State's total gross public capital formation. 
The recession put a stop to growth in this sector as the Government 
cut expenditure in an attempt to balance the budget. Despite the 
exercise of restraint in the second half of the decade, Queensland 
generally followed the borrowing policies of the other States. 
Over the period 1922 to 1928 Queensland's public debt rose by forty 
(42) percent which was average for the country as a whole. Against 
the loan fund surplus of £3m that Schedvin speaks of, the State owed 
the Bank of England £6m in interest payments in the years 1928/9 
and 1929/30. The possible benefits derived from the loan 
surplus were mitigated by the over-cautious economic policy pursued 
by the Country Progressive National party Government which replaced 
the Labor administration in May 1929. 
To state that Queensland suffered less during the depression 
than comparable States is not to say that the economic crisis left 
Queensland untouched. A commonly used indicator of the severity of 
the depression is the level of unemployment. On the basis of the 
data presented in Table 1:3, it can be seen that Queensland's 
unemployment level in the 1930s was consistently the lowest in 
Australia. Yet the statistics presented in Table 1:3 stand in 
need of amendment. The table does not reveal the percentage of 
the workforce unemployed, merely the percentage of registered trade 
unionists out of work. There has been much debate on the question 
40. CB Schedvin, .Australia and the Great Depression, Sydney, 1970, 
p 105. 
41. NG Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign 
Borrowing, 1861-1938/9, Cambridge. 1962. Table 240. p 394. 
42. British Economic Mission, op.cit., p 5. 
43. RS Gilbert, The Australian Loan Council in Federal Fiscal 
Adjustments, I89O-I965, Canberra, 1973, p 108. 
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of whether the trade union returns are an accurate reflection of the 
real level of unemployment or whether they exaggerate or under-
estimate it. Ray Broomliill has argued that for Adelaide at least 
the trade union figures 'quite severely understated the actual level 
(44) 
of unemployment'; whereas David Potts suggests that the opposite 
(45) 
may have been the case. Potts has recently admonished those 
who, he claims, have sought to inflate unemployment rates for 
political purposes, but it is difficult to fault Colin Forster's 
observation that, for the depression years, 'the Queensland trade 
(47) 
union records do understate unemployment. 
As far as Australia as a whole was concerned, it appears that 
the trade union returns were a reasonable guide to unemployment levels 
during the depression. The 1933 Census revealed that twenty-four 
percent of wage and salary earners were out of work, compared with 
the trade union returns which showed that twenty-five percent of 
their members were unemployed in the same year. Yet it is important 
to bear in mind the warning of the Cotmnonwealth statistician in 1933 
that the accuracy of the trade union figures for the smaller States 
was poor because the scope of the returns was too narrow. In 
Queensland, for example, the statistics were compiled from information 
supplied by any forty-six of the State's 107 trade unions. 
Queensland's largest union, the AWU, was one of those who could not 
provide data to the statistician because of the physical dispersion 
of its members. This meant, of course, that unemployment in rural 
industry went largely unmeasured. 
Professor JB Brigden, who was appointed as the Queensland 
Government statistician in 1930, was also aware of the weaknesses 
inherent in the trade union method, and in 1932 he developed a 
44. Broomhill, op.cit., p llf. 
45. Potts, op.cit., p 125f. 
46. ibid., p 130. 
47. C Forster, 'Australian Unemployment, 1900-1940', m, 4l;95, 
September, I965, p 437-
48. Quoted in ibid., p 433. 
lb. 
formula for adjusting the trade union figures to account for 
'unrecorded unemployment' This formula was based on statistics 
drawn from the State Unemployment Insurance Scheme, census data and 
(49) factory reports. The Bureau of Economics and Statistics then 
produced the following revised table of unemployment levels: 
TABLE 1:6 
Percentages Corrected for Unrecorded 
Unemployment 
Aust. N.S.W. Vic. Qld. S.A. W.A. Tas. 
1929 
Recorded average 11.1 11.5 H.l 7-1 15-7 9-9 13.4 
Unrecorded 0.9 1.2 0.7 3-9 1-5 0.8 2.0 
Total 12.0 12.7 11.8 11.0 17-2 10.7 15-4 
1931 
Recorded average 27.4 30.8 25.8 l6.2 32.5 27.3 27.4 
Unrecorded 10.4 11.0 9.5 13.9 12.1 10.7 11-2 
Total 37-8 41.8 35.3 30.1 44.6 38.0 38.6 
Increase in two 
years 9-5 9-8 8.8 
Unrecorded total 25.8 29.1 23.5 
Source: Economic News, 9 June 1932, p 67. 
Brigden's figures show that in 1931 Queensland had the lowest 
rate of 'recorded' unemployment concurrent with the highest rate of 
'unrecorded' unemployment. This was probably because the trade 
union method was most reliable in predorainar .ly secondary industry 
States and was less effective in measuring unemployment in rural 
economies such as Queensland. Because it was so dominated by 
primary industry even Brigden's revised statistics failed to reveal 
fully the level of unemployment. Farmers and their families were not 
10.0 
19 .1 
10 .6 
27.4 
9-9 
27 .3 
9-2 
23 .2 
49. Economic News, 9 June, 1932, p 6O. 
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classified as unemployed unless they vacated their farms, regardless 
of their economic circumstances. Contemporary reports also suggest 
that some agricultural workers were retained in employment and were 
provided with board and lodgings but not wages. Needless to say, 
this 'underemployment' denied quantification. 
The stagnation of the Queensland economy in the late 1920s was 
to have adverse electoral consequences for the ruling Labor party. 
Labor had come to power in 1915 and governed the State continuously 
until 1929. The party won three elections in the 1920s, but in none 
of them did it achieve an absolute majority of the vote. Its success 
depended on a divided Opposition and a single-member electoral 
system that favoured the party that could win a plurality over each 
of its individual opponents. By 1929, however, the Queensland non-
Labor groups had combined as the Country Progressive National Party 
and the ALP was beset with serious factional disputes. Labor had 
been able to overcome these problems at the I926 election, but the 
serious deterioration of the local economy over the next three years 
was to prove decisive in the defeat of the Government of William 
McCormack in May 1929. 
50. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in defining 
unemployment see RA Gordon, 'Employment and Unemplojmient', 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 
vol 5, p 52f. 
CHAPTER 2 
DISSENSION AND DEFEAT: 
QUEENSLAND LABOR IN THE 1920s 
19. 
Queensland voters went to the polls on 11 May 1929 and rejected 
the Labor Government of William McCormack in favour of the Country 
Progressive National party (CPNP) led by Arthur Moore. The defeat 
came as a shock to the Labor party which had won five consecutive 
elections in Queensland since 1915. While none of its supporters 
were aware of it at the time. Labor was fortunate to lose in 1929 
because it handed the responsibility of Government to the CPNP just 
as the world-wide depression was about to descend on Australia. 
A fortunate election defeat allowed the ALP to avoid the problems 
of governing during the financial crisis and to capitalise on the 
misfortunes of the Moore Government at the 1932 election. 
The majority of contemporary observers singled out the internal 
condition of the Labor party as the major cause of the defeat of the 
McCormack Government. Sources as diverse as CA Bernavs, the 
Australian Railways Union (ARU)^ and the Australian Federated 
Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE) concurred that the Labor 
ministry in 1929 paid the electoral price of alienating key sections 
of its support among the more militant Queensland trade unions. 
These sentiments were echoed by three trade unionists who were 
involved in Labor politics in the late 1920s. Frank Waters, who 
at that time was an honorary official in the Amalgamated Postal 
Workers Union (APWU), viewed the Government's defeat as the result 
of trade union reaction to the cabinet's handling of the 1927 South 
(4) (5) 
Johnstone strike. Bill Morrow, then a regional organiser 
for the ARU, and Jack Read, a rank and file unionist, were more 
specific in arguing that McCormack's treatment of the ARU led to his 
downfall. Academic investigations have endorsed the opinions of the 
contemporaries and few have quarrelled with Kett Kennedy's observation 
1. CA Bernays, Our Seventh Political Decade, 1920-1930, Sydney, 
1931, p 55. 
2. Advocate, 15 June, 1929. 
3. Headlight, 5 July, 1929. 
4. Interview with Frank Waters, 17 June, 1975, transcript, p 1. 
5. Interview with Senator Bill Morrow, 21 August, 1974, transcript, 
p 1. 
6. Interview with Jack Read, 8 September, 1975, transcript, p 5-
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that ' there is no doubt that several traditional ALP supporters 
cast their votes for CPN candidates, the one large block which was 
discernible being the militant trade unionists.' 
Despite its popularity, there is little statistical or other 
evidence to support this view. If one factor is to be singled out 
as the primary cause of Labor's defeat in 1929 then that factor was 
the state of the Queensland econoray-
The 1920s was a contradictory decade for the Labor party in 
Queensland: on the one hand, the party enjoyed consistent electoral 
success; yet, at the same time, it was raked with serious internal 
divisions. The divisions were multi-dimensional. Disputes between 
the cabinet and sections of the trade union movement were paralleled 
by divisions among and within the unions themselves - notably 
involving the Australian Workers Union (AWU) and the Australian 
Railways Union. Because many of the unions involved were affiliated 
with the ALP, these factional disputes were reflected within both the 
parliamentary and organisational wings of the party-
Frora 1915 to 1919 relations between the trade unions and the 
Labor Government of TJ Ryan were generally cordial. The unions 
welcomed the Government's endeavours in the areas of social and 
industrial reform and the Queensland Labor movement escaped the 
divisiveness produced in other States by the conscription controversy 
7. K Kennedy, The Public Life of William McCormack, PhD, James 
Cook University. 1973, vol 1, p 384, and Kennedy, K, 
'William McCormack:Forgotten Labor Leader', in DJ Murphy and 
RB Joyce (eds.), Queensland Political Portraits, 1859-1952, 
Brisbane, 1978, p 369. Others who have endorsed this 
opinion include: EM Higgins, 'Queensland Labor:Trade 
Unionists versus Premiers', HSANZ, 9;34, May, I96O, p 140; 
AA Morrison, 'Militant Labour in Queensland, 1912-1927', 
JRAHS, 38;5, 1952, p 234; RM Martin, Trade Unions in 
Australia, Melbourne, 1975, PP 9-10; G Lewis, 'Queensland 
Nationalism and Australian Capitalism', in EL Wheelwright 
and K Buckley (eds.). Essays in the Political Economy of 
Australian Capitalism, vol 2, Sydney, 1978, p 127 
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(8) 
of 1916/17.^ ' This harmony was ruptured by the onset of the post-
World War One recession and the failure of Theodore's attempts to 
(9) 
raise a loan in London in 1920. In an attempt to offset the 
State's financial difficulties, the Government adopted a number of 
policies which brought it into conflict with the trade union 
movement. In 1922 the Arbitration Court, in response to a drop 
in the cost of living, reduced the basic wage by five shillings to 
four pounds per week and, as a further economy measure, the 
Government applied to the Court for a wage reduction for its own 
employees. When this was granted, the ARU spearheaded a public 
campaign against the cost-cutting policies of the cabinet. 
The issue dominated the 1923 Labor-in-Politics convention and, while 
a motion to restore the wage cuts was defeated by two votes, 
convention instructed the Government to amend the Ax'bitration Act 
(11) to provide for a forty-four hour week. Theodore was opposed 
to such a move and refused to legislate on the matter. Intense 
lobbying of members during the Premier's absence in London in 1924 
resulted in the parliamentary caucus overruling the Premier on the 
issues of wage reduction and the forty-four hour week. Theodore 
and the cabinet then resigned. This crisis was overcome by the 
caucus's inability to elect a new cabinet and Theodore's willingness 
to compromise on the question of the forty-four hour week issue, but 
the fact that the incident occurred highlighted the problems in the 
, (12) party. 
8. The following discussion aims to identify the causes of faction-
alism in the Labor movement in the 1920s as a prelude to an 
examination of the ALP's defeat in 1929- It does not aim at a 
comprehensive history of the Labor movement in the 1920s, for 
such a history see: MNB Cribb, Some Manifestations of 
Ideological Conflict within the Labor movement in Qld. 1924-1929, 
BA, Queensland, 1964; Higgins, op.cit.; Kennedy, op.cit.; 
Morrison, op.cit.; DJ Murphy, 'Edward Granville Theodore', in 
Murphy and Joyce, op.cit. 
9. For details of the rather unusual reasons for Theodore's failure 
see: Murphy, op.cit. p 317f and CB Schedvin, 'E. G. Theodore and 
the London Pastoral Lobby', Politics, 0;1, May 1971. 
10. See Cribb, op.cit., p llf. 
11. Official Report Eleventh Labor in Politics Convention, Emu Park, 
March 1923. 
12. For details see Murphy, op.cit.,p 328f; Morrison, op.cit., p 223f 
Throughout the 1920s the Labor cabinet found itself in regular 
conflict with a group of trade unions led by the ARU. ARU hostility 
to the Government sprang from two major sources. The chief officers 
of the union. President George Rymer and Secretary Tim Moroney, were 
ideologically opposed to the democratic socialism of the Labor 
leadership. Until 1926 both were members of the ALP but were 
attracted to the anarcho-syndicalist ideas that had found expression 
in the IWW movement during the first world war- The State Government 
and the ARU were in an employer-employee relationship and the fact that 
the union was prepared to use direct action to obtain its industrial 
objectives also produced conflict between the two. Ironically it was 
the policies of the Ryan and Theodore Governments that helped the ARU 
to become a powerful force in Labor politics in the 1920s. Theodore, 
first as Treasurer and later as Premier, promoted the expansion of the 
State's railway service in order to provide employment opportunities 
and to assist the Government's closer settlement policies. From 
1915 to 1926 the number of kilometres of railway track in Queensland 
increased by 27 percent from 7-994 to 10,142. This expansion 
naturally produced a growth in the number of railway employees from 
16,823 in 1920 to 22,036 in 1926. Because it was the major railway 
union, the ARU benefi'^ted from the growth and its membership 
increased by 46 percent from 9,037 to 13,790 over the same period. 
Its increased numerical strength encouraged the ARU to embark on 
an ambitious industrial campaign to improve the conditions of its 
members. In 1925 the union led a strike against the Arbitration 
Court's decision not to restore the 1922 cuts in the basic wage. 
After a brief but intense campaign. Premier William Gillies acceded 
to the strikers' demands and legislated for a basic wage of 
£.4/5/-per week. Kennedy is correct in his observation that 
(14) 
this victory marked the pinnacle of ARU influence in the 1920s, 
but it also provoked a backlash within the ALP that was to have 
serious consequences for the entire Labor movement. William Gillies, 
13. Caucus Minutes, 31 August, 1925, p 245. 
14. Kennedy in Murphy and Joyce, op.cit., p 359-
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who had been Minister for Agriculture since 1919, was elected leader 
(15) by twenty two votes to twenty one over William McCormack, when 
Theodore vacated the Premiership in his unsuccessful bid to enter 
Federal politics in February 1925. The trade union movement 
welcomed the election of Gillies and ' .hoped that such appointment 
will be the means of achieving, .a better luiderstanding between the 
(if.) 
industrial and political wings of the Labor movement.' However, 
Gillies' capitalulation to the ARU's demands in August 1925 confirmed 
the fears of many caucus members that he lacked the desire and ability 
to confront the militant and left-wing elements in the party. Gillies 
came to share this belief and after only eight months as Premier, he 
arranged for his appointment to the newly formed Board of Trade and 
(17) Arbitration in October 1925. The caucus then elected Gillies' 
deputy, William McCormack, as leader and Premier- McCormack was an 
ex-AWLT official, with a reputation for toughness and with a record of 
sely 
(19) 
(I8) 
anti-ARU actions. It was preci these qualities that 
endeared him to the caucus majority. 
McCormack, with the assistance of the AWU faction within the 
party, set out to neutralize the influence of the ARU within the ALP 
On Theodore's initiative, the 1924 Federal Conference of the ALP had 
decided against any affiliation with the Communist Party of Australia 
(CPA) and henceforth required all ALP members to sign a pledge 
declaring that they were not members of the CPA. In July 1925 
McCormack moved at a meeting of the Queensland Central Executive (QCE) 
of the ALP, that former CPA member, Fred Paterson, not be endorsed as 
the Labor candidate for the State seat of Port Curtis. This caused 
an uproar among the ARU delegates because Paterson was a paid official 
15. Caucus Minutes, 25 February, 1925, p 219. On the first ballot 
Gillies and McCormack each had nineteen votes, Forgan Smith had 
four and Alfred Jones one vote. The result for Gillies was 
achieved at the second ballot. 
16. TLC Minutes, 25 February, 1925, p 98. 
17- Caucus Minutes, 21 October, 1925, p 262. 
18, It was McCormack who had urged a hard-line policy against striking 
7\RU members in North Queensland in 1917, Murphy, op.cit., p 313. 
19. Cribb, op.cit., p 56. 
24. 
(OQ) 
of that union. ^'' At the November QCE meeting all delegates present 
were called upon to sign the anti-communist pledge. Tim Moroney and 
George Rymer of the ARU refused to sign on the grounds that the QCE 
did not have the authority to demand such an action. The President 
(21) then ordered the two ARU delegates to withdraw from the meeting. 
When the Labor-in-Politics convention opened at Southport in February 
1926, it was obvious from McCormack's manner that he was prepared for 
a final showdown with the ARU. The ARU delegates (Moroney, Rymer, 
Hartley and Foley) had signed the pledge but had typed across it the 
following statement: 
The QCE has no authority under the rules of the ALP 
(state of Queensland) to demand this pledge. It is 
therefore signed under protest and on instruction of 
the State Council of the ARU. (22) 
The credentials cormnittee declined to accept the pledge signed 
in this form and refused to seat the ARU delegates. A motion to 
permit the ARU members another opportunity to sign was defeated by 
the narrow margin of forty three votes to thirty eight. Protracted 
negotiations failed to secure the re-admission of the ARU delegates 
to the QCE. 
A stalemate then developed in which the QCE would not accept ARU 
delegates who would not sign the pledge unconditionally and the ARU 
refused to choose alternative delegates. This meant that the ARU 
was effectively dv^barred from the party and was to remain so until 
1957. McCormack had now achieved one of his major objectives - to 
remove the ARU's influence from the ALP. His subsequent attempts to 
curb the industrial influence of the union were to be achieved at a 
much higher price. 
20. QCE Minutes, 31 July, 1925. 
21. ibid., 27 November, I925. 
22. Official Report of the Twelth Labor in Politics Convention, 
Southport, February 1926, p 4; and K Kennedy, 'The Anti-
Communist Pledge Crisis', in Murphy, DJ, Joyce, RB and Hughes, 
CA, Labor in Power, Brisbane, I98O, p 375. 
25. 
McCormack led the Labor party to an electoral victory in May 
1926 and his prestige was such that the caucus dispensed with the 
(25) 
usual ballot and re-elected him leader unaminously. With the 
parliamentary party united under him, the Premier was confirmed in 
his belief that the union militants could be defeated by a policy 
of firmness. He demonstrated this during a strike of Brisbane 
building workers in February 1927 when he declared that 'the 
Government takes the full responsibility of fighting the unions 
(24) 
on the forty hour week dispute' Later the same year a strike 
over preferential employment broke out at the South Johnstone sugar 
(•^ 5) 
mill near Innisfail. From a localized dispute, the affair 
rapidly spread into a major confrontation involving not only the 
AWJ, which covered the workers directly involved, but also the ARU, 
AFULE and a number of other railway unions. McCormack arrived home 
from an overseas visit and chose to regard the strike as an attempt 
by the ARU to extend its influence throughout the entire railway 
(26) 
service. To prevent this McCormack was determined to terminate 
the dispute as quickly as possible. He did so by issuing an order 
of dismissal to all members of the railway service. The Premier 
then decreed that only those men who were prepared to sign a pledge 
to obey the rules of the Railway Department would be offered re-
employment. 
While the press and the Opposition hailed the Premier's action 
as a resolute stand against industrial anarchy, the union movement and 
many sections of the ALP combined to heap abuse upon him. The 1927 
Trade Union Congress overwhelmingly passed a motion condeiraiing 
McCormack and declared that 'this Government is not worthy of the 
(27) 
confidence of the workers' Such criticism was not restricted 
to the trade union movement. During a major parliamentary debate on 
23. Caucus Minutes, 17 June, 1926, p 269. 
24. Worker, 23 February, 1927-
25. For details of the strike see: Kennedy in Murphy and Joyce, 
op.cit., p 363f; Higgins, op.cit., p 145f; Morrison, op.cit., 
p 230f; Cribb, op.cit., p60f. 
26. Higgins, op.cit., p 143. 
27 Official Report of Trade Union Congress,Brisbane, October 1927, p4. 
26. 
the South Johnstone dispute no fewer than eleven Labor backbenchers 
(28) 
openly castigated the Premier for his actions. The outspoken 
criticism of these members gave rise to speculation that the 
parliamentary Labor party was about to experience a major schism. 
It was rumoured that between sixteen and twenty members were prepared 
(29) to vote for a caucus resolution of no confidence in McCormack. 
Yet, when the delayed caucus meeting was finally convened on 
9 September all major opposition to the cabinet had been dissipated 
and a vote of confidence in McCormack was passed by thirty-eight 
^ + f (30) votes to iour 
McCormack achieved this very favourable result by intimating to 
members that he would be prepared to hold an early election if the 
(31) 
vote went against him. The Premier employed a similar tactic 
in successfully cowering the Central Executive of the ALP- When the 
QCE met on 23 September a motion sponsored by the Carpenters' Union 
calling for the expulsion from the party of McCormack and his cabinet 
lapsed for want of a seconder. The Executive Cormnittee of the QCE 
then put forward a compromise motion which laid the blame for the 
affair on 'misunderstandings caused through lack of co-ordination 
(32) between the industrial and political wings of the movement' 
This motion was carried. While these decisions saved McCormack 
and staved off a formal split in the party, the South Johnstone 
dispute and the animosities it engendered were to beset the party 
for the next two years. The notice paper for the 1928 Labor-in-
Politics convention contained so many 'anti-politician' motions that 
the President, WH Demaine, felt it necessary to comment on the fact 
in his Presidential address. Unfortunately the President's 
expression of concern did not prevent the convention embarking on a 
long and recriminatory debate on the South Johnstone strike which 
(34) did little to heal the rifts that still existed within the party. 
28. ^PD, clxix, 6 September, 1927, P 44f. 
29. Bernays, op.cit., p 48: Brisbane Courier, 6 September, 1927-
30. Caucus Minutes, 9 September, 1927, p 326. 
31. Cribb, op.cit., p 103. 
32. QCE Minutes, 23 September, 1927-
33. Official Report of the Thirteenth Labor-in-Politics Convention, 
1928, President's address, p 6. 
34. ibid., p 37f. 
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The response to the South Johnstone dispute gave the misleading 
impression that the trade unions were united in their opposition to 
the Labor cabinet. Wliile the AWU Branch Executive voted on 21 June 
(35) 1927 to officially suppoit the strike, this action was adopted 
with a good deal of reluctance. As the AWU Secretary, Bill Riordan, 
said at the time 'the only way that we could confine it to the South 
Johnstone area was to make it an official strike' This 
attitude on the part of the AWU was pilloried by the ARU which 
accused Riordan of being more concerned with the votes of the sugar 
farmers than he was with winning the strike. Such rifts in the 
strikers' solidarity also extended to relationships between the ARU 
(38) 
and the AFULE. The AFULE, despite its suspicions of ARU motives, 
participated in the strike but its President, Theo Kissick, refused 
to appear in public with either Tim Moroney or George Rymer or to 
(39) 
allow them to address members of the AFULE. The ARU I'esponse to 
this action consisted of a trenchant denunciation of officials of 
both the AFULE and the Guards Association for allegedly 'selling out' 
to the Goverrmient. This antagonism had its denouement when 
Kissick was expelled from the Trades and Labor Council because it 
was alleged that he had personally conspired with McCormack to under-
mine the strike. 
Given the history of inter-union relationships in Queensland in 
the 1920s, it was not surprising that they would find it impossible 
to maintain even a modicum of unity and cormnon purpose during a major 
industrial dispute. In fact the chief reason the ARU called off the 
strike was because of dissensions among the participants. The ARU, 
as an all grades union, was keen to establish a One Big Union within 
the railway industry but faced vigorous opposition from unions such 
35. Worker, 24 June, 1927. 
36. Advocate, 15 July, 1927 
37 ARU South Eastern District Committee Minutes, 19 August, 1927, 
p 12. Held at ARU Office, Brisbane. 
38. AFITLE Executive Minutes, 7 August, 1927, p 2. E212/5 RSSSA/ANU. 
39. Brisbane ('ourier, 27 August, 1927-
40. Advocate, 21 September, 1927-
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as the AFLTLE who viewed the ARU proposals as a threat to their own 
independence. Differences over policy matters soon became confused 
with personality clashes and by the mid-1920s a state of open warfare 
existed between the ARU and the AFULE. Of even greater significance 
were the deep divisions that existed between the ARU and the AWU. 
The reasons for the conflict that existed between these two important 
unions were many and complex. While not strictly a railway union, 
the AWU covered many workers in various sections of the railway 
industry. Unfortunately demarcation lines were not always clearly 
defined and this led to frequent clashes between the AWU and ARU 
over the question of 'body snatching'. On the political plane, 
the ARU was influenced by radical syndicalist/socialist notions 
whereas the AWU espoused a moderate version of democratic socialism. 
Within the arena of ALP politics the AWU was in a dominant position, 
with the ARU cast in the role of an insurgent. Power in the Labor 
party depended on the membership size of affiliated unions because 
the number of delegates per union was related to the number of members 
in that union. The AWU viewed with concern the growth in ARU member-
ship in the 1920s because it feared that a strong ARU would be in a 
position to lead a coalition of dissident unions, including the 
Meatworkers and Waterside Workers, in a direct challenge to its own 
political and industrial dominance within the Labor movement. The 
ARU, on the other hand, believed that the AWU was determined to 
destroy it. For instance, the ARU felt that one of the reasons the 
AWU purchased the controlling interest in the trade union owned 
newspaper, the Daily Standard, was to provide it with yet another 
(4l) forum to attack the ARU. 
Two incidents which occurred in 1926 indicate the extent of the 
animosity that existed between the two unions. In March of that year 
a group of ARU dissidents led by the south eastern divisional secret-
ary, J Hayes, attempted a coup against Rymer and Moronev. The 
(42) 
attempt failed and Hayes was expelled from the union. Hayes had 
'll. Report of ARU Secretary and President, 1926, Manuscript, Welsby, 
Papers, 40/A72, p 6, FNH.. 
42. Kennedy, PhD, op.cit., p 291. 
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attracted the active support of the AWU in his endeavours and the 
Worker referred to the leadership of the ARU as 'an uncompromising, 
unreasoning, dictatorship' In September 1926 the AWU stepped 
up its campaign against the ARU by establishing a 'railway section' 
in order to entice disenchanted railway employees away from the ARU. 
This was a provocative act which was denounced by Moroney as a 
blatant attempt at *bodysnatching' The AWU hierarchy was shaken 
when its western district secretary, ,'JM Durkin, wrote to the 
(44) 
Worker and agreed with Moroney. Durkin's action was supported 
in a strongly worded motion by the western district committee of the 
(45) 
AWU. The union executive was not prepared to brook such dis-
loyalty and Durkin was dismissed sutirmarily from his union position. 
He refused to accept this dismissal and instituted legal action 
against the AWU. Despite the failure of his action, the court 
hearing provided ammunition for the ARU and further soured relations 
between it and the AWU. While the ARU may have gained some solace 
from the AWU's internecine problems, the combined effect of the AWU's 
action, their virtual expulsion from the ALP, the defeat of the South 
Johnstone strike, and retrenchments and unemployment in the railway 
industry rendered them impotent as an effective rival to the AWU. 
Despite its internal difficulties, the ALP achieved consistent 
electoral success from 1915 until the 1929 defeat. The problems 
produced by factional disputes within the party were offset by the 
divided and debilitated state of the non-Labor parties. The defeat 
of the Denham Government in 1915 had plunged the non-Labor parties 
in Queensland into a period of acute dissension. Queensland's 
economic development determined that the urban non-Labor party, 
variously termed Liberal, Nationalist, United, was unable to secure 
ascendancy over the rural non-Labor elements that eventually were to 
form the Country party. The political birth of a united Country 
43. Worker, 11 March, 1926. 
44. ibid., 6 October, 1926. 
45. ibid., 13 October, 1926. 
46. The Durkin Case, 1927, Hayes Collection, FML. 
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party in Queensland was also a rather torrid affair which was 
characterized by factionalism and bitterness. Partly as a con-
sequence of its inter and mtra-party disputes, the Opposition lacked 
a leader who could provide a match for either TJ Ryan or EG Theodore. 
I'" compiling a confidential report on the Nationalist party organiza-
tion in Queensland in 1920, Archdale Parkhill, who was then Secretary 
of the Nationalist Association in New South Wales, enumerated one of 
the major problems facing the non-Labor forces: 
Whilst the organization can be improved and built up 
on technical and systematic lines into an effective 
organising machine, still, it will clearly,...lack 
the enthusiasm and interest which lifts it out of 
a mere mechanical organisation into a big force and 
inspires it with life and vigour, which only a 
trusted and capable leader can effect. (47) 
Denham himself was defeated in the electorate of Oxley in 1915, and 
his successors as leader (j Tolmie, EH McCartney, W Vowles, and CJ 
Taylor) did not prove themselves to be outstanding politicians. 
Their parties suffered foui consecutive electoral defeats under 
their leadership. 
The relatively poor performance (in terms of votes) of the ALP 
in the 1920 election contained lessons which at least some in the 
non-Labor parties were prepared to learn. Before the 1920 election 
these parties were beginning to exhibit symptoms of what might be 
called 'the perpetual opposition syndrome' However, the troubles 
encountered by the Theodore Government gave them hope that a return 
to the Treasury benches was possible. Yet, those committed to 
unifying the non-Labor forces had a difficult task ahead of them. 
At both the 1920 and 1923 elections no fewer than three separate 
parties carried the anti-Labor banner. Moreover there existed 
deep mutual hostilities among these parties. A city-country 
antagonism was further complicated by fissKi,t';s within the Country 
47 B Irving, and B Schedvin, 'A Confidential Report on Nationalist 
Party Organisation in Queensland, 1920', Queensland Heritage, 
2;8, May, 1973, p lb. 
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parties that were as frequent as they were incurable. Regional 
differences, sectional differences, and policy differences combined 
with baser motives of personal hatred, jealousy, and ambition to 
ensure that non-Labor remained disunited and that Labor remained the 
Government. 
The organisational structures of the various non-Labor parties 
were themselves an obstacle to unity. Nationalist organisation was 
extremely weak and the Nationalists, or United party as they were 
called at the 1923 election, were more a parliamentary faction than 
a mass political party. Lack of party discipline made it difficult 
to bind parliamentary members to specific proposals : uch as a 
decision to join with other parties in an electoral alliance. 
Theoretically the Country party was a more tightly structured 
organisation, but it was not until the late 1920s that a united 
Country party existed in Queensland. The fact that many groups 
such as the United Graziers Association tended to disaffiliate from 
country political organisations if particular policies or strategies 
offended them did nothing to encourage solidarity. In short, the 
fluidity and looseness of non-Labor party structures were an 
important obstacle to attempts to achieve unity of purpose among 
them. Despite these obstacles, a number of attempts at unity were 
trtade. In January 1923 there was an attempt at a conference held 
in Rockhampton to form a party called the Queensland United Party 
(Nationalist and Country Party). This was an ambitious venture that 
failed because only four of the twenty-one Country party State 
parliamentarians were prepared to join. One of the major reasons 
behind Country party reluctance to become committed to the organisa-
tion was the fear that it was really an attempt by the United party 
(^ 8) to swamp them. 
The first steps towards a lasting coalition between the non-
Labor parties was not taken until 9 April, 1924. On that date 
48. BD Graham, The Formation of the Australian Country Parties, 
Canberra, I966, p 180. 
52. 
Arthur Edward Moore was elected leader of the Opposition. This 
decision was followed a year later by the merger of the CPP 
(Country Parliamentary Party) and the UPP (United Parliamentary 
Party) into a single Country Progressive Party with Moore as leader-
In a lengthy statement the new party engaged in a good deal of 
soul-searching regarding the divisiveness of the past, declaring, 
in conclusion, that 'the partv is not sectional, and being State-
(49) 
wide, is for the whole of the people' This noble declaration 
was not, however, totally in accord with reality. Four United 
Party members (CJ Taylor, WH Barnes, W Kelso and GP Barnes) were 
not invited to join the new party because of their alleged disloyalty. 
This charge of disloyality related to their refusal to accept an 
agreement entered into in January 1925 whereby the National Union 
was to be the sole collection agency for the CPP and the UPP- While 
these dissidents eventually made their peace with the new party, 
they did not constitute the only problem the new CPP and its leader 
had to overcome. The birth of the party was greeted with hostility 
by Queensland's major newspaper, the Brisbane Courier. Precise 
motives are difficult to establish, but the Courier concentrated its 
criticism upon the CPP's links with the National Union. In a 
stinging editorial the paper claimed that: 
Democracy is a futility, a howling farce in fact, if 
the electors are to be subservient to a coterie of 
representatives of the moneyed interests of Melbourne 
such as the National Union is. (51) 
These attacks by the Brisbane Courier were accompanied by 
opposition from sections of the old CPP and UTP Non-parliamentary 
members of the two parties were angry because the merger was enacted 
primarily by the politicians, and because they felt that there had 
been inadequate consultation with other sections of the parties. 
49. Brisbane Courier, 13 May, 1925, 
50. For details on the National Union see; BD Graham, 'The Place 
of Finance Conmiittees in Non-Labor Polities', 1910-1930, 
AJPH, 6, i960, 
51. Brisbane Courier, 15 May, 1925. 
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Because of the Courier's o\m antipathy, these dissidents had their 
views widely publicized in the paper's columns to such an extent 
that it appeared the party amalgamation would be aborted. However, 
skilful leadership combined with a display of solidarity by the 
politicians to ensure the successful birth of the new coalition 
party- In December 1925 the merger was completed and the name 
changed to Country Progressive National Party. The insertion of 
the word National was a concession to United party members. 
Having successfully endured its birth traumas, the new party 
made important inroads into Labor party support at the 1926 election. 
Willie the state of the parties remained substantially unaffected by 
the election and while the swing to the CPNP was only 1.2/C, the fact 
that the CPNP (49.12fo) outpolled the ALP (47.96^) on primary votes 
provided Moore's party with a much needed psychological boost. 
This was the first occasion for many years that the Government had 
faced a united opposition. The result attained by the CPNP placed 
it in an ideal situation to capitalize on the numerous difficulties 
that befell the Labor administration in the three years prior to the 
1929 election. 
The 1929 poll was held on 11 May and produced the first of 
only two 'normal' changes of Government that were to occur in 
Queensland over the sixty-five year period between 1915 and I98O. 
Tables 2:1, 2:2 and 2:3 provide the data necessary to discuss the 
election result in greater detail. 
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TABLE 
(52) 
ELECTION RESULTS, QUEENSLAND 1929 ^ ' 
Party Percentage Votes Seats Percentage Seats 
ALP 40.16 27 37-5 
CPNP 54.23 43 59.7 
Others 5.61 2 2.7 
EXPLANATION 
(53) This result constituted a 'Nuffield'^ ' swing of 6.9^ ^ 
to the CPNT and a 'Berrington'V 54) swing of 8.V;'o based 
on the 1926 election result. A feature of the election 
was the uniformity of the swing, with only six of the 
seats contested deviating from the anti-Labor trend. 
Of the sixteen seats (Bulimba, Kelvin Grove, Maree, 
Merthyr, South Brisbane, Chillagoe, Cook, Eacham, 
Ipswich, Gympie, Fitzroy, Keppel, Port Curtis, Rockhampton, 
Rosewood and Toowoomba) which L^bor lost to the CPNP only 
six can be classed as marginal.v55j All but five, Bulimba, 
Kelvin Grove, Merthyr, Port Curtis and Toowoomba, of the 
seats conceded to the CPNP in 1929 can be tei^ med traditional 
Labor seats in that they consistently returned ALP members 
over a series of elections. 
52. All election figures, unless otherwise stated, are from CA Hughes, 
and BD Graham, A Handbook of Australian Governnrent and Politics, 
I89O-I964, Canberra, I968; and CA Hughes and BD Graham, Voting 
for the Queensland Legislative Assembly, 1890-1964, Canberra, 
1974. 
53, 'Nuffield' - after the calculation of swing devised by Butler and 
Stokes of Nuffield College, Oxford; see, D Butler, and D Stokes, 
Political Change in Britain, London, 1969. The swing is 
calculated in the following manner: 
where Ll 
L2 
Cl 
Co 
^ 
= 
= 
= 
(L^ - Lo) + 
2 
1926 Labor vote 
1929 Labor vote 
1926 CPNP vote 
1929 CPNP vote 
(''2-• S ' 
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TABLE 2:2 
ALP ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE 1920-1929 
Election ALP votes Seats 
1920 47-7 38 (52) 
1923 48.1 43 (60) 
1926 47.9 43 (60) 
1929 40.1 27 (37) 
54. 'Berrington' - after Hugh Berrington; see, HB Berrington, 'The 
General Election of 1964', Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Vol,128, Series A, I965, pp 17-66; and M Mackerras, 
Elections 1975, Sydney 1975, PP 300f, The Berrington swing is 
calculated in the following manner: 
V2 (L^  - Lj 
s 
Berrington's method relates only to the vote of the party which 
is losing support. The advantage of Berrington's method for 
this study is that it relates the swing to the proportion of 
the original vote at risk. This is particularly important in 
establishing the proportion of those Labor voters who changed 
their votes in 'safe' as compared to 'marginal' seats. 
55. In this study any seat won with less than 55/^  of the vote is 
classed as marginal in the succeeding election. All results 
cited are first preference votes unless otherwise stated. 
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TABLE 2:3 
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SWING, 1929 
Brisbane 
(includes electorates of Brisbane, Bulimba,* 
Buranda, Enoggera, Fortitude Valley, Ithaca, 
Kelvin Grove, Kurilpa, Maree, Merthyr, Nundah, 
Paddington, Sandgate, South Brisbane, Toombul, 
Toowong, Windsor, Wynnum) 
Non Metropolitan South East Region 
(includes electorates of Albert, Aubigny, 
Bremer, Burrum, Carnarvon, Cooroora, 
Cunningham, Dalby, East Toowoomba, Fassifern, 
Gympie, Ipswich, Lockyer, Logan, Murrumba, 
Manango, Rosewood, Stanley, Toowoomba, 
Warwick, Wide Bay) 
Central Coast Region 
(includes electorates of Bundaberg, Burnett, 
Fitzroy, Keppel, Mackay- Maryborough, Mirani, 
Mount Morgan, Normanby, Port Curtis, 
Rockhampton) 
North Coast Region 
(includes electorates of Bowen, Cairns, 
Charters Towers, Chillagoe, Cook, Eacham, 
Herbert, Kennedy, Mundingburra, Queenton, 
To\^ l^sviIle) 
Western Region 
(includes electorates of Balonne, Barcoo, 
Burke, Flinders, Gregory, Leichardt, 
Maranoa, Mitchell, Murilla, Warrego) 
Nuffield Swing 
$ 
6.75 to CPNP 
8.26 to CPNP 
= 8.77 to CPNP 
= 7.92 to CPNP 
= 1.57 to CPNP 
* Seats underlined are those lost by Labor in 1929 
In five of this region's ten seats the Labor 
candidate was returned unopposed. 
See electoral maps for the geographic location of seats. 
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Contrary to popular opinion at the time, the ALP did not lose 
any seats in 1929 because of the intervention of dissident Labor 
parties. Such parties did contest a number of electorates but they 
had no influence on the result. It is not surprising that the 
intensity of the factionalism within the Labor movement in the late 
1920s, together with dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
cabinet on the part of some unionists, would raise the issue of 
forming a trade union or industrial party to the left of the ALP-
Simmering discontent over the question of the anti-communist pledge 
produced a number of meetings at the Brisbane Trades Hall at which 
a decision was taken in January I926 to form an Industrial Labor 
Party. Union support for such a move was far from unanimous. 
(57) The AWU and the AFULE declared it 'bogus',^^ and the Printers' 
Union threatened to disaffiliate from the TLC unless that body 
declared itself against the party.^ ^ When the ARU executive 
decided not to encourage the development of a new party the 
initiative collapsed. 
The approach of the 1929 election revived interest in such a 
party. An added stimulus was a change in policy on the part of 
the Communist party which decided to oppose the ALP in the election 
and was prepared to encourage other dissident groups to do the 
(59) same. In the six months prior to the State election a number 
of Left Wing Labor Electoral Committees were established with the 
intention of challenging sitting Labor members. Certain unions 
gave assistance to these committees by way of funds and organisational 
support. One such union was the Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) 
which concentrated its efforts in the Paddington electorate. 
QCE response to this move was swift and in February 1929 the WWF 
56. Brisbane Courier, I6 January, I926. 
57- Official Report AWU Thirteenth Annual Delegate Meeting, Brisbane, 
January, 1926, p 37 FML: AFULE Executive, Minutes, 3 October, 
1926, E 212/5, p 2, RSSSA-ANU. 
58. PIEUA Board of Management Minutes, 25 April, 1927 
59. See further chapter 5. 
60. WWF Minutes, 6 February, 1929, pp 37-8, E213/9, 
RSSSA/ANU. 
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secretary (Andy Brown) was expelled from the ALP Despite the 
intervention of the Federal branch of the union, the WWF refused to 
support the ALP in the election and was subsequently excluded from 
(6^) the party for non-payment of affiliation fees. The success of 
the left-wing movement depended on the support of the key dissident 
union - the ARU. The ARU's formal policy on the matter was debated 
at the union's State council in February 1929« At that meeting a 
formal motion was proposed that the ARU give full support to the 
left wing movement. This motion was supported by Mick O'Brien 
and Frank Nolan but faced strong and skilful opposition from Tim 
Moroney and George Rymer- The discussion closed with the passage 
of a motion sponsored by Moroney and Rymer which had the effect of 
withholding ARU coimnitment to the left wing programme. While 
Moroney himself was a supporter of the left wing he did not regard 
it as politic for the ARU to be formally associated with the dissident 
party. Notwithstanding this setback, left wing candidates contested 
the electorates of Brisbane (JB Miles), Fortitude Valley (JM Durkin)% ^ 
Mundingburra (E Tripp), Paddington (FW Paterson), and Townsville 
(65) (DJ Morris). These candidates managed to poll only 0.74^ ? of 
the total valid votes cast and the ALP won the six seats they 
contested. The high vote the left wing candidates secured in 
Mundingburra (l8.54/?) and Paddington (28.36/») was partly the result 
of the failure of the CPNP to contest these seats. The entry of 
the Left Wing Movement into the election did not lead to the loss 
of any ALP seats because of vote splitting. 
Some published accounts of the 1929 election give the mistaken 
impression that the Labor cabinet was faced with a unanimously 
hostile trade union movement. This ignores the reconciliations 
61. ibid., 6 March, 1929, p 49 and QCE Minutes, 15 February, I929. 
62. WWF Minutes, 1 May, 1929, p 76; 26 June, 1929, p 112; and 
22 August, 1929, E213/9 RSSSA/ANU. 
63. Minutes ARU State Council, 7-10 February, 1929, p 134; 
Advocate, 15 April, I929. 
64. Durkin had stood unsuccessfully as an Industrial Candidate in 
the 1928 Mitchell by-election. 
65. Miles, Tripp, Paterson and Morris stood as Conmiunists. 
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that had taken place between the Government and many of the unions 
in the twelve months before the election. After the shock of the 
1927 TUC, the QCE and the AWU made a concerted effort to restore 
unity within the party. The AVrtJ group was instrumental in 
defeating most of the anti-McCormack motions that came before the 
1928 Labor-in-Politics convention. When the 1928 Trade Union 
Congress assembled in October a motion was put forward calling on 
all unions to support both the Federal and State Labor parties. 
After a lengthy debate this motion was lost twenty-six votes to 
twenty-four but was subsequently carried 22,000 to 18,000 when a 
(67 ^  
card vote was demanded. The margin of victory was narrow, yet 
the Trades and Labor Council at its March 1929 meeting carried a 
motion by forty-five votes to twenty, endorsing the congress 
. . . (68) decision. 
When faced with the choice of supporting the ALP or the CPNP, 
the majority of Queensland's unions agreed with the Printers' that 
'the worst Labor Government is a long way better than the best 
Tory Government...' Yet the defeat of the Speaker, W Bertram, 
in Maree together with the defeats of Railway Minister, Jim Larcorabe, 
in Keppel and Ijabour Minister, DA Gledson, in Ipswich all occurred in 
centres of strong ARU influence; which suggests perhaps that the 
union rank and file did seek vengeance on the parliamentary party. 
An argument against the thesis that it was the militant unionists 
who put out the Government concerns the defeat of HL Hartley in the 
central coast seat of Fitzroy- Hartley was the doyen of the 
militants for it was he who had led the attack on Theodore's wage 
reduction policies at the 1923 Labor-in-PoIitics convention. More 
recently Hartley had been the most unrestrained in his denunciation 
of McCormack's handling of the South Johnstone strike, and was one 
66. QCE Minutes, 28 January, 1928. 
67. Report of Queensland Trade Union Congress, October 1928, p 3f. 
68. TLC Minutes, 6 March, I929. 
69. Printing Trades Journal. 9 April, 1929, p 71. 
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of the four who had voted against him in caucus. On the eve of the 
election Hartley publicly endorsed the Left Wing Programme. If 
the votes of militant unionists were as decisive in 1929 as some 
have claimed then Hartley should have had an easy victory. Yet 
he was defeated in a massive eighteen percent swing to the CPNP 
candidate. Further evidence against the view that Labor lost in 
1929 because of the votes of alienated unionists is the uniformity of 
the swing that occurred. Such a uniformity suggests that Labor's 
defeat was not occasioned by an aggregation of localized grievances 
but was the result of a more general change of allegiance on the 
part of the electorate. 
In the years subsequent to the election a series of myths grew 
up within the Labor movement regarding the 1929 defeat. One was 
that rather than express their dissatisfaction with McCormack's 
ministry by voting for the CPNP, a significant percentage of 
hitherto loyal Labor supporters abstained from voting and thus 
brought about the defeat of the Government. The facts disprove 
this thesis. The total percentage of the enrolled electorate 
voting in 1929 (89.15fO was higher than that of 1926 (88.73^) and 
1923 (82.23^). While the average turnout in the seats Labor lost 
was slightly lower (89.02J^) an analysis of the pattern of turnout 
in those sixteen seats reveals no evidence of a uniform low vote. 
A second myth which gained some currency in Labor circles was 
that although the disenchanted went to the polls they deliberately 
spoiled their ballot papers, thus ensuring the defeat of the 
Government. Again the facts undermine the credibility of this 
argument. The informal vote in 1929 (l.5^) was only slightly 
higher than that in 1926 (1.2^), and the informal vote in the 
sixteen seats lost by Labor (l.3^) was below that of the 1929 
State average. 
There certainly was a qualitative difference in the campaigns 
conducted by the ALP and the CPNP in 1929, but it is doubtful if 
this alone decided the result. The Government's campaign strategy 
was to stand on its record of sound management over the previous 
44. 
fourteen years. When taxed on the growing unemployment problem 
which seemed to belie this argument, McCormack replied that it was 
caused by forces beyond the control of his administration. 
Labor's campaign was apologetic and lack-lustre when compared with 
the progressive and vigorous campaign conducted by the CPNP. As 
Opposition leader, Moore travelled widely through all areas of the 
State speaking to crowds large and small. His central campaign 
theme was that fourteen years of Labor rule had reduced Queensland's 
economy to a ruinous state. When he came to deliver his policy 
speech in April 1929 Moore outlined a series of projected changes 
(71) too numerous to itemize in full,^ but which included promises 
such as the abolition of the rural award, tax relief, restoration 
of freehold tenure and stimulation of employment. In a rare moment 
of rhetorical flourish he appealed to the voters: 
My party offers sound, progressive legislation and 
honest, efficient administration. It will undo 
the mischief of recent years, arrest the financial 
avalanche, plug leaking state losses, encourage 
instead of penalise enterprise; and, by reducing 
taxation and restoring confidence, will promote 
national and individual prosperity. I appeal not 
to your greed and cupidity, but to your intelligence 
and patriotism. (72) 
During the campaign Moore directed particular attention to farmers 
and the urban working class. To the former he offered relief from 
Labor's allegedly restrictive rural legislation, and to the latter 
he offered security of employment via the raising of a special loan 
of £2m to finance projects to absorb the unemployed. 
Moore's individual efforts were supported by an ably conducted 
and imaginative campaign on the part of the CPNP organisation. In 
addition to the normal media advertisements, the CPNP produced a 
70. Daily Mail, 16 April, I929. 
71. See ibid., 5 April, 1929; Bernays, op.cit., pp 60-64; and 
CPNP Speakers' Notes. I929 Election, Brisbane, p 102, OML. 
72. CPNP Election Leaflet. 1929 ,Queensland Political Pamphlets, 
Box 7, OML. 
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series of striking cartoon-style dodgers which pilloried the alleged 
ineptitude of successive Labor Governments in such areas as agricul-
(73) tural policy, employment and industrial development. These 
dodgers were supported by a nvmiber of articles in the Telegraph 
newspaper which fulminated against the evils of 'socialism' and 
(74) 
were collected in a twenty-four page CPNP propaganda manual. 
The CPNP claimed great credit for its slogans 'Change the Government!' 
and 'Give the Boy a Chancel' in determining the outcome of the 
election. While their claims are supported by contemporary 
(75) 
observers such as Bernays, the impact of slogans in influencing 
voters should not be exaggerated. Similarly, the actual campaign 
period may not be as influential in determining electoral outcomes 
as has been imagined. David Butler and Donald Stokes concluded, in 
their seminal study of voting behaviour in the United Kingdom, that: 
The voter's choice is not normally a sudden thing, 
but the product of months or years or even generations. 
Even those who change their votes are often reverting 
to some past pattern or reflecting some long established 
attitude rather than reacting to the specific stimulus 
of the campaign.. Over the last thirty years one of 
the primary contributions of studies of opinion change 
during campaigns has been to revise traditional 
judgements of the impact of campaigns. Time and 
again it has been shown that relatively few votes are 
changed and that these are largely in mutually 
cancelling directions. (76) 
What then did bring about the defeat of Labor in I929? 
Obviously, as in any election, there were a number of factors at 
work, but the depressed state of Queensland's economy deserves 
more attention than it has received. In Chapter 1 it was shown 
that the three years between I926 and 1929 were ones of severe 
economic recession in Queensland. While agreeing with David Butler's 
73. CPNP Election Dodgers, Nos. 1-15, Fryer Memorial Library FML. 
74.Change the Government, 24pp, pa/C18, FML. 
75.Bernays, op.cit., p 57-
76.Butler and Stokes, op.cit., p 502. 
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contention that the manner in which an 'elector translates his 
economic circumstances into a voting intention is still largely a 
(77) 
mystery', it is nevertheless true that Australia's electoral 
history indicates that voters have in the main been quick to respond 
to variations in levels of employment. No Australian Government 
(except that in Tasmania in 1931) that went, or was forced, to the 
polls during the depression survived the ordeal. Since Queensland 
experienced an earlier depression, McCormack may have been as much 
a victim of economic circumstances as was Scullin, Lang, Hogan or 
Mitchell. 
There are a number of reasons for preferring the economic 
explanation of Labor's defeat to the 'treachery of militant unionists' 
theory- The uniformity of the swing against Labor suggests that the 
electorate responded to a broad issue - such as the economy (See 
Table 2:3). If the actions of militants were decisive the swing 
would have been patchy because it would have varied in accordance 
with the geographic location of the allegedly disenchanted unionists. 
If internal dissension exerted such a negative influence on Labor's 
electoral support then this should have been evident at the I926 
election. Although the South Johnstone dispute lay in the future, 
there was significant union opposition to the McCormack Government 
in 1926. Yet Table 2:2 shows that the Labor vote remained stable 
in 1926. The new element that intervened to disrupt the stability 
of the Labor vote in the 1920s was the economic recession - the 
worst effects of which were not felt until after the I926 election. 
Other elections held between 1926 and 1929 also reveal the impact 
of the recession on the Labor vote. At the 1928 Federal election 
Labor's senate vote in Queensland dropped by 5.5 percent on its 
1925 result and at the 1928 Brisbane Mayoralty election the Labor 
candidate polled only 38.6/. of the vote to the CPNP's 6l.4^. 
77- D Butler, The Canberra Model, Canberra, 1974, p 89. 
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A fact that has been overlooked by many writers is that the 
state of the economy and the resultant unemployment were significant 
issues at the 1929 election. The trade unions had regularly 
(78) 
petitioned the Government to act on the problem, and the 
made unemployment a major plank in its electoral platform and 
(79) highlighted it in much of its propaganda. Table 2:4 sho 
that Labor performed worst in its safest seats: 
TABLE 2:4 
BERRINGTON SWING ACCORDING TO MARGINALITY 
Marginal ALP - 5.6^ 
Safe ALP - ^ . 1 % 
Marginal CPNP - 1.\$ 
Safe CPNP - 6.8fc 
This could indicate support for the view that these seats contained 
a high proportion of militant unionists who deserted the Government. 
On the other hand, these seats also contained large numbers of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers who were prone to unemployment 
and whose votes may have been influenced accordingly. A final 
shortcoming of the argument that Labor was voted out of office by 
trade union militants in 1929 concerns the composition of Labor's 
electoral support. Those who could be described as 'militant 
unionists' were statistically insignificant in terms of the electorate 
as a whole. Also, it is wrong to assume that the Labor vote was 
purely a trade union vote. Trade unionists were the core group 
but Labor in Queensland had traditionally attracted support from 
farmers and sections of the urban middle class, some of whom no 
doubt turned against the Government in 1929 because of the state 
of the economy and the high level of strike activity that had occurred 
in the late 1920s. 
78. Trades and Labor Council to Home Secretary, 15 November, 1927; 
Notes of Deputation of Waterside Worliers Federation to Home 
Secretary, 7 December, 1927, item 47/l6l5 COL/300, QSA; and 
Report AWU Annual Delegates Meeting,Brisbane,January 1929,p26,OML, 
79. Brisbane Courier, 6 May, 1929, 
The 1929 election defeat meant that the Queensland branch 
of the ALP was to be absolved of the responsibility of Government 
during the worst years of the depression. Instead, the task of 
administering the affairs of the State was transferred to an 
inexperienced cabinet under the leadership of a Premier who had 
never before held ministerial office. Not suprisingly, the Moore 
Government performed poorly under the strain of economic stagnation. 
Its attempts to undo what it saw as fourteen years of 'socialist 
mismanagement' alienated large sections of the manual and non-manual 
trade union movement. At the same time many of its most fervent 
supporters became impatient with a Government that pleaded economic 
circumstance as an excuse for the curtailment of a promised policy 
of reform. The Federal election of December 1931 revealed that 
popular opinion in Queensland was swinging back to the ALP. 
Moore's Government proved unable to halt or reverse this electoral 
decline and in June 1932 Labor regained its mantle as the 'natural' 
Government of Queensland after only one term in Opposition. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE MOORE GOVERNMENT: 
A NON-LABOR INTERREGNUM 
50. 
The 1929 election provided Queensland with its only non-Labor 
Government in the forty-two years between 1915 and 1957 The 
(1) CPNP Ministry led by AE Moore was brought to office chiefly as 
a result of the depressed state of Queensland's economy in the late 
1920s, and it was removed from office three years later by the 
world-wide depression. Because of the difficult economic circum-
stances, combined with its short term in office, the Moore Government 
did not make a significant impression on the course of Queensland's 
political or economic history. Perhaps the major, if ironical, 
consequence of the Moore Government was the reunification of the 
Queensland Labor movement. Because Labor was out of office during 
the worst years of the depression, it escaped the circumstances that 
split the party and destroyed the Labor Governments in the Common-
wealth and in the States of New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia. Furthermore, the poor performance of the Moore 
Government in the difficult economic situation provided a background 
conducive to the reconstruction of the ALP Labor went out of office 
in May 1929 in a debilitated and divided condition. Yet by the time 
of the 1932 State election, the party was the most united and 
purposeful in the Commonwealth. The behaviour of the Moore adminis-
tration antagonised large sections of the Labor movement and 
encouraged them largely to forget their differences and to combine 
against a common enemy. Simultaneously, the strains of being in 
power during the depression activated latent centrifugal forces 
within the non-Labor ranks which hampered the CPNP's campaign to 
retain office in 1932. 
1. The Moore ministry comprised the following: 
Arthur Edward Moore Premier, Chief Secretary, Vice-
President of Executive Council 
Reginald MacDonnell Secretary for Public Instruction, 
King Secretary for Public Works 
Walter Henry Barnes Treasurer 
James Christian Peterson Home Secretary 
Neil Francis Macgroarty Attorney-General 
William Arthur Deacon Secretary for I\iblic Lands 
Harry Frederick Walker Secretary for Agricultui'e and Stock 
Godfrey Morgan Secretary for Railways (until 28 Jan. 
1932); Minister for Transport (from 
28 Jan. 1932) 
Hubert Ebenezer Sizer Secretary for Labour and Industry 
Ernest Albert Atherton Secretary for Mines 
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The success of the CPNP at the polls in 1929 was greeted with 
extravagant enthusiasm by its supporters. Business, commercial, 
farming, and grazing interests had for years been opposed to what 
they regarded as Labor's socialist programmes, and viewed Moore's 
victory as something akin to the coming of the millenium. As extreme 
as it may appear, the reaction of the North Queensland Register was 
typical: 
Grand is the news. A dawn of a new era, an era, 
let us hope of peace, prosperity, industrial 
development, when men will be given the right 
to live, when the backbone of the country - the 
man on the land - will be given an opportunity- (2) 
After fourteen years of Labor rule, the first few months of the 
Moore Government were destined to be heady days. However, by mid-
1930 Queensland was beginning to feel the shock waves of the economic 
depression. As the depression deepened the high expectations of the 
Government's supporters began to sour. The hard reality of governing 
during a period of economic stagnation determined that the Government 
would behave differently from what its supporters had expected. The 
economic climate forced Moore to break many of his election promises, 
including his grand plan for a £2 million employment loan. Barely 
twelve months after his election Moore was on the defensive, not 
only against the Labor movement but also against critics in his 
own party- His address to the 1930 CPNP conference clearly 
illustrates this: 
Irrespective of the consequences to us as a party, 
we must meet the situation that exists today. I 
want you to recognise that anything the Government 
may do in the next 12 months which may be drastic and 
unpopular is being done, not because we like it, but 
because it is absolutely necessary for the welfare of 
the State that it shall be done. (3) 
2. North Queensland Register, 18 May, 1929, P 6. 
3. Brisbane Courier, 12 August, 1930. 
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As concerned as they no doubt were about 'the welfare of the State', 
Moore's supporters remained unconvinced by this logic. The sections 
of Queensland society which comprised the power base of the CPNP 
gradually became disillusioned with Moore, because they felt he did 
not live up to their naive expectations of him as a saviour from 
'socialism' By the 1932 election this disillusionment was 
manifesting itself in serious intra-party disharmony, and was a 
contributing factor to the Government's subsequent electoral defeat. 
The commercial and rural interests that supported the CPNP 
firmly believed that Queensland's economic development was being 
retarded by the high cost of production of the State's major exports, 
and that these high costs were caused by the unrealistically generous 
industrial awards that had been instituted during Labor's tenure in 
office. Hence, one of the first tasks embarked upon by the Moore 
Government was the 'reform' of the State's Conciliation and 
Arbitration system. At its first meeting on 22 May, 1929, the new 
cabinet issued an Order-in-Council which abolished the industrial 
award covering rural industries. The current rural award had been 
introduced by the Board of Trade and Arbitration in March 1928 and 
it stipulated a forty-four hour week, preference to AWU members and 
a wage scale ranging from three pounds eighteen shillings to five 
pounds per week. Hubert Sizer, Minister for Labour and Industry, 
defended the abolition of the award on the grounds that it would 
allow hard pressed farmers to take on more workers and thereby reduce 
(4) 
rural unemplojonent. The unions saw the decision as a direct 
assault on the whole system of industrial awards and denounced the 
(5) Government vigorously. By abolishing the award the Government 
alienated the AWU which, over the next three years, directed its 
considerable strength and influence to the removal of Moore and 
his party. 
4. ibid., 23 May, 1929. 
5. Worker, 18 December, 1929. 
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Following the suspension of the rural award, the Government 
introduced a new Conciliation and Arbitration Bill in November 1929. 
The new Bill replaced the Board of Trade and Arbitration with an 
Industrial Court; gave the Government power to remove employees 
from the ambit of the court; abolished preference to unionists; 
ended compulsory unionism in the public service and prohibited 
public service unions from affiliating with 'political' organisa-
tions. The passage of this piece of legislation, which the 
AWU described as 'one of the most reactionary measures that has 
ever been introduced into any Parliament of Australia', marked 
the declaration of a state of open warfare between the Moore ministry 
and the majority of the trade unions. Soon after his appointment 
Sizer had invited the unions to meet him in conference so that he 
might outline the Government's attitude on relevant industrial 
matters. At this conference Sizer adopted a conciliatory approach 
and attempted to allay any fears union officials might have harboured 
(8) 
regarding the policies of the new ministry.^ ' Sizer's groundwork 
was largely undermined by the indiscreet comment by the Attorney 
General, NF Macgroarty, that the Government was determined to 
'ringbark the Arbitration Court at an early opportunity'. 
Predictably, the union movement responded in a hostile manner to 
the changes introduced in the Bill. The Queensland Trades and 
Labor Council (TLC) denounced is as 'a vicious attack upon the 
workers and their union organisations...' and organised public 
meetings and protests against the legislation. 
,,(ii) The wages and hours clauses of the 1929 Arbitration Aci 
were the cause of bitter confrontation between the Government and 
the unions. Sections 6(i) and (ii) of the Bill excluded a large 
number of rural employees from the operations of the Act, and 
further provided that the Government by way of Orders-in-Council 
6. QPD, cliv, 20 November, 1929, p 17251. 
7. Worker, 27 November, 1929-
8. Report of Conference between HE Sizer and Representatives of 
Industrial Unions, Brisbane, 14 June,1929, AFULE Papers, E212, 
RSSSA/ANU. 
9. Lack, op.cit., p 94. 10. TLC Minutes, 27 November, 1929. 
11. 20° Georgii V- No. 28 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
of 1929, ^GG, 169, 30 December, I929. 
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could, in the future, exclude any category of workers from the 
protection of the Act. Moore's ministry made extensive use of 
this provision and by June 1931 more than fifty percent of the 
(12) State's workforce was no longer covered by the Act. The unions 
viewed these clauses as a direct repudiation of Sizer's earlier 
promise that the Government would stand by arbitration and had 
(13) 
'no intention of legislating against the basic wage' Another 
section of the Act that antagonised the unions was 13(7) which 
stated that: 
The (industrial) Court shall, in the matter of 
making declarations in regard to the basic wage 
or standard hours, take into consideration in 
relation to the community in general and the 
probable economic effect thereof upon industry 
or any industry or industries concerned. 
Because of the steadily declining economic situation, the unions 
argued that this clause virtually ensured that wages would be 
reduced. Furthermore, the unions were highly suspicious of the 
role played by the newly created Bureau of Economics and Statistics. 
While the Director, Professor JB Brigden, was keen to win the 
confidence of the unions by declaring that he came to the job 'with 
(14) 
an absolutely open mind looking for facts', many unions felt 
that his Bureau contributed to wage reductions by supplying the 
Court with gloomy reports on the State's economic situation. The 
AWU was blunt in its condemnation: 
The State Government had imported Professor 
Brigden to find out how little the worker could 
live on and what that little would cost. (l5) 
12. Cabinet Document, Persons Taken away from Arbitration Court by 
Moore Government, Larcombe Papers, M47, OML. 
13. Sizer Conference, op.cit., p 9-
14. Queensland Industrial Gazette, 24 March, 1930, p 159. 
15. AWU, Report of Eighteenth Annual Delegate Meeting, Brisbane, 
January, 1931, np. 
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In 1930 a number of important wage cases came before the 
Industrial Court. During the first case in March 1930 the 
representative of the Crown made full use of Section 13(7) of the 
Act and laid stress on the economic circumstances in which the State 
found itself. The union representatives argued that any wage 
reduction would lead to a further deepening of the depression because 
(17) 
of the reduction in purchasing power that would result. While 
the unions were successful in this case, two decisions of the court 
later in the year reduced the basic wage from four pounds five 
shillings (£4.5s) per week to three pounds seventeen shillings 
(£3.17s) per week. These were followed by a further reduction 
to three pounds fourteen shillings (£3.l4s), in May 1931. 
Section 13(4)B of the 1929 Arbitration Act deleted reference 
to the forty-four hour week and empowered the court to determine 
'the maximum weekly hours to be worked, called the standard hours, 
in an industry or in respect of particular industries' At the 
March 1930 case the unions had argued unsuccessfully for a 
reduction of hours from forty-four to forty per week in order to 
(I8) 
reduce unemployment. In May 1930 the Government lodged a 
claim before the Industrial Court for an extension of hours to 
forty-eight per week for certain Crown employees and major sections 
of the railway service. The decision of the Court went against the 
(19) 
unions. This decision incensed the railway unions, and led 
the Trades and Labor Council Executive to lay the blame for the 
increased hours at the feet of the Moore Government because of 
(20) its amendment of the Act. 
16. Report Industrial Court of Queensland, 18 March, 1930, p 51f, 
Industrial Registrar's Office, Brisbane. 
17 ibid., p 9. 
18. Report Industrial Court, op.cit., p I6. 
19. AFULE Minutes, 18 May, 1930, E212/7, RSSSA/ANU. 
20. TLC Minutes, 12 May, 1930. 
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Moore further antagonised the unions by his 'arbitration by 
legislation' approach when, in 1931, the Government introduced the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Bill. This Bill 
consisted of a single substantive clause which provided that: 
The Industrial Court or a Conciliation Board may 
vary an award where it is proved that similar 
awards in other States will operate in all things 
other than wages to the detriment of Queensland 
industry, in consequence of which Queensland 
industry cannot carry on and meet that competition. (2l) 
The Bill was introduced specifically to extend assistance to the 
Toowoomba Foundry which had applied unsuccessfully to the 
Industrial Court six times in the previous eighteen months for 
an award alteration. Sizer declared that it was the function of 
parliament to prevent Queensland industries going out of existence 
and, therefore, the Toowoomba Foundry was granted an extension of 
working hours to forty-eight, plus certain concessions regarding 
the conditions of the award. The ALP denounced the Bill as a 
vicious piece of legislation which attempted to lay down the 
principle that if 'sweated labour conditions' existed in any 
other State, then the workers of Queensland had to be brought down 
(22) to that level. The Government was adamant that Queensland 
industries, which provided the bulk of the State's employment, 
should not be jeopardized by unfair competition from other States, 
and the Bill was duly passed. The unions then commenced legal 
proceedings against the Act, but the ALP was re-elected to 
Government and repealed the legislation before the appeal was 
heard. 
While many of Moore's economic and industrial initiatives 
angered the union movement as a whole, his Government's attitude 
21. Sizer, ^ IPD, clx, 15 December, 1931, pp 2595-6. 
22. Smith, ibid., l6 December, 1931, p 2631. 
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to its own employees brought it into direct conflict with the public 
service unions. The Government's conception of the role of the 
public service was bluntly stated in its 1932 election manifesto: 
The Public Service is appointed solely for the 
purpose of facilitating the business and industries 
of the State. If it ever becomes a burden on, 
rather than a help to, such business or industry, 
it has so far failed in its functions, and 
conditions must be righted in such a way as 
to allow the life blood of industry once more 
to flow unfettered, at any rate, by internal 
conditions in the State which are amenable to 
political action. (23) 
Soon after its election in 1929 the ministry abolished compulsory 
unionism in the public service and struck out the regulation that 
prevented any State employee benefitting from an industrial award 
unless he was a union member. Furthermore, Section 83(3) of 
the 1929 Arbitration Act forbade public service unions to affiliate 
'with any other union or federation of unions or political organisa-
tions whatsoever' In defending this clause, the minister reverted 
to nineteenth century notions when he argued that, as employees of 
(25) 
the Crown, public servants should possess but one allegiance. 
The Labor movement, on the other hand, viewed it as an attack on 
the right of a union to combine with kindred unions and organisa-
(26) 
tions. 
Moore demonstrated that he was not prepared to countenance 
opposition to these measures by further tightening the public service 
regulations to provide that: 
(1) An officer shall not publicly comment upon any 
administrative action or upon the administration 
of any department of State. 
23. CPNP Speakers' Notes, 1932 State Election, OML, p 75. 
24. Brisbane Courier, 23 May, 1929. 
25. C|IPD, cliv, 20 November, 1929, p 1727-
26. QCE Minutes, 14 January, 1930. 
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(2) An officer shall not directly or indirectly take 
any part in political affairs otherwise than by 
exercise of the franchise. (27) 
This initiative was prompted by the actions of two public servants, 
\^f Copley and F Baker, who had publicly criticised aspects of the 
Government's public service regulations. Both were officials of 
the State Service Union (SSU) and Baker had twice stood as a 
candidate for the ALP- The fact that their outspokenness earned 
them disciplinary transfers provoked the Trades and Labor Council 
to denounce the Government for blatantly victimizing public 
+ 1. T T. + (28) servants who were Labor supporters. 
In addition to these new regulations, Moore took a number of 
rather drastic steps in order to achieve expenditure reduction in 
the public sector- In September 1930 all public servants, as 
defined under the 1922 Public Service Act, were removed from the 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. The Government then 
introduced a Salaries Act which reduced the salaries of State public 
servants by ten to fifteen percent depending on their classifications. 
When he presented the Bill, the Premier explained that since 
additional revenue could not be raised from the hard pressed private 
sector, it was necessary for the Government to prune its own 
expenditure. Moore also criticized the Industrial Court for failing 
to respond positively to previous Government requests to reduce the 
(29) 
salaries of State employees. The wage reduction was roundly 
condemned by the unions, and the Leader of the Opposition, 
William Forgan Smith, accused Moore of deliberately attempting to 
intimidate the court and of destroying the arbitration system. 
Despite these criticisms, Moore pushed ahead with his arguments that 
27- Mining Standard,3 September, 1931. 
28. TLC Minutes, 2 September, 1931. 
29. .QPD, clvi, 17 September, 1930, pp 1014-1015. 
30. Secretary of Railway Salaried Officers' Union to Moore, 
8 September, 1930, item 30/5547, PRE/A 1005, QSA. 
31. £PD, clvi, 18 September, 1930, p 10551. 
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drastic problems call for drastic solutions, and that, in this time 
of economic depression, public servants could not hope for favoured 
(•\o) 
treatment. Public service salaries were further reduced in 
1931 as a consequence of the State Government's adoption of the 
Premiers' Plan. These reductions caused widespread dissatisfaction 
within the service and were the subject of a number of protest 
delegations to the Premier at which the public service unions 
complained that they had been unfairly singled out for discriminatory 
(34) treatment. 
There is little doubt that the CPNP Government handled relations 
with its own employees in a less than diplomatic manner. The 
ministry's thinly veiled hostility to the public service was the 
consequence of a number of influences. The Government service 
presented itself as a readily accessible area of expenditure 
reduction; and members of the Government possessed ideological 
objections to the public service. As a party which drew its major 
support from farmers and businessmen, it is understandable that the 
CPNP would be biased against the public sector and in favour of the 
private sector. A more practical consideration was also present. 
Soon after coming to office, Moore's earlier commitment to almost 
unfettered laissez faire economic principles was compromised by 
the exigencies of office. This drew criticism from his supporters 
and it is reasonable to assume that Moore's draconian approach to 
the public service was an attempt to prove to those supporters that 
he still believed in the efficacy of pure private enterprise. 
Whatever prompted Moore to adopt the approach that he did, the 
consequences for his Government were serious. His attitude 
encouraged the while collar and blue collar unions to unite 
against what they now saw as a common opponent. Despite the fact 
that the SSU was required to disaffiliate from the ALP, it, in 
32. ibid., 17 September, 1930, pp 1012-1016. 
33. Queensland Teachers' Journal, 24 September, 1930, p 31; 
23 November, 1931, p 21. 
34. ibid., 18 June, 1934, p 19; and Brisbane Courier, 19 May, 1932. 
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common with other white collar unions, worked to ensure the defeat 
of Moore at the 1932 election. 
The decision to vary the wages and conditions of Government and 
non-Government employees was motivated by the orthodox economic 
thinking which guided the CPNP Government throughout its three 
years in office. Moore believed that the depression had been 
caused by extravagant public sector spending in the 1920s and that 
prosperity would be restored only when Governments curtailed their 
own expenditure and encouraged the revival of private enterprise. 
Moore and his Treasurer, WH Barnes, were enthusiastic deflationists 
in economic policy matters and believed that any attempts at credit 
expansion would lead inevitably to a total economic collapse. 
Moore's attitude to the proper role of Government in economic policy 
was revealed in his response to the Labor party's claim that the 
public sector should be expanded to permit a consumer led economic 
recovery; he said: 
It is nonsense to talk about keeping up the purchasing 
power of the people. A Government cannot do that. 
All a Government should do is to give encouragement 
to private industry. (35) 
The Moore Government found its economic theories reflected in 
the Premiers' Plan which was drawn up at a Premiers' Conference in 
May 1931. This plan was inspired by the economic orthodoxy of 
the day and was designed to be deflationary. It involved a twenty 
percent reduction in Government expenditure; an increase in 
Commonwealth income and sales tax; and a reduction of private and 
(37) public interest rates. Queensland was one of the first States 
to put the plan into operation. In late June 1931 the Parliament 
was assembled for a three-day emergency session and passed the 
35. AE Moore, The Elector (Journal of the CPNP), 15 August, 1932. 
36. See further, CB Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, 
Sydney, 1970, Chapters 10 and 11. 
37- ibid. 
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Debt Conversion Agreement Bill and the Financial Emergency Bill 
which gave legislative effect to those sections of the plan which 
("18) 
could not be implemented by executive initiative. Henceforth, 
the Moore Government explained and defended its economic policies 
by arguing that the Premiers' Plan had been endorsed by all 
Australia's Governments and that they were duty bound to adhere to 
its contents. Moore went further and deliberately made the plan 
the central issue at the 1932 State election when he stated in his 
policy speech that 'the Government will stand or fall by the 
(39) Premiers' Plan.. ' The fact that the Government fell can, 
in part, be explained in terms of the electoral unpopularity of the 
Premiers' Plan in Queensland, an unpopularity which was skilfully 
exploited by the Labor party. 
The economic policies developed by the Moore Government to deal 
with the depression were anathema to the Labor movement because 
they involved the dismantling of industrial conditions which had 
taken the trade unions many years to achieve. In Victoria and 
South Australia State Labor Governments pursued similar policies 
which split the Labor movement into warring factions. The absence 
of a Labor Government in Queensland meant that the political and 
industrial wings were at one in their opposition to Moore. Yet 
it was not only the economic policies of the CPNP that promoted 
unity within the Labor movement. The cabinet also took a number 
of controversial decisions which at the same time provoked the ALP 
and the trade unions, caused disharmony among CPNP supporters, and 
produced little in the way of electoral rewards for the Government. 
The first of these was a decision to carry out an investigation 
into rumours that previous Labor ministers had profited as a result of 
38. QPD, clvii, (Emergency Finance Session), 23-25 June, 1931. 
39. Brisbane Courier, 30 April, 1932. 
40. For details of the Queensland ALP's attitude to the Premiers' 
Plan see Chapter 4. 
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financial misdealings involving the State-owned mines in the 
Mungana-Chillagoe area. The CPNP had been calling for a Royal 
Commission into allegations relating to the Labor Government's 
purchase of mining leases in the Mungana area since the 1927 
Auditor-General's report had drawn attention to certain irregularities 
regarding the purchase. However, on asstuning Government Moore 
required some prodding from his party before he decided to institute 
(41) 
a Royal Commission. From this point onwards Moore took a series 
of decisions which convinced Labor supporters that his real aim was 
to embarrass the Federal Labor Government and its Treasurer, EG 
Theodore, rather than to pursue the cause of justice. 
In his search for a commissioner, Moore passed over the entire 
Queensland Supreme Court Bench and appointed Mr Justice Campbell, 
a retired judge of New South Wales Supreme Court, as sole commissioner 
in October 1929. The Royal Commissioner brought down his report on 
4 July, 1930, and in it he made serious allegations against Theodore, 
(42) William McCormack and two others. Theodore immediately resigned 
his Federal ministry, but not before he attacked Campbell, who, it 
was revealed, had a financial interest in private mining ventures in 
Queensland, and accused Moore of orchestrating a cheap political 
(43) 
stunt. The ex-Treasurer also demanded that the Queensland 
Government bring formal charges against him immediately so that he 
might clear his name and rejoin Scullin's cabinet. Despite 
Theodore's demands, the civil case against him did not commence until 
22 July, 1931 - more than twelve months after the report had been 
presented. Moore was roundly criticised for this delay on the 
ground that he was deliberately stalling in order to cause as much 
trouble for the Federal Government as possible. While it would be 
naive to suggest that Moore was not keenly aware of the overtly 
political nature of the case, there did exist extenuating circum-
stances that can be cited to defend his dilatoriness. 
41. Brisbane Courier, 7 July, 1930. 
42. Royal Commission, Mungana, 4 July, 1930, QPP, Vol 1, 1930, p 1372. 
43. Sydney Morning Herald, 7 July, 1930. 
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The report of Justice Campbell was forwarded to the Queensland 
Crown Law office in July 1930 for a legal opinion. It appears that 
(44) for technical reasons. Crown Law was reluctant to recommend 
criminal proceedings against Theodore. Moreover, there existed 
certain legal impediments to civil action, which were only removed 
(45) by Government amendments to the Crown Remedies Act. Debate on 
the amending Bill was extremely vitriolic with the Labor Opposition 
alleging that Moore was changing the law merely to 'get' Theodore. 
While the Bill received Royal assent in late September 1930, Moore 
still dallied and it was suggested at the time that he hesitated 
because he did not wish to appear foolish if any legal action 
against Theodore proved unsuccessful.^ The civil trial of 
Theodore, McCormack and the two others finally commenced on 22 July, 
1931. The case for the prosecution was handled by the Attorney-
General, NT Macgroarty and AD McGill, who also happened to be 
chairman of the CPNP organisation. The party affiliations of the 
Crown attorneys did little to convince Labor supporters that the 
proceedings were anything but a political vendetta. 
Moore's fear of political embarrassment was confirmed when the 
jury of four returned a verdict of not guilty. Theodore's guilt or 
(47) innocence is still disputed, but there is no doubt that the 
affair undermined the Scullin Government by causing further dissension 
within an already faction-ridden cabinet and caucus. Within the 
Queensland political arena the affair had negative repercussions 
for the Moore Government. Macgroarty's tactless remark during the 
1932 election campaign that: 
44. See the Attorney-General's explanation, QPD, civ, 26 August, 
1930, p 589. 
45. ibid. 
46. Kennedy, PhD, op.cit., p 6IO. 
47. See Irwin Young, Theodore: His Life and Times, Sydney, 1971, 
which is sympathetic to Theodore; and KH Kennedy, The Mungana 
Scandal: State Mining and Political Corruption in the 1920s, 
Brisbane, 1978, which is sceptical of Theodore's innocence; 
see also Murphy and Joyce, op.cit., chapters 11 and 12. 
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The Mungana case smashed the Labor Party in 
Australia almost beyond mending. Thousands 
of people throughout the Commonwealth consider 
I was worth what 1 was paid in that case, (48) 
merely added another piece of evidence to the Labor party's assertions 
that Moore had attempted to frame Theodore. On the other hand, 
many non-Labor supporters were equally convinced of Theodore's guilt 
and were angry because Moore had bungled his prosecution. 
In the midst of the Mungana affair, Hubert Sizer suddenly 
announced that he had placed before a Government party meeting 
proposals to extend the life of the current Parliament for two 
(49) 
years and to reintroduce the Legislative Council. The first 
of these announcements was quite unexpected and aroused strong 
passions in the community. The Labor party was outraged and 
launched a public campaign in opposition to the proposal. Such 
a reaction was, of course, to be expected, but the Government was 
visibly shaken by the hostile comments of the usually sympathetic 
Brisbane print media. The Daily Mail's reaction was perhaps the 
most harsh: 
There is no argument for such a course that will 
stand a moment's examination. It would be 
undemocratic and autocratic in the extreme. 
Considered from the lowest plane of party 
expediency it would be suicidal. From the 
public point of view, it would be grievously 
wrong. (50) 
At this point the Premier intervened and announced that the cabinet 
had decided not to proceed with the matter-
48. Daily Mail and Daily Standard, 1 June, 1932. 
49. Lack, op.cit., p 115. 
50. Daily Mail, 30 September, 1930. 
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Moore experienced much greater difficulty in extricating 
himself from the problems that surrounded the possible re-establish-
ment of the upper house. Labor had abolished the Legislative 
Council in 1922 and a succession of non-Labor leaders had pledged 
themselves to restore it. During the 1929 election campaign, 
Moore had promised that a CPNP Government would reintroduce the 
bicameral system to Queensland. Yet it soon became obvious that 
the parliamentary party was deeply divided on the issue. Some 
wished for reintroduction by legislation alone which others demanded 
that the question first be put to a referendum. Moore was 
sympathetic to the second method but, as the economic situation 
deteriorated, he became unwilling to put the issue to a plebiscite 
for fear that it would become a public test of his Government's 
electoral standing. The good result achieved by the Labor party 
at the Brisbane municipal elections in May 1931 confirmed him in 
this view. Others, however, placed a different interpretation on 
those results. Sectional groups opposed to the Labor party came 
to the realisation by mid-1931 that Moore was likely to lose the 
State election scheduled for the following year They saw the 
reintroduction of the Legislative Council as an insurance policy 
against the likelihood of a Labor Government being elected in 1932. 
In July 1931 the Brisbane Courier commenced a public campaign 
in favour of the establishment of a second chamber- The short-term 
goal of this campaign was to influence the CPNP conference, which 
was to be held in August, to direct the parliamentary party to act 
(51) 
on the issue. As it tu: 
following open-ended motion: 
urned out, the conference adopted the 
That this conference confirms the principles of 
the restoration of the Legislative Council, and 
that the matter of giving effect to the foregoing 
resolution be left to the judgement of the 
Government. If it is decided to hold a 
referendum this conference recommends that it 
be held before the end of the current year (52) 
51. Brisbane Courier, 21, 28 July? 4 August, I93I. 
52. ibid., 11 August, 1931. 
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By this stage opinions within the parliamentary party had hardened 
and there were rumours that at least twelve members were prepared 
to cross the floor if an attempt were made to reintroduce the 
(53) Council without a referendum. Moore responded to this deadlock 
with vacillation. 
As the 1931 parliamentary year drew to a close and Moore 
appeared to do nothing, many CPNP supporters became openly critical 
of him. As before, the Brisbane Courier was eager to articulate 
the views of those demanding action, and displayed no hesitation 
in attacking Moore in its columns. The following editorial 
illustrates the degree of hysteria that was creeping into the 
debate: 
Mr Moore is Premier of the State, and the people 
will blame him, and not half a dozen recalcitrants 
of his party, if he leaves Queensland open to 
attacks by a Socialist Government without the 
safeguard that he and his party were elected to 
provide. (54) 
During the last few months of 1931 the parliamentary party held 
numerous discussions on the matter without reaching any concrete 
decision. By late November a draft Bill had been prepared, but 
no agreement could be reached upon it. The matter dragged on 
until the last scheduled party meeting of the year, at which many 
hoped for a final decision. However, the meeting lapsed because 
of the lack of a quorum. It was rumoured at the time that the 
lack of a quorum was arranged by some person who deliberately 
misled some members as to the exact venue of the meeting. 
Regardless of the truth of these rumours no decision was taken 
and the Government did not proceed with any legislation regarding 
the Legislative Council. This episode seriously damaged Moore's 
political career. His indecisiveness convinced many, both within 
53. ibid., 10 December, 1931 
54. ibid., 17 November, 1931 
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and without the party, that he was a feeble leader The following 
comment, which he made to the press in the midst of the affair, did 
nothing to discourage this opinion: 
If, on the one hand, I decided not to go on with 
the project, one section would hotly criticise me, 
and if, on the other, I do, another section would 
condemn me. There is, however, one thing one must 
have before going on with a proposal of this kind. 
That thing is a majority- (55) 
Another good example of the general difficulties encountered 
during the depression by the Moore Government can be found in a case 
study of its attempts to render assistance to the State's wool 
growers. 
As a Country party Premier of a predomina "ly rural State, Arthur 
Moore was keenly aware of his responsibilities to the man on the 
land. In January 1931 he recognised that the Queensland woollen 
industry, which contributed sixty percent of the State's export 
earnings, was in serious economic straits. The Government diagnosed 
the problem as being one of high production costs caused by interest 
payments on overdrafts. In order to improve the condition of the 
wool industry Moore suggested the following measures: 
1. Sheep grazing selectors will received a 25 percent 
reduction in rent. 
2. Sheep grazing selectors will receive a 7 years 
extension of lease. 
3. Sheep grazing selectors and sheep pastoral lessees 
will have the interests on overdi'afts reduced from 
an average of 72 percent to 6 percent. 
4. Sheep pastoral lessees will have an adjustment made 
in their leases as financial circumstances warrant. (57) 
55. ibid. 
56. See Governor's speech, QPD, 153, 21 August, 1929, p 6. 
57- Moore to Forgan Smith, n d , file 31/6403, PRE/A 1036, QSA. 
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Queensland wool growers were generally pleased with the Government's 
efforts on their behalf. Yet, they demanded further concessions, 
which they presented to Moore in March 1931. These were: 
1. a reduction in crown rents by 25 percent 
2. an extension of leases 
3. a granting of additional areas to small selectors 
4. certain concessions to cattle holdings 
5. a reduction in railway freights 
6. the carrying forward of leases for taxation purposes 
7 the abolition of land tax. 
Moore pointed out that his Government intended to introduce reforms 
one to four, but added that he could not comply with the last three 
demands because of the decline in Government revenue that would 
(59) 
result.^^^^ 
Initially Moore enjoyed the support of the graziers' organisa-
tions for the Government's new scheme, but he was soon to 
encounter strong opposition from certain financial institutions 
whose concurrence was essential for its success. Moore had argued 
from the outset that the programme was necessarily a joint venture 
involving the Government, the banks, and the pastoral companies. 
However, support from some of these financial institutions was not 
immediately forthcoming and Moore was required to embark on a 
58. Secretary Selectors' Association to Moore, 21 February, 1931, 
ibid.; and Secretary United Graziers' Association of 
Queensland to Moore, 18 March, 1931, ibid. 
59. Moore to United Graziers' Association of Queensland, 9 April, 
1931, ibid. 
60. Some graziers in the Winton area were not happy with Moore's 
proposals; Secretary Winton Chamber of Commerce to Moore 
27 January, 1931, ibid. 
61. Managing Director Queensland Primary Producers' 
Co-operative Association Limited, 10 March, 1931, 
ibid. 
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lengthy campaign to convince them of the efficacy of the scheme. 
The pastoral companies responded enthusiastically to Moore's 
proposals, and by April five leading wool firms and a number of 
private mortgagees had accepted the Government's jjlan and had cut 
(62) 
their rates of interest on overdrafts to six percent. 
The trading banks were unresponsive to the Government's proposals, 
The general manager of the Bank of New South Wales, AP Davidson, told 
Moore quite unequivocally that his bank did not approve of the 
scheme. In a letter of four foolscap pages he lectured the 
Queensland Premier on the evils of Government meddling in economic 
affairs, and denounced the Queensland Land Courts' decision to 
reduce rentals as being 'a political dictation of prices', which 
ignored the economic laws of supply and demand. Davidson also 
expressed concern that the Government's measures would lead to an 
inflation of cheque currency. He concluded his letter with the 
following warning: 
It is surely a lesson of our recent history that 
release from the present difficulties requires a 
diminution of political interference with economic 
adjustment rather than further essays in control, 
leading inevitably though insensibly in the 
direction of Communism. (63) 
Moore reacted angrily to this letter and he accused the Bank of New 
South Wales of acting on 'erroneous impressions' and 'inaccurate 
premises' Such exchanges did nothing to improve relations 
between Government and the banks, and Moore was required to push 
on with the scheme without their support. 
In July 1931 the Premier sent a letter to those pastoral 
companies and banks which had not co-operated in the Government's 
62. Premier's Press Statement, 20 April, 1931, ibid. 
63. Davidson, to Moore, 13 April, 1931, ibid. 
64. Moore to Davidson, 29 April, 1931, ibid. 
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scheme, informing them that because of falling interest rates and 
the introduction of legislative protection for mortgagees, it was 
unlikely that interest for money lent on good security would exceed 
six percent in the near future. Consequently, the Government felt 
that its concessions to induce the cutting of interest rates for the 
wool industry were no longer necessary. Moore was aware that 
should the Government withdraw its offer this would discriminate 
against clients of those companies that did not co-operate with 
the Government in the first instance. Therefore the Government 
extended its offer for one month to allow the companies and banks 
to reconsider their position. On this occasion the Premier 
received a somewhat more favourable response, with most of the 
financial institutions reducing overdraft interest rates to six 
percent for one year and also reducing interest rates on pastoral 
leases by ^ to 1 percent for one year. Moore again encountered 
difficulties when he asked that these concessions be made retro-
spective to 1 January, 1931. On this issue the companies closed 
(67 ^  
ranks and flatly refused to accede to Moore's request. Tne 
result of this refusal was that the Government was forced to abandon 
that section of the scheme and accept reduction from July 1931. 
The circumstances surrounding the wool relief scheme are 
interesting in that they exhibit the confluence and conflict of 
interests that existed among the Government, the wool growers, the 
65. Moore to New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Company, Australian 
Mercantile Land and Finance Company Limited, Dalgety and Company, 
Bank of New South Wales, Commercial Banking Company of Sydney, 
and the Queensland National Bank, 14 July, 1931, ibid. 
66. Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Company Limited to Moore, 
New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Company Limited and 
Queensland National Bank Limited to Moore, 6/II August, 1931, 
ibi d. 
67. Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Company Limited to Moore, 
1 September, 1931, New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Company 
Moore, 2 September, 1931, New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency 
Company to Moore, 1 October, 1931, ibid. 
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banks, and the pastoral companies. A Country party Premier such as 
Moore was loath to allow the wool growers to be swamped by the 
economic depression, but scarcity of funds placed severe limitations 
on the assistance which could be given by the Government alone. As 
was mentioned before, Moore was unable to agree to some of the 
graziers' initial requests because of the adverse effect they would 
have had on Government revenue. Moore also intimated that he was 
most strongly opposed to introducing any discriminatory legislation 
regarding the granting of concessions, but also pointed out that 
to give assistance to all Crown tenants in the sheep industry would 
mean an annual loss in revenue of £100,000 per year, which the 
Government was unable to forego unless the financial institutions 
were also prepared to make some contribution. 
The financial institutions were reluctant to agree to the 
Government's proposals because of resultant decrease in their 
incomes. Most of the companies and banks involved had interests 
and commitments outside Queensland. On the other hand, many of 
them, for example Dalgety's and Winchcombe Carson's, had a substantial 
economic stake in the Queensland woollen industry, and did not wish 
to see it collapse. In such a period of economic depression, the 
financial institutions were also wary of endangering their own 
solvency and the solvency of their shareholders by granting over-
generous concessions to any one industry. This situation 
produced a virtual stalemate whereby the Government was being 
pressured into action by the wool growers, but dared not overstretch 
itself because of the possible economic consequences. Turning to 
the financial institutions for support, the Government found that 
these organisations were not prepared to anger their shareholders 
by reducing their margin of profit. The frustrations caused by 
this situation were made apparent by Moore in a letter to the Bank 
of New South Wales in which he declared that 'If all parties... 
insist on expecting their full rights under existing contracts from 
68. Moore to Bank of New South Wales, 14 July, 1931, ibid. 
69. Queensland National Bank of Moore, 11 August, 1931, ibid. 
the wool and other key industries, then bankruptcy and Communism 
await us.' 
The debate over the wool relief scheme also clearly exhibits 
the manner in which the depressed economic situation caused division 
and acrimony among groups which, in ordinary times, would have 
displayed a keen awareness of their common interests. Moreover, 
the circimistances that developed placed Moore in an invidious 
situation whereby he was forced to attempt to be all things to all 
men. Such situations occurred time and again during his Premiership, 
with the result that he constantly found himself in the position 
where his policy options were extremely limited. Perhaps a more 
skilful politician could have extricated himself from such situations 
with a greater degree of success. However, Moore seemed to possess 
a flair for antagonising important sections of his party's power base 
by adopting apparently indifferent attitudes to key client gi'oups 
among the CPNP's supporters. 
The Government's problems were magnified because of the 
administrative inexperience of the cabinet. Moore himself had 
never been in a Government before 1929 and the only minister who 
had been was the Treasurer, WH Barnes, who was seventy-one years 
old on his appointment. Talent was so scarce within the ranks 
of the CPNP that Moore was required to appoint as ministers two 
men who were first elected to parliament in 1929. These were: 
NF Macgroarty (Attorney General) and EA Atherton (Minister for 
Mines) After a year in office Moore became aware of the incom-
petence of a number of ministers but declined to effect a cabinet 
reshuffle because he was concerned about his own position as 
(71) 
leader. Leslie Wilson, who replaced John Goodwin as Govern 
of Queensland in June 1931, gave the secretary of the Dominions' 
Office an accurate picture when he wrote that 'the Moore Governir 
(72) 
...,. , had a most inefficient collection of ministers. ' 
70. Moore to Bank of New South Wales, 29 April, 1931, ibid. 
71. Daily Mail, 15 June, 1932. 
72. Leslie Wilson to Dominions' Office, 5 June, 1933, Wilson Papers, 
unclassified, FML. 
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Some CPNP dissidents later claimed that Moore deliberately chose and 
retained incompetent National party members in many cabinet posts so 
as to ensure the overall dominance of Countiy party views. RM King 
(the Deputy Premier), Macgroarty and Sizer were named in this 
respect. These rumours highlighted the divisions which existed 
between those in the CPNP who aligned themselves with the National 
party and those who had previously been associated with the Country 
(74) 
party. The two parties had merged in 1925, but they held 
separate meetings during their years in office and cabinet decisions 
(75) 
were often taken by vote along 'party' lines. 
Some disillusioned non-Labor supporters decided to establish 
new political organisations in competition with the CPNP The first 
of these to appear in Queensland was the Vigilants which was a mild 
replica of the New Guard and the All for Australia League ( A F A L ) . 
A dramatic feature of the depression in New South Wales was the 
(7(1 
militant political activity of sections of the urban middle classes. 
Organisations such as the New Guard and the AFAL came into being to 
combat what they saw as the extreme socialism of the Lang Government. 
Despite their alleged antipathy to all political parties, they, in 
fact, operated in the interests of the non-Labor parties, and a 
faction within the AFAL was instrumental in the formation of the 
(77) United Australia Party in 1931. The Moore Government derived 
73. TP Fry, 'State Elections - Queensland', Australian Quarterly, 
26, June, 1935, p 89. Fry's father was the CPNP member for the 
Brisbane seat of Kurilpa and he clashed with Macgroarty over 
the changes made to the electorate by the 1931 redistribution. 
74. See chapter 2 for details. 
75. Forgan Smith to the Premier of Victoria, 20 September, 1933, 
item 35/552, PRE/A 1081, QSA. 
76. See Keith Amos, The New Guard Movement, 1931-35, Melbourne, 1976; 
Eric Campbell, The Rallying Point, Melbourne, 1965; JRH James, 
'The Guardsmen Are Born', Nation, 11 March, I96I, and 'Guardian 
of the Faith', Nation, 2 October, I965; John McCarthy, 'All for 
Australia:Some Right Wing Responses to the Depression in New 
South Wales, 1929-32', JRAHS, 57;2, June, 1971; Trevor Matthews, 
'The All for Australia League', Labour History, 17 October, 1970; 
and Phyllis Mitchell, 'Australian Patriots:A Study of the New 
Guard', AEHR, 9;2, September, I969. 
77- Matthews, op.cit., p 144f. 
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little direct or indirect benefit from the activities of the 
Vigilants, whose existence reflected the schismatic state of the 
anti-Labor forces in Queensland. 
The Vigilants first appeared on the political scene in October 
1930, when they led a deputation to Premier Moore to complain about 
high taxes and excessive cost of government. The Brisbane Courier 
described the organisation as 'an association of business and 
professional interests .. (which) has been formed to watch the 
(78) 
trend of financial and economic conditions.' The Daily Standard 
was more specific in its analysis of the composition of the Vigilants' 
deputation and pointed out that it contained representatives from the 
following bodies : Commonwealth Institute of Accountants, Queensland 
Institute of Architects, Master Builders' Association, Master 
Carriers' Association, Chamber of Commerce, Constitutional Club, 
Employers' Federation of Queensland, Fat Stock Brokers' Association, 
United Graziers' Association of Queensland, Queensland Chamber of 
Manufacturers, Meat Traders' Association of Queensland, Brisbane 
Merchants' Association, Motor Traders' Association, Master Printers' 
Association, Property Owner's Protection Association, Real Estate 
Institute of Queensland, Soft Goods Warehousemen, Australian Sugar 
Producers' Association, Taxpayers' Association of Queensland, 
Brisbane Timber Merchants' Association, Town Planning Association, 
(79) Brisbane Wool Selling Association. In other words, the Vigilants 
could claim to have the support of the most prominent business 
organisations in Brisbane. This breadth of support was short 
lived since many of the Vigilants' original members withdrew in 
the face of subsequent bad publicity-
78. Brisbane Courier, 8 October, 1930. 
79. Daily Standard, 8 October, 1930. 
80. ^PD, clxv, 15 October, 193O, p l604. 
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The Vigilants soon commenced an intensive propaganda campaign 
around the slogans 'Balance the Budget' and 'Taxes cause 
Unemployment' They took a particular interest in advising the 
State Government on ways to reduce expenditure. For instance, 
they assailed the Main Roads Department for placing an advertisement 
in the press calling for tenders to shift a quantity of gravel on the 
(8l) 
grounds that the advertisement cost more than the job itself. 
The Vigilants received lavish praise for their work from the Telegraph 
newspaper which told Moore that he should take particular notice of 
the Vigilants' criticism of the high level of taxation which existed 
(82) in the State. Moore did not take this advice and gave the 
Vigilants a decidely cool reception when their representatives 
(83) 
waited upon him in deputation. The activities of the Vigilants 
soon drew strong criticism from the Labor movement. The Opposition 
launched an attack on them in parliament on 15 October, 1930 when 
Sam Brassington (Balonne) suggested that their stated aim of 
abolishing State and Federal Governments and replacing them with a 
national council was akin to the methods of the Italian fascist 
movement. The Labor party also pointed out that a spokesman 
of the Vigilants, a Mr Herbert, was assistant manager of the 
Union Trustee Company, which had been fined in 1925 for attempted 
tax evasion. Criticism of the Vigilants was not confined to 
parliament, and the president of the Trades and Labor Council 
designated them 'a fascist group' The Daily Standard 
endorsed this view and accused the Vigilants of promoting 'a 
(87) 
socially degraded policy' 
81. Daily Standard. 8 October, 1930. 
82. Telegraph, 15 October, 1930. 
83. Queensland Teachers' Journal, 36;4, October, 1930, p 1 
84. ^PD, clxv, 15 October, 1930, p l604. 
85. ibid. 
86. Daily Standard, 1 November, 1930. 
87. ibid., 15 August, 1930. 
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By mid-November 1930 the Vigilants had established an organisa-
tional structure and were conducting fortnightly meetings at Commerce 
House, which was also the address of the Chamber of Commerce. About 
this time it is possible to discern a shift of emphasis in the 
Vigilants' activities away from State Government issues towards 
matters related to the Brisbane City Council. The Vigilants 
displayed a particular interest in The City of Brisbane Amendment Act 
which was then being drafted for presentation to Parliament. On 
the 24th of November the Chairman of Vigilants' municipal sub-
committee, AJ Thompson placed before the Home Secretary, JC Peterson, 
who was in charge of the legislation, the following demands : that 
there should be no more than ten aldermen; that salaries for 
aldermen should be abolished that the life of the council should 
be extended from three to five years; that a property owners' and 
occupiers' franchise be introduced; that a mayoral allowance of 
£2,000 be paid in lieu of a salary; and that the city should be 
administered by a manager. These demands had been formulated in 
a series of formal discussions between the Vigilants the Property 
Owners' Association, the Taxpayers' Association, the Chamber of 
(88) Commerce and other similar groups. A major aim of the Vigilants 
was to ensure the election of businessmen to the City Council in place 
of 'professional politicians' This desire is indicated in 
Thompson's statement to the Home Secretary that : 
They (the Vigilants) were convinced that a system 
which provided a salary for aldermen just 
sufficient for a livelihood was not likely to 
attract those men best suited for the position. (89) 
In the midst of the Vigilants' campaign regarding the City of 
Brisbane Anendment Act, there suddenly emerged yet another new 
group, calling itself the Civic Reform League (CRL). This group 
88. Brisbane Courier, 25 November, 1930. 
89. ibid. 
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announced that it intended to hold a public meeting in the Brisbane 
City Hall on 27th November 'to protest against the action of the 
Government in blocking reform of the City Council' At the 
meeting various 'leading citizens' expressed agreement with the 
Government's intentions to amend the City of Brisbane Act, but 
castigated the Premier for his timidity in not making more sweeping 
(91) 
changes. Moore stated that he had no intention of making any 
substantial alterations to the Bill, which had its first reading on 
(9^) the day of the CRL meeting.^ ' 
While the appearance of the CRL may have appeared to many a largely 
unheralded one, there is substantial evidence to suggest that it 
had close connections with the Vigilants. For instance, the 
personnel and programmes of the two groups were very similar-
AJ Thompson, who was a prominent spokesman for the Vigilants, 
was also a major protagonist at the 27 November CRL meeting. The 
State Service Union explained at the time that the hostile criticism 
which the Vigilants attracted soon after their formation frightened 
off many supporters, and those that remained decided to change their 
(93) 
name so as to be free of the bad public image of the 'Vigilants'. 
While there may have been an element of truth in this analysis, the 
birth of the CRL was somewhat more complicated than the State 
Service Union realised. The real beginning of the events that 
culminated in the formation of the CRL and the Vigilants can be 
traced back to 1929. 
Various sections of the Brisbane business community harboured 
objections to the constitution and operations of the Brisbane City 
Council throughout the 1920s. These criticisms were generally not 
well received by successive Labor Governments. The election of the 
90. ibid. 
91. ibid., 28 November, 1930. 
92. ibid., 27 November, 1930. 
93. State Service, 15;4, April, 1931, p 1 
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Moore Government gave encouragement to the business sector, who felt 
that the new administration would introduce long overdue reforms in 
the council. In November 1929 a deputation of business groups 
interested in the zoning of Brisbane, waited on the Home Secretary 
to make complaints regarding details of the zoning ordinances which 
had recently been approved by the City Council. The deputation 
insisted 'that the ordinance was a very serious menace to the rights 
of citizens, in that it gave the council power to require an 
established business to move within five years, without compensation, 
(94) if it were situated outside its correct zone.' An interesting 
feature of this deputation was that thirteen of the twenty-three 
organisations represented on it were also members of the Vigilants' 
deputation which waited on the Premier in October 1930. Also, the 
same organisations had taken an active interest in the zoning of 
(95) Brisbane throughout 1929- These groups were optimistic that 
Moore would reform the City Council, and they formed the Vigilants 
as a pressure group to make their opinions known to both the public 
and the Government. When it became clear that Moore was not prepared 
to accede to all their demands, they decided that it was necessary 
to have their own representatives elected to the City Council. To 
this end, they altered their role from that of a pressure group to 
that of a municipal party under the title Civic Reform League. 
When the City of Brisbane Amendment Act was in its second reading 
stage, Peterson took the opportunity to explain why some of the CRL 
suggestions had been rejected. He defended the city's aldermen 
against the 'ill-advised, illogical and unfair' criticism levelled 
against them, and argued that a mere reduction in the number of 
(97) 
aldermen would not solve the problems besetting the City Council. 
94. Mclnnes to Peterson, 15 November, 1929, item 29/3142, PRE/A997, 
QSA. 
95. Brisbane City Coun cil. Town Plan File, l6062,142/l no. 29, 14 
February, 1929. I am indebted to Professor John Laverty for 
this reference. 
96. ^PD, clvii, 2 December, 1930, p 2675. 
97- Brisbane Courier, 27 November, 1930. 
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He was supported on this point by the Town Planning Association who 
argued that a council of only seven or ten aldermen would be 'Queen 
Street Council' and ratepayers in the outer Brisbane suburbs would 
be under-represented. The CRL had little success in enlisting 
support from metropolitan members of either party, and it was left 
to TA Dunlop (independent, Rockliampton) to argue the case for a 
reduction in the numbers and pay of the city's aldermen. 
The CRL entered the May 1951 elections for the Brisbane City 
Council and ran a very active election campaign which stressed the 
(99) twin issues of no pay lor aldermen and a reduction in rate pajTiients. 
The CRL won seven wards. Labor eight. Progressives three and 
National Citizens two. The CRL's most important victory was in 
the ward of Toowong, where H Massey defeated the Lord Mayor- The 
new CRL aldermen were H Tait, company director: TG Paine, retired 
school teacher; MP Campbell, manufacturer; JB Vickers, civil 
engineer: A Faulkner, Vice-President of the Chamber of Commerce* 
and a former mayor of South Brisbane, and H Massey. The social 
background of these CRL aldermen bears out Greenwood and Laverty's 
observation that 'the Civic Reform League found its essential strength 
among prominent executives and businessmen.' While the CRL 
did not offer a direct electoral challenge to the CPNP at the State 
level, it did displace the Nationalist-aligned parties as the major 
non-Labor group on the Brisbane City Council. 
Prior to the 1932 election a split occurred in the CPNP and a 
new non-Labor party, the Queensland Party, was formed. The driving 
force behind the new party was the Young Nationalists Organisation 
who complained that Country party dominance within the Moore 
Government was not being effectively countered by the National 
98. gPD, clvii, 2 December, 1930, pp 2697-8. 
99. ibid. 
100.Brisbane Courier, 4 May, 1931. 
101. Gordon Greenwood and John Laverty, Brisbane, 1859-1959; 
A History of Local Government, Brisbane, 1959, P 493. 
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members.^ "' The new body shared the anti-political party senti-
ments of the Vigilants and had close connections with the Queensland 
Non-Party League which had been formed in June 1931. The 
league was under the patronage of the Independent member for 
Fassifern, Arnold W.- nholt, who was a regular speaker at their 
meetings. Nevertheless, W'?,'^ nhoId declined to join the 
Queensland party and was elected unopposed in Fassifern in 1932 
as an Independent. In the face of almost hysterical opposition 
from most of the Brisbane media, the Queensland party entered 
fifteen candidates in the State election. Their declared aim was 
' ..to send free men and women to Parliament, representing no 
particular faction or class.. , but Queensland as a whole.' 
In fact, they failed to win a seat. The party received only 1.68 
percent of the valid vote and fourteen of the fifteen candidates 
forfeited their deposits. While they did split the non-Labor vote 
in the seats they entered, the CPNP did not lose any seats because 
of this. The life-span of the Queensland party was brief and it 
collapsed soon after the election. 
The Labor party won the 1932 election by a small margin and 
commenced a period in Government that was to last until 1957-
Labor was successful in 1932 because the depression created 
insurmountable economic and political problems for the Moore 
Government. In this sense Queensland was no exception because 
no Australian State Government (except Tasmania in 1931) survived 
a depression election. Its three years in Opposition were construc-
tive ones for the Labor party because they restored that sense of 
unity that had been shattered by the events of the late 1920s. 
102. Fry, op.cit., p 88. 
103. Brisbane Courier, 10 June, 1931. 
104. ibid.. 30 October, 1931. 
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Labor was doubly fortunate in that it returned to power at a time 
when the economic situation began to improve. The first Forgan 
Smith Government was able to take the credit for this improvement 
and to win the 1935 election in a landslide which cost Arthur 
Moore his position as leader of the Opposition and which destroyed 
the CPNP which he had helped to create in 1925. 
CHAPTER 4 
LABOR RECONSTRUCTS, 1929-1932 
83. 
The ALP's three years in opposition were ones of reconciliation 
and reconstruction for the Queensland Labor movement. Moore's 
industrial relations policies were a major unifying force and the 
experience of the depression re-oriented most of Queensland's unions 
towards parliamentary politics. The Labor Party was the chief 
beneficiary of this development because it was the only organisation 
capable of giving expression to the political aspirations and require-
ments of the Labor movement as a whole. When the initial shock of 
the 1929 defeat had passed, the ALP was faced with the problem of 
whether or not William McCormack was to remain as parliamentary 
leader. McCormack, who was in poor health, solved this problem 
by tendering his resignation as leader on 27 May, 1929. In the 
subsequent ballot the deputy leader, William Forgan Smith, had an 
(2) 
easy victory over the member for Maryborough, David Weir. 
McCormack then departed for the United Kingdom where, in a speech 
to a group of Labour MPs, he attacked the Queensland railway unions 
for bringing about the defeat of his Government. These remarks 
produced an outcry from the Brisbane trade unions, and his old 
adversaries on the TLC managed to pass a motion calling for 
(4) 
McCormack's expulsion from the ALP. McCormack's own actions again 
diffused the issue. On 21 February, on his return from the United 
Kingdom, he resigned his seat of Cairns and followed this with his 
resignation as a QCE delegate in March. It was fortunate for the 
internal stability of the Labor party that McCormack decided to 
withdraw from public life. A major dispute over his position in 
the ALP, following so closely on the 1929 defeat, would certainly 
have reopened the divisions of the previous four years and would 
have seriously hindered attempts to restore unity to the party. 
1. William Morrow, op.cit., p 1, stated that McCormack was suffering 
from cancer of the throat in 1929. The fact that he lived 
until 1947 throws some doubt on this diagnosis. 
2. Caucus Minutes, 27 May, 1929. The result of the ballot was: 
Forgan Smith twenty votes, Weir three votes. Weir died in 
September I929. 
3. Worker, 11 September, I929. 
4. TLC Minutes, I6 October, 1929. 
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When it had recovered from the initial shock of the 1929 defeat, 
the Labor party set about the task of regaining Government. In 
August 1930 the QCE established a 'Back to Power' campaign committee 
to encourage co-operation between the parliamentary party and the 
organisation, to raise finance, and to boost morale within the 
(5) branches. The primary task of the ALP during its three years 
in Opposition was to achieve a 1econciliation between the parliamen-
tary and industrial wings and to convince the latter of the necessity 
of returning Labor to power at the 1932 State election. The TLC 
made the first steps in this direction when it proposed that a Unity 
Conference be convened at which the unions, the QCE and the parliamen-
tarians could talk out their differences. The organisation of 
this conference was interrupted when Forgan Smith announced that he 
would not attend because of derogatory remarks made about the 
Parliamentary Labor party by trade union speakers at a public rally 
called to protest against the Moore Government's amendments to the 
(7) Conciliation and Arbitration Act. Fortunately, the situation 
was salvaged when the TLC and the QCE decided that their executives 
should meet in private discussion rather than in a semi-public forum. 
This gathering was a success and both leaders made public statements 
(8) 
that all contentious matters between them had been resolved. 
In retrospect, the decision not to hold an open conference was a 
wise one because the unifying influence of the Moore Government had 
not yet touched all segments of the Labor movement, and the discussion 
could easily have degenerated into a fruitless and debilitating 
slanging match. 
Relationships among the unions, the QCE and the parliamentary 
party steadily improved as the depression deepened and the reality 
of a Government hostile to the Labor movement became apparent. Even 
5. QCE Minutes, 22 August, 1930. 
6. ibid., 2 December, 1929: TLC Minutes, 27 May, 1929. 
7. QCE Minutes, 13 December, 1929. 
8. ibid., 13 May, 1930, 
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unions such as the Waterside Workers' Federation (WWF), which had been 
implacably opposed to the McCormack Government, became reconciled to 
the ALP. Relations between the Waterside workers and the QCE in the 
late 1920s had been marked by hatred and bitterness. The sources of 
this alienation were not removed solely by McCormack's replacement as 
leader, and it took almost four years for the union to return to the 
ALP. Being outside the party created problems for the union because 
it was denied representation at ALP conferences and its members were 
not permitted to vote in pre-selection ballots. The WWF gradually 
softened its attitude to the QCE and campaigned on behalf of the ALP 
(9) 
at the 1931 Federal election. In January 1932 the union's 
executive decided to seek re-affiliation with the party and appointed 
a committee to discuss with the QCE the questions of accumulated 
affiliation fees and the status of the union Secretary who had been 
expelled from the ALP because of his public criticism of 
McCormack. The QCE did not immediately accept the union's offer 
(11) (12) 
to re-affiliate, but in March 1933 they were finally readmitted. 
Neither the economic crisis nor the activities of the Moore 
Government could, however, effect a reconciliation between the ALP 
and the Australian Railways Union (ARU). The decision of the union 
to support the Federal party at the 1929 election gave some hope of 
(13) 
a settlement, but this was short-lived. In the State sphere, 
the ARU believed that the QCE was under the domination of an AWU-led 
clique that had engineered the union's expulsion in 1926. The ALP 
did make overtures to the ARU regarding the question of reaffiliation. 
This approach was part of the general strategy of the QCE to heal the 
breaches in the Labor movement in preparation for the 1932 election. 
The ARU executive received the overture coldly, and when the matter 
came before the 1930 State conference of the union a motion calling 
for reaffiliation was defeated fourteen votes to two after a very 
9. WWF Minutes, 8 December, 1931, p 79 E213/10 RSSSA/ANU. 
10. ibid., 6 January, 1932, p 95 and 10 February 1932, p 118. 
11. ibid., 2 March, 1932, p 141. 
12. ibid., 29 March, 1933, p 285, 
13. ARU State Council Minutes, 26 September, 1929, p 121. 
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brief debate.^ ^ Major arguments put forward against the QCE 
were that the ARU had never voluntarily left the ALP, it had been 
expelled, and that the union was in no position to pay accumulated 
(15) 
affiliation fees. Despite the hostility of the union's 
executive officers, there developed within the ARU a rank and file 
movement in favour of rejoining the Labor party. At the February 
1931 ARU State Council meeting one delegate moved that the union 
reaffiliate, but was ruled out of order by the President. A 
subsequent motion to force the issue to a plebiscite of members 
lapsed for want of a seconder The Cairns sub-branch of the 
union then applied to the QCE for separate affiliation. This was 
refused and the union members were advised to take up membership 
(17) 
via their local ALP branches. The steadfast refusal of the 
ARU executive to rejoin the ALP created some strain within the 
Labor movement, but the union had lost the capacity to offer a 
serious challenge to Labor's ruling elite. 
An important, long-term effect of the depression in Queensland 
was to extend and consolidate the hegemony of the Australian Workers' 
Union within the Australian Labor party. The AWl^  had occupied a 
central place in Labor politics in Queensland for many years, but 
thf experience of the depression made it the unassailable master of 
the party organisation for the next twenty years. Before the 
depression, the smaller unions were confident and powerful enough 
to challenge the AWU for control of the ALP. The economic collapse 
so weakened the industrial vmions that they became incapable of 
checking the influence and authority of the AWU. AWU dominance was 
established at three, related levels of the ALP organisation: at 
the triennial Labor-in-Politics convention; on the party's 
14. Report ARU Twelth Annual Conference, Brisbane, August, 1930, p 60. 
15. Advocate, l6 March, 1931. 
Ih. ARU State Council Minutes, February 1931, p 72; and 6 November, 
1931, p 113. 
17 QCE Minutes, 13 April, I931. 
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Queensland Central Executive and its Executive Committee (the so-
called 'inner-executive'); and within the State parliamentary caucus. 
The alliance between the AWU and the ALP was personified in the close 
political relationship that developed between the union's Secretary, 
Clarrie Fallon, and William Forgan Smith. 
The AWU achieved its dominance within the ALP because of the 
preferential relationship that existed between the party and the 
trade unions. Most officials of the affiliated trade unions in the 
1930s regarded the ALP as little more than a subsidiary branch of the 
industrial Labor movement. In their view the party was created by 
the unions to achieve objectives that could not be attained by 
traditional industrial means, and it was vital that the party remain 
under the control of the unions. The long-time President of the 
ALP, WH Demaine, stated the consensus bluntly during his address to 
the 1955 Labor-in-Politics convention: 
Well, I want to say right here and now that the 
constitution of the ALP is the widest and most 
democratic in the world, and that every activity 
of the working-class movement is represented 
therein, and that to all intents and purposes it 
is controlled by organised industrial Labor. (I8) 
'Democracy' was defined and measured in terms of the level of formal 
trade union representation within the councils of the party. 
Predictably, the ALP's constitution in the 1930s reflected and 
preserved the preferential status of the unions. Membership of 
the party could be obtained in either of two ways: by direct 
membership of a local branch, or through membership of an affiliated 
trade union. In 1928 there were 4270 'branch' members and 97776 
(19) 
'union' members of the ALP in Queensland. This meant that 
only four percent of the party's total membership were located in 
18. Daily Standard, 19 February, 1935. 
19. Official Report Labor-in-PoIitics Convention, 1928, p I3. 
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branches. Union members had equal status with branch members and 
it was not tmtil after the 1957 split that the party's rules were 
altered to require parliamentary candidates and convention delegates 
to be financial members of local branches. 
Because of their numerical superiority, the unions were in a 
position to dominate the triennial Labor-in-Politics convention. 
The party's constitution provided that the branches and unionists 
within each State electorate were entitled to send one delegate to 
convention and that the affiliated unions were allocated delegates 
according to the following formula: those with a membership ranging 
between 1000 and 3000 were entitled to one delegate; tmions with a 
membership in excess of 3000 were granted an additional delegate 
for each 3000 up to a maximum of ten; those unions with a membership 
less than 1000 were classified as 'small unions' and were granted 
one delegate. This arrangement produced a 1932 convention of 
seventy-three delegates, of whom twenty-five were direct represen-
tatives of the unions and forty-eight came from the electorates. 
At first glance this would seem to deny the proposition that the 
unions 'controlled' the convention. A number of factors, however, 
need to be considered. The electorate representatives were referred 
to as 'branch' delegates but this was a misnomer since very few of 
them were merely rank and file members of the party. When the 
list of 'branch' delegates is examined many of them are shown to be 
parliamentarians or trade union officials. Providing there was 
more than one candidate, all electorates chose their delegates by 
plebiscite in which members of affiliated trade unions had full 
voting rights. Because the party had only 3144 branch members in 
1932 spread over 197 separate branches, the unions were able t 
determine the outcome of most convention plebiscites. 
20. Headlight, 5 February, 1932. 
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TABLE 4:1 
QUEENSLAND TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 1927-1935 
Union Membership 
Australian Workers 
Union 
Australian Railways 
Union 
Amalgamated Foodstuffs 
Union 
Shop Assistants Union 
Australian Engineering 
Union 
Queensland Teachers 
Union 
Australasian Meat 
Industries Employees 
Union 
Amalgamated Carpenters 
& Joiners Union 
1927 
58,244 
8,972 
5,664 
5,000 
4,503 
4,400 
4,286 
4,090 
Australian Road Transport 
Workers Union 3,850 
Membership 
1932 
26,862 
5,789 
2,382 
3,830 
2,924 
4,227 
3,415 
2,680 
2,440 
$ + 
1927 
- 32 
- 54 
- 42 
- 58 
- 23 
- 35 
- 4 
- 20 
- 34 
- 37 
Membership 
1935 
53,547 
6,827 
3,120 
4,310 
3,910 
3,677 
4,847 
5,232 
3,179 
f. H-
1932 
- 35 
-F136 
+ 18 
+ 31 
-H 13 
-)- 34 
- 15 
-H 42 
-1- 95 
-t- 30 
Federated Clerks Union 
(Central & Southern 
Branches) 3,409 5,570 + 63* 6,792 + 22 
Federated Engine Drivers 
& Firemens Association 
State Services Union 
Colliery Workers 
Australian Federated 
Union of Locomotive 
Enginemen 
Federated Storeman & 
Packers Union 
Builders Labourers 
Federation 
Printing & Kindred 
Industries Employees 
Union 
Coachmakers Union 
Electrical Trades Union 
Tramways Union 
Federated Ironworkers 
Association 
Others 
TOTAL 
*This growth was brought about by branch amalgamation. 
*The increase in 'others' 1927-32 was produced by a decline in the 
memberships of small tmions which rendered them unworthy of 
individual listing. 
. 2,734 
2,661 
2,502 
2,271 
2,206 
2,194 
2,157 
1,944 
I 1,297 
1,200 
1,164 
13,408 
154,781 
2,792 
2,782 
2,006 
2,023 
2,381 
859 
2,005 
1,639 
1,296 
921 
1,355 
22,560 
108,285 
-1-
•f 
-
-H 
-
± 
-(-
-
2 
4 
20 
11 
8 
61 
7 
16 
0 
23 
16 
68* 
30 
3,071 
3,747 
2,268 
1,800 
2,499 
1,160 
2,070 
1,690 
1,587 
1,023 
NA 
12,422 
154,025 
+ 10 
-t- 35 
+ 13 
- 11 
+ 5 
+ 35 
-t- 3 
+ 3.1 
-t- 22 
11 
- 45 
-f 42 
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The representation formula for convention was biased in favour 
of large unions in general and the State's largest union, the AWU, 
in particular. In 1932 there were sixty-one unions affiliated with 
the ALP, which represented fifty-seven percent of the State's unions, 
but only fourteen of these achieved individual representation at 
convention. This situation benefitted the AWU not only because it 
was the State's largest union but also because of the enormous 
membership gap that existed between it and the second largest union. 
In 1932 the AWU had 26862 financial members and the Australian 
Railways Union (ARU), which was in second place and not affiliated 
to the ALP, had only 5789 members or twenty-one percent of the AWU 
total. As Table 4:1 shows, almost all unions in Queensland 
experienced a heavy drop in membership during the depression. The 
AWU suffered more than most because it represented many unskilled 
workers who were vulnerable to unemployment and because the Moore 
Government abolished the industrial award which gave preference to 
the union in rural industries. Yet the massive percentage decline 
in its membership did not adversely affect the AWU's relative position 
of influence within the Labor party. This was because it still 
retained sufficient members to attract the full quota of delegates 
to convention and the QCE. In contrast, other unions suffered a 
decline in party representation because their smaller original 
memberships could not absorb even a minor percentage decline. 
At the 1932 Labor-in-Politics convention only two unions were 
entitled to send more than one delegate, the Australasian Meat 
Industry Employee's Union (AMIEU) earned two delegates and the AWU 
the full quota of ten. The AWU delegation accounted for forty 
percent of the total union representation of twenty-five. The AWU's 
voting strength at convention was further enhanced by the addition 
of those 'branch' delegates who were members and officials of the 
union. The power of the AWU group was put to the test at the 1932 
convention when an attempt was made to alter the balance of 
representation in favour of the smaller unions. Frank Waters, 
the delegate of the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union (APWU), 
proposed that the convention rules be amended to allow union 
representation on the following basis: 
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250 to 500 members . ... one delegate 
501 to 750 members ... two delegates 
751 to 1000 members ,.. three delegates 
1001 to 2000 members . four delegates 
With an extra delegate for each additional 1000 
members up to a maximum of sixteen for any one 
union. (2l) 
Waters defended this formula on the grounds that it provided more 
equitable representation for the smaller unions and was in accord 
with the practice adopted in other State branches of the ALP- The 
AWU realised that, despite a proposed increase in its total 
representation from ten to sixteen. Waters' scheme was designed 
to reduce its relative strength at convention. If Waters' formula 
was applied to the 1932 convention, the trade unions would have been 
entitled to over sixty delegates, only sixteen of whom would have 
been from the AWU. 
In 1932 the AWU had 26862 financial members which equalled 
twenty-five percent of the total Queensland trade union membership. 
Under Waters' proposal the union would have been granted credit for 
only 14000 of these members while the other affiliated unions, 
most of whose memberships ranged from 1500 to 3500 would have been 
entitled to four, five or six delegates each. When the delegates 
of these 'small' unions were added together the AWU would have had 
only twenty-six percent of the total union representation. Since 
Waters did not advocate any alteration to the method of branch 
representation, the focus of power at convention would have been 
shifted away from the AWU group and in the direction of an alliance 
of the other unions. Waters' motion provoked a major debate at 
convention during which he was supported by the delegates from the 
Shop Assistants' Union, the Printing and Kindred Industries 
Employees' Union, the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive 
Enginemen and the Electrical Trades Union. This support was 
21. Official Report Labor-in-PoIitics Convention, 1932, p 82. 
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countered by the vigorous opposition of the AWU delegates who argued 
that Waters' proposal was anti-democratic in that it disfranchised 
the larger unions and gave too much power to what AWU secretary, 
Clarrie Fallon, called 'the conglomerate of small unions operating 
(22) 
with a purely craft outlook'.^ When the motion was finally put 
only sixteen of the seventy-three delegates present voted in favour, 
which was a clear indication of the influence the AWU was able to 
wield within the party. The union quickly capitalised on its 
victory and easily convinced convention to increase the maximum 
delegates permitted for one union from ten to twelve. This, of 
course, further entrenched the dominant position of the AWU because 
it was the only union large enough to be entitled to send a full 
quota of delegates. 
Control of the Labor-in-Politics convention helped pave the way 
to AWU dominance of the ALP State executive. The Queensland Central 
Executive (QCE) was charged with the general administration of the 
party between conventions. It comprised representatives elected 
from among the parliamentarians, convention and the affiliated trade 
unions. This method of representation was designed to produce a 
QCE that was dominated by the AWU. The 1932 convention elected 
eleven QCE delegates and eight of those were officials or members 
of the AWU. The Federal and State caucuses were entitled to send 
one delegate each to the QCE. Affiliated trade unions were directly 
represented according to the following formula: 
2000 members 
5000 members 
10000 members 
15000 members 
20000 members 
one delegate 
two delegates 
three delegates 
four delegates 
five delegates 
and above (23) 
22. ibid., p 84. 
23. Australian Labor Party - Queensland Branch, Constitution and Rules, 
Brisbane, 1935, p 9. 
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In 1932 only one affiliated union was eligible to send more than one 
delegate to the QCE, the AWU, which sent a full quota of five. When 
the post-1932 convention QCE assembled on 26 August, thirteen of the 
nineteen delegates present were aligned with the AWU faction. The 
major task of the meeting was to choose the Executive Cormnittee. 
No ballot was required for any of the eight positions and of those 
elected only SJ Bryan, the President of the TLC, and RJ Carroll, the 
(24) Secretary of the AEU, were not members of the AWU.^ The AWU's 
position within the structure of the ALP was impregnable because the 
consitution and rules exaggerated its relative representation at 
convention and on the QCE while at the same time disfranchising the 
majority of the affiliated unions. Predictably, the AWU was able 
to rebut any attempt on the part of the other unions to redraft the 
rules regarding representation because it controlled the Labor-in-
Politics convention which was the only body with the authority to 
alter the party's constitution. It was not until the split of 
the 1950s that the opportunity arose for the smaller unions to 
break the hold the AWU exercised over the decision making machinery 
of the party. 
A similar pattern of AWU dominance was to be found in the 
composition of the first and subsequent Forgan Smith Governments. 
When the caucus completed its election for the nine man ministry in 
June 1932 only three successful candidates, Percy Pease, Ned Hanlon 
^4. QCE Minutes, 26 August, 1932. The result of the ballot was: 
President: WH Demaine, nominated by Messrs. W Forgan Smith and 
G Crooks - re-elected unopposed. 
Vice President: WJ Riordan, nominated by Messrs. JC Lamont and 
E Rusling - re-elected unopposed. 
Secretary: L McDonald, nominated by W Forgan Smith and R/J 
Carroll - re-elected unopposed. 
Executive Cormnittee: Messrs. EJ Carroll, SJ Bryan, W Forgan 
Smith, MP Hynes, JC Lamont, were 
nominated and re-elected unopposed. 
The QCE meeting that was held subsequent to the 1935 Labor-in-
Politics convention produced an identical executive committee. 
The only alteration had occurred in 1933 when Clarrie Fallon had 
been elected Vice-President to replace WJ Riordan when the latter 
accepted a position on the Industrial Court. QCE Minutes, 28 
November, 1935. 
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(•^ 5) 
and Frank Cooper, had not held official positions within the AWU, 
This result reflected the influence the AWU had gained within the 
parliamentary party by its judicious use of the plebiscite system 
of candidate selection. The AWU was placed at a great advantage 
compared with the other unions because its large membership was 
widely distributed throughout the State whereas the other tmions 
had relatively small memberships concentrated in Brisbane or the 
coastal towns. Despite its recruitment of urban relief workers, 
the AWU was primarily a rural union; a fact which aided its pre-
selection strategy in a State where sixty-eight percent of the 
electorates in 1932 were located outside the Brisbane metropolitan 
area. In addition to these 'natural' advantages, the AWU benefited 
from the party rules which governed the conduct of plebiscites; 
rules, of course, which its convention delegates had drafted. The 
most significant of these was what was known as the 'facsimile 
ballot'. Prior to each ALP plebiscite a facsimile of the ballot 
25, The first Forgan Smith ministry was as follows 
William Forgan Smith 
Percy Pease 
John Mullan 
Edward Michael Hanlon 
Maurice Patrick Hynes 
John Dash 
James Stopford 
Frank Arthur Cooper 
Frank William Bulcock 
Henry Adam Bruce 
Premier, Chief Secretary, Vice President 
of Executive Council; Treasurer (until 
12 April, 1938); Secretary for Public 
Instruction (8 December, 1941 to 9 
February, 1942) 
Secretary for Public Lands (until 17 
September, 1940) 
Attorney-General (until 14 November,1940) 
Home Secretary (until 5 December, 1935); 
Secretary for Health and Home Affairs 
(from 5 December, 1935) 
Secretary for Labour and Industry (until 
27 March, 1939) 
Minister for Transport (until 4 August, 
1939) 
Secretary for Mines (until 30 November, 
1936) 
Secretary for Public Instruction (until 
12 April, 1938); Treasurer (from 12 
April, 1938) 
Secretary for Agriculture and Stock 
Secretary for Public Works; Secretary 
for Public Instruction (l2 April, 1938 
to 8 December, 1941) 
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paper was printed in the AWU journal, the Worker; a similar privilege 
was extended for a time to the AMIEU. AWU members who were entitled 
to vote but who could not attend a booth on polling day merely filled 
out the facsimile ballot paper, affixed one of the perforated 'right 
to vote' slips that were attached to all AWU union tickets and posted 
the vote to the returning officer- This voting procedure was a 
source of constant tension within the Queensland Labor party, and 
there were regular accusations of malpractice on the part of the AWU 
officials who were alleged to have filled in ballot papers for members 
who they knew would not vote in a particular plebiscite, 
Pre-selection contests in Queensland during the 1930s regularly 
erupted into pitched battles between the AWU faction, which was keen 
to enhance its already dominant position within the State caucus, and 
the smaller unions who hoped, in vain, to curb the AWU's power- The 
tone was set by the events surrounding a plebiscite for the Brisbane 
metropolitan electorate of Fortitude Valley which occurred in mid-
1933, Tom Wilson, who had held the seat for the Labor party since 
1916, died in May 1933 and a by-election was scheduled for 15 July. 
Fortitude Valley was a safe Labor seat and there was no shortage of 
aspircno candidates. One of those who entered the pre-selection 
contest was ex-MLA Sam Brassington. Brassington's electorate of 
Balonne had been abolished in the 1931 redistribution and he had 
failed in an attempt to win Murilla at the 1932 election. He had 
been an AWU official and was a delegate to the QCE. It was widely 
known in ALP circles that the party hierarchy was anxious for him 
to re-enter parliament, and when he won the Valley plebiscite a 
number of the defeated candidates alleged malpractice on the part 
of the AWU and some party officials. Their complaints were that 
the QCE had rejected the nomination papers of a strong local candidate 
on dubious technical grounds;^ and that on the day of the pleb-
iscite union tickets had been used in an illegal maimer in order to 
secure votes. Eleven of the defeated candidates attempted to 
26. QCE Minutes, 10 Jtme, 1933; the'strong local candidate' happened 
to be the author's maternal grandfather, James Connell. 
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protest to the full QCE about the conduct of plebiscite, but the 
(27) inner executive would not permit this. A meeting of ALP members 
was then convened in the electorate and the following resolution was 
carried: 
As the plebiscite was corrupt and violated the 
true principles of Labor it was decided that the 
machine candidate be opposed. (28) 
Two Independent Labor candidates stood against Brassington but he won 
the seat comfortably. 
The animosities engendered by the Fortitude Valley plebiscite 
had barely subsided when they were rekindled by the pre-selection 
procedures adopted for the 1934 Federal elections. The QCE decided 
not to employ the plebiscite system but to constitute itself as an 
electoral college and to endorse candidates directly. It subsequen-
tly endorsed FP Byrne, RJ Carroll, and party secretary Lewis McDonald, 
as Senate candidates. The President of the AFULE, Theo Kissick, had 
put his name forward as a candidate and, when he heard that he had 
not gained a place on the ticket, announced that he intended to 
contest the election as an independent Labor candidate; whereupon 
he was expelled from the party. Some branches of his union were 
critical of his behaviour and he was called upon to explain his 
actions to the AFULE executive. Kissick argued that the party 
leadership had abandoned the plebiscite system in order to ensure 
the selection of candidates who were supporters of the 'inner 
(29 
circle'.^ The debate that ensued was vitriolic and divisive 
and the central issue of Kissick's nomination became entangled with 
personal and factional rivalries among the members of the executive. 
Eventually a series of motions was carried which, while criticising 
the methods adopted by the QCE, condemned Kissick's decision to 
nominate against the endorsed Labor candidates. 
27- Brisbane Courier, 29 June, 1933, 
28. Brisbane Courier, 1 July, 1933; Advocate. 15 July, 1933. 
29, AFULE Executive Minutes, 9 September, 1934, E212/9, RSSSA/ANU, 
pp 1-10. 
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The AWU kept a close watch on the performance of those it put into 
parliament, and was not slow to rebuke any who failed to act in the 
interests of the union. One example of AWU disciplinary action 
involved the ALP member for the western electorate of Gregory, George 
Pollock. Pollock had been an AWU organiser prior to his entry into 
parliament in 1915 and in late 1929 he wrote a series of newspaper 
articles outlining the parlous state of the woollen industry in 
Queensland. Since the electorate of Gregory was dominated by 
pastoral activities, Pollock was necessarily concerned by the 
problems of that industry- His suggestion that the cause of these 
difficulties was the high cost of production provoked an outraged 
response from the AWU, who, at the time Pollock went into print, 
were involved in an arbitration case involving the question of wages 
and hours in the woollen industry- Pollock was subsequently 
summoned before the annual delegates' meeting of the AWU and called 
(31) 
upon to explain his actions. The delegates were unimpressed with 
his explanations and they voted unanimously to cancel his membership 
in the union. Fortunately for Pollock's future political career he 
made his peace with the union and on the election of Labor in 1932 
he was made Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, a post he held 
until his death in 1939. 
One reason for the dominance of the AWU within the ALP was 
because the union provided the party with essential organisational 
and financial support to an extent not equalled by the other unions. 
The AWU was organised on a regional basis; south eastern, western, 
central and northern, and its branches, particularly in remote areas 
of the State, often served as the local branches of the ALP. During 
election campaigns, AWU officials acted as ALP officials, the AWU 
car became the ALP car, and canvassers, booth workers and candidates 
were drawn heavily from the ranks of the AWU. Because of its large 
30. Worker, 6 November, 1929. 
31. Report Annual Delegates* Meeting AWU, Brisbane, January, 1930, 
p 24f, OML. 
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membership the AWU was in a position to make much larger financial 
contributions to the party than other affiliated tmions. The AWU 
was Queensland's wealthiest trade union and in 1934 it possessed 
(32) liquid assets in excess of £150,000. In 1932 the union paid 
£671 in capitation fees to the ALP whereas the next largest 
affiliated union, the AMIEU, paid only £85; in 1935 these figures 
had risen to £1338 and £121 respectively. Furthermore, the AWU 
made regular contributions of between £500 and £2000 to Labor party 
campaign funds when most other unions could afford only £25 or 
£50.(55) 
In return for its assistance the AWU expected, and received, 
heavy representation within the party organisation and in Labor 
ministries; favourable industrial awards, one of the first decisions 
of the Forgan Smith Government was to re-introduce the rural award; 
and the appointment of its officials to important boards and 
commissions, eg the AWU Secretary, WJ Riordan, was appointed to the 
re-constructed Industrial Court in December 1933, When the hegemony 
of the AWU was under attack in the Labor party in 1949 the Worker, 
in a frank editorial, stated the case for the union: 
Whence, then, comes the power of the Labor Movement 
in Queensland? Where is the basic strength - the 
resiliency which has enabled Labor Governments to 
occupy the Treasury benches in this State ever since 
1915 with the exception of three years 1929 to 1932 
,,, The answer is the AWU, The AWU provides the 
network of organisation, its secretaries and 
organisers, representatives and rank and file are 
everlastingly preaching the gospel of Labor in the 
places where votes count most... With few exceptions 
every one of the huge membership...is a disciple of 
Labor and where AWU members do not participate 
directly in ALP activities their union supplies 
much of the funds to fight political campaigns. (34) 
32. ^ ro,clxv, 2 October, 1934, p 422. 
33. ARTWU Board of Control Minutes, 23 July, 1934, p 124. 
34. Worker, 24 January, 1949. 
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This statement stressed, among other things, the importance to the 
AWU group of the Labor party being in Government in Queensland. In 
fact, the dominance of the AWU faction depended heavily on the 
electoral success of the ALP, Had Labor lost the 1932 election 
and thereby given the CPNP the opportunity to claim credit for the 
economic recovery that occurred aft,er 1932, it is possible that the 
party may have turned in on itself and reverted to the bitter 
factionalism of the 1925-29 period. 
The major reason why Labor won in 1932 was that the Moore 
Government was destroyed by the great depression, Forgan Smith 
was secure in the leadership and the parliamentary party was remark-
ably free of factional rivalry during Labor's three years in opposi-
tion. In the vexed area of economic policy, Forgan Smith skilfully 
chartered a course between the 'extremism' of Lang on the one hand 
and the ardent deflationists on the other. The essence of the 
Queensland ALP's economic policy was that consumer purchasing power 
should be stimulated by Government initiative. Opposition to wage 
reduction was based on the notion that this would lead to a reduction 
(35) in spending and would thus prolong the depression. This policy 
was, of course, at odds with the deflationary Premiers' Plan which 
was promulgated at a Premiers' Conference in July 1931. As leader 
of the Opposition, Forgan Smith played no official part in the 
development of the plan and his personal economic beliefs and a 
desire not to precipitate divisions in the party determined that 
he could not wholeheartedly support the plan. On the other hand. 
Smith knew that if he opposed the plan he could encounter difficulties 
with its Federal and State Government supporters should he become 
Premier. Shrewd compromise solved his dilemma. As soon as the 
contents of the Premiers' Plan were annotmced the QCE expressed total 
opposition to it. The TLC went a step further and called on 
the Federal executive to expel any parliamentarian who supported the 
plan.(57) 
35. £PD, clxi, 18 October, 1932, p 965. 
36. QCE Minutes, 12 June, 1931. 
37- TLC Minutes, 10 June, 1931. 
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Forgan Smith then announced that the parliamentary party was 
opposed to the deflationary provisions of the Premiers' Plan and 
would, if elected in 1932, review the plan and develop a more 
(38) balanced policy to deal with the economic situation. The party 
indicated that it still favoured a controlled inflationary policy 
and argued that, while being successful in effecting a reduction 
in the cost of government, the Premiers' Plan was lacking in the 
measures necessary to restore industry and commerce by reviving the 
(39) purchasing power of the people. By adopting this policy, Smith 
placated the party and the trade unions, whose main objection to the 
Premiers' Plan was that it provided for the reduction of wages and 
social service benefits, and at the same time ensured that Queensland's 
subsequent economic policies were not placed out of step with the rest 
of Australia, 
His handling of the delicate question of the Premiers' Plan aptly 
illustrated the political skills Forgan Smith brought to the office 
of Opposition leader and Premier. One reason for the contented 
internal condition of the parliamentary party during the years I929-
1932 was Forgan Smith's clear mastery over the Premier, Arthur Moore. 
Smith was more experienced in Government, and was a superior debater 
and parliamentary tactician than the CPNP leader. Throughout his 
ten year (1932-1942) reign as Premier, Forgan Smith's astute leader-
ship proved invaluable in maintaining the AWU group at the pinnacle 
of party affairs. At the same time, the active support of the AWU 
was an important factor in maintaining Smith's own leadership position. 
Despite his close association with the AWU in the 1930s, the new 
Premier had never, unlike Theodore and McCormack, held any position 
in the union before he entered parliament. Forgan Smith became 
closely associated with the AWU during the 1920s through two avenues: 
his occupancy of the agriculture ministry brought him into regular 
contact with the tmion's officials; and his opposition to the 
'radicals' within the party organisation led him to support the 
AWU group in the factional disputes that bedevilled the ALP in the 
38. 2E^, clviii, 24 June, 1931, p 29f. 
39. QPD. clxi, 16 August, 1932, p 4. 
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twenties. It was a tradition in Queensland Labor politics at the 
time for politicians who did not retain union membership to take 
out a ticket in the AWU; Smith did so when he became a minister-
By 1932 Forgan Smith was established as the dominant personality 
in Queensland Labor politics. He had extensive ministerial 
experience, he was an accomplished parliamentary performer, and he 
derived additional authority from leading the party to an important 
electoral victory. He consolidated his parliamentary leadership 
with a position on the inner executive of the QCE and developed a 
close and effective working relationship with the secretary of the 
AWU, Clarrie Fallon. The Governor of Queensland, Leslie Wilson, 
was an astute and candid observer of Forgan Smith and he wrote to 
the Secretary of the Dominions Office in 1933 that: 
Forgan Smith is a man of considerable ability -
very clear minded and with a definite purpose. 
He will not accept dictation from his 'caucus' 
and is master of them. (4l) 
Smith's ability and his mastery of Queensland Labor politics did not 
escape the attention of others, and after his crushing defeat of the 
CPNP at the 1935 election he received many overtures to follow in 
the footsteps of TJ Ryan and EG Theodore and to assume a leadership 
(42) position in the Federal party. Smith declined these offers and 
consistently denied persistent rumours that he intended to enter 
Federal politics. Many reasons have been advanced to explain 
(43) 
Smith's unwillingness to vacate the State arena, but one that 
should be singled out is that the Premier realised that the foundation 
of his success in Queensland was the strength and consequent 
40. It was claimed that when Forgan Smith turned the first sod to 
commence work on the Story Bridge he reminded those present that 
'...I have a union ticket for this class of work'. 
41. Leslie Wilson to Dominions Office, 5 June, 1933, Wilson papers 
FML, p 6. 
42. Courier Mail, 14 May, 1935. 
43. B Carroll, 'William Forgan Smith: Dictator or Democrat', in 
Murphy and Joyce, op.cit.. p 423. 
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stabilising influence of the AWU within the ALP organisation. Smith 
was aware that the stability that was the hallmark of Queensland 
Labor in the thirties could not be transferred to the Federal arena 
merely by a change in leadership. The schisms of 1931 had left 
Federal Labor faction-ridden, demoralised and electorally weak. 
Forgan Smith was a man who enjoyed the exercise of power and 
preferred to remain as Premier and chief decision maker in Queensland 
rather than to occupy the relatively powerless office of leader of 
the Federal Opposition. Also the leadership was never formally 
offered to him in the way it had been to TJ Ryan and it was imlikely 
that Smith would have been prepared to risk an humiliating rebuff at 
the hands of the Federal caucus. 
One of the primary objectives of Forgan Smith during his long 
term as Premier was to maintain the tmity of Labor in Queensland and 
to guide the party along the path of moderate social reform. He 
believed that the ALP had lost Government in 1929 because of the 
disruptive activities of left-wing radicals and militants and he 
was determined that they should never again exercise influence within 
(44) 
the party. The traditional leader of the militants, the ARU, 
remained unaffiliated to the ALP and adopted the rather impotent 
role of opposition in exile. The union's officers, particularly 
Tim Moroney, remained hostile to the AWU and the Labor leadership 
(45) in general but could do little more than criticise. Other 
tmions occasionally condemned Government policy on such economic 
matters as wages and hours but they remained reluctant to back these 
criticisms with militant industrial action.^ The continuing 
high incidence of unemployment kept the level of industrial disputation 
low in Queensland throughout the 1930s, Even the ARU, which had a 
reputation for militancy, did not engage in a single, major industrial 
dispute in Queensland in the fifteen years between 1931 and 1946. 
44. ibid., p 421. 
45. Report of State Secretary, Thirteenth Annual ARU State Conference, 
Rockhampton, October, 1934, pp 73-7^. 
46. WWF Minutes, 4 January, 1933, E213/10, RSSSA/AMJ, p 247; Caucus 
Minutes, 8 November, 1932, p 37; Report Fourth Annual Conference 
ARTWU, August, 1936, p 19. 
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The ascendancy of the Forgan Smith/Fallon group and the general 
weakness of the 'left' is well illustrated by the latter's attempts 
at the 1932 and 1935 conventions to highlight the party's socialist 
objective. A major debate occurred at the 1932 convention on the 
socialisation objective. Some members of the party obviously had 
been impressed by the performance of the Socialisation Units within 
the New South Wales branch, and moved the following motions: 
(1) That a definite review be made of the fundamental 
plank of the party, viz. Socialisation of means of 
production, distribution and exchange. Either it 
is practicable to put same into operation or, 
alternatively, it is to be an instruction to the 
political party to evolve plans for its full 
operation within two years of gaining office, 
(2) That political candidates for election seek a 
mandate from the people for complete socialisation 
by definitely advocating same from all public 
platforms at next election, 
(3) That socialisation of industry be placed on the 
ALP fighting platform and that a Socialisation 
Committee be formed for educational purposes, and 
publication of literature, with power to circularise 
all ALP branches with same, (47) 
These three motions were opposed vigorously by the AWU. Forgan 
Smith, in a major speech, argued that it was naive to think that 
there were a large number of dedicated socialists in Queensland 
and that Labor would attract little electoral support if it 
campaigned solely on the socialisation plank. He suggested 
that the party should do more to educate the public in the tenets 
of socialism because 'before we can achieve Socialism we must have 
a majority of the people already converted to Socialism, capable 
(49) 
of thinking as Socialists and understanding Socialist theory.' 
47- Report Labpr-in-Politics, 1932, op.cit., p 8. 
48. ibid., p 10. 
49. Daily Standard, 12 January, 1932. 
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Clarrie Fallon then entered the debate and stated that the party was 
progressing steadily towards the attainment of socialism and that to 
attempt to hasten the process would invite disastrous electoral 
consequences. David Riordan, the Federal member for Kennedy and 
a prominent member of the AWU faction, reminded delegates that 'the 
Labor party is not a revolutionary party it is an evolutionary 
party.' In the face of such determined opposition the motions 
were soundly defeated and convention adopted an amendment moved by 
Forgan Smith that the principles contained in the current objective 
be affirmed. 
This debate was repeated atthe 1935 convention and the 'radicals' 
(51) 
were again routed. Partly because the ALP was controlled by a 
union that was committed to moderate social and industrial reform 
through parliament and the conciliation and arbitration system, the 
depression had little impact on the party's ideology other than to 
confirm the belief in social democracy. The economic collapse did 
not lead to an upsurge of revolutionary thought or action within the 
Queensland Labor party. The trade union owned newspaper the Daily 
Standard occasionally engaged in flights of 'rhetorical socialism'. 
It believed, for instance, that the capitalist system had been shaken 
(52) to its foundations, and that the Australian people were turning 
(53) inexorably to socialist solutions. The paper remained 
contradictory on the issue of how to establish a socialist system. 
(54) 
At times it appeared to condone open rebellion, but on other 
occasions counselled against any attempt to stage a general strike 
(55) to overthrow the capitalist system. Such ideological uncerta 
was a characteristic of many sections of the Labor movement and 
operated as an additional restrain 
socialist policies within the ALP. 
t to the development of avowedly 
(56) 
50. ibid. 
51. Daily Standard, I9 February, 1935; Courier Mail, 18 February, 1935. 
52. Daily Standard, 1 January, 1932. 
53. ibid., 9 September, 1931. 
54. ibid., 3 May, 193O. 
55. ibid., 14 September, 1932. 
56. Louis, op,cit., p 30f; Healy, op.cit., p 27-
105, 
When Forgan Smith became Premier in 1932 he led a party whose 
ideological consensus favoured social and economic amelioration via 
established constitutional machinery. Not suprisingly, his own 
political views were in accord with this consensus. By all accounts, 
Forgan Smith was well read in the classics of political theory and 
(57) political economy but he found Marx 'boring'. He was a socialist 
in the sense that he believed in the necessity for a vigorous public 
sector operating within a predomina;''ly capitalist economy. He did 
not believe that it was essential to abolish private property in 
order to achieve a socialist society. On the contrary, he believed 
that: 
Socialism does not aim at the destruction of 
private property, but...demands that all men shall 
have an equal right to own property. Socialism 
does not aim to destroy profitable activity, and 
proposes that all engaged in useful human effort 
shall share equitably in the results of their 
industry. (58) 
As Premier, he remained an unrelenting opponent of communism and 
political extremism and was ruthless in his determination to exclude 
the proponents of such ideas from the ALP. Political extremism rem-
ains,for many, a hallmark of the great depression. This is an 
exaggeration, but it is true that the Labor party in at least three 
States and the Commonwealth was destroyed in the early thirties 
partly as a consequence of battles between 'extremists' and 
'moderates'. Queensland did not remain immune from the general 
ferment within Australian Labor politics, but the local party proved 
capable of containing and neutralising potentially dangerous 
challenges from Langites, Communists and Social Creditors, A major 
reason that party dissidents were unable to attract a large following 
within the Queensland ALP was because the parliamentary party was in 
57, MJ Thompson, The Political Career of William Forgan Smith, 
B Econ, Queensland, I965, p 3; Carroll, op,cit., p 401, 
58. William Forgan Smith, Socialism, tmdated, late 1930s, typescript, 
Forgan Smith papers, FML, p 1. 
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Opposition during the crucial years of the depression. As a 
consequence, there was no possibility of a Labor cabinet provoking 
splits in the party by embracing controversial economic policies 
such as the Premiers' Plan. 
CHAPTER 5 
DISSIDENT LABOR 
108. 
One of the most distinctive features of the depression in 
Queensland was that the local Labor party was not consumed by the 
factional disputes that ravaged the party at the Federal level and 
within the ."^ tates of New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia, 
The relative peacefulness of internal Labor politics in Queensland 
in the early thirties was produced by a number of factors. Defeat 
at the 1929 State election effectively ended the factionalism that 
had characterised the ALP in the late twenties. It also meant 
that the parliamentary party was absolved from the responsibility 
of governing during the worst years of the crisis. This, combined 
with the performance of the Moore Government, encouraged most sections 
of the party to rally behind the leadership of William Forgan Smith 
with a view to winning power in 1932, The clear dominance of the 
Australian Workers Union within the organisational wing also 
encouraged unity. Dissent within political parties typically 
produces schisms only when there is some balance of power between 
the dominant and insurgent factions. In the 1930s the AWU was so 
powerful as the dominant group that dissenters were imable to 
marshall sufficient strength to offer a serious threat to the 
ruling elite. Challenges to the stability of the party were 
offered by the Communist party, Langites and Douglas Credit but 
these were rebuffed. At the end of the decade the party was 
required to cope with a novel electoral challenge in the form of 
the Protestant Labotir Party. 
By mid-1931 Labor Governments in the Commonwealth and in the 
States of New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia were raked 
by internal conflicts. Ostensibly the disputes concerned the 
relative merits of contending economic policies, but were character-
ised by power struggles and personality clashes of serious dimensions. 
The disputes reached a peak in June 1931 when New South Wales Labor 
Premier, Jack Lang, advanced his alternative to the Premiers' Plan. 
Space does not permit a detailed analysis of the politics of the 
(1) 
'battle of plans', but it must be noted that Lang's plan was the 
1. See CB Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, Sydney, 1970, 
Chapters X and XI, 
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product of his own political ambitions and hatreds, combined with 
the political situation within the New South Wales Labor movement. 
As Jim Hutchison has argued: 
The Lang Plan was essentially proposed to 
maintain the support of the labor movement 
in order to preserve Lang's precarious basis 
for political primacy in NSW, and at the 
same time reduce the possibility of any 
threat to his position as leader of the 
NSW Labor Party, (2) 
The influence of Langism soon spread beyond the boundaries of 
its originator's home State, Many disenchanted and dissident Labor 
members saw in the person of Lang the possibility of salvation from 
(3) the depths of economic chaos, 'Langism' meant more than an 
adherence to a particular economic programme; it represented an 
act of defiance of the authority of the Federal Executive of the 
ALP, and as such inevitably brought its supporters into open conflict 
with those State executives which remained loyal to Federal Labor. 
Fortunately for the unity of the Labor party, Langism never became 
a seriously disruptive force in Queensland. The State parliamentary 
party disowned the Lang plan and, after mid-1931, support for Langism 
was regarded as political heresy by the Labor party in Queensland, 
Despite the disapproval of the party's leaders and officials, a 
Lang plan organisation was formed in Brisbane by a number of 
Australian Labor Party rank and file members. In mid-1931 a series 
of local branches passed motions expressing support for the Lang 
plan. The QCE in reply sent a circular to all party branches 
informing them that any motions passed in favour of Lang were to 
(4) be rescinded forthwith. The QCE threatened to dissolve any bra: 
that did not comply with this directive. This attitude of the QCE 
2. J Hutchison, 'The Lang Plan and Its Origin', unpublished paper, 
Lang Seminar, Macquarie Univ, Sydney, 1976, p 13, 
3. For a discussion of Lang's charismatic qualities see M Dixson, 
Greater than Lenin?:Lang and Labor 1916-1932, Melbourne, 1976, 
Chapters 1 and 2. 
4. QCE Minutes, 8 Jtme, 1931. 
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and the parliamentary party was quite predictable. At a time when 
the organisation was attempting to rebuild in preparation for the 
1932 election it was in no mood to tolerate divisive and enervating 
factionalism. The AWU also determined that the party would adopt a 
hostile attitude to Lang and his proposals. When Lang first entered 
Labor politics in New South Wales soon after World War I he found the 
party's executive dominated by the State's largest union, the AWU. 
After 1923 Lang sought the active support of tmions affiliated with 
the New South Wales Labor Council in an attempt to break the hold 
of the AWU. The clashes between the Lang/Labor Council faction and 
AWU faction rendered internal Labor politics in New South Wales in the 
(5) 
early 1920s particularly torrid. The final outcome was decided 
in Lang's favour, but the battles had embroiled both the ALP and 
AWU Federal Executives. Lang's political conflicts with EG Theodore 
also determined that the Queensland ALP would emerge as an opponent 
of his proposals. From the date of Theodore's entry into Federal 
politics via the New South Wales seat of Dalley, Lang had viewed him 
as a major rival. Theodore, of course, was closely associated with 
the AWU both in Queensland and New South Wales, and there is evidence 
to suggest that the New South Wales Premier was eager to destroy 
Theodore politically, and that his advocacy of the Lang plan was but 
a part of that campaign. 
Despite the strong stand taken by the Queensland ALP hierarchy, 
the QCE received reports in October 1931 indicating that at least 
four ALP branch members continued to be actively involved in a pro-
(7) Lang organisation. As a consequence of further reports those 
members, VD Kearney, W Mitchell, E Pforr and J O'Leary, were dismissed 
from the executive positions they held in their respective branches. 
Kearney was a prominent ALP member, being Secretary of the Enoggera 
5, Dixson, op,cit., p 69f; and J Hagan, 'JT Lang and the Trade 
Unions', unpublished paper, Lang Seminar, Macquarie Univ, 
Sydney, 1976, pp 1-3. 
6, Hutchison, op,cit,, p 8f. 
7- QCE Minutes, 7 October, 1931, 
Ill, 
Electoral Executive Committee (EEC) and of the Lilley Federal 
Division Executive (FDE), The QCE was obviously concerned that 
a man who held such positions in the party, and who had stood as 
an ALP candidate in the 1926 State election, should so actively 
defy its rulings, and it instructed Kearney to hand over the books 
of both bodies to their respective Presidents, Kearney was 
reluctant to do so, and the QCE was eventually forced to employ 
a solicitor to recover the books. The QCE then took the step 
of again writing to all branches informing them that Kearney, 
Pforr, O'Leary together with two others, had been expelled from 
the party because of their continued support for the Lang plan. 
The QCE also took the opportunity to point out to the branches 
(8) the party's official rejection of Langism. 
A number of branches defied the QCE directive and after the 
Christmas recess eleven of them were given fourteen days to rescind 
motions they had passed supporting Kearney, and to declare their 
(9) loyalty to the party. After the expiration of the fourteen 
day period, six of the branches indicated that they were willing 
to do so. The failure of the remainder to reply led to their 
closure and the formation of new branches in their areas. 
In addition to Langite activities in Brisbane, the QCE found it 
necessary to take disciplinary action against members in South 
Johnstone and Toowoomba, The inner executive of the QCE alleged 
that such groups as the Lang planners were merely disruptionists 
attempting to effect Labor's defeat at the forthcoming election. 
The tone of the executive's statement reveals a determination that 
internal factionalism was not going to contribute to a Labor defeat 
(11) in 1932, However, the above events also indicated a degree of 
support amongst the ALP rank and file for the Lang plan. 
8. ibid., 16 October, 1931. 
9. ibid., 4 February, 1932. 
10. ibid., 22 February, 1932. 
11. McDonald to Secretary of Cairns ALP, 28 October, 1931, QCE 
Archives, Brisbane. 
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Langism held a certain attraction for some sections of the 
Queensland trade union movement. In March 1931 a motion was 
proposed, but defeated, that the TLC send a telegram to the New 
South Wales branch of the ALP expressing its support for Eddie 
Ward, who was contesting the East Sydney by-election on the platform 
(12) 
of the New South Wales branch rather than that of the Federal party. ' 
The initial meeting to form a rank and file organisation to support 
the economic policies of Jack Lang was held in the Brisbane Trades 
Hall. This meeting was the consequence of the enthusiasm 
engendered by Lang when he addressed a public meeting at the 
Brisbane stadium. After this initial meeting, further gatherings 
of the Lang group were held at the Trades Hall. On 23 May I93I 
two New South Wales politicians, John Lamaro and Senator Arthur Rae, 
addressed a meeting on Lang's financial schemes. The Shop 
Assistants' Union was particularly active in calling and organising 
(13) these meetings.^ The WWF also invited John Beasley, the leader 
of the Lang faction in the Federal parliament, to address their 
(14) 
union. Some members of the ARU also expressed support for 
Langism. Frank Nolan, who was a member of the Union's State Council, 
(15) 
chaired at least one pro-Lang gathering;^ and Mick O'Brien, also 
a State Councillor, attempted unsuccessfully to censure the President 
of the TLC for his public support of Theodore's economic policies 
in preference to Lang's.^ ' Despite its hostility to the ALP and 
the AWU, the ARU was never officially committed to Langism. 
Secretary Tim Moroney believed that the union would gain little 
by associating with a particular political party or faction. With 
these few exceptions, the Queensland trade unions remained loyal to 
the Federal and State executives of the ALP and the 1931 Trade Union 
Congress passed a resolution deploring the divisive effect the Lang 
(17) plan was having on the Australian Labor movement. 
12. TLC Minutes, 4 March, 1931. 
13. Official Report of the Fourteenth Labor-in-Politics Convention, 
1932, p 89. 
14. WWF Minutes, 2 September I93I, E213/IO, RSSSA/ANU. 
15. F Nolan, You Pass This Way Only Once, Brisbane, 1974, p 67-
16. TLC Minutes, 10 June, 1931. 
17- Official Report of the Eighth Queensland Trade Union Congress, 
Brisbane, 1931, p 12. 
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The dispute over the Lang plan flared again at the 1932 Labor-
in-Politics Convention, where Kearney appealed against his expulsion 
from the party. Wliile the debate on a motion to readmit Kearney 
was an extremely lengthy one, he received the support of only three 
branch delegates and two union officials. The unionists, Frank 
Waters of the APWU and Gordon Brown of the Shop Assistants, were 
rather lukewarm in their support and were careful not to appear as 
(l8) 
Langites. Kearney's appeal was rejected by forty-four votes 
to twenty-two and his subsequent appeal to the Federal Executive was 
ruled inadmissable because he had not gained the permission of the 
QCE to appeal. By the time of the 1932 State election, Langism 
was a dead issue in Queensland and the two Lang candidates who 
stood both forfeited their deposits. 
An important question is why Langism was unable to command 
popular, sustained support in Queensland during the depression? 
Langism persisted in the States of New South Wales and South Australia 
mainly because there were serious divisions affecting the Labor 
parties there prior to Lang announcing his economic plan in mid-1931. 
The events surrounding the split between the Federal Labor party and 
the New South Wales branch are too well known to need recounting 
here, but an examination of Lang Labor in South Australia is 
interesting because it illustrates why the Lang planners never 
gained a strong foothold in Queensland, Don Hopgood has shown that 
there was a high level of factionalism present in the Labor party in 
(19) South Australia prior to 1931, The deflationary policies of 
the Hill Labor Government, which was elected in April 1930, had 
provoked the anger of the trade unions and large sections of Labor's 
rank and file. Thus, when Lang announced his plan at the 1931 
Premiers' Conference, there existed dissident factions in South 
Australia who were eager to make use of it in their struggle for 
control of the local Labor party. The situation in Queensland 
18, Labor-in-Politics, 1932, op,cit,, pp 95 and 99, 
19. D Hopgood, 'Lang Labor in South Australia', in R Cooksey (ed), 
'The Great Depression in Australia', Labour History, 17, 1970. 
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was quite different. By June 1931 the Queensland Labor party was 
one of the most tmited in Australia. With no potential power base 
in the form of a strong, strategically placed group of party 
dissidents, Langism was destined to be short-lived in Queensland 
Labor politics. As well as being denied the preconditions for 
survival, the Lang plarmers had other difficulties to face in 
Queensland. The fact that the parliamentary party was out of 
office ensured that it could not antagonise any section of the 
Labor movement by legislative action. In States where Langism 
gained a foothold it did so partly because the dissidents in the 
party made political capital out of Labor's support for the 
deflationary Premiers' Plan. For example, the Premiers' Plan 
caused a serious split in the Labor party in Victoria, where the 
Premier, EJ Hogan, was expelled from the party for lending his 
support to it. In Queensland the leader of the parliamentary 
Labor party, William Forgan Smith, was sufficiently astute to 
express only guarded support for the Premiers' Plan, thereby 
depriving the Langites of the opportunity of accusing the parlia-
mentary party of being 'friends of the money power'. 
Many of those Labor supporters who embraced Langism in the 
thirties did so because they saw it as a socialist alternative 
to the moderate reformism of the established Labor parties. 
Lang himself did not share this view and was unwilling to extend 
full support to Langite organisations in States other than New 
South Wales because he believed that many of their members were 
extremists and/or crypto-Communists. The Communist Party of 
Australia (CPA) regarded the Langites as 'left social fascist' 
opportunists and as enemies of the socialist revolution. During 
the depression years the Communist party attempted to establish 
itself as the vanguard party of the socialist revolution by 
motinting a concerted challenge to the Labor party's leadership of 
the working class movement. The CPA was encouraged in these 
20. See above Chapter 4. 
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attempts by their belief that the economic depression would produce 
an upsurge of socialist militancy among working people. Communist 
strategists reasoned that the social democratic parties and trade 
tmions would prove incapable of accommodating or containing this 
radicalism and that the people would then reject reformism and 
embrace the scientific socialist solutions offered by the CPA. 
This 'destitution produces revolution' thesis was shown to be 
invalid during the depression, but it nevertheless attracted a 
wide range of adherents. The editor of the Brisbane Courier gave 
an illustration of the theory in I929 when he wrote that: 'Just 
as bullrushes flourish best in a sodden undrained area, so 
Commtmism flourishes best in an atmosphere of depression and 
(21) 
tmemplojTnent'. 
Many supporters and scholars of the Communist Party of Australia 
have shared this appraisal of the party's history during the 
depression years. There is an inherent attraction in the proposi-
tion that the political party which preached the inevitability of 
the collapse of capitalism should flourish at a time when capitalism 
was undergoing its most serious crisis. In 1932 the CPA claimed 
that, because of the economic circumstances, it had 'divested itself 
of its swaddling clothes and began to grow rapidly, strengthening 
(22) its connections with the Australian masses in the process'. 
Academic opinion has tended to agree. Les Louis and Ian Turner 
stated that, while revolution was never on the Australian political 
agenda, the CPA 'grew in strength and influence during the 
(23) depression years'. Robin Gollan explained that many people 
accepted the Communist message in the thirties because social 
democratic politicians and trade union officials failed to protect 
(2^) 
the living standards of the working class. The historian of the 
21. Brisbane Courier. 29 July, 1929. 
22. Workers' Weekly, 21 October, 1932. Similar views are expressed in 
EW Campbell, History of the Australian Labor Movement:A Marxist 
Interpretation, Sydney, 1945, p 138f. 
23. Louis and Turner, op.cit.. p 5. 
24. Robin Gollan, 'Some Consequences of the Depression', Labour 
History. 17, October, I970, p 185. 
116. 
party, Alastair Davidson, expressed some misgivings with the above 
arguments, but nevertheless entitled his chapter on the depression 
(05) 
'The Party Grows'. Geoffrey Bolton was less circumspect when 
he asserted that 'Queensland during the 1930s became the home of the 
(26) 
most widely supported communist movement in Australian history'-
Any assessment of the influence of the depression on the CPA 
must be placed within a specific context. The CPA has always been 
a minority political party. Its best result in terms of votes won 
was at the 1943 Victorian State election when it obtained 4.51 
percent of the valid vote, Fred Paterson, who was the member for 
the Queensland State seat of Bowen from 1944 to 1950, was the only 
communist ever to sit in an Australian parliament. The only arena 
in which the party has achieved a modicum of electoral success has 
been local government elections in northern Queensland and western 
(27) New South Wales. ' An examination of the party's fortunes within 
the trade union movement reveals a slightly different picture. 
Davidson estimated that in the period immediately after the second 
World War the party controlled unions which contained between twenty-
(28) 
five and forty percent of Australia's trade unionists. This was 
certainly a significant achievement, but the word 'control' must not 
be interpreted literally. 'Commtmist control' generally indicated 
that a particular union had a number of CPA members among its 
officials. It does not connote that the union membership was 
committed to the full support of the CPA's political or industrial 
programme. Despite the party's influence within the trade unions, 
and despite the fact that it could boast a book membership of 23,000 
(29) in 1945, the CPA has never posed a serious constitutional or 
unconstitutional threat to any Australian Government, 
25, Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, California, 
1969, P 43, 
26, GC Bolton, 'Unemployment and Politics in Western Australia', 
Labour History, 17, October, I969, P 81, 
27- Ian Moles, A Majority of One:Tom Ai^^kens and Independgnt Politics 
in Townsville. Brisbane, 1979, P 58f. 
28, Davidson, op,cit,, p 126, 
29. ibid,, p 83. 
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If one considers Table 5:1, there are data for Queensland which 
seriously undermine the assertion that there existed a close, causal 
relationship between the state of the economy and support for the 
Communist party-
TABLE 5:1 
State election Percentage of Trade Percentage of votes 
(Queensland) Unionists Unemployed for CPA in seats 
contested 
1929 7-5 11.50 
1932 18.0 1.96 
1935 8.7 8.70 
1938 6.4 11.80 
1941 4.5 13.90 
1944 0.7 28.20 
Nineteen thirty two was the worst year of the depression in 
Queensland, yet seven CPA candidates, an increase of two on the 
1929 election, could muster a combined total of only 1224 votes 
in the State election that was held that year- This suggests that 
variables other than the level of unemployment influenced the extent 
of support for the Communist party. Alternatively, it could be 
argued that election statistics are a misleading indicator of CPA 
support. However, during the period under review the CPA in 
Queensland placed great store on election campaigns as a method 
of building and maintaining working class consciousness; and 
the CPA chose carefully those seats in which it fielded candidates. 
It required a minimum level of political commitment to cast a vote 
for a communist in a secret ballot, yet very few Queenslanders were 
prepared to display such a commitment. 
30. Workers' Weekly, 26 April, 1935; Tribune, 20 April, 1944, 
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Australia's electoral history in the 1930s suggests that voters, 
while being intolerant of the incumbent Government, saw as the 
credible alternative not the CPA but the established Opposition 
party. During the worst years of the depression the CPA also 
failed to capitalise on a potentially favourable local situation 
by zealously embracing Comintern-inspired policies which were out 
of step with the realities of the Australian political climate. 
The mistaken belief that History was on their side, and that the 
total collapse of capitalism was at hand, encouraged the CPA to 
pursue adventurist and sectarian policies that resulted in its 
almost total isolation from the mainstream of the Australian Labor 
movement. Davidson has shown that the growth of the CPA in the 
early twenties was dependent on its close association with the ALP 
(31) 
and the established trade union movement. This relationship 
disintegrated after the 1924 Federal Conference of the ALP decided 
against formal affiliation with the CPA. The conference resolution 
led many State branches of the ALP, including Queensland, to declare 
(32) the CPA a proscribed body. Despite this adverse decision, the 
CPA continued to support the ALP both politically and industrially. 
In 1928 the Comintern directed all Communist parties to end their 
collaboration with bourgeois, social democratic parties and to 
asstmie their rightful places as vanguard parties of the socialist 
revolution. After a bitter power struggle which culminated in the 
expulsion of central committee member Jack Kavanagh, this directive 
(33) 
was adopted by the Australian party. 
The new CPA policy was enshrined in the slogan 'Capitalism has 
two parties - fight both'. Communists now regarded all ALP leaders 
and trade union officials as 'social fascists', who consciously 
propped up capitalism by pursuing reformist policies. Those Labor 
31. Davidson, op.cit., p 24f. 
32. See Chapter 2. 
33. Davidson, op.cit., p 48f; Robin Gollan, Revolutionaries and 
Reformists, op.cit., p 20f; R Dixon, 'The CPA in the Thirties', 
ALR, 49, 1979, pp 25-7 
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men who were commonly seen as 'left-wing' were more vigorously 
denounced as 'left social fascists' because, according to the CPA, 
they assumed left-wing postures only to divert the working class 
from correct revolutionary struggle. Australian Communists believed 
that the misery and deprivation brought by the depression had won 
the bulk of the working class to radical socialism, and all that 
remained to precipitate a revolutionary situation was to destroy 
(34) the credibility of social fascism. The CPA committed a serious 
error of judgement in adopting such an isolationist policy. 
Tactless and sometimes vitriolic attacks on traditional working 
class leaders served only to antagonise and to alienate potential 
CPA recruits. Both EW Campbell and Lance Sharkey later admitted 
that this negative and sectarian attitude prevented the party from 
taking full advantage of the opportunities presented by the 
(35) depression. 
Queensland played an important role in the adoption of this new 
vanguardist stance. The 1929 Queensland State election provided the 
CPA with its first opportunity to mount a direct electoral challenge 
to the ALP From its formation in 1920 until 1929 the CPA generally 
supported Labor's electoral candidates. This policy was departed 
from at the 1925 New South Wales State election, but the decision 
was so unsuccessful and produced such division within the party 
that it was not repeated.^ ' The CPA reasoned that the chief 
enemies of the working class were the non-Labor parties, and that 
communists were likely to have more influence with a Labor Government 
than a non-Labor one. During the 1926 Queensland State election 
campaign the CPA issued the stern warning that 'any worker who votes 
(37) 
anti-labour is a scab on his class' In 1929 the party was expres-
sing similar sentiments about workers who intended to vote for the AL^. 
34. CPA, Towards a Workers' Government, Sydney, 1929, PI2/1/7, p 17, 
RSSSA/ANU. 
35. Campbell, op.cit., p 140; LL Sharkey, An Outline History of the 
Australian Communist Party, Sydney, 1944, p 24. 
36. Davidson, op.cit., p 33. 
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The turbulent state of the Labor movement in Queensland after 1925 
was conducive to the emergence of an organised left-wing political 
organisation that was prepared to offer a formal challenge to the 
(38) 
McCormack Government. 
It was in this atmosphere of growing radical discontent with the 
State Labor Government that prominent CPA activists Norman Jeffrey 
and Jack Ryan compiled a document entitled the 'Queensland 
Resolution' in late 1928. This resolution embodied the essentials 
of the Comintern's instruction that the world's Communist parties 
(39) 
must cease their collaboration with social democratic parties. 
Rival interpretations of this document provided the focal point for 
the internal party dispute that led to the downfall of Jack Kavanagh 
and his supporters on the Central Committee. The Queensland branch 
of the party was a strong proponent of the new line, and a local 
party conference in January, 1929, declared that: 
This conference...endorses the new tactic of the 
Communist Party to fight Labor and all other 
capitalist parties in the forthcoming State election 
by running of Commtmist and left wing candidates. (40) 
The Labor party responded to the challenge by alleging that the CPA 
actively conspired with the Opposition in an attempt to defeat the 
McCormack Government, and that the CPA campaign was funded by the 
(41) 
Country Progressive National party. The CPA vigorously denied 
the charge and claimed that the letter which was cited as proof of 
(42) 
collaboration was a blatant forgery. On the eve of the election 
the CPA issued a final statement in which it said that it was '. .not 
concerned whether the Nationalist Party or the ALP is returned to 
(43) 
office; both are equally agents of capitalism'. 
38. For details see Chapter 2. 
39. Workers' Weekly, 24 August, 1928; Campbell, op.cit., p 125; 
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Relations between the two parties were soured further when unions 
affiliated to the Labor party took steps to have the CPA expelled 
from the rooms it occupied in the Brisbane Trades Hall. Moderate 
(44) (45) 
unions such as the printers and the postal workers were 
keen to be rid of the communists, but had to contend with strong 
opposition from the Waterside Workers' Federation which had cancelled 
its ALP affiliation and had given support to the CPA's election 
campaign. The issue produced many heated debates at TLC 
meetings, and the communists were not issued with a notice to quit 
(47) 
until June 1929.^ ^ 
At the 1929 election the CPA fielded candidates in five of the 
seventy-two electorates. These were: JB Miles (Brisbane), JM Durkin 
(Fortitude Valley), E Tripp (Mtmdingburra). FW Paterson (Paddington), 
and DJ Morris (Townsville). They polled a combined total of 3194 
votes which represented 0.74 percent of the State vote and 11.5 
percent of the votes cast in the five electorates contested. 
Individual performances ranged from a minimum of 2.5 percent in 
Townsville to a maximum of 25.6 percent in the Brisbane metropolitan 
seat of Paddington. Communist officials were elated with the 
results and the Workers' Weekly editorialised that: 
The success with which the Communist Party met in 
this its first direct challenge to capitalist 
reformism, (sic) Communist meetings were invariably 
received with interest. Communist literature was 
distributed and eagerly read all over Queensland. 
Hundreds of willing workers popularized the 
Communist message. The Communist Party challenge 
gave new life and hope to rebels who had apparently 
despaired of the struggle. (48) 
44. Printing Trades Journal, 12 February, 1929, p 27-
45. Postal Advocate, 15 February, 1929, p 12. 
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A closer examination of the results suggests that the party exaggera-
ted the significance of the election. 
The CPA chose to regard itself as the major cause of the defeat 
of the McCormack Government. Such a claim had obvious propaganda 
value, but was not grotmded in fact. The party contested only 
Labor held electorates, and all five were retained by the sitting 
member- Only in the most indirect and ironical sense could the 
CPA claim to have unseated a Labor member. Harold Hartley, the 
Labor member for Fitzroy, was a prominent critic of McCormack and 
chose to endorse the 'Left-Wing Programme' sponsored by the CPA. 
He subsequently lost his seat to the CPNP. The total CPA vote 
was inflated by the fact that in two of the seats contested their 
candidates were involved in a two-way contest with the sitting Labor 
member- These seats were Paddington where they polled 25.6 percent 
of the vote and Mundingburra where they obtained 17.16 percent. 
The strong showing in Mundingburra can be contrasted with the 
result in the contiguous electorate of Townsville where the CPA's 
candidate could manage only 2.5 percent in a four-way contest. 
Nevertheless, the party regarded the election as a victory and as 
(49) 
a validation of their new, independent policy- The fallacy 
of this assessment was to be illustrated at the 1932 State election 
when, despite an increase in the number of candidates to seven, the 
party received only 1224 votes or I.96 percent of the total votes 
cast in the seats contested. 
The Communist party believed that its relatively good performance 
at the 1929 election was the consequence of the extensive propaganda 
work that it had carried out in Queensland in the late twenties. 
Encouraged by the opportunities provided by the frequent industrial 
disputes experienced in the 1920s, the CPA regarded the State as a 
lucrative recruitment area. In 1925 the party sent its national 
organiser, Norman Jeffrey, on a tour of north Queensland. He 
was given the following instructions: 
49. Davidson, op.cit., p 50. 
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He will endeavour to link up the discontented 
elements into the revolutionary organisation -
the Communist Party - to enable the advanced 
sections to make war on the social traitors in 
an organised way, to replace the policy of 
reformism by the active class struggle and 
to prepare the Queensland workers for the 
situation that capitalism is plunging headlong 
into - the period of the proletarian revolution. (50) 
Jeffrey paid particular attention to organising among waterside 
(^ l) 
workers, railwaymen and sugar workers. The Workers' Weekly 
claimed that the tour was successful in building working class 
consciousness and that active branches of the CPA had been established 
(52) 
at Townsville, Port Douglas and Cairns. Despite the advances 
made in the north, much of the work was done in a spasmodic and 
uncoordinated manner As a result, CPA influence waxed and waned 
according to a multitude of local conditions. Distance, isolation, 
and an itinerant workforce combined to hinder CPA attempts to channel 
the traditional militancy of the north along 'correct' paths. 
The formation of the Militant Minority Movement (MMM) in 1928 was 
an attempt to place commtmist organisation on a more stable basis. 
The MMM was modelled on the British Minority Movement and was designed 
to operate as a 'front' group within the trade union movement. Its 
proclaimed aims and objectives were as follows: 
The Militant Minority Movement shall consist of an 
unlimited number of members who are trade unionists 
and who are prepared to accept and work for the 
attainment of the objects of the organization. 
(1) To increase the power and efficiency of 
organized labor by promoting class consciousness 
and a correct knowledge of the principles of the 
working class movement and by stimulating activity 
in the unions on all matters affecting their interests. 
50. Workers' Weekly, 18 September, 1925. 
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(2) To endeavour to bring about the closer 
organization of the workers by urging the 
adoption of the principles of the OBU, and, 
as a means to that end, favouring the amalgama-
tion of the crafts on the basis of one union in 
each industry. 
(3) In times of industrial crisis to act as a 
vanguard in the workers' struggle and to expose 
those who attempt to betray the workers. 
(4) To develop amongst the workers a dependence 
upon their own collective strength as a means of 
forcing concessions from capital and as a means 
of defence against its attacks. 
(5) To work for the abolition of contract, piece 
work and bonus systems. 
(6) To organize for a short working day. 
(7) To bring into being a centralized industrial 
movement linked up with the Red International of 
Labour Unions. 
(S) To assist in the development of the working 
class movement for the overthrow of capitalism and 
the socialisation of industry. (53) 
While the stated aim of the MMM was to win the broad mass of 
unionists to socialism, it also concerned itself with the more 
mundane intricacies of internal union politics. Attempts by 
MMM activists to win positions within individual Queensland 
unions did not meet with notable success in the early thirties. 
The MMM was organised in a semi-secretive fashion around the 
(54) 
sale of the newspaper the Red Leader. A rare insight into 
its operations was provided at an MMM conference held in Brisbane 
during 1931. 
The conference attracted only twenty-seven delegates, and a 
report submitted by the executive complained that: 'The MMM owin^ 
to organisational weaknesses has so far failed to capture the 
(55) 
effective leadership in a single struggle'. As a solution 
53. ibid., 30 March, 1928- Campbell, op.cit., p 123. 
54. Healy. op.cit., p 8. 
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to this problem, the executive successfully urged the conference to 
adopt and implement the policy guidelines laid down by the Red 
International of Labor Unions (RILU), at its 1930 conference. 
The essence of the RILU programme was that the unions should take 
advantage of the economic situation and embark on a militant 
strategy of direct action aimed at the final destruction of the 
capitalist state. The conference endorsed the RILU policy in the 
following resolution: 
The results of the conference are to bring the 
Queensland MMM definitely in line with the RILU 
on policy and organisation; to liquidate the 
mistakes of the past and to bring Queensland into 
line with the nation-wide campaign for the building 
of a Minority Movement based on the broad masses of 
the workers and putting forward an active leadership 
of economic struggles which will launch the counter 
offensive against the triple alliance of the bosses. 
State and trade union bureaucrats, and to organise 
for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment 
of a Workers' government. (57) 
The adoption of this super-militant policy in a time of unprecedented 
unemployment illustrated how out of touch the CPA had become with the 
Australian political situation. MMM support in Queensland consequen-
tly underwent a sharp decline in the months following the conference; 
By 1932 there were MMM cells operating in thirty Queensland 
(59) 
unions, but none had made any significant headway in realising 
its objectives. An ambitious attempt to have the Pastoral Workers' 
Industrial Union operate as an MMM cell within the AWU did not survive 
the collapse of the 1930-31 shearers' strike. (See Chapter 7) 
The general weakness of the Minority Movement in Queensland in the 
early thirties is illustrated in a set of MMM State Executive minutes 
56. Frank Farrell, 'The Pan-Pacific Trade Union Movement and Australia, 
1921-1932', HSANZ, 17;69, October, 1977, PP 441-458. 
57 Workers' Weekly, 17 April, 1931. 
58. Davidson, op.cit., p 69. 
59. ibid., p 58. 
126. 
that were leaked to the police in 1933. They showed that the 
executive possessed the princely sum of eight shillings and two 
pence halfpenny with which to conduct revolutionary activity through-
out the State. A summary of MMM activities in the major industrial 
centres of Queensland revealed a constant pattern of poor organisation, 
incompetent management and lost opportunities. Party functionary 
and trade tmionist, Tom Wright, corroborated this interpretation when 
speaking of the Queensland situation in a Workers' Weekly article 
later the same year- He wrote that: 
...it must be frankly acknowledged that 
revolutionary activity on the job, in the 
unions, and among the unemployed is weak, 
and that the party nuclei and MM groups 
function poorly and irregularly (6l) 
The ARU was the only Queensland union in which the MMM exercised 
any real influence. Yet, poor tactics combined with skilful 
manoeuv ring on the part of the incumbent Secretary, Tim Moroney, 
cotmtered MMM attempts to gain control of the union. At the 1930 
ARU State conference a motion was proposed that the union establish 
formal links with the Communist party. The main speaker against 
the motion, Mick O'Brien, drew on the syndicalist traditions of the 
union when he argued that a Communist Government would prove to be 
as incapable of solving the problems of the depression as a Labor 
one. He coimselled the union to rely on its own industrial strength 
and to avoid the entanglements of political parties. The motion was 
defeated ten votes to six. Such a close result encouraged the 
MMM to regroup its forces and raise the matter again at State Council 
level. At the June 1931 meeting Frank Nolan moved that the union 
support the CPA both organisationally and electorally. Speakers 
were divided evenly for and against the motion. Moroney then put 
60. Minutes of a Meeting of the MMM State Executive, 26 March, 1933, 
item 33/3266, PRE/A1074,QSA,llpp; Police Report, 22 November, 
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the view that while he supported the general policy direction of the 
CPA, he strongly disapproved of the actions of certain Communists, 
and that it was not in the long-term best interests of the union to 
become formally committed to any political party. Moroney prevailed 
and Nolan's motion was defeated by the very narrow margin of five 
+ + ^^  (63) votes to four.^ ' 
The CPA earlier had committed a serious tactical error in 
antagonising Moroney by labelling him a 'left social fascist' 
Moroney's considerable prestige at the Trades Hall and among the 
more militant unemployed could have proved a considerable asset to 
the CPA. However, when the MMM faction in the ARU managed 
to topple George Rymer as President in 1930, (See Chapter 6), 
Moroney reasoned that he would be their next target. Nolan alleges 
that Moroney became so hostile to the CPA that he was even prepared 
to sabotage the 1931 Mt Oxide strike in order to discredit the MMM 
in the eyes of the union rank and file. Moroney's tactics 
were nevertheless successful and he remained as Secretary of the 
union until his death in 1944. 
Lack of notable success within the trade union movement was 
accompanied by an inability on the part of the CPA to attract 
members in Queensland during the early years of the thirties. 
At the national level, the CPA managed to boost its membership 
from 249 in 1928 to III6 in 1931. But over the same period the 
Queensland membership grew from seventy-four to only II6. 
The absence of a Labor Government in Queensland during the worst 
years of the depression restricted the capacity of the CPA to 
attract to its ranks Labor supporters who were disillusioned with 
the policies of their party. The CPA's hostile attitude to the ALP 
also cost it members. Until 1933 the party in Queensland was a 
63. Minutes ARU State Council, 26 June, 1931, pp 104-106. 
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zealous supporter of the social fascist line. An unsuccessful 
attempt by Fred Paterson in 1932 to moderate this policy almost led 
to his expulsion from the party. CPA activists regularly 
referred to Labor leaders as 'parasites on the workers'. For 
its part, the Queensland branch of the ALP had little sympathy with 
the philosophy and policy of the CPA. In 1926 the QCE had introduced 
an 'anti-communist pledge' for all ALP members, thereby declaring 
itself against any possible cooperation with the CPA. Throughout 
the depression the ALP held to the view that the CPA was a disrup-
tionist element opposed to the best interests of the Labor movement. 
The CPA lacked the political influence to force the Labor party 
into any form of alliance. On the contrary, it was the CPA that 
was compelled to trim its sails. In 1933 the Communist party in 
Australia eagerly embraced the latest Comintern directive to build 
a united front of the working class against the onslaught of fascism. 
In August 1933 the Queensland executive of the MMM commimicated to 
all its branches a direction to cease their attacks on 'reformist' 
politicians and union officials and to direct all their energies to 
build a united front of the working class. The executive stated 
that: 
.it agrees with the National Bureau and the 
NSW conference of the MMM that the workers, 
despite religous, party or craft union prejudices, 
whatever the attitude of the trade union leaders 
may have towards our proposals will manage to 
overcome all obstacles and with us realise a 
common unity in struggle against the capitalists. (69) 
After 1933 the CPA made frequent requests to be permitted to affiliate 
with the ALP on the same terms and conditions as a trade union. 
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but the Labor party consistently rejected these overtures. 
On balance, the CPA in Queensland reaped few immediate political 
benefits from the depression. On a long term basis, however, the 
work done within the trade unions and among the unemployed paid some 
dividends within the more favourable political climate of the 
(71) Second World War The depression in Queensland was a period 
of lost opportunities for the CPA. When the spontaneous radical-
isation of the workers did not occur the party proved incapable of 
developing new and appropriate strategies to deal with the political 
situation. As a result of this failure, the CPA remained isolated 
and impotent. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of party functionaries, 
the CPA lacked the capacity to challenge seriously the ALP's 
position of dominance within the Labor movement. 
Communism offered little threat to the unity of the Labor party 
in Queensland during the 1930s partly because the ALP had declared 
itself against any association with the CPA before the onset of the 
depression. Communists were regarded as pariahs by most Labor 
supporters in Queensland because of the mistaken belief that they 
had caused the downfall of the McCormack Government in 1929. Labor, 
however, possessed no such preconceived hostility to the Douglas 
Social Credit movement, which ironically posed a more serious 
threat to the unity and strength of the party. Today in Australia 
social credit ideology is usually associated with extreme right-wing 
(72) 
organisations such as the League of Rights, but during the 
depression there was, at least, a superficial similarity between 
their theories and policies and those of the ALP- Major Douglas' 
ideas on credit reform were readily endorsed by many Labor supporters, 
particularly after the problems the Scullin Federal Government 
encoimtered with the Commonwealth and private trading banks. On a 
71. Jones, op.cit., p 190f. 
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more general level, the ALP and Douglas Credit shared elements of a 
common ideology of populism that seemed to explain and offer a 
(73) 
solution to the depression. The Queensland AWU journal. 
Worker, described the relationship in these terms: 
Labor...does not accept the Douglas theory in its 
entirely, .(but) in the immediate aims of both in 
regard to financial and currency reform there is 
no divergence. (74) 
From its formation in Queensland in late 1930 until 1934, the 
Douglas Credit movement operated as an educative and propaganda pres-
sure group. It printed leaflets, wrote and distributed books, held 
discussion groups and arranged public meetings to expound the theories 
(75) 
of Major Douglas. Douglas Credit saw the Labor movement as an 
area of potential recruits and their speakers regularly addressed 
local ALP branch meetings. The TLC made a room available free 
of charge for Douglas Credit, but stopped short of allowing Douglas 
(77) 
Credit speakers to address the council.^ The 1932 Labor-in-
Politics rebuffed a similar approach from the Douglas Credit 
organisation. Both bodies refused permission not because of any 
enmity towards Douglas Credit, but because they did not wish to set 
(78) 
a precedent for outside groups to address their meetings. 
Some ALP branch members and affiliated trade unionists joined the 
Douglas Credit organisation, and in 1933 the QCE was asked to rule 
whether or not membership of Douglas Credit was compatible with 
membership of the ALP The executive gave the cautious opinion that: 
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...providing that the Douglas Credit group does 
not run (electoral) candidates there can be no 
objection at present to an ALP member joining 
such a group, but the matter is being kept under 
review by the Executive. (79) 
Cordial relations between Douglas Credit and the ALP in 
Queensland came to an abrupt end in 1934 when the Social Credit party 
was formed and endorsed candidates for the Federal election that was 
scheduled for later that year- In August 1934 the QCE declared the 
new party a proscribed organisation and forbade ALP members to 
associate with it. This decision did not produce any immediate 
disharmony within the party since by 1934 relatively few Labor party 
members remained associated with Douglas Credit. There was, however, 
lingering support for Douglas Credit within the ranks of the 
Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE). Over 
the previous three years a strong Douglas Credit group had developed 
in the union under the leadership of the divisional Secretary, John 
Valentine. In September 1935 the State Council of the AFULE debated 
the ^cretary's association with the Social Credit party. Motions 
from a number of local branches called on the council to forbid paid 
officials from joining anti-Labor bodies and wearing the badges of 
those bodies when engaged on union business. Labor party loyalists 
on the council launched a strong attack on Valentine and one of them 
warned that 'if we let Douglas Credit creep in we will be kicked out 
of the Labor party'. Valentine responded by defending the economic 
policies of Social Credit by asserting that they were substantially 
in accord with those of the Labor party. A long and sometimes 
vitriolic debate followed until the following motion was passed by 
five votes to three: 
That as this union is affiliated with the Australian 
Labor Party. ,any member of our union who does not 
uphold the principles according to the Labor platform 
shall not hold office in this union, .. (80) 
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This was, in effect, an ultimatum to Valentine to choose between 
Social Credit and his job; he chose to retain his job. 
Despite their lack of success within the Labor movement. Social 
Credit maintained a presence in Queensland politics throughout the 
1930s. By 1934 Douglas Credit had developed an impressive 
infrastructure with sixty branches and over 1,000 members distributed 
(8I) 
throughout the State. At the 1934 Federal election they contes-
ted five electorates and secured 6.9 percent of the votes cast in 
those seats. They improved their position at the 1935 State election 
by obtaining 19.8 percent of the vote in the nineteen electorates 
contested. Both these results are inflated somewhat because Social 
Credit candidates tended to perform best in seats that were not 
contested by both the major parties. Berzins' comment that they 
(82) became the Labor party's 'chief rural rival' in the 1930s 
exaggerates the party's strength in Queensland. However, they 
did benefit from the decline of the CPNP after 1935. Social Credit's 
best electoral effort in Queensland occurred at the 1937 Federal 
election in which its candidate polled, after the distribution of 
ALP preferences, 49.4 percent of the vote in the electorate of 
Wide Bay and almost defeated the sitting Country Party member-
This represented the zenith of Social Credit's achievements in 
Queensland and, after a relatively poor showing at the 1938 State 
election, the party withdrew from the Queensland political scene. 
Since Labor in Queensland survived intact the challenges offered 
by Langism, Communism and Social Credit, it was perhaps ironic that 
the only serious electoral threat to the ALP in the 1930s sprang from 
religous rather than ideological antagonisms. In December 1937 the 
formation of an organisation called the Protestant Labour party was 
annotmced. The historian of the party has explained its birth in 
terms of a Protestant reaction to Catholic agitation for State aid 
for church schools, an agitation which was intensified in Queensland 
in 1936 with the establishment of the Catholic Tax Payers' 
81. Report of the First State Conference of the Douglas Credit Party 
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Association.^ ' While State aid was the catalyst that produced the 
new party, there were other issues involved. Sectarian animosities 
were never far below the surface of Queensland, or Australian, 
politics and were easily inflamed by official policies which appeared 
to discriminate against a particular denomination. Two decisions 
of the Moore Government were interpreted by many Catholics as being 
discriminatory: first, the cabinet decided that subsidised relief 
labour was not to be used to improve the grounds of denominational 
schools; and second, the Government, as an economy measure, reduced 
the number and value of secondary school scholarships in a way which 
appeared to disadvantage Catholic children. The Catholic Archbishop 
of Brisbane, James Dtihig, had campaigned against the Labor party at 
the 1929 election, allegedly because McCormack had refused to grant 
him freehold title to a piece of land for a church building. 
Moore's unsympathetic attitude to the scholarship issue turned 
the Catholic hierarchy and press against him. During the 1932 
election campaign the church endorsed the Labor party^ after 
Forgan Smith promised to restore the scholarship system. 
When Labor was elected to Government in 1932, the two contentious 
decisions were reversed. A striking difference between the CPNP and 
ALP cabinets was that while nine of Moore's ten ministers were 
Protestants, seven of Forgan Smith's ten were Catholics. The 
Premier himself was a Presbyterian but had no sympathy with any 
form of militant Protestantism, For instance, in 1933 he turned 
down an invitation from the Loyal Orange Institute to be part of the 
(87) 
official party at a function to celebrate the battle of the Boyne, 
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Isolated protests against the 'Catholicity' of the Queensland Labor 
party occurred throughout the 1930s. The Protestant Labour party 
repeated most of these in its initial manifesto where it alleged 
that the Government was insidiously pro-Catholic and that members 
of that faith received preferment within the party organisation 
( 88) 
as well as within the police force and public service. None 
of these allegations was new; what was new was that those who made 
them claimed to be erstwhile Labor party members. 
The Protestant Labour party entered the 1938 State election and 
its twenty-three candidates polled 8.75 percent of the valid vote. 
One of its candidates, GA Morris, defeated the sitting Labor member 
for the metropolitan seat of Kelvin Grove, FJ Waters. The party 
then consolidated this victory by winning two mtinicipal by-elections. 
In 1939 their preferences almost brought about the defeat of the 
ALP candidate in a by-election for the Federal seat of Griffith. 
These results established the Protestant Labour party as a more 
serious electoral threat to Labor than either the Lang party or 
Douglas Credit. Fortunately for the ALP the Protestant Labour 
party proved to be more Protestant than Labor and its success, while 
brilliant, was short-lived. Those prominent in the party claimed 
that they were 'true Labor men' and that they aimed only to correct 
the sectarian bias that existed within the ALP Yet, while the 
Protestant Labour party was able to make disturbing inroads into 
Labor's voting base at the 1938 election, it was unable to attract 
the support of any prominent members of the Labor party. ' Some 
of the Protestant Labour party spokesmen and candidates were ex-ALP 
members but none had occupied any position of authority within the 
party. The Protestant Labour party attracted many who were motivated 
solely by anti-Catholicism and were not interested in reforming the 
ALP Tensions between those who saw themselves as part of the Labor 
movement and those who did not eventually produced a split in the 
Protestant Labour Party in late 1939, after which the party went into 
rapid decline. 
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The outbreak of war in 1939 created an atmosphere that was not 
conducive to a political party that campaigned exclusively on a 
religous issue, and at the 1941 State election the party polled 
only 1.74 percent of the vote. Morris, who had enlisted in the 
navy in 1940, lost his seat to the ALP candidate. The Protestant 
Labour party never contested another election. 
Labor in Queensland survived the depression organisationally 
intact. The challenges offered by a range of dissident groups 
were rebuffed without producing major factional disputes. Labor's 
depression experiences confirmed it as a moderate, democratic 
socialist party committed to meliorism and constitutionalism. The 
strength of the similarly inclined Australian Workers Union provided 
the stable foundation on which the Labor edifice was constructed. 
The other affiliated trade unions were so weakened by the depression 
that they were unable to muster the strength to challenge the 
dominance of the AWU until the early 1950s. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION 
ON QUEENSLAND'S TRADE UNIONS 
137-
Prior to the onset of the depression the Queensland trade union 
movement was reformist in ideology and was committed to a political 
strategy which placed heavy emphasis on the Parliamentary Labor party. 
The confirmation of these beliefs was an important effect of the 
depression on the trade unions. The Queensland Labor movement's 
commitment to what Ralph Milliband has termed 'parliamentarism' 
was largely due to the State Labor party's ability to win political 
power. During the years 1915 to 1926 the party won five consecutive 
elections. This set it apart from, for example, the ALP in Victoria 
(2) 
which did not win a clear electoral majority until 1952. A 
deeply ingrained abhorrence of revolutionary theory and methods, 
combined with a decline in union strength, meant that political and 
economic initiatives in the thirties rested with the opponents of 
the Labor movement. At the same time, the trade unions bore the 
brunt of the economic collapse. Unemployment sapped their membership 
and their financial resources. Depression conditions also hindered 
unity of action on the part of the unions. Peak councils, which 
some hoped would operate as the coordinators of union activity, were 
reduced to virtual impotence because of disaffiliation on the part 
of member organisations. Widespread unemployment discouraged even 
the most militant unions from using the strike weapon to press their 
demands. The overall consequence of these conditions was that, 
rather than radically altering their political and industrial 
programme, the trade unions in Queensland emerged from the depression 
more deeply committed to moderate social democracy and constitutional 
methods than ever before. 
The dominant ideological consensus within the Queensland Labor 
movement in the 1920s was a mild form of democratic socialism. More 
militant tendencies did manifest themselves from time to time. Yet 
they offered no serious challenge to the general orthodoxy after the 
1. R Milliband, Parliamentary Socialism, NY, 1964, p 13f. 
2. H McQueen, 'Victoria', in D J Murphy, (ed). Labor in Politics, 
Brisbane, 1975, p 293. 
3. See chapter 7-
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(4) 
removal of the ARU from the ALP in 1926.^ Despite their moderate 
socialism and their practical approach to politics, many Queensland 
union leaders shared Marx and Engels' belief that 'what the bour-
(5) geoisie produces, above all, are its own gravediggers'. They, 
like most socialists, were convinced that capitalism would eventually 
produce an economic crisis that would precipitate its own downfall. 
In the 1930s the trade unions were neither ideologically nor organ-
isationally equipped to take advantage of such a crisis. Notwith-
standing the dire predictions of some capitalists and the dire 
threats of some socialists, the existing property relationships in 
Australia emerged from the depression substantially unaltered. This 
was due not only to the strength and resilience of capitalism, but 
also to the weakness of the Labor movement. 
Table 6:1 shows the decline in union membership that accompanied 
the depression in Queensland. The figures reveal that the number of 
registered tmionists in Queensland declined by thirfy percent in the 
period 1927 to 1932. This compares with a national decline of nine-
teen percent over the same period. 
On the surface, these comparative figures appear contradictory. 
Queensland's rate of unemployment during the depression was consis-
tently below the national average; yet the decline in trade union 
membership was much greater than that experienced by the nation as 
a whole. An important point to note is the rapidity with which 
Queensland unions recovered their membership after 1932. Between 
1932 and 1935 union membership in Queensland increased by forty-two 
percent to a figure approximating the 1927 total. The Australian 
experience was quite different. In 1927 the number of registered 
trade unionists in Australia totalled 911,652.^ ^ By 1932 this 
figure had declined by nineteen percent to 740,821, and by 1935 
had risen only seven percent to 790,830. The more violent fluc-
4. See further chapter 2. 
5. Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, NY, 
1955, P 22 
6. Commonwealth Year Book, 1930, p 130. 
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TABLE 6:1 
QUEENSLAND TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 1927-1935 
Union Membership 
Australian Workers 
Union 
Australian Railways 
Union 
Amalgamated Foodstuffs 
Union 
Shop Assistants Union 
Australian Engineering 
Union 
Queensland Teachers 
Union 
Australasian Meat 
Industries Employees 
Union 
Amalgamated Carpenters 
& Joiners Union 
1927 
58,244 
8,972 
5,664 
5,000 
4,503 
4,400 
4,286 
4,090 
Australian Road Transport 
Workers Union 3,850 
Membership 
1932 
26,862 
5,789 
2,382 
3,830 
2,924 
4,227 
3,415 
2,680 
2,440 
1^ . -1-
1927 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
32 
54 
42 
58 
23 
35 
4 
20 
34 
37 
Membership 
1935 
53,547 
6,827 
3,120 
4,310 
3,910 
3,677 
4,847 
5,232 
3,179 
$ + 
1932 
- 35 
-1-136 
-1- 18 
+ 31 
H- 13 
-H 34 
- 15 
+ 42 
+ 95 
-H 30 
Federated Clerks Union 
(Central & Southern 
Branches) 3,409 5,570 + 63* 6,792 + 22 
Federated Engine Drivers 
& Firemens Association 
State Services Union 
Colliery Workers 
Australian Federated 
Union of Locomotive 
Enginemen 
Federated Storeman & 
Packers Union 
Builders Labourers 
Federation 
Printing & Kindred 
Industries Employees 
Union 
Coachmakers Union 
Electrical Trades Union 
Tramways Union 
Federated Ironworkers 
Association l,l64 1,355 + I6 NA 
Others 13,408 22,560 -H 68* 12,422 - 45 
TOTAL 154,781 108,285 - 30 154,025 + 42 
*This growth was brought about by branch amalgamation. 
*The increase in 'others' 1927-32 was produced by a decline in the 
memberships of small unions which rendered them unworthy of 
individual listing. 
2,734 
2,661 
2,502 
2,271 
2,206 
2,194 
2,157 
1,944 
1,297 
1,200 
2,792 
2,782 
2,006 
2,023 
2,381 
859 
2,005 
1,639 
1,296 
921 
-1- 2 
-1- 4 
- 20 
- 11 
-(- 8 
- 61 
- 7 
- 16 
± 0 
- 23 
3,071 
3,747 
2,268 
1,800 
2,499 
1,160 
2,070 
1,690 
1,587 
1,023 
^• 1 0 
4- 35 
+ 13 
- 11 
-H 5 
+ 35 
-H 3 
+ 3.1 
-1- 22 
11 
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tuations of Queensland's trade union statistics can be explained in 
terms of the effect of specific Government policies. When Moore came 
to power he set about dismantling those clauses in industrial awards 
which provided for union preference in employment. For example, the 
fifty percent decline in AWU membership was very much the result of 
(7) the suspension of the rural award in May 1929. Similarly, the 
rapid growth experienced by Queensland's unions after 1932 can be 
related to the Forgan Smith Government's policies of restoring the 
industrial awards that had been amended or abolished by Moore. Such 
examples provide a necessary corrective to the notion that all changes 
experienced by the Labor movement in the 1930s were induced solely by 
economic circumstances. 
The disastrous fall-off in membership rendered many Queensland 
unions politically and industrially impotent. Two unions which 
suffered particular difficulties in this regard were the ARU and the 
Australian Road Transport Workers Union (ARTWU). The Collinsville 
branch of the 7\ETWU was so affected by the problem of falling member-
ship that it failed to meet at any time between 1930 and 1933. A 
visit from a union organiser in 1933 injected a breath of life into 
(s) 
the branch, but it collapsed again in May 1934. An even more 
serious situation arose in the ARU. Because it was a militant union 
influenced by syndicalist ideas, the ARU had always placed great 
stress on maintaining solidarity and morale within its ranks. When 
Tim Moroney came to deliver his Secretary's report to the 1934 State 
Conference of the ARU he apologised to the delegates present for the 
failure to hold a conference earlier- He explained that to do so 
would have been farcical because of the membership decline the tmion 
had suffered. As Table 6:1 indicates, it was the manual and/or 
unskilled unions that suffered the greatest loss of membership during 
the depression. Whereas white collar or skilled unions such as the 
7. Report of the Nineteenth AWU Annual Delegates Meeting, Brisbane, 
1932, p 8; Report Third Annual Conference of the ARTWU, Brisbane, 
1933, P 2. 
8. ARTWU Minutes, 1 October, 1933; and 3 May, 1934. 
9. Report of the Twelfth ARU State Conference, Rockhampton, 1934, p 1, 
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Teachers' Union, the Electrical Trades Union and the Printers fared 
much better. The Printers were particularly fortunate, and the 
annual reports of the union's Board of Management showed that the 
union was relatively lightly touched by the ravages of depression. 
The union's historian, Jim Hagan, argues that the depression was a 
period of positive development for the PIEUA since in 1933 it ended 
its collusive arrangement with the Master Printers. Under an 
agreement entered into in the 1920s the PIEUA and the Master Printers 
cooperated via a Joint Industrial Council. In current parlance it 
was a 'sweetheart agreement' under which the Master Printers provided 
significantly better conditions for Queensland printers than were 
specified under the Federal award. For their part, the union encour-
aged all employers to join the Master Printers Association (MPA). 
The decline in the business cycle during the early years of the 
depression prompted the MPA to attempt to have the Commonwealth 
Printing Award applied to Queensland, whereupon the PIEUA withdrew 
from the Joint Industrial Council. From this point the branch for-
sook its dual system of loyalties and became a fully fledged indus-
trial organisation. 
A general corollary of declining membership was a steady worsening 
(12) 
of the state of union finances. Again the PIEUA was an exception, 
as was the Colliery Employees Union who reported in 1933 that despite 
a heavy loss of members, sound investments and careful accotmting 
(13) practices left the tmion in a healthy financial state. Partly 
because of its extensive property holdings, the AWU was also able 
(14) to maintain its financial solvency during the depression. Unio 
whose income was primarily dependent on annual membership fees soon 
10. Printing Trades Journal, 11 March, 1930, p 57; PIEUA Board of 
Management Report, 31 December, 1931, p 4. 
11. J Hagan, Printers and Politics, Canberra, I966, p 247-
12. PIEUA Board of Management Report, 31 December, 1932, p 3. 
13. QCEU Annual Delegate Board Meeting, 29 April, 1933, E165/43/5, 
RSSSA-AMJ. 
14. See chapter 4 for details of the financial position of the AWU. 
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fell into severe financial difficulties. The ARU, which was Queens-
land's second largest union, collected in 1937 only £3,596 in member-
(15) 
ship fees compared with the £10,233 it had collected in 1927-
Because of such a decline in revenue, most unions were required to 
effect stringent economies. Annual picnics, reunions and May Day 
celebrations, which helped to maintain union solidarity, were the 
first to go. Yet these were mere trimmings and more drastic measures 
were soon contemplated. 
One effect of the 1890s strikes in Australia was to encourage 
the growth of 'Labor' newspapers. Prior to the depression, most 
of Queensland's larger unions possessed their own journals which 
carried technical information, union news, and articles on current 
political and economic issues. A union journal was regarded by the 
leadership as an important, avenue of communication with the rank and 
file. Yet low membership combined with a decline in paid advertise-
ments placed most of these journals in jeopardy during the 1930s. 
In 1931 the ARU was required to reduce the size of the Advocate 
because it had become a drain on union ftmds. During the same 
year the AFUIF's Headlight fell into similar difficulties. The 
Advocate survived its travails but the Headlight ceased publication 
in 1938. The depression also claimed as a victim Brisbane's only 
daily Labor newspaper, the Daily Standard. The Standard began 
publication as the bulletin of the 1912 Brisbane general strike 
committee, and was later expanded into a regular evening newspaper. 
Funds for the paper were provided by the trade unions who bought 
shares in the company that operated it. The Standard was never 
highly competitive, and by the late 1920s was sustained only by the 
injection of substantial ftmds on the part of the AWU. Depression 
conditions caused a marked decline in advertising which placed the 
paper in a precarious financial condition. Regular appeals for 
funds and a variation in the size of the paper proved unsuccessful. 
15. Report of the Biennial Meeting of the ARU Australian Council, 
March, 1931, p 6. 
16. ARU State Council Minutes, 6 June, 1931, p 91. 
17- AFULE Minutes, 21 March, 1931, E212/8, RSSS^''AMJ. 
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and the Standard ceased publication in July 1936. 
From time to time most unions attempted to improve their finan-
cial position by pressuring unfinancial members to pay their dues. 
The AWU decided, in 1932, to refuse membership to any person who 
worked in the sugar industry during the preceeding season, but who 
(l8) 
had failed to take out a current union ticket. Regular adver-
tisements appeared in the Advocate exhorting ARU members to remain 
financial. It was pointed out to recalcitrant members that if they 
continually refused to pay their dues the union would not hesitate 
(19) to initiate legal action to recover any outstanding debts. 
The Postal Workers Union, in 1933, decided to adopt a similar 
(20) 
attitude to its unfinancial members. Such actions had a 
miniscule effect on the net income of the unions concerned, and more 
drastic economy measures had to be adopted. Unions which possessed 
honorary officials attempted to conserve funds by reducing the meeting 
fees paid to these officials. The next logical step was to reduce 
the wages of full time officials, or to abolish the positions 
altogether- Unions which displayed the courage to take such 
decisions often found that they engendered bitterness and rancour 
within the ranks of the membership. In January 1931 the Southern 
District Executive of the AWU reported that the decline in membership 
(21) had necessitated the retrenchment of one of its four organisers. 
This dismissal was regretted by the membership, but was accepted 
because it was motivated by purely economic considerations. When 
the ARU dispensed with one of its officials in 1930 it contributed 
to a major factional dispute within the union. When the State 
Cotmcil of the ARU assembled in March 1930 the editor of the Advocate 
and President of the union, George Rymer, was criticised vigorously 
for allegedly censoring a letter Frank Nolan, of the Central District 
18. Report of the Nineteenth AWU Annual Delegates Meeting, Brisbane, 
1932, p 38, FML. 
19. Advocate, 15 April, 1931. 
20. Postal Advocate, 15 April, 1933. 
21. Report of the Eighteenth AWU Annual Delegates Meeting, Brisbane, 
1931, p 10, FML. 
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(22) 
Committee, had written to be published in the paper-^ The 
ensuing debate was extremely recriminatory with Rymer alleging that 
(23) 
'this is an unscrupulous attempt to discredit me' Later in the 
meeting an apparently unrelated motion was moved that 'the dual 
position of paid President and editor of the Advocate be abolished' 
After some debate the motion was carried by seven votes to five. 
The major arguments advanced in favour of the motion were that the 
union could not afford the luxury of both a paid President and 
Secretary, and that the task of editing the journal could be 
fulfilled by the Secretary- Events at the August conference of the 
AWU tended to confirm Rymer's allegations that the cry of financial 
hardship was merely an excuse to remove him from the presidency-
The Maryborough branch of the union moved at conference that: 
'The decision of the State Cotmcil to abolish the position of paid 
State President be repudiated and Comrade Rymer be reinstated in 
(24) 
this position.' During the course of the debate, delegate 
McDonnell of Rockhampton, who had moved the original dismissal motion 
at State Council, claimed that there was no plot on the part of the 
Central District Committee to sack Rymer But he added that when 
he witnessed Rymer's 'behaviour' at the March Council meeting he 
(25) decided that the president had to be replaced. After lengthy 
discussion the motion was defeated ten votes to six. When questioned 
(26) (27) 
on the subject both Mick Healy and Frank Waters attested that 
Rymer was dismissed for purely economic reasons. A close study of 
the facts seems to suggest otherwise. By 1930 there had arisen 
within the ARU a group of members centred at Rockhampton, and led 
by Frank Nolan, whose sympathies lay with the Communist party and its 
industrial front group, the Militant Minority Movement (MMM). This 
group came to command significant support within the union, and a 
number of its members harboured leadership ambitions. 
22. ARU State Council Minutes, 27 March, 1930, p 9. 
23. ibid., p 23. 
24. Report Twelfth ARU State Conference. Brisbane, August, 1930, p 29. 
25. ibid., p 32. 
26. Healy Interview, op.cit., p 26. 
27- Waters Interview, op.cit., p 3. 
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The difficulty facing the insurgent group was how to fracture the 
diumvirate which held control of the union. George Rymer was an 
experienced tmion official who, together with Secretary Tim Moroney, 
had been the guiding influence of the ARU for over a decade. 
Unfortunately for Rymer he was singled out for removal because 
Moroney proved to be a more formidable opponent for the dissidents. 
Both Rymer and Moroney were opposed to the intrusion of the CPA into 
the affairs of the union, but Moroney was astute enough to couch 
his opposition in careful language. Moroney had been a leading force 
in the Left Wing Movement that grew out of the divisions of the Labor 
movement in the late 1920s. Furthermore, Moroney was regarded in the 
union movement as one of the most effective union officials at the 
Trades Hall. Moroney's militancy was based on syndicalist rather 
than communist theory- When the MMM faction moved against Rymer 
they did so because he was in a more vulnerable ideological and 
strategic position than was Moroney- At both the State Council 
and State Conference meetings Rymer received Moroney's unqualified 
and vocal support. Moroney conceded that finance dictated that the 
combined position would have to be abolished, but argued that it 
(28) 
should be done in a manner that did not reflect on Rymer. 
Rumours at the State Conference suggested that the dissidents, having 
(29) 
removed Rymer, were now prepared to challenge Moroney. The Nolan 
faction seriously underestimated Moroney's tactical skill, and over 
the next few years he successfully marshalled his support within the 
union and out-manoeuvred the MMM on both the political and industrial 
front. Despite Nolan's election to the union vice-presidency 
in 1931, he did not succeed in becoming ARU Secretary tmtil after 
Moroney's death in 1944. The dismissal of Rymer had a deleterious 
effect on the functioning of the union because it consumed energies 
that could have been more profitably deployed in guiding the ARU 
through one of the most difficult periods in its history. 
28. Report of the Twelfth ARU State Conference, op.cit., p 31. 
29. ibid., pp 33-34. 
30. See further chapter 4. 
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As well as promoting difficulties within individual unions, the 
depression also seriously hindered attempts to effect solidarity among 
Queensland's trade unions. Since its inception in 1922, the 
Queensland Trades and Labor Council (TLC) represented the chief force 
for unity within the Queensland trade union movement. The effective-
ness of the TLC was dependent on the number of unions which were 
affiliated to it. During the depression years membership sank to a 
record low. Average imion affiliation to the TLC over the period 
1922 to 1967 was thirty-six. The peak year was 1925 when fifty 
unions were affiliated and the worst year was 1932 when only twenty-
three out of a total of 111 Queensland unions were TLC affiliates. 
While inability to pay affiliation fees was the major cause of the 
decline, it was not the sole one. During the late 1920s a number of 
important unions left the TLC because they disapproved of its politics. 
The most significant of these was the AWU who left for one year in 
1928 because they opposed the TLC's hostile policies towards the State 
Labor Government. Furthermore, the AWU stated that it would not 
rejoin until the TLC adopted the card system of voting at its meet-
(31) ings. Because the TLC had strongly criticised its delegates for 
their behaviour during the South Johnstone strike, the AFULE decided 
(32) 
to follow the example of the AWU. While the AWU made its peace 
with the TLC and re-affiliated in 1929, the AFULE maintained its 
stand that the Cou 
return until 1936. 
(33) ncil was a communist dominated body and did not 
The return of the AWU to the TLC proved to be a mixed blessing. 
While the affiliation of the State's largest union was essential to 
the success of the TLC, the introduction of the card system of voting 
caused many of the smaller unions to reconsider their membership. 
Once the card vote was introduced it was inevitable that the AWU 
would dominate the council. This method of voting remained a divisive 
31. Worker, 18 September, 1928. 
32. AFULE Executive Minutes, 6 November, 1927, E212/5, p 3, RSSSA/ANU. 
33. ibid., 13 January, 1929; and 5 October, 1930. 
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influence in the union movement until it was finally abolished in 
1939. Inmtediately the AWU returned to the TLC in 1929, the WWF 
(34) 
raised misgivings regarding the operation of the card vote. 
Events came to a head in 1930 when the TLC demanded that one of the 
WWF delegates be expelled because he referred to the AWU delegates 
as 'liars' and 'scab herders' The union declined to replace the 
delegate and alleged that the whole affair was engineering by the 
AWU; whereupon the WWF was expelled from the TLC and did not return 
(35) 
until 1935. Constant clashes between the AWU and ARU delegates 
also culminated in the latter's decision to leave the TLC in 1933 
for a period of three years. While many of these decisions to 
disaffiliate were caused by political and personal antagonisms, the 
chronic state of finances kept the question of the affiliation con-
stantly to the fore in union affairs. Small organisations such as 
the Boot Trades Federation and the Cooper's Union affiliated and 
disaffiliated as their finances fluctuated. This had a 
deleterious effect on the functioning of the TLC because the 
unpredictability of its yearly income made effective planning 
impossible. The issue of affiliation also created difficulties 
for the industrial unions concerned because many hours of meetings 
were devoted to debating the question. These debates often engen-
dered hostilities and rivalries that did little to further the cause 
* 1-^  •+ (38) of solidarity-
The problems encountered by the TLC during the depression were 
shared by the Trade Union Congress (TUC). The TUC was a yearly 
conference convened to debate matters of general concern to the union 
movement. It lacked any formal legislative authority, but its 
decisions were referred to the TLC for endorsement and action. Despite 
its lack of formal powers, the TUC served a useful function as a 
34. WWF Minutes, 7 November, 1929, E213/9, p 86, RSSSA/ANU. 
35. ibid., 2 July, 1930. 
36. ARU State Council Minutes, 27 January, 1933, p 151. 
37- Coopers Union Minutes, 1 March, 1929, T56/l/2; ABTEF Minutes, 28 
September, 1930 and 27 June, 1932, T49/l/9, p 21, RSSSA/ANU. 
38. AFULE Executive Minutes, 2 November, 1930, E212/7 p 4, RSSSA/ANU, 
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forum for union opinion. Furthermore, some tmions who declined to 
affiliate with the TLC nevertheless sent delegates or observers to the 
TUC. Like the TLC, the TUC ran into serious difficulties during the 
1930s. Because it was such an informal body it lacked an infra-
structure of its own, and was totally dependent on the cooperation 
and goodwill of its member unions. Economic circumstances dictated 
that such cooperation was not forthcoming during the depression. 
Attendances at TUCs declined steadily after 1928 and 'lack of interest' 
(39) 
caused the abandonment of the 1933 congress. The TUC was also 
bedevilled by the intrusion of the card vote controversy into its 
affairs, and a number of unions declined to attend because of alleged 
AWU dominance. The impotence of Queensland's unions was well 
illustrated at the 1932 congress when the ARU delegates moved that 
the TUC authorise and finance a strike of unemployment relief workers 
if the Government refused to pay them award rates. Clarrie Fallon 
of the AWU opposed the move and stated that 'The unions are not in a 
position to finance anything. They cannot even finance their own 
domestic affairs, let alone handle thousands of men and their 
(41) dependents.' In the context of the ti 
challenge and the TUC decided to do nothing 
me, such logic was beyond 
While the majority of Queensland's unions chose to remain outside 
the ambit of the TLC, most were affiliated with their relevant Federal 
branch. Despite the Intercolonial Trade Union Congresses of the late 
(42) 
nineteenth century, and the later activites of the One Big Union 
(43) 
movement. Federal unionism was still in its infancy in Australia 
during the 1930s. The Australasian Cotmcil of Trades Unions (ACTU) 
was formed only in 1927, and did not begin to play a significant role 
in Australian industrial relations until the 1940s. One hundred 
years of separate colonial development was reflected in a deep sense 
of parochialism on the part of many unions, and the Federal organisa-
tions were often fragile and powerless bodies. The experience of 
39. Report Tenth Trade Union Congress, Brisbane, November, 1934, p 4. 
40. WWF Minutes, 2 September, 1931, E213/10, pp 38-39, RSSSA/ANTJ. 
41. Report Ninth Trade Union Congress, Brisbane, 1932, p 34. 
42. RN Ebbels, (ed), The Australian Labor Movement, Melbourne, I96O, 
Chapter III. 
43. I Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, Canberra,1965,ppl82-194. 
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the depression was to highlight this fragility by aggravating centri-
fugal forces within the Federal branches. A powerful force operating 
against tmion federalism in Queensland was that most (approximately 
80 percent) unions operated under State rather than Federal industrial 
awards. Because of fourteen consecutive years of Labor rule, the 
State awards were more generous to the unions than were their 
Federal counterparts. Many unions in Queensland would join their 
Federal branch only if workers in their particular industry were 
covered by a Federal award. 
Undoubtedly the chief point of contention between Federal unions 
and their State branches was the level of capitation fees levied on 
each State. In 1929 the AFULE in Queensland was seriously consider-
ing suspending payment of its Federal capitation fees. The fees were 
eventually paid because Queensland was threatened with exclusion from 
(44) 
the union's Federal conference if the money was not forthcoming. 
By 1931 the AFULE's financial situation was critical. Arguments 
about the solvency or insolvency of the union occupied many hours 
(45) 
of executive meetings and produced much bitterness within the union. 
In July 1931 the executive decided unanimously not to send a delegate 
to Federal conference because of the union's inability to meet the 
(46) 
Federal capitation fees. This was the first time since the 
formation of the Federal body in 1920 that Queensland had not been 
represented at conference. The membership of the Queensland branch 
was regarded as essential by the Federal executive, and in February 
1932 the Federal President, AS Drakeford, came north to exhort the 
Queensland branch to remain financial. Drakeford appealed for 
solidarity in the face of hard times and was at pains to point out 
that the Federal executive did not waste the money of the State 
branches. Drakeford also appealed to the self interest of the 
branch by prophesy ing that 'the railways were heading for Commonwealth 
44. AFULE Executive Minutes, 5 July, 1931. 
45. Financial Report, AFULE Minutes, 4 March, 1932, E212/8, RSSSA/AMJ. 
46. AFULE Executive Minutes, 5 July, 1931. 
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control', and that a Federal award would soon be in force in the 
(47) Queensland service. While his grasp of Federal-State financial 
relations proved to be deficient, Drakeford did manage to convince the 
AFULE that it should again become a financial member of the Federal 
branch. 
The ARTWU was another tmion which the declining economic situation 
caused to review their Federal affiliation. At the 1927 State 
conference criticism was expressed at the high cost of Federal affil-
iation fees, but there was such strong support for the Federal body 
that the matter was not put to a vote. The situation had altered 
substantially by 1933 and at that year's conference there was a 
debate on the union's relations with its Federal branch. The major 
arguments against remaining in the federation concerned money. 
Delegates from Gympie and Maryborough argued that since only 
Queensland and Tasmania were financial members, Queensland was paying 
over half the Federal union's annual operating expenses of £2000. 
Furthermore, the fact that only two States were financial rendered any 
attempts to hold a Federal convention farcical. Other delegates, 
including the State President, George Lawson, argued that the present 
difficulties were of a temporary nature and that for Queensland to 
withdraw would be a tactical error since they may, at some time in 
the future, require a Federal award for the industry. This argument 
held sway, and a motion to remain a member of the Federation was 
(49) 
carried by thirteen votes to four-
Some white collar associations also decided that under depression 
conditions affiliation with a Federal organisation was not justified. 
At their 1935 State conference the Queensland Teachers' Union (QTU) 
voted by thirty-four votes to twenty-three to withdraw from the 
Federated State School Teachers' Association.^ Delegates argued 
that not only were affiliation fees proving onerous, but also that the 
47- ibid., 3 January, 1932. 
48. Report ARTWU State Conference, August, 1927, p 4. 
49. Report ARTWU State Conference, August, 1933, pp 19-20. 
50. Queensland Teachers' Journal. l6 September, 1935, P 28f. 
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constitutional arrangement whereby education was principally a State 
matter made Federal teachers' organisations superfluous. Because 
it was a public service association, the QTU was affected in a 
different manner by the depression than most other unions. Table 
6:1 indicates that the tmion suffered only a four percent decline 
in membership over the period 1927 to 1932. This was primarily 
because State public servants, with the exception of married women, 
could not be easily retrenched. However, they did have their 
salaries reduced by ten to fifteen percent, and this was translated 
into a decline in dues paid to the union. Table 6:1 also shows that 
during the years 1932 to 1935 the QTU suffered a significant membership 
decline at a time when most tmions were recouping their lost members. 
This situation came about because the State Government, as an economy 
measure, drastically reduced the number of scholarships offered to 
prospective teachers. Hence natural wastage through retirement, 
resignation etc was no longer counterbalanced by regular infusions 
of new teachers, and the union membership steadily declinea It was 
in response to these problems that the union took its 1935 decision 
to withdraw from the Federal body. 
The negative influence exerted by the depression on union 
federalism was equally apparent in the movement towards union 
amalgamation. Multi-unionism had been a feature of Australian 
industrial relations for many years, and while the economic conditions 
reduced union membership it did not reduce the number of separate 
unions. In 1927 Australia possessed 369 industrial unions with 
(5l) l64l branches. By 1935 this figure stood at 354 unions with 
1755 branches. Queensland followed the Australian pattern with an 
increase of five unions (l04 to 109) and fourteen branches (367 to 
3§l) over the same period. While it was official TUC and TLC policy 
(52) to foster union amalgamations whenever possible, they experienced 
little success in achieving this aim. The Queensland railways was 
51. Source: Commonwealth Year Books. 
52. Report of the Twentieth AWU Annual Delegates Meeting, Brisbane, 
1933, p 7, FML. 
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an industry that was plagued constantly by difficulties arising from 
multi-unionism. There were over thirty unions covering workers in 
the industry, and demarcation disputes were a regular occurrence. 
The ARU, as an all-grades union, possessed a long standing policy 
of uniting all the railway tmions into a single industrial organisa-
(53) tion. This ambition was regarded with deep suspicion by the 
smaller railway unions, particularly the AFULE, who viewed it as a 
(54) plot to absorb them into the ARU. Constant denunciations of the 
evils of craft and sectional unions by the ARU antagonised the 
officials of the smaller tmions and further retarded the cause of 
(55) 
amalgamation. In an attempt to coordinate industrial action 
some unions joined together to form the Railway Transport Council. 
Yet rivalries among its members culminated with the withdrawal of 
the AFULE in 1933.^5^) 
Queensland's trade unions were generally spared the major schisms 
that were a feature of the Labor movement in other States during the 
thirties. But the divisions and bitterness that had been engendered 
by the disputes of the 1920s were in no way obliterated by the exper-
ience of the depression. Conflicts concerning political and 
industrial policies combined with personal animosities to prevent 
the unions establishing a united front during the depression. The 
ARU and the AFULE were at loggerheads throughout the 1920s, and the 
major cause of their disputes centred around the vexed question of 
membership poaching. ARU officials modelled their union along the 
lines of the National Union of Railwaymen which had been formed in 
Britain as an all-grades union in 1913. The plethora of craft and 
sectional unions within the railway service vigorously resisted any 
amalgamation moves sponsored by the ARU. For their part the ARU 
officials argued that 'snc shness, stupid ignorance or foolish 
(57) prejudice alone' prevented the formation of a single railway union. 
53. ARU State Council Minutes, 26 September, 1929, p II6; 27 January, 
1933, p 7, FML. 
54. AFULE Executive Minutes, 6 November, 1927, E212/5,p 5, RSSSA/ANU. 
55. Advocate, 5 January, 1929. 
56. AFULE Executive Minutes, 7 January, 1934, E212/4, p 8, RSSSA/ANU. 
57- MNB Cribb, Some Manifestations of Ideological Dispute in the 
Queensland Labour Movement, 1915-1929, BA Queensland, I965, P 79. 
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AFULE officials constantly accused the ARU of attempting to steal its 
members, and relations between the two bodies became so strained 
that an AFULE executive member was suspended from the union because 
he had 'collaborated' with the ARU during an industrial dispute in 
1925.^59) 
A major stumbling block to union amalgamation at any time has been 
the fear on the part of the officials of the smaller unions that they 
would forfeit their jobs on joining a larger organisation. The ARU 
regularly reassured such officials that they would be guaranteed 
employment in any amalgamated tmion that may be formed, but these 
reassurances fell on deaf ears. The cause of factionalism was 
further advanced during the early thirties when the Queensland Railway 
Traffic Employees Union (QRTEU) made a concerted effort to oust the 
ARU as the chief all-grades union. Through a series of applications 
to the industrial court the QRTEU managed to have its list of 
registered callings expanded. The ARU took umbrage at this action 
and filed an application to the court either to restrain or to 
deregister the QRTEU. During the course of the hearing the 
commissioners identified the central cause of disharmony amongst the 
railway unions: 
It is quite apparent from the evidence that railway 
unions generally have not strictly adhered to both 
their registered lists of callings and to their 
rules in their acceptance of and retention of 
members. This, to some extent, appears to be 
due to the fact that the Commissioner for Railways 
may transfer employees from one section to another or 
from one calling to another, and to compel individuals 
to change their union with each transfer or change of 
calling would create endless confusion. This does 
not mean, however, that any union is entitled to 
accept as members persons not covered either by its 
rules or list of callings. (61) 
58. AFULE Executive Minutes, 6 December, 1925, p 3; 5 November, 1926, 
p 5; 5 August, 1928, p 4, E212/5, RSSSA/ANU. 
59. ibid., 4 October, 1925, pp 1-3. 
60. Cribb, op.cit., p 80. 
61. Queensland Industrial Gazette, 24 December, 1934, p 466. 
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The court ruled that QRTEU had not breached its terms of 
registration and dismissed the ARU's application for deregistration. 
Despite this decision, the QRTEU did not have the strength to displace 
the ARU from its position as the chief railway union. On the other 
hand, the ARU made little headway in its attempt to absorb the other 
unions. As a consequence, Queensland railway unionism emerged from 
the depression in much the same state as it had entered it. The 
railway service contained three types of unions: an industrial union, 
the ARU; a series of craft unions such as the AEU and the ETU-
and a collection of sectional unions including the Guards and Shunters, 
(62) 
the Stationmasters and Railways Officers. This mixture of often 
competing organisations acted as a serious restraint on any attempts 
to establish industrial solidarity in the service as a whole. 
The railway industry was not the only arena of competition 
between unions. While the ARU harboured ambitions to become the 
blanket union in the railways, the AWU often behaved as though it 
wished to supplant all other tmions in the State. As the Common-
wealth's largest union, the AWU displayed initial interest in the 
'One Big Union' movement, but its enthusiasm dulled when it realised 
that it could not be the leader of that movement. In Queensland 
the sugar and woollen industries were the bulwarks of AWU power-
The union also covered workers in other primary industries as well 
as the mining and transport industries. As the AWU grew in strength 
and extended its horizons it was almost inevitable that it would 
come into conflict with the State's second largest industrial union 
- the ARU. Again the issue was the usual one of membership demarca-
tion, which had come to a head in I926 when the AWU formed a Railway 
Branch and openly encouraged ARU members to join. The AWU was 
always keen to limit the power of the ARU and acted in I926 because 
it believed that a number of ARU members were disenchanted with the 
militant policies of their leadership. Despite some vigorous 
campaigning on the part of the AWU, only 400 ARU members resigned 
to join the newly created Railway Branch.^ The AWU-inspired 
62. Cribb, op.cit., p 80. 
63. VG Childe, How Labour Governs, Melbourne, 1923/1964, Chapter 12. 
64. Worker, 18 October, 1926. 
65. Cribb, op.cit., p 254. 
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moves against the ARU at the 1926 Labor-in-Politics Convention 
confirmed a state of war between the two unions which the depression 
did nothing to abate. The ARU constantly denounced the AWU for the 
latter's alleged manipulation of the card vote system on the TUC, 
and with the election of the Forgan Smith Government in 1932 relations 
between the two tmions worsened. The ARU argued that the AWU was 
using its influence with the Government to grant itself favorable 
industrial awards which invariably involved the poaching of members 
^ +V. • (67) from other tmions. 
Similar charges of 'body snatching' were laid against the AWU by 
the Waterside Workers Federation. In 1928 the WWF was engaged in a 
major industrial dispute on the Brisbane Waterfront. During the 
dispute a group of wharf labourers applied for and received 
registration as a union before the industrial court. The WWF 
executive believed that this move had been sponsored by the AWU 
as part of an overall plan to displace the WWF from the waterfront, 
and throughout the depression relations between the two unions were 
highly acrimonious. AWU expansion into the transport industry soon 
brought it into conflict with ARTWU. The 1933 ARTWU State conference 
instructed its officials to visit each sub-branch at least once a year 
in order to prevent attempts by the AWU to poach ARTWU members. 
As the ARTWU expanded its operations beyond the Brisbane area it 
frequently clashed with the AWU regarding membership rights. Such 
encounters often ended in the Industrial Court, and did little 
to foster unity in the transport industry as a whole. 
Factionalism was a feature of Queensland unionism before, 
during and after the depression. While most unionists agreed in 
66. Advocate, 15 November, 1932 and 15 December, 1934. 
67. Report ARU State Conference 1934, op.cit., p 34. 
68. WWF Minutes, 7 August, 1929, p 124 and 22 August, 1929, p 146, 
E213/9, RSSSA/AMJ. 
69. Report of the Third ARTWU Conference, Brisbane, 1933, p 18f. 
70. Report of the Fourth ARTWU Conference, Brisbane, 1933, p 4lf. 
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principle with the AWU President Clarrie Fallon's statement that 'we 
must present a united front to the enemy on the industrial and polit-
(71) ical field', few were prepared to set aside personal and political 
antagonisms and work for the establishment of such a united front. 
Periods of industrial discord or economic recession invariably place 
union officials under great stress. In the 1930s most Queensland 
union leaders responded to this stress by pursuing cautious policies. 
Furthermore, they were encouraged by economic circumstances to 
concentrate on the welfare of their own members, and to set aside 
broader questions of industrial and political cooperation with other 
tmions. Practical considerations such as finance, membership and 
industrial awards dominated the business of Queensland's trade unions 
to the virtual exclusion of all else. A significant feature of the 
depression in Queensland was that it failed to produce any major 
ideological reassessment on the part of the unions. Union executives 
and State conferences were little concerned with discussing ideolog-
ical problems posed by the depression. As Chapter 4 indicated, the 
main impact of the depression was to drive the unions closer to the 
ALP and its moderate, democratic socialist notions. The ARU, which 
before I929 was the only union capable to posing an alternative to 
this social democratic consensus, was overcome by ideological 
atrophy during the thirties. Despite brave talk of socialism and 
syndicalism, the ARU's philosophy degenerated into a rather negative 
and sterile anti-parliamentarism which produced little that was 
original or helpful in confronting the depression. In organisational 
and philosophical terms the Queensland union movement in 1935 was 
much the same as it was in 1925. 
71. Report of the Twentieth Annual AWU Delegates Meeting, Brisbane, 
1933, p 7-
CHAPTER 7 
INDUSTRIAL MILITANCY 
DURING THE DEPRESSION 
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Les Louis, in his study of the depression in Victoria, has 
observed that 'the depression witnessed a steep general decline in 
(l 
strikes in Australia' Unionists were unwilling to engage in 
militant industrial action during the 1930s because of the fear that 
employers and Governments would recruit volunteer labour from among 
the ranks of the unemployed to break strikes. Examination of the 
pattern of industrial disputes in western societies has generally 
concluded that the level of strike activity varies in inverse propor-
(2) tion to the trade cycle. Ian Turner qualified this generalisation 
by pointing out that on the downturn of the economic cycle trade 
unions often find themselves engaged in 'defensive' industrial actions 
against employers' attempts to reduce wages and/or conditions. 
Australian industrial relations experience in the late 1920s and early 
1930s illustrated Turner's argument. In 1929, just prior to the 
onset of the world-wide economic collapse, there occurred a trilogy 
of major industrial disputes in the coal, timber and waterfront 
(4) industries. All were provoked by attempts to reduce wages or 
working conditions, and all resulted in defeats for the workers 
involved. 
Queensland appears as an exception to this national pattern. 
This is because two substantial industrial disputes occurred in the 
State in late 1930 and late 1931, thereby apparently contradicting 
the theory that strikes do not occur during economic depressions. 
Closer examination reveals that Queensland unionists were not as 
deviant as might first appear. It must be remembered that Queensland 
entered the great depression later than most other States and that the 
1. Les Louis, Trade Unions and the Depression, Canberra, I968, p 148. 
2. KGJC Knowles, Strikes:A Study in Industrial Conflict, Oxford, 1952, 
p 146; A Rees, 'Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations', 
in A Kornhauser et al (eds) Industrial Conflict, NY, 1954, p 218; 
R Hyman, Strikes, London, 1972, p 28. 
3. Ian Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, Canberra, I965, p 82. 
4. See for details of the strikes: Miriam Dixson, 'The Timber Strike 
of 1929', HSANZ, 40;10 May I963, pp 479-492; Miriam Dixson, 
'Rothbury', Labour History. 17, November, 1970, pp 14-26; Brian 
Fitzpatrick, A Short History of the Australian Labor Movement, 
Melbourne, 1940/1968, Chapter 13. 
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full impact of the economic crisis did not begin to be felt until the 
third quarter of 1930. Many Queensland unionists saw themselves in 
much the same position in late 1930 as their southern comrades did in 
late 1929 - on the downturn but not yet at the trough of the economic 
cycle. Some, but not a majority, still clung to the belief that 
their living standards could be defended by militant industrial action. 
The 1929 strikes revealed the folly of this belief to the 
Australian unionists but the lessons of those defeats went largely 
unheeded in Queensland because its unions were not major participants 
in the strikes. Queensland was totally immune from the timber strike 
because the relevant workers were covered by a local, State rather 
Year 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
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1931 
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1936 
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Source: 
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8.1 
14.7 
3.0 
2.8 
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(5) than by a Federal industrial award.^ Similarly, the State's 
involvement in the 1929 coal strike was restricted to the participation 
of the mining unions in protest stoppages against the killing of New 
South Wales colliery worker, Norman Brown. When the Federal executive 
of the Waterside Workers' Federation called out its members in protest 
against the terms of the industrial award handed down by Justice Beeby 
in the Commonwealth Arbitration Court in September 1928, the ports of 
Brisbane, Bowen and Townsville went on strike. Yet they were back at 
work in October and Queensland unionists took no further part in the 
dispute which was continued only in the port of Melbourne. Thus, 
the industrial disputation that so dominated the political life of 
Australia on the eve of the depression was centred primarily in New 
South Wales and Victoria; the Queensland unions entered the new 
decade relatively unscarred by recent industrial humiliation. 
This state of innocence was soon to be shattered in two major 
strikes. The first involved shearers in western Queensland, which 
began as a defensive action against a wage reduction. The second 
commenced as a pay dispute amongst a small group of miners in a 
remote area of the State, but later spread to sections of the 
railway service in northern Queensland. Factionalism within and 
among the participant unions was an important feature of both disputes. 
The defeats inflicted on the strikers by the combined action of the 
State Government and the employers finally convinced even the most 
militant unions of the dangers of engaging in direct industrial action 
during a period of economic depression. This is revealed by the facj;, 
that notwithstanding minor disputes involving meatworkers and brewery 
workers in 1935, Queensland's industrial history was devoid of major 
strikes between 1931 and 1946. The experience of the two depression 
strikes had a restraining influence on the Queensland trade unions 
and encouraged them to seek political solutions to their problems by 
returning Labor to power at the 1932 State election. It is however, 
of value to examine the two strikes in some detail to indicate that 
some workers were prepared to strike even in the most hazardous econ-
omic conditions. 
5. Dixson, 'Timber Strike of 1929', op.cit., p 481. 
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In November 1930 the State Arbitration Court announced that a 
ten percent reduction in the pastoral award would take effect from 
1 December, 1931. This constituted a cut in the shearing award 
from forty shillings per hundred sheep to thirty shillings per 
hundred. The AWU State executive soon received a ntmiber of urgent 
telegrams from sheds in western Queensland requesting advice regarding 
possible industrial action against the variations in the award. The 
executive counselled the shearers against strike action, and asked 
them to place their faith in the arbitration system. WJ Riordan, the 
AWU Secretary, defended the action of the executive by pointing out 
that under S87 of the State Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act strike action would result in automatic cancellation of the 
entire award and would '...involve the organisation (the AWU) in 
the heaviest penalties for their infringement of the law.' 
The shearers were not impressed by this logic, and by December 
many sheds in the Longreach, Barcaldine and Emerald areas were on 
strike. 
The shearing dispute was to be characterized by internecine 
warfare within the AWU ranks. The diffuse and disparate industries 
and callings covered by the union, together with the decentralization 
of Queensland industry produced within the AWU conditions that were 
highly favourable to the emergence of an 'iron law of oligarchy' 
(7) 
syndrome. Robert Murray is perhaps a little harsh in his 
description of the AWU as a union run 'of officials, for officials 
(8) 
and by officials' but to many rank and file members the union 
hierarchy often appeared too willing to sacrifice internal democracy 
for industrial effectiveness. Over the years such disaffection gave 
rise to a number of militant, insurgent groups within the AWU, the 
most significant of which was the Committee for Membership Control 
(CMC) which played an important role in the Mt Isa disputes of the 
6. Worker, 21,January, 1931, 
7- Roberto Michels, Political Parties, Illinois, 1915/1949, Chapter 11. 
8. Robert Murray, The Split:Labor in the Fifties, Melbourne, 1971, 
p 134. 
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1960s. The CMC had its forebears in such organisations as the Bush 
Workers Propaganda Group, which was active in Queensland in the early 
twenties, and the more substantial Pastoral Workers Industrial 
Union (PWIU). 
The PWIU was formed by disgrtmtled AWU members in New South 
Wales in 1930 as a consequence of the shearers' defeat in a strike 
at Moree. In conceding defeat, the unionists laid the blame on the 
New South Wales AWU officials, whom they accused of undermining the 
solidarity of the rank and file by issuing a statement which 
encouraged shearers to accept the wage-cutting Dethridge Award, 
(9) 
which had been the initial cause of the dispute. Despite organ-
isational difficulties, the disenchantment felt by many New South 
Wales AWU members was institutionalized by the formation of the PWIU, 
whose aim was to attract members from the AWU by adopting militant 
policies to achieve a number of objectives: The principal ones were: 
(a) To organise the workers in the pastoral and related 
rural industries and those following the callings 
coming under the general heading bushwork, with the 
object of securing better wages and improved working 
conditions. 
(b) To equip all workers in the industries covered with 
a better knowledge of the class nature of the struggle 
that goes on in society. 
(c) To expose the Arbitration and Conciliation Courts 
and all forms of class collaboration as the instru-
ments of the ruling class. 
(d) To fight all forms of class oppression and exploi-
tation and to organise for the ultimate overthrow of 
capitalism and the introduction of a socialist state as 
the means of achieving freedom and justice. (lO) 
Because shearers were itinerant workers who moved freely across 
the New South Wales/Queensland border, the involvement of the PWIU 
in the 1931 Queensland dispute was virtually inevitable. The 
9. Advocate, l6 February, 1931. 
10. Workers' Weekly, 25 November, 1930. 
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refusal of the AWU officials to endorse the strike provided the PWIU 
with an ideal opportunity to win support amongst the shearers. 
Since its formation, the dissident union, whose headquarters were at 
the Sydney Trades Hall, had issued a regular newsletter entitled the 
Rank and File Bulletin. With the commencement of the Queensland 
dispute, a local version of this publication was issued weekly, and 
served as a forum for attacks on the graziers, the State Government 
and the AWU hierarchy. A regular feature of the newsletter was 
a list of shearers who, the PWIU alleged, were engaged in strike 
breaking activities. The following was a typical entry: 
Paddy Hughes, shearer, well known as 'Galloping 
Paddy', or the 'Flinders Terror'. Married, 
living at Longreach. Height 5ft. 9 ins. 
Weight 10 st. 6 lbs. Age 42. Has lantern jaws. 
Complexion dark. Hungry haggard appearance. 
The 'Phar Lap' of all Jacks. (l2) 
The Queensland branch of the AWU attacked the activities of the 
PWIU, and throughout the strike both organisations joined in a 
vitriolic slanging match. Official AWU policy towards the PWIU 
was that it was a commtmist inspired group which was being orches-
trated from Sydney with the sole aim of destroying the AWU and the 
(13) 
unity of the Queensland Labor movement. Riordan made much of 
the fact that many of the leaders of the PWIU were either communists 
or persons who had a history of disruption within the AWU. Thirty-
five years later, a successor as AWU Secretary, Edgar Williams, 
continued the verbal war against the PWIU and wrote that it was nothing 
(14) 
more than a commtmist front organisation bent on destroying the AWU. 
While there was truth in the allegation that a number of the PWIU 
leaders were avowed communists, notably Norman Jeffrey, and that the 
CPA wanted the PWIU to operate as a Militant Minority Movement (MMM) 
11. An incomplete set of the Rank and File Bulletin is held in the 
Fryer Memorial Library, Brisbane. 
12. ibid., 12 January, 1931; and Police Report nd,item 31/3178, 
PRE/A1025, QSA. 
13. Worker, 28 January, 1931. 
14. Edgar Williams, Yellow, Green and Red, Brisbane, 1957, p 8f. 
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cell in the AWU, much of the rhetoric of the militants was accepted 
by the rank and file shearers because the AWU officials allowed 
themselves to become identified with those who wished to break the 
strike. In January 1931 a number of the local pastoral disputes 
committees had cabled the central executive of the AWU appealing 
for financial assistance for the strikers. All received the same 
(15) 
curt reply - 'there is no way of complying with your wishes.' 
This intransigent and unsympathetic attitude on the part of the 
AWU officialdom was encouraged by their belief that the PWIU leaders 
were keen to goad the shearers into strike action so that the pastoral 
award would be suspended, thereby providing the PWIU with the 
opportunity to apply for a new award and supplant the AWU as the 
major shearing union.^ Whether this was the aim of the PWIU, 
or whether the AWU leaders refused to support the strike because 
they believed that to do so would be to play into the hands of the 
employers, is impossible to determine. Yet, the PWIU did win the 
allegiance of many shearers because of its militant stand against the 
(17) graziers and the AWU officials. Reports in the CPA paper,the 
(I8) 
Workers' Weekly\ '^  that the majority of shearers in the Toowoomba, 
Hughenden, Charleville, Cunnamulla, Blackall, Longreach, St George 
and Goondiwindi districts had resigned from the AWU and joined the 
PWIU were partly corroborated by regular police reports to the State 
(19) Premier-
Despite the growing strength of the PWIU, the lack of union 
solidarity weakened the position of the strikers. Because of its 
political complexion and because of the importance of the woollen 
industry to the Queensland economy, the Moore Government did all in 
its power to ensure that shearing proceeded as normally as possible. 
15. Worker, 21, January, 1931. 
16. Official Report Eighteenth Annual Delegates Meeting, AWU, Brisbane, 
January, 1931, pp 6-7, OML. 
17- Worker, 28 January, 1931. 
18. Workers' Weekly, I6 January, 1931. 
19. Police Report, 2 March, I93I, item 31/6975, PRE/A1025, QSA. 
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The tactic adopted by the Government was to rail strikebreakers 
under police escort into western Queensland from other parts of the 
State and from New South Wales. Because they were eager to stem the 
growing influence of the PWIU, the AWU agreed to assist the Government 
in recruiting 'volunteer' labour-^ Such an action provided 
the PWIU with the opportunity to denounce the AWU as 'the greatest 
(21) 
scab agency in Australia.' Also implicated, in the eyes of 
the strikers, was the New South Wales Lang Labor Government which 
provided police protection for a trainload of 'volunteers' who had 
(22) been recruited in Victoria and New South Wales. The arrival 
of these trains in the west was occasioned by a good deal of resis-
tance on the part of the strikers. In Emerald, a pitched battle was 
waged between the shearers and the police which resulted in a number 
of the former being jailed. Despite the actions of the strikers, 
many sheds were able to complete shearing by employing these 
(23) 
'volunteer' workers under heavy police guard. By February 1931 
the combined actions of the graziers,the Government and the AWU had 
begun to break the strike. The only hope the shearers now had was 
the possibility that the major transport unions would come to their 
aid by declaring non-union wool 'black' and refusing to carry it to 
the ports. 
This was not to occur- The Australian Railways Union readily 
(24) 
gave moral and financial assistance to the strikers but was 
unwilling to involve itself directly without an assurance that it 
would receive the support of the other railway unions. John Valentine, 
the AFULE Secretary, ended any possibility of a concerted railway 
union involvement by issuing a directive to AFULE members that they 
should avoid becoming embroiled in the dispute. The AFULE statement, 
while expressing sympathy for the cause of the shearers, noted that 
20. E Jensen, the Effect of the Depression on the Trade Unions in 
Queensland, 1929-31, BA, Queensland, 1971, p 93. 
21. Workers' Weekly, 21 January, 1931. 
22. ibid., 6 February, 1931. 
23. Police Report, 4 December, 1930, item 30/7489, PRE/A1025, QSA. 
24. Advocate, 15 April, 1931. 
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its own members had suffered a wage reduction without resorting to 
strike action, and commented unfavourably on the violent actions of 
(25) 
some of the shearers. By April 1931 these factors had combined 
to bring about the total capitulation of the strikers, whereupon the 
United Graziers Association heartily thanked the Premier for 
providing police protection for the non-unionists and for helping to 
'defeat the forces of anarchy,' that were arrayed against the wool-
(26) 
growers. 
The second major industrial dispute to occur in Queensland during 
the depression also began as a tmion protest against wage reductions. 
By an Order-in-Council dated 3 September, 1931, the Moore Government 
removed all gold and metalliferous miners from the ambit of the 
Industrial Court. The owners of the Dobbyn, Orphan and Mt Oxide 
mines, which were situated approximately lOOKm north west of 
Cloncurry, took advantage of this decision and reduced the wages 
of their employees. The mines were small-scale enterprises, and 
were adversely affected by the low level of economic activity that 
accompanied the depression. Their isolation, Cloncurry is 2113 Km 
by rail from Brisbane, and their out-of-date equipment helped render 
the mines uneconomic. In November 1931 the mines' owners, a 
partnership of AE Powell and J Peterson, reported a net loss for 
(27) 
each month since April. From the point of view of the employees, 
the Mt Oxide area was an unpleasant place to work. In addition to 
the normal hazards and discomforts of underground mining, the workers 
were required to endure a harsh climate, isolation and loneliness. 
There were also pecuniary disadvantages involved in living at Mt 
Oxide. At the time of the strike, the basic wage in Townsville, 
the nearest provincial city, was £4,11 shillings, but Mt Oxide 
workers received only £4,2shillings 6d. Because of the isolation. 
25. Statement on Shearers' Strike, 3 February, 1931, AFULE Records, 
E212/8, RSSSA/ANU. 
26. United Graziers Association to Moore, 28 May, 1931, item 31/3178, 
PRE/A1025, QSA. 
27- Telegram, Mining Warden to Moore, 22 November, 1931, item 31/7541, 
PRE/A1089, pp 1-2, QSA. 
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the cost of living at Mt Oxide was fifty percent higher than 
Townsville's and twenty-five percent higher than Cloncurry's. The 
workers also regularly complained that the mine store engaged in 
(28) profiteering and other questionable practices. 
In October 1931 the owners announced that the falling price of 
copper demanded a reduction in production costs, and announced a 
(29) 
wage cut from 18 shillings a day to 16 shillings. Negotiations 
between the men and the company broke down, and on 2 October sixty 
miners began a strike that was to last six months, and was to involve 
a large section of the north Queensland workforce. The early days 
of the strike were uneventful and gave no hint of the conflicts 
that were to follow. The strikers lacked any formal organisation, 
and only one of their number was a union member. The AWU was the 
union that nominally covered the industry- Soon after the 
declaration of the strike most of the men left the mine sites and 
established themselves in and around the Dobbyn hotel. Dobbyn 
was the nearest town, and served as the railhead from which ore 
was transported to the State-owned smelters at Chillagoe. 
A surprising feature of the early days of the strike was the 
attitude of the AWU. In sharp contrast to their response to the 
shearers' dispute, the union extended its full support to the 
(31) 
miners. Circumstances dictated this change in attitude. The 
AWU's main objection to the shearers' strike was that, in ignoring 
the arbitration system, the shearers had endangered the livelihood 
of all pastoral workers. The AWU could not put this argument to 
the Mt Oxide miners because the State Government had, by its Order-
in-Council, denied them access to the normal machinery of arbitration. 
28. Commissioner of Prices to AE Jones (MLA), 13 November, 1931, top 
number, 34/345, QSA; AWU to Moore, 6 November, 1931; Minutes of 
Conciliation Conference, Dobbyn, 21-22 November, 1931, item 
31/7682, PRE/A1089, QSA. 
29. Police Report, 13 October, 1931, item 31/687O, ibid. 
30. Police Report, 6 November, 1931, ibid., p 3. 
31. See June 1931 issues of Worker. 
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In early November, the AWU attempted to bring the dispute before the 
Industrial Court by requesting Premier Moore to repeal the Order-in-
(32) Cotmcil. Moore refused the request.^ The AWU officials also 
were determined to avoid a repetition of the shearers' dispute, from 
which they emerged with a reputation as strike-breakers. This 
determination encouraged the union to aid the embattled miners. 
From October 1931 until April 1932 the AWU provided the strikers with 
food, clothing and a small amount of strike pay. 
The miners soon realised that their only hope of winning the 
strike lay in preventing the removal of ore from the mines to the 
railway yards at Dobbyn. Powell and Peterson devised a number 
of strategems to outwit the strikers. One such plan involved 
hiring a camel train and a team of Afghan drivers to transport the 
ore. This was eventually abandoned in favour of a motor lorry. On 
29 October a lorry laden with ore managed to avoid a picket line and 
departed for Dobbyn. The strikers quickly procured a lorry of their 
own and set off in pursuit. However, the owners' lorry arrived 
safely and unloaded its ore at the railway yards under the watchful 
eye of the local police. As the police were returning to their 
station, the strikers' lorry appeared in the main street. The two 
constables immediately challenged the strikers, who responded by 
attacking them and stealing their revolvers. During the fracas, 
the manager of the Orphan mine, a Mr Pshedpelsky, appeared. One 
of the strikers, John McCormack, brandished the recently stolen 
pistols and threatened: 'Here is the Russian bastard, we will give 
him his share too. .1 will shoot you, you Russian bastard.' 
Fortunately for Pshedpelsky, McCormack was clamed by his colleagues. 
The strikers then adjourned to the railway yards and held a public 
meeting to air their grievances against the company and the 
Government. 
32. State Executive AWU to Moore and Reply, 2 November, 1931, top 
number 34/345, PRE/A1089, QSA. 
33. Police Report, 27 November, 1931, item 31/38076, ibid. 
34. Details from Police Report, 26 November, 1931, pp 1-3, ibid. 
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This incident marked a turning point in the strike. McCormack 
was convicted of assault and sentenced to two months detention in 
Stewart Creek jail. The strikers now realised that they lacked the 
industrial strength to win the dispute alone; so they called on the 
railway unions for assistance. The latter responded positively, 
and on 19 November all ore from the Dobbyn mines was declared 'black' 
Support for the miners spread rapidly. Their action was endorsed by 
(35) the Brisbane Trades and Labor Council. The Queensland Trades 
Union Congress, which was then meeting in Brisbane, unanimously 
carried the following resolution: 
That this Trade Union Congress declares its 
support of the miners in the Cloncurry district 
who are resisting wage reductions and price-
exploitation for commodities, by direct action; 
and strongly recommends to the executives of all 
unions concerned, or those whose practical 
assistance to the striking miners is necessary, 
to help them win, that ore from the mines affected 
by the strike which is produced or loaded by scab 
labor, should be immediately declared 'black' (36) 
The success or failure of the strike now depended on the solidarity 
of the railway unions. 
When the miners first issued their call for support, Riordan of 
the AWU and Moroney of the ARU spoke to Valentine, the AFULE Secretary, 
to arrange a co-ordinated strike effort. Valentine declared himself 
in favour of the strike, but insisted that the matter would have to 
decided by the AFULE executive. Valentine also made it clear to 
Riordan and Moroney that they could expect opposition from the 
President of the AFULE, Fred Hughes. Despite Valentine's declaration 
of support, the AFULE adopted a policy of vacillation to avoid becoming 
embroiled in the dispute. The union parried a direct call for support 
35. TLC Minutes, 23 November, 1931. 
36. Advocate, 15 December, 1931. 
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from the miners by questioning the bona fides of the secretary of 
the strike committee. When the State executive finally met in raid-
November, at the height of the strike, it failed to reach the agenda 
item dealing with the dispute, and issued no directive to its members. 
President Hughes then took the opportunity to issue a personal state-
(37) 
ment urging AFULE members not to become involved in the strike. 
The AFULE journal, the Headlight, argued that, in the present 
economic climate, tmionists who 'allowed themselves to be forced by 
a militant minority element into industrial troubles that got them 
(38) 
nowhere' were playing into the hands of the Moore Government. 
In mid-November the solidarity of the unions was put to the test. 
When a trainload of 'black' ore arrived in Townsville from Cloncurry 
it was met by a large body of strikers who attempted to convince the 
railway shunters not to handle it. The shunters resisted and a 
melee ensued. As a consequence, the Railway Commissioner, 'JW 
Davidson, dismissed three ARU members on a charge of intimidating 
other railway employees. One of those dismissed was EP 'Pooger' 
O'Brien, who was later to become northern district Secretary of the 
ARU. When the commissioner rejected the union's demand that the men 
be reinstated, the ARU called a State-wide strike to commence on 27 
(39) November.^ The dispute now developed into a pitched battle 
between the ARU and the State Government, with the Dobbyn miners 
relegated to the background. No mention of the miners was made 
when the Townsville strike committee issued its list of demands. 
Why, then, did a relatively minor dispute at a small and isolated 
mining camp develop into a major industrial conflict? An obvious 
37- Headlight, 4 December, 1931. 
38. ibid. 
39. Official Report Thirteenth State Conference, ARU, Rockhampton, 
October, 1934, p 7-
40. The major demands of the strikers were: reinstatement of the 
sacked men; a state minimum wage of £4 per week; a forty-four 
hour week; and increased pay and benefits for the tmemployed. 
Townsville Strike Committee to Moore, 26 November, 1931, 
item 31/7539, PRE/A1089, QSA. 
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answer would be that the ARU reacted to the dismissal of its three 
members by calling for a show of sympathy and solidarity. Fred 
Paterson provided a more satisfactory answer when he told a public 
meeting in Brisbane that: 
the conditions of the railway workers for a 
long time has been such that the service was 
seething with discontent through bad conditions 
and loss of wages that a strike was pending long 
before the truck load of ore got to Townsville. (41) 
North Queensland was a major centre of union militancy, and the frus-
trations of the early years of the depression created a local 
atmosphere conducive to industrial unrest. The passage of the 'black' 
ore provided the catalyst that ignited the latent discontent of the 
northern railway workers. 
The indiscreet and sometimes provocative actions of the Moore 
Government and the Railway Department also helped to widen the 
dispute. Given the tense situation that had developed in Townsville, 
the department's summary dismissal of the three unionists was a 
tactless action. The intransigent attitude of the department during 
the dispute even brought it into conflict with the local police. On 
November 27 the regular Hughenden to Townsville train was in danger 
of being intercepted by a group of stone-throwing unionists. 
Sergeant Honan of the Hughenden police assessed the situation, and 
suggested to the Railway Department that, in order to avoid trouble, 
the departure of the train be delayed tmtil the early hours of the next 
morning. When he received this advice, the General Manager of the 
Railway Department at Townsville immediately contacted Police Inspector 
GE Lock, and demanded to know by what authority Honan presumed to tell 
him how to run his department. Lock bowed to this pressure and 
instructed Honan not to meddle in railway departmental business. At 
4.00 pm the train was fired-up and ready for departure. Before it 
41. Police Report, 26 November, 1931, item 31/7635, ibid. 
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could leave, it was attacked by a large body of strikers and the 
(42) 
crew was assaulted. The train was then cancelled. 
The State Government claimed that the strike represented such a 
threat to law and order that it rushed through, in a single day's 
sitting, a Railway Strike and Public Safety Preservation Bill, which 
empowered the Governor-in-Council to proclaim a state of emergency 
(43 
whenever and wherever the public order was imperilled. Section 
6(i) of the Act provided that, in the event of a railway strike, any 
employee who joined the strike would automatically cease to be a 
member of the service, and would forfeit all the service credits due 
to him. The Government insisted that the sole aim of the Act was 
(44) 
to end the rail strike as quickly as possible. Both the 
(45) 
Parliamentary Labor party and the TLC denounced it as a vicious 
piece of anti-working class legislation. A state of emergency 
was never declared at either Dobbyn or Townsville because of the 
sudden collapse of the strike. 
Throughout the dispute, the Government consistently over-rated 
the strength and solidarity of the strikers. At one point the 
Premier insisted that the Public Service Commissioner's Department 
prepare alternative plans for the transport of essential goods in 
anticipation of a complete shutdown of the State's commtmication 
(47) 
system. This was a gross over-reaction. Despite the efforts 
of the unions, the strike was never effective outside Townsville. 
On the day after the strike was called the Railway Commissioner 
informed Moore that only the Cloncurry, Townsville, Hughenden and 
Innisfail centres were on strike, and that all other centres in the 
State were operating normally. The strikers blamed the 
42. Police Report, 2 December, 1951, item 31/7635, ibid. 
43. Queensland Industrial Gazette, 24 December, 1931, p 560f. 
44. £PD, xlx, 25 November, 1931, p 2231f. 
45. ibid., p 2303. 
46. TLC Minutes, 25 November, 1931. 
47. Memo Public Service Commissioner's Department to Chief Secretary, 
25 November, I931, item 31/7518, PRE/A1089, QSA. 
48. Police Commissioner to Moore, 26 November, 1931, top number 
34/345, ibid. 
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Railway Transport Council (RTC) unions for the failure to extend the 
strike beyond the north.^ ' The RTC was a loose affiliation of 
railway tmions which did not include the ARU, and which was dominated 
by the AFULE, At the commencement of the dispute, the RTC pronounced 
itself sympathetic to the aims of the strikers, but would not endorse 
the tactic of direct action. Instead, the Council approached the 
Premier and asked him to use the emergency clauses of the Indus.frial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act to allow the Industrial Court to 
settle the dispute. Moore refused the request, and the strike 
committee then accused the RTC of collaborating with the Government 
to undermine the strike. Relations among the participants in the 
dispute were further damaged when the AFULE issued a statement claim-
ing that the confrontationist tactics of the ARU had provided the 
(51) Government with the excuse to introduce its anti-union legislation. 
While this squabbling among the unions lowered the morale of 
the strikers, it was events within the ARU which eventually broke 
the strike. The ARU led the strike in Townsville, but was tmable 
to convince its members in the southern areas to join the dispute. 
On the day the strike was called, 26 November, 1931, a mass meeting 
of over 2000 railwaymen was held at the Roma Street yards in Brisbane. 
Kissick, Hughes and Valentine of the AFULE outmanoeuv/red the ARU 
representatives and quickly moved a motion calling on the strikers 
and the Government to negotiate a settlement. When Moroney and 
ARU State executive member, Charlie Walbank, rose to speak against 
(52) the motion they were howled down and counted out. Somewhat ctiastened 
by this experience, the ARU held its own meeting at the Trades Hall 
later the same day, but attracted only fifty unionists. Moroney 
now realised that the prevailing economic conditions made it unlikely 
49. Leaflet issued by Railway Rank and File Committee, 25 November, 
1931, item 31/7552, ibid. 
50. Railway Transport Cotmcil to Moore, 24 November, 1931, 31/7540, 
ibid. 
51. Headlight, 4 December, 1931. 
52. Police Report, 26 November, 1931, item 51/7552, PRE/A1089, QSA. 
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that the Townsville strikers would receive support from their 
southern comrades. Moroney was also concerned at the increasing 
number of men in Brisbane who were resigning from the ARU in protest 
against the strike, and who were transferring their loyalties to other 
(53 
railway unions. These events convinced him that the strike had 
little chance of success, and that he was endangering his own position 
as well as that of his union by allowing it to continue. The strike 
(54) 
was called off on 29 November. 
Frank Nolan, who was at the time an ARU State executive member, 
provides a somewhat different interpretation of Moroney's motives in 
(55) deciding to end the strike. The most enthusiastic supporters 
of the strike were the Commtmist party/Militant Minority Movement 
(MMM) fraction of the ARU. Although he was a militant socialist, 
as well as a devout Roman Catholic, Moroney was a vigorous opponent 
of the MMM. Moroney believed that the dismissal of George Rymer 
as President of the union in 1930 was part of a broader strategy on 
the part of the MMM to replace him as Secretary with one of their 
number He was determined to prevent this. Nolan implies that 
Moroney encouraged the MMM in their campaign of militancy when he 
knew that such tactics were doomed to failure. He further claims 
that Moroney then worked behind the scenes to bring the strike to a 
premature end so as to make the MMM appear reckless and misguided. 
Whichever interpretation is accurate does not detract from the fact 
that internal ARU politics determined the outcome of the strike. 
The involvement of the northern railwayinen distracted attention 
from the catalyst of the dispute - the strike at the Mt Oxide mines. 
When the railway strike collapsed the miners decided to continue their 
struggle unaided. The withdrawal of the support of the railway 
unions revealed the basic weakness of the miners' position. They 
53. ibid. 
54. ibid. 
55. Frank Nolan, op.cit., p 60. 
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were few in number; they were not unionised; there were no 
alternative jobs available; and they were opposed by a determined 
employer. Because the State Government had removed the possibility 
of a settlement through formal arbitration, the strike soon reached 
a stalemate. The local mining warden, S Wilson, made two tmsuccess-
ful attempts to settle the dispute by informal concdliation. On 
17 October he arranged a meeting between Powell and the strike 
committee. This meeting was aborted by Powell, who, late on the 
night of the l6th sent a note to the committee in which he stated 
that he had decided not to attend 'as there was nothing to discuss, 
as they knew his terms which he did not intend to alter' One 
month later, Premier Moore secretly asked Wilson to convene another 
57) 
conference. Wilson succeeded, and a conference was held at 
Dobbyn on 21 and 22 November. Wilson examined the books of the 
company, and recommended that the daily wage rate be increased from 
16 shillings to 17 shillings and fourpence. Powell agreed, but the 
miners would accept nothing less than 18 shillings and fourpence. 
(58) No compromise could be reached, and the negotiations collapsed. 
When the dispute commenced, the owners believed that they would 
easily defeat the strikers by enlisting volunteer labour Peterson 
and Powell travelled to Townsville on numerous occasions in an 
attempt to recruit workers* but, despite the high level of unemploy-
(59) 
ment, they always returned empty-handed. The Communist party 
was quick to argue that this was an example of working class 
solidarity. More mtmdane factors which encouraged the unemployed 
to remain in Townsville were the low pay and poor working conditions 
at the mine sites. The miners also served notice that any 
56. Police Report, 19 October, 1931, item 31/33794, PRE/A1089, QSA. 
57- Telegram, Wilson to Moore, 22 November, 1931, item 31^7541, ibid. 
58. Conciliation Conference Minutes, Dobbyn, 21-22 November, 1931, 
item 31/7682, ibid. 
59. Police Report, 18 November, 1931, item 31/36955, ibid. 
60. Speech by Sidney Jordan, Police Report, 22 November, 1931, 
item 31/7467, ibid. 
61. Police Report, 23 November, 1931, item 31/7636, ibid. 
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voltmteers who arrived in Dobbyn could expect to receive a warm 
reception.^ "' Their inability to recruit alternative labour 
prevented the employers from exploiting the weakness of the strikers. 
In early January Powell and Peterson dissolved their partnership 
and the latter left the area. Powell was determined to recoup some 
of his losses, and he began to pump out the Orphan Mine in preparation 
for a commencement of work. The strikers responded by sending a 
letter to Powell in which they moderated their pay demands, but 
insisted that no scab labour was to be engaged and that all the 
strikers were to be offered their previous jobs. Powell's evasive 
reply was regarded by the strike committee as a rejection of their 
offer to end the dispute. 
Late on the night of 20 March, 1932 a small railway bridge at 
Dobbyn was destroyed by explosives. The police immediately suspected 
sabotage on the part of the strikers. With the aid of an Aboriginal 
tracker, they followed a set of footprints into the camp of John 
McCormack, who had been released from prison, and had returned to 
Dobbyn to assume the leadership of the strikers. Despite his 
protestations of innocence, he was charged with the wilful destruction 
of public property, convicted and returned to jail. This minor 
act of sabotage had a cathartic affect on the dispute. It broke 
the stalemate by convincing all the parties that the time had come to 
end the strike. The destruction of the bridge also centred public 
attention on Dobbyn, and provoked the direct intervention of the AWU. 
In early April the union's State president, Clarrie Fallon, visited 
the area and convened a conference which produced a set of wage scales 
acceptable to all the parties. The strike finally was called off on 
3 April, 1932. (^ ^ 
62. Police Report, 26 November, 1931, item 31/7039, ibid. 
63. Police Report, 29 February, 1932, item 32/1272, ibid. 
64. Police Report, 24 March, 1932, item 32/9558, ibid. 
65. Police Report, 11 April, 1932, item 32/I856, ibid. 
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After a strike lasting six months the miners won a wage increase 
of two shillings per day. The railwaymen who supported them won 
nothing. Seven months after the strike ended over 100 members of the 
ARU in Townsville had not been re-admitted to the railway service. 
The experiences of the shearers' and Dobbyn strikes were evidence 
that to engage in direct industrial action during a period of economic 
depression was to court disaster. In the years between 1931 and 
1946 there was a low level of union militancy in Queensland. The 
strikes that did occur during those years were sporadic, short-lived, 
and usually resulted in the complete defeat of the strikers. 
Nevertheless, the depression strikes had one beneficial outcome for 
the Queensland Labor movement. The response of the State Government 
to the strikes further convinced the majority of the unions of the 
necessity to unite behind the Parliamentary Labor Party to oust Moore 
at the 1932 election. Paradoxically, the strikes themselves 
encouraged Queensland unionists to forsake industrial action in 
favour of political action. 
66. Advocate, 15 February, 1932; Legal Opinion, 0'Sullivan and 
Ruddy to ARU, 14 July, 1933, top number 34/345, PRE/A1089, 
Q,SA. 
SECTION TWO 
CHAPTER 8 
UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF POLICIES 
182. 
Unemplo5Tnent was the principal political issue of the 1930s in 
Australia. Its incidence and severity influenced the behaviour, 
priorities and longevity of Governments of all ideological complexions. 
During the depression years the relief of unemployment was primarily 
a problem for the States, and remained so until 1944. Before the 
onset of the economic collapse, Queensland was the only State to have 
instituted a Government operated tmemployment relief system. This 
was the Unemployed Workers' Insurance scheme which commenced operation 
in 1923. The programme was designed to deal with seasonal unemploy-
ment and proved unable to cope with the prolonged unemployment that 
was a hallmark of the depression. When the Moore Government realised, 
in 1930, that the insurance scheme was incapable of dealing with the 
problem, it introduced a tax funded unemployment relief scheme which 
provided intermittent relief work for the unemployed. Neither the 
Moore nor the Forgan Smith Governments would countenance the dole 
system because they saw it as socially and personally undesirable 
for men to receive 'charity' in lieu of work. 
Public sponsored relief measures operated simultaneously with 
more traditional forms of charity. Private tmemployment relief in 
Queensland was almost exclusively the preserve of the Christian 
churches. The Roman Catholic and the Anglican denominations were 
the most active. The churches devoted most of their energies to 
providing food and shelter for the unemployed, particularly single 
men, and were unsuccessful in their limited attempts to operate as 
private labour exchanges. The impact of the depression revealed 
the financial and organisational weakness of Queensland's charitable 
bodies and the State Government was required to come to their 
assistance by establishing the Queensland Social Service League (QSSL) 
which was charged with the task of co-ordinating private lelief 
activities. 
Humanitarianism is the most popular explanation of why public 
and private authorites instituted unemployment relief schemes during 
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the depression. Frances Piven and Richard Cloward have 
challenged this interpretation and have claimed that Governments 
introduced relief work schemes in order to prevent mass insurrection. 
They argue that work is the major instrument of social control in 
western societies and that the incidence of widespread, prolonged 
unemployment constitutes a potential threat to the stability of those 
societies. Hence, the authorities initiated work relief systems 
(O) 
during the depression as 'surrogate systems of social control' 
Piven and Cloward's thesis is based on an examination of the United 
States, but has some relevance for Australia. A cabinet minister 
in the Lang Government candidly informed a deputation of unemployed 
(3) that he regarded the dole as an insurance against revolution. 
Similarly, the Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane argued in a public 
address in 1933 that 'it was the Queensland Social Service League 
which stood between (us) and turmoil in the community'. 
As a general explanation of the motives of Governments during the 
depression, however, the Piven and Cloward thesis is defective. 
First, a number of countries preferred the dole to relief work, yet 
did not experience major social upheavel; the United Kingdom is but 
(5) 
one example. Second, Piven and Cloward's argument is predicated 
on the notion that prolonged lack of stable employment transforms 
normally law-abiding citizens into disaffected radicals. The 
experience of the depression suggests, on the contrary, that the 
chronically tmemployed were alienated, anomic and politically 
inactive. Finally, Piven and Cloward fail to take into account 
the mundane realities of democratic politics. The combination of 
compulsory voting and a relatively inclusive franchise encouraged 
1. FF Piven and RA Cloward, Regulating the Poor, NY, 1971, Chapters 
1 and 2. 
2. ibid., p 8. 
3. Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February, 1932. 
4. Brisbane Courier, 2 July, 1933. 
5. FM Millar, 'The Unemployment Policy of the National Government, 
1931-1936', The Historical Journal, 19;2, 1976. 
6. This argimient is discussed in detail in Chapter 11. 
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Australian State politicians to take action on the unemployment 
problem. The volatility of the electorate in the thirties, 
particularly at the State level, \'fas a further incentive for 
Governments to act. 
Australia entered and emerged from the depression bereft of any 
systematic. Commonwealth sponsored tmemplojTnent relief scheme. This 
absence of Federal involvement was produced by a lack of commitment 
on the part of the Commonwealth combined with disagreements among 
the seven Australian Governments. Following the introduction of 
a system of unemployment insurance in the United Kingdom in 1911, 
the 1915 Premiers' Conference commissioned the Queensland Government 
(7) to prepare a draft Bill along the lines of the British legislation. 
Nothing came of this decision. Ten years later a Commonwealth 
initiated Royal Commission on National Insurance reported that: 
The fundamental principle of tmemployment insurance 
is that of mutual thrift by means of which provision 
is made to meet the financial disabilities under 
which members of the community suffer during periods 
of unemployment. (S) 
The commission recommended that the Federal Government introduce such 
a scheme but noted that the quality of unemployment statistics first 
(9) 
would have to be brought up to an acceptable standard.^ The 
Commonwealth seized upon this proviso as an excuse to vacillate. 
During the 1928 election campaign the Prime Minister, Stanley 
Melbourne Bruce, announced that the Commonwealth had decided that 
unemployment insurance was properly a matter for the States. 
The issue then lay dormant until 1957 when the Federal Government 
invited an officer of the British Labour department, Godfrey Ince, 
to come to Australia to advise on matters related to unemployment 
7- TH Kewley, Social Security in Australia, 1900-1972, Sydney, 2nd 
ed, 1973, P 150. 
8. Second Progress Report of the Royal Commission on National 
Insurance;Unemployment, 1927, CPP, 1926-28, vol 4, p 1432. 
9. ibid., pp 1431-3. 
10. Quoted by Senator George Pearce, _CPD (s), vol 120, 7 February, 1929, 
P 51. 
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lef.^ In hi reli s report he argued that insurance was preferable 
to relief work on economic grounds and that Australia should adopt 
(12) 
a modified version of the British system. None of Ince's 
recommendations was acted upon because of disagreements between the 
Commonwealth and the States and because of the outbreak of war in 
1939. Australia did not acquire a national unemployment scheme 
tmtil the passage of the Unemployment and Sickness Benefits Act of 
1944.(15) 
Queensland was the only State before the depression prepared to 
fill the gap left by the Commonwealth in the area of unemployment 
insurance. The Labor Government of TJ Ryan first attempted to 
introduce a scheme in 1919, but it did not become operational until 
1923. In August 1919 the Treasurer and Minister for Public Works, 
EG Theodore, introduced an Unemployed Workers' Bill into the 
(14) Legislative Assembly. Earlier in the same year the International 
Labour Organisation had urged its member states to introduce unemploy-
(15) 
ment insurance schemes; but this does not seem to have been the 
motivating factor behind the Queensland legislation. Theodore 
explained that the increase in tmemployment which accompanied the 
cessation of hostilities in I9I8 combined with the long-term, 
structural problem of seasonal unemployment in the woollen and sugar 
industries required the humane solution of an insurance scheme. 
The contents of the Bill were wide-ranging and included, in addition 
to the insurance provisions: the establishment of an Employment 
Council; an expansion in the general public works programme; and the 
establishment of 'labour farms' for the chronically unemployed. 
11. GH Ince, Report on Unemployment Insurance in Australia, CPP, 
1937, vol 5, p 2663. 
12. ibid., pp 2661 and 2673. 
13. See Kewley, op.cit., p 265f for details. 
14. ^PD (Assembly), clxxii, 26 August, 1919, p 348f. 
15. NN Franklin, 'Employment and Unemployment: Views and Policies, 
1919-1969, n^, 99;3, March, 1969, P 295. 
16. £PD, (Assembly), clxxxii, 2 September, 1919, p 96f 
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The Opposition gave the Bill a hostile reception. They claimed 
that it would: 'encourage the worst sentiments' in those who did not 
wish to work; 'sap our moral fibre instead of making us a virile 
race'; 'irritate, harass and penalise a large section of the 
Community'; and create 'a premium on laziness' Theodore's claim 
that the Bill was modelled on the UK legislation was met with the 
(17) 
retort that 'it is singularly tm-British' The Brisbane Courier 
(18) 
derided the legislation as 'the Loafers' Paradise Bill' Non-
Labor members were particularly incensed at the powers given to the 
Employment Council to direct private industry. They also objected 
to the provision that, unlike the UK scheme which was funded by three-
way contributions from employees, employers and Government, only 
employers would make a financial contribution to the Queensland 
(19) insurance fund. The Opposition did not vote against the second 
reading of the Bill in the Assembly but moved a series of amendments 
at the committee stage, all of which were rejected by the Government. 
The legislation was then defeated by the non-Labor controlled 
Legislative Council. 
One of the first pieces of legislation to be brought forward after 
the abolition of the Legislative Council was a revised Unemployed 
Workers' Insurance Bill which was introduced by the Minister Without 
Portfolio, William Forgan Smith, on 19 December, 1922.*^^^' The new 
Bill differed significantly from that of 1919. First, its scope 
was confined almost exclusively to insurance matters. Second, the 
insurance fund was to be financed by three-way contributions along 
the lines of the British scheme. Third, the powers of the 
Employment Council were investigatory and advisory rather than 
(21) directional. These alterations did not satisfy the Opposition, 
but the absence of an upper house ensured the smooth passage of the 
legislation and the scheme commenced operation on 1 March, 1923. 
17- Comments gleaned from ibid. 
18. A comment they repeated in 1922; see Brisbane Courier, 20 
September, 1922. 
19. For a full account of the Opposition's objections see QPD (Council), 
clxxxiii, 15 October, I919, p 1397 
20. QPD, cxl, 19 September, 1922, p l657, Forgan Smith became Minister 
for Public Works on 6 October, 1922. 
21. See for details ibid., 20 September, 1922, p 17151. 
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The scheme compulsorily insured all workers both male and female 
over the age of eighteen who were covered by State industrial awards. 
Employers, employees and the State Government made weekly payments 
of threepence (later sixpence) regardless of the salary of the 
individual contributor. The Government made its payment in a lump 
sum on a yearly basis. Unemployed persons who had continuously 
contributed to the fund for six months were entitled to receive a 
weekly payment for a maximum of fifteen weeks per calendar year-
The rates of payment varied according to marital status, geographic 
location and the nature of the occupation usually engaged in. Persons 
who were recipients of pensions or workers' compensation, or were 
physically incapacitated, or who refused reasonable offers of work, 
or who were tmemployed because of their participation in an 
industrial dispute were not entitled to benefit from the scheme. 
In 1926 the scheme had 150,000 contributors of whom about seventeen 
percent made at least one yearly claim. Manual workers in the sugar 
(22) industry were the heaviest claimants. The general administration 
of the fund was in the hands of the Employment Council which comprised 
the Minister for Labour, the Director of Labour, the Registrar of 
Friendly Societies, a representative of the trade unions and a 
representative of the employer organisations. 
From 1925 to 1930 the scheme was not substantially amended and 
proved effective in dealing with short-term and seasonal unemploy-
(23) 
ment. It was much less effective, however, in coping with the 
prolonged tmemployment that became a feature of the Queensland 
economy after 1930. The scheme was based on the premise that 
workers would be in employment for most of the year and would thereby 
accumulate credit with the scheme. Lengthy bouts of tmemployment 
undermined this premise and once an unemployed worker exhausted the 
permissible fifteen week period payment ceased. The scheme was 
22. Royal Commission op.cit., Appendix, pp 1427-28. 
23. Ince Report, op.cit., Appendix, pp 2718-19. 
originally introduced to deal with seasonal unemployment; it was 
never designed to cope with a serious economic depression. In 1933 
the Department of Labour reviewed the performance of the system over 
the previous three years: 
As the industrial depression developed, and 
as unemployment intensified both as to members 
affected and as to the duration of unemployment 
it became obvious that the unemployment insurance 
scheme could not of itself handle the whole 
situation. (24) 
By Jtme 1930 the fund was heavily indebted to the Treasury. A year 
later the Moore Government announced substantial amendments to the 
scheme which included: a reduction of the allowable payment period 
to 13 weeks; a reduction of one shilling per week in the amount 
paid; and the application of a means test which excluded from the 
scheme all workers who received an annual income in excess of £220 
(25) pounds. Table 8:1 illustrates the problems encountered by the 
scheme during the depression. 
TABLE 8:1 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FUND 
Year 
1928/29 
1929/30 
1930/31 
1931/32 
1932/33 
1933/34 
1934/35 
1935/36 
1936/57 
Source: 
Rece: 
£ 
491, 
490, 
453, 
411, 
419, 
419, 
504, 
570, 
ipts 
,503 
,568 
,439 
,867 
,734 
,545 
048 
552 
560,964 
Annual Ref )orts, Queens 
Payme 
£ 
439, 
517, 
517, 
385, 
558, 
336, 
410, 
mts 
,171 
,781 
,293 
,105 
,807 
,000 
,688 
479,658 
488, ,528 
land Department 
Excess oJ I receipts 
over payments 
£ 
52, 
-27, 
-65, 
26, 
80, 
83, 
93. 
50, 
72, 
of Labour < 
,551 
,212 
,854 
,762 
,926 
,545 
,560 
,894 
,436 
and Ini dustry. 
24. Tenth Annual Report on Operations under the Unemployed Workers 
Insurance Acts, 1922-30, ^ PP, vol 1, 1933, p 259. 
25. Cabinet Memo, Unemployment Insurance Fund, 1941, Larcombe papers, 
M 47, p i , OML. 
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The unprecendented shortage of employment in the early 1950s 
revealed unforeseen failings and anomolies of the insurance scheme. 
Long-term contributors were particularly disadvantaged because, 
regardless of their period of membership, they were entitled to 
payment for only fifteen (later thirteen) weeks in each calendar year. 
The depression crippl^ed the scheme in two other ways: first, as the 
rate of displacement from the workforce accelerated after the second 
quarter of 1950, when the world-wide depression effectively took 
hold in Queensland, the rapid increase in the number of claims 
impoverished the fund; second, the surplus trading years of 193l/2, 
1932/3 and 1933/4 provide a misleading picture of the operations 
of the scheme. The system stagnated in this period because 
tmemployed members who had exhausted their entitlements were unable 
to draw on the money now effectively locked up in the fund. Hence 
the accumulated surplus was dead money, unable to be spent on those 
who most needed it. The Moore Government was required to break 
this log jam by temporarily transferring the assets of the insurance 
ftmd to the general tmemployment relief fund. 
The unemployment insurance scheme recovered as the general economic 
situation improved and it played a useful role as a first line of 
defence against 'normal' unemployment during the years of recovery-
(27) 
In 1933 the Labor Government raised the means test to £300 and 
the continued buoyancy of the scheme permitted a number of liberalising 
(28) 
amendments over the next five years. The major contribution of 
the insurance scheme was that it provided a buffer period of at least 
fifteen weeks, the fifteen week provision was restored in 1935, before 
tmemployed workers had to be absorbed into the relief work programme. 
Unfortunately it still provided assistance only to those able to 
obtain six months normal employment per year, but it did ease the 
very keen competition that existed for places on relief work projects. 
26. Tenth Annual Report, op.cit., pp 258-9. 
27. .QPD, clxiv, 24 November, 1933, p 1730. 
28. Cabinet Memo, op.cit., p 2. 
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The insurance scheme also assisted seasonally unemployed women who 
were effectively excluded from most other unemployment relief 
(09) 
programmes. Despite the positive recommendations of the 1937 
Ince report, Queensland remained the only Australian Government to 
maintain an unemployment insurance scheme. It was abolished in 
1944 when the Commonwealth finally assumed responsibility for the 
payment of unemployment benefits. 
Prior to the onset of the depression, Queensland, in common with 
most other State Governments, responded to periodic increased in 
unemployment by temporarily expanding the public works programme. 
Such expansions were usually restricted to the geographic areas of 
highest unemployment and were funded from consolidated revenue. By 
January 1930 there were 20,000 registered tmemployed in Queensland 
and the Moore Government decided that new measures were needed to 
deal with the problem. The decline in Government revenue and the 
shortage of loan money meant that relief works on the scale required 
could not be financed in the normal way. The major aim of the 
Income (Unemployment Relief) Tax Act which commenced operation on 
1 August, 1930 was to provide a special fund to finance relief proj-
ects. Under the terms of the Act a tax of threepence in the pound 
was levied on all income earners, the proceeds of which were paid 
into a trust fund separate from consolidated revenue. The unemploy-
ment relief fund was administered by the Department of Labour- In 
October 1931 the tax scales were altered to three pence in the pound 
for incomes below £104 per annum and sixpence in the pound for those 
in excess of £104. 
The Queensland Parliamentary Labor Party did not vote against the 
Bill, but nevertheless expressed strong opposition to certain of its 
provisions. Percy Pease, and the deputy leader, argued that the 
29. Tenth Annual Report, op.cit., p 259. 
50. The taxation provisions of the scheme are set out in the 'Seventh 
Annual Report of the Department of Labour and Industry on the 
Operations and Proceedings under the Income (UnempIo\Tnent Relief) 
Tax Acts 1930-35', £PP, vol 2, 1957-
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whole scheme was unnecessary because the Government possessed a 
(31) 
reserve of loan ftmds which they refused to spend. Forgan Smith 
concentrated his attack on the allegedly regressive nature of the 
tax scales. He argued that 'this Bill...introduces the pernicious 
principle of the taxation of all in the community, irrespective of 
(32) income. In addition to criticism from the Labor Party, Moore 
had also to cope with opposition to the legislation from among his 
own supporters. The CPNP had come to Government in 1929 on a policy 
of tax reduction. Yet after a little more than a year in office 
they were required to impose a new and substantial tax on income. 
The decision attracted vigorous opposition from such business 
organisations as the Taxpayers*Association and the Brisbane Chamber 
of Commerce. Despite its earlier opposition, when Labor returned 
to power in June 1932 it retained the scheme but introduced a 
graduated tax scale and increased the average rate of sixpence in the 
(34) pound. Both the ALP and CPNP insisted that the tax was a 
(35) temporary and undesirable measure, but it was not repealed until 
1938 when it was replaced by a State Development Tax. 
The function of the relief tax was to finance the unemployment 
relief programme that was commenced in 1930. Intermittent relief 
work formed the basis of both the Moore and the Forgan Smith 
Governments' unemployment alleviation policies. Both administrations 
refused to distribute dole money to those out of work. This decision 
was based on the arguments that the dole was economically wasteful 
and that it was degrading to those who received it. Ration coupons, 
'outdoor relief, were distributed to those for whom no relief work 
was available or who were physically incapable of heavy, manual labour. 
31. ^P^, civ, 16 July, 1930, p 18f. 
32. ibid., p 38. 
33. T Thatcher, 'Unemployment Relief in Queensland', Australian 
Quarterly, September, 1931, p 56; Brisbane Courier, 22 July, 
1932; and Brisbane Chamber of Commerce to Forgan Smith, 12 
December, 1932, item 32/6781, PRE/AIO63, QSA. 
34. ^PD, clxi, 28 September, 1932, p 585 f 
35. ibid. 
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Relief work was generally organised on a rotational gang system and 
by March 1932 there were 13,742 men engaged in the construction of 
roads and channelling, laying drainage, flood prevention and land 
reclamation, forestry work, improving the condition of state school 
grounds and constructing playing fields in various parts of Brisbane. 
('^fi) 
Similar work was carried out in the provincial towns. 
While the general principles of this system were supported by 
both major political parties, many of its specific provisions became 
objects of controversy. Its most contentious features were the 
eligibility, pay and conditions of intermittent relief workers. 
When the scheme was introduced HE Sizer, the Minister for Labour 
and Industry, announced that relief workers would be paid at less 
than basic wage rates. He argued that the Treasury lacked the 
necessary funds and that: 
If we put relief work on the same basis as industry 
proper no man would have an incentive to reach a 
higher or a better position. It would draw everybody 
down to the same level, and would thereby defeat its 
own ends. Instead of providing more employment 
it would decrease it. (37) 
Initially, married relief workers were paid sixty shillings per 
forty-four hour week and single men fifty shillings. The State 
basic wage at the time was sixty-seven shillings per week for an 
adult male. The spiralling numbers of tmemployed, however, 
rendered this method too costly and from 1931 intermittent relief 
workers were employed and paid according to the following scale: 
36. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry, QPP, Vol 2, 
1932, p 25. 
57. ^PO, civ, 17 July, 1930, p 75. 
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Family Circumstances of Work days allowed 
per week 
Total pay 
(cash) 
One person 
Man and wife 
Man, wife and one child 
Man, wife and two children 
Man, wife and three children 
Man, wife and four children 
Man, wife and five children 
Man, wife and six children 
Man, wife and seven children 
Man, wife and eight children 
1 
li 
o 
y 
3 
4 
4 
11/-
17/-
21/6 
22/6 
27/-
32/-
34/-
38/-
43/-
44/-
Source: Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 2, 1931, p 10. 
The Department of Labour also issued a list of conditions to be 
observed on relief projects that fell far short of the minimum 
standards set by equivalent industrial awards. Preference was not 
accorded to unionists and the tenor of the directive was summed up 
in its concluding paragraph : 
As good a standard of work as possible is required 
from each man. Willing men can be given two weeks 
in which to adapt themselves, after which they are 
expected to give of their best. Men refusing to 
work are to be dispensed with immediately. (38) 
The Labor movement regarded the pay and conditions of relief workers 
(39) 
as an assault on the State's industrial relations system. When 
Labor returned to power in 1932 it placed all relief workers under 
the Local Authorities Award and thereby granted them the basic wage. 
While this decision was applauded by the unions, it did little to 
38. Memo Department of Labour and Industry, Special Relief Works, 
30 April, 1930, item 30/2958, PRE/A996, QSA. 
39. QPD, civ, l6 July, 1930, pp 117 and 121; Maryborough ALP to 
Moore, 29 April, 1930, item 30/2709, PRE/A996, QSA. 
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improve the position of the average relief worker. This was because 
the Forgan Smith Government did not alter substantially the system 
of allocation of work days to the unemployed. Award wages were 
certainly paid for each day worked but very few tmemployed were 
entitled to receive a full week's work. In 1936, the only year 
for which reliable statistics are available, over eighty percent of 
relief workers were employed for less than three days each week with 
the average being 2,18 days. This meant that a man with a 
wife and one child earned approximately thirty-three shillings per 
week at a time when the male basic wage in Brisbane was sixty-seven 
shillings and the average Queensland wage was eighty-four shillings 
per week. 
The relief work scheme discriminated in favour of married men. 
Not only were they paid more than single men but also they were given 
preference for relief work when it became available. One group of 
single unemployed complained to Premier Moore that there was a three 
to one emplojnnent ratio in favour of married men operating on relief 
(41) projects in their area. During the worst years of the depression, 
the demand for relief work always exceeded the supply and ration 
coupons were distributed to those who could not be placed in the work 
programme. Single men could not draw rations at the same centre on 
two successive weeks. The rationale behind this requirement was 
that the bona fide unemployed should be prepared to travel the State 
to show that they were serious in their search for employment. 
If they could not convince the local police sergeant, who usually 
was responsible for the distribution of rations, that they were 
genuinely 'on the move' they were refused their six shillings worth 
of coupons. The Labor Party criticised this policy on the grounds 
that it was economically unrealistic, that it broke up families and 
(42) 
that it placed unreasonable pressures on the young. In 1932 
40. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry, QPP, vol 2, 1937, 
pp 19-20. 
41. Secretary Inglewood Unemployed to Moore, 29 May, 1929, item 
29/3389, PRE/A965, QSA. 
42. Paddington ALP to Moore, 5 October, 1931, item 31/63696, PRE/AIO36, 
QSA. 
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the in-coming Labor Government was lobbied strongly by church and 
charitable bodies to amend the 'travelling' regulation. These 
approaches were successful, and after June 1932 single tmemployed 
(43) 
men were permitted to draw rations at their place of residence. 
Nevertheless the other disabilities of the single unemployed 
remained. In 1935 a deputation of single, unemployed males placed 
a list of demands before the Minister for Labour and Industry, 
MP Hynes; The Minister stunned them with his reply: 
..I cannot understand why, whenever people get 
into difficulties they rush to the Government. 
I again tell you single men that the best way to 
emancipate yourselves is to get married and thus 
become entitled to the privileges of the married 
men. (44) 
Other groups in the community were also discriminated against 
under the scheme. Neither farmers nor their sons were eligible 
for relief work. Farmers were required to pay relief tax but could 
not be classified as being unemployed while they remained in possess-
ion of their farms. When the Labor Government liberalised the relief 
provisions relating to single men, the CPNP and a number of rural 
interest groups demanded an extension of the legislation to cover 
the under-employed sons of farmers. The Council of Agriculture 
went further and requested that financially depressed farmers be allowed 
to register as unemployed and to undertake relief work 'on their own 
(45) 
or neighbouring farms' The Government rejected these suggestions 
and the only concession granted was that necessit^_ous farmers could 
register for rations, providing that they agreed to reimburse the 
Government when their economic situation improved. 
43. gPB^, clxi, 27 September, 1932, p 547-
44. Cairns Post, 15 January, 1933. 
45. Report of the Council of Agriculture, Brisbane, 5-6 August, 1932, 
pp 78-79. 
46. ^PD, clxii, 3 October, 1933, p 606; clxv, 17 October, 1934, 
p 743; clxix, 1 October, 1936, p 684; Department of Labour 
and Industry to Pease, 30 March, 1937, item 37/2121, PRE/A1174, 
QSA. 
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Perhaps the group most discriminated against by the relief scheme 
was unemployed women. They were the hidden people of the depression. 
Because of inadequate statistics, the actual level of unemployment 
amongst women in Queensland can only be guessed. Mendelsohn 
estimates that fifteen percent of the female Australian workforce 
(47) 
was tmemployed in 1933. The 1933 Commonwealth census revealed 
that the female workforce in Queensland totalled 81,714. If 
Mendelsohn's figure is accurate for Queensland, then over twelve 
thousand were out of work. Yet only 1,937 of that twelve thousand 
were registered as unemployed in 1933. Women tended not to 
register as unemployed because there was little benefit in doing so. 
Relief work was designed for men only and women were largely ,J:>.barred. 
The 1930 relief tax legislation initially contained no provision for 
women other than an obligation to pay the tax. During the committee 
stage of the Bill the Labor Opposition managed to force two amendments: 
the first entitled unemployed females to draw rations of six shillings 
per week; and the second allowed tmemployed women such as sisters 
and daughters to be counted in the family of a relief worker, which 
(49) 
meant an increase in his allowance. Women were entitled to 
receive rations only if they were prepared to submit to a detailed 
police investigation of their personal circumstances which many found 
distasteful. Those who were prepared to fulfil this condition 
sometimes found themselves confronted by unforeseen difficulties. 
A private charity worker reported to the Premier than when a police 
officer called at a single woman's lodgings to arrange the distribution 
of rations, a neighbour misinformed the landlord that the premises 
were being used for prostitution; whereupon the woman found herself 
(51) 
evicted.^ ' 
The formulation of specific policies to deal with female unemploy-
ment was hindered by negative societal attitudes towards working 
women. An increase in the female component of the workforce had been 
47 Mendelsohn, op.cit., p 125. 
48. ^PD, clx-v, 6 September, 1934, p 157-
49. ibid., civ, 22 July, 1930, p 207. 
50. Organiser, 21 May, 1936. 
51. Steele to Moore, 9 May, 1931, item 31/3173, PRE/A1025, QSA. 
197-
tolerated between 1914 and 1918 as a war-time necessity, but the 
atmosphere of insecurity during the depression led to repeated demands 
that men be given total preference in employment. Letters-to-the-
editor columns of the daily newspapers regularly received epistles 
which decried the selfishness of 'flappers' who stole the jobs of 
men. The following is a typical example: 
When the war broke out I well remember how some 
smartly dressed girls and women distributed white 
feathers to any unfortunate males they met in 
civilian clothes. They did this because they 
understood their homes were in danger and to stave 
off disaster the men threw up their jobs and donned 
khaki. Then, under the guise of patriotism, these 
women proceeded to annex the jobs the men vacated. 
Today quite as many homes are in danger-, this is due 
to the vast army of unemployed heads of families and 
the unfortunate spectacle of thousands of youths 
facing a hopeless future._ • .>leanwhile, the smart 
modern young lady merily/'^lies her powder puff and 
draws her £4 to £6 per week, regardless of the 
consequences. Surely something can be done to 
bring home to these women their selfish disregard 
of their brothers' well-being. 
Signed 
Ex-Imperial. (52) 
Such sentiments were not confined to isolated malcontents but 
were endorsed by many prominent community leaders. During a public 
meeting called to discuss the matter, Mrs Zina Cumbrae-Stewart of 
the National Council of Women and the Lady Mayoress of Brisbane, 
Mrs JW Greene, concurred that it was inimical to the public interest 
for women to be placed in jobs while men went workless. The Catholic 
Archbishop of Brisbane, James Duhig, claimed that the entry of women 
into the workforce was humiliating to men and contributed to a low 
marriage rate. His suggested remedy was that the State Government 
should set an example to the rest of the community by employing only 
(55) 
men. The Public Service Commissioner defended the service 
52. Brisbane Courier, 4 September, 1932. 
53. ibid., 14 July, 1931 and 30 August, 1933. 
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against this criticism by pointing out that, although females were 
employed, 'care is taken as far as possible that, even in the minor 
clerical sections, males are allotted the work which leads to the 
(54) higher positions, ' Most of the trade unions were also 
opp 
(55) 
osed to the emplojinent of married women, although the 1935 
Trades Union Congress called on the Government to extend to single 
women the conditions enjoyed by unemployed single men. 
Despite these prejudices, some intermittent relief work was made 
available for unemployed Brisbane women. The State Government was 
only indirectly involved because the organising agency was the women's 
committee of the Queensland Social Service League (QSSL). The 
committee established headquarters at the South Brisbane Town Hall 
where women were employed in the manufacture of garments to be 
distributed to unemployed families by the QSSL. All women employed 
were required to be registered with the Women's Employment Bureau 
and their wages of seven shillings and sixpence per six hour day were 
paid by the Department of Labour and Industry from the unemployment 
relief fund. The average size of the workforce at South Brisbane 
was thirty and between January 1930 and November 1931, ll,06l garments 
valued at £1,400 were produced. In 1931 the Government began a 
House Craft Training scheme which conducted classes in cooking, 
dressmaking and home nursing for approximately forty women each 
(57) 
month. Neither the Moore nor the Forgan Smith Governments 
developed a comprehensive plan to deal with tmemployment amongst 
women. They shared the widespread belief that most women had 
husbands, fathers or brothers who would look after them and that the 
existing charities would deal with any particularly serious cases of 
hardship. 
54. Report of the Public Service Commissioner, QPP, vol 1, 1953, p 55. 
55. ABTEF minutes, 30 November, 1931, T49/l/9, p 104, RSSSA/AMJ; 
Report Annual Delegates Meeting, AWU, Brisbane, January, 1931, 
p 22, FML. 
56. Report of the Trade Union Congress, Brisbane, 1935, p 31. 
57- QSSL Report, 24 November, I931, item 31/7477, PRE/A1039, QSA. 
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A final contentious feature of the unemployment relief scheme 
concerned its expenditure regulations. When the original legislation 
was before Parliament Forgan Smith alleged that 'because of political 
patronage, the relief ftmd would be used to develop the private property 
of some of the citizens of the State'. Other members of the 
Opposition claimed that relief work such as road building and land 
clearance would unfairly benefit private individuals by improving 
the value oTtheir rural properties. Sizer agreed that this could 
occur, but denied that there was conscious political patronage 
involved. He concluded: 
..We can increase the productivity of the State, 
generally increase the wealth of the community and 
ultimately banish tmemployment by the utilization of 
these funds, even though some benefit may go to a 
private individual, I think we are justified in 
doing it. (59) 
The legislation permitted only State and Local Government authorities 
to spend money from the unemployment relief ftmd. Many business and 
primary industry groups criticised the Moore Government for adopting 
this 'socialist' policy, and advocated an alternative system whereby 
the Government made grants to employers on the proviso that they 
created work for a certain number of registered tmemployed. 
This alternative scheme was actively promoted from within the 
State public service. Prior to the passage of the relief tax 
legislation, the Land Administration Board drew up a draft Bill 
which provided for low interest loans to be granted to landholders 
to create rural employment opportunities for those out of work. 
Sizer initially accepted this advice but later retreated from it 
in the face of public and private criticism. The Land Administration 
Board again offered the scheme to the cabinet when the legislation was 
58. ^PD, civ, 16 July, 1930, pp 90-91. 
59. .2PD, clix, 50 September, 1950, p 1058. 
60. Thatcher, op.cit., p 56. 
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being amended in 1951, but again it was rejected. Eventually the 
scheme was adopted in an amended form after 1932 when the Employment 
Cotmcil allocated some Commonwealth loan money in the manner 
. H (61) suggested. 
Despite their earlier criticisms. Labor did not substantially 
alter the expenditure guidelines laid down by Sizer- Unemployed 
organisations occasionally accused the Government of using the relief 
fund to provide cheap labour for farmers, but the only exception 
that Labor was prepared to make to the requirement that all relief 
workers be public employees was in regard to certain mining companies. 
This exception was made as a result of the widespread belief of the 
time that the discovery and exploitation of precious metals would 
alleviate the depression,^ In 1933 the Director of the Bureau 
of Industry, Professor JB Brigden, public advocated a major 
alteration in the method of disbursing relief funds, Brigden 
rejected the idea of conditional subsidies to selected employers 
on the ground that this would inevitably be discriminatory- He 
favoured a more universal form of subsidisation of industry. 
Brigden's proposal was enthusiastically endorsed by the Queensland 
Employers' Federation, and the Minister for Labour and Industry, 
MP Hynes, pronounced himself to be'interested' in the suggestion. ' 
It was, however, a major departure from current policy and was 
successfully opposed at cabinet level. 
Another difficulty which surrounded the relief scheme concerned 
the type of work upon which relief workers could be engaged. This 
problem was never satisfactorily resolved and was the source of 
frequent disputes between the State Government and local councils. 
Under the terms of the legislation, the bulk of the relief fund was 
61. Report of the Land Administration Board on Reproductive Works of 
Unemployment Relief, QPP, vol 2, 1933, pp 484-5. 
62. Organiser, 11 August, 1958. 
63. .QTO, clxi, 29 September, 1932, p 633. 
64. Economic News, 7 July, 1933, p 1. 
65. Brisbane Courier, 22 June, 1955. 
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expended via local authorities. The Brisbane City Cotmcil was the 
largest single spender- Hence the majority of relief workers were 
officially Local Government employees. This system of dual respon-
sibility inevitably produced conflict between the two tiers of 
Government. Wlien the Local Comicils became accustomed to the 
scheme, some of them began to use it as a lever to extract additional 
funds from the State Treasury. In 1935 the Brisbane City Council 
won an extra allocation of money from the State Government by 
threatening to sack fifty percent of its relief workers. Some 
of the smaller councils were not so successful in their disputes 
with the State Government. For instance, the Nanango Shire Council 
applied to the Minister for Labour for permission to employ relief 
workers on general road maintenance. Hynes refused the request and 
warned the cotmcil not to regard the relief fund merely as another 
f (67) 
source ol revenue. 
While it was clear that relief workers were to be employed only 
on public projects, the definition of the term 'public' remained 
debatable. Government policy on the matter tended to be somewhat 
contradictory. In 1937 Hynes interceded to prevent the Toowoomba 
City Council deploying relief workers to clear land for a golf 
course because the area was to be leased to a private club and would 
not be available to the general public. Yet four years earlier 
the Brisbane City Council had been given permission to enter into an 
agreement with a private company to build a model suburb on the site 
of a disused saleyard at Newmarket. The cotmcil then made applica-
tion to the State Government to use relief workers to clear the land. 
Hynes took the matter to cabinet which approved the request on 
condition that the council abide by a lengthy and complicated set of 
conditions. Thus the prohibition on the use of relief labour 
66. ibid., 4 August, 1933; 18 August, 1933; 19 August, 1933. 
67- ibid., 3 August, 1955. 
68. Hynes to Forgan Smith, 28 October, 1937, item 37/6943, PRE/A1192, 
QSA. 
69. Brisbane Courier, 10 May, 1933; 13 May, 1933. 
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for private or semi-private ventures was not absolute. Each applica-
tion was considered on its merits and with regard to available ftmds, 
the current level of unemployment and whether the project would absorb 
a reasonable number of workers. 
While successive State Governments wrestled with the problems of 
the intermittent relief workers scheme, the religious charities 
carried on a campaign against the personal distress caused by 
unemployment. Since their establishment in Queensland in the early 
19th century, many of the Christian churches had been engaged in 
various forms of 'poor relief'. Church welfare services always 
operated on a rather ad hoc basis and on a shoe-string budget. They 
were neither designed nor equipped to deal with the extensive poverty 
which accompanied the great depression. Nevertheless, the Catholic, 
Anglican and Methodist chui'ches greatly extended their charitable 
mission to the tmemployed during the 1930s. An appreciation of the 
extent of this increase can be gained from the fact that during the 
1929-30 Christmas week the Church of England Men's Society (CEMS) in 
Brisbane supplied 714 free meals to destitute men, yet in the 
(71) 
week ending 24 December, 1932 they supplied 2718 such meals. 
*iTie CEMS was the linchpin of the Anglican Church's activities in 
regard to unemployment. It operated out of St Luke's Hall, 
Fortitude Valley, and its main aim was to give unemployed men at 
least one substantial meal per day. Any man registered at the 
Labour Bureau or at the Returned Soldiers' Bureau was, on presenta-
tion of his unemployment registration card, able to receive a meal. 
This service proved to be immensely popular among the city's 
unemployed, and by July 1930, 300 men were receiving a hot midday 
(72) 
meal each day of the week. During 1931 the organisation provided 
98,357^ "^  free meals, and from October 1929 to February 1932 it 
(74) 
supplied a total of 197,000 meals at a weekly average of 1,850.^ ' 
70. ibid., 4 January, 1930. 
71. ibid., 31 December, 1932. 
72. Report of the Executive Committee of CEMS, Church of England Year 
Book, Diocese of Brisbane, 1950, p 194. 
73. Church Chronicle, 1 July, 1931. 
74. ibid. 
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As well as providing food, the CEMS also distributed clothing to the 
unemployed and operated a boot repair service for those men who were 
'on the move' searching for work. Shelter was another major need 
of the tmemployed catered for by CEMS via two resident hostels. 
The most important of these was St Oswald's which was established 
at North Quay specifically to deal with the depression situation. 
Men staying in these hostels had a token rent deducted from their 
unemployment relief payments. The popularity of St Oswald's is 
clearly evident in the fact that as late as 1935 it provided 49,009 
beds and 146,859 meals throughout the year. Additionally, 545 men 
(75) 
made use of its boot repair service. 
These services of the CEMS catered mainly for single men, and 
the Co-adjutor Bishop of Brisbane correctly pointed to the plight 
of these men who he observed that 'the CEMS and kindred organisations 
doing social service had saved the situation as far as single 
unemployed men were concerned' In carrying out their activities 
the CEMS was forced to»make repeated appeals to parishes and the 
(77) general public to come forward with donations. The CEMS did 
receive donations in money and in kind, but the general economic 
situation placed severe limits on the capacity of people to donate 
to charity. Like the majority of voluntary charitable agencies, 
even in prosperous times, the demands on the CEMS always exceeded its 
resources. 
The Central Methodist Mission carried on similar work to that of 
the CEMS, and faced similar demands on its services. For instance, 
in June 1930 the Mission was providing hot midday meals for 85 men 
(78) daily, but by the close of 1931 this number had risen to over 
(79) 
340. During the eighteen months prior to November 1931 the 
75. CEMS Report, Church of England Year Book, 1935, p 239. 
76. Church Chronicle, 18 June, 1932. 
77- Brisbane Courier, 24 January, 1931; 31 January, 1931; H April, 
1931. 
78. ibid., 14 June, 1930. 
79. QSSL Draft Report, 21 November, 1931, item 31/7477, PRE/A1039,QSA, 
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Mission supplied a total of 140,000 free meals to the unemployed of 
Brisbane.^ ' The Mission spent £1276 during the 1950/31 financial 
year out of a total income of only £1295 which included a Government 
(81) 
subsidy via the Queensland Social Service League. Like the 
CEMS, the Mission engaged in the distribution of clothing to the 
unemployed and also operated a hostel at Spring Hill. The Mission 
attempted to aid the families of the unemployed by the distribution 
of food and clothing. The Methodist Church was assisted in these 
projects by farmers aid business firms who donated produce and goods. 
The Queensland Railways Department also assisted by carting goods 
(82) free of charge. In addition, the Methodist Church in Brisbane 
took the rather imaginative action of writing to all its country 
clergymen asking them to enquire if any of their congregation were 
willing and able to employ casual labour. This list of potential 
employers was to be matched with a list of men out of work in the 
district. Unfortunately no evidence remains regarding the success 
of this scheme. 
The Catholic Church also directed most of its activity towards 
alleviating unemployment amongst single men, and, in July 1930, a 
committee of Catholic laymen obtained a building to provide food 
(83) 
and accommodation for about 100 men. The major Catholic 
institution which gave aid to the tmemployed was the Saint Vincent's 
Hostel for Unemployed in Brisbane, which was operated by the St 
Vincent de Paul Society. It provided 600 meals and 200 beds daily, 
and was financed by a dual system of appeals and art unions. 
By 1931 the St Vincent de Paul Society had thirty-three branches in 
Brisbane and twenty-six throughout the remainder of the State with 
an active membership of about 400. During 1952 it spent over £3700 
on relief to the poverty stricken of Queensland. The Catholic 
80. ibid. 
81. ibid. 
82. Methodist Times. 17 April, I93O. 
83. Brisbane Courier, 3 July, 1930. 
84. Leaflet, 23 October, 193O, item 30/65O8, PRE/A1008, QSA. 
85. Information received from Mr PA Ttmney, Welfare Officer, St 
Vincent de Paul Society, September, 1973. 
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Daughters' of Australia (CDA) catered more for single women and 
families, and gave 3,108 garments to 510 families during 1931. The 
food distribution facilities of the CDA were not as extensive as 
those of other groups mentioned, and in 1931 they served only 223 
meals and could give food to only thirteen families. 
While these and other charitable organisations prevented many 
tmemployed and their depend .nts from starving to death, they generally 
had little success in their limited attempts to find employment for 
those out of work. For example, the CEMS placed only sixteen men 
in permanent positions and 106 in temporary positions throughout 
the whole of 1931. Even by 1935, when economic conditions had 
(87) improved markedly they could place only 177 men. Similarly 
the CDA could find permanent employment for onlv eight girls in 
1951.(^^) 
Wliile the Anglican, Methodist and Catholic churches were deeply 
involved in charitable work among the unemployed, some other churches 
did very little in that direction. The centenary historian of the 
Presbyterian Church was not overstating his case in writing that: 
Social Service, by which a helping hand is extended 
to the orphan and the aged, to men and women fallen 
by the Way,...has not been the 'forte' of the 
Presbyterian Church of Queensland. (89) 
The Presbyterian Church was certainly aware of the extent of economic 
distress in Queensland and issued a number of statements expi'essing 
sympathy for the tmemployed. Yet, it was not until 1934 that 
the Presbyterian Assembly took the decision to establish a Committee 
on Unemployment. This committee failed to deliver a repoit in 1935 
86. QSSL Report, op.cit. 
87. CEMS Report, op.cit., 1935. 
88. QSSL Report, op.cit. 
89. R Bardon, The Centenary History of the Presbyterian Church of 
Queensland, Brisbane, 1949, p 175. 
90. Report of the Eighty Third State Assembly of the Piesbyterian 
Church of Queensland, May, 1932, p 49; Presbyterian Outlook, 
1 December, 1933. 
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and its 1936 report gave little indication of any practical work 
(91) 
among the unemployed by Presbyterians.^ 
Such lack of action brought a sharp retort from a former 
Organising Secretary of the Queensland Protestant Federation, 
J Gillespie, who angrily declared to the editor of the Presbyterian 
Outlook: 
Let me say. Sir that while it is of utmost 
importance to preach the Gospel, and for people 
to believe its priceless messages, still they 
must have some measure of daily bread. The 
Master admitted this. (92) 
The editor replied that he had been advised that there wei'e very few 
cases of distress among Presbyterians. He also added that those who 
were tmemployed needed to be given work not charity and that this 
exempted the church from any obligation to distribute charity amongst 
(93) the tmemployed. It also appears that the Presbyterian Church 
had a great deal of difficulty in evoking a satisfactory response 
from its members whenever it made appeals for cash to be used for 
(94) 
social welfare projects. The Baptist Church also restricted 
most of its tmemployment relief work to those of its own flock. 
Its Social Service Committee distributed blankets, and Christmas 
cakes amongst needy Baptists but there appeared to be little call 
on its services since it spent only £45 during the year 1930/31 and 
(95) it suspended operations in 1933. This reticence on the part 
of some Protestant churches to become deeply involved in unemployment 
relief was certainly related to their size and limited financial 
capacity. But there also were doctrinal issues involved. 
91. Report of the Eighty Eighth State Assembly, May, 1936, pp 56-7 
92. Presbyterian Outlook, 1 April, 1929. 
93. ibid., 1 February, 1930. 
94. ibid., 1 October, 1933. 
95. Annual Report of the Social Service Committee, Baptist Union of 
Queensland Year Book, 1931, p 39. 
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Calvinism had traditionally been suspicious of alms-giving and 
regarded it as a form of Popish bribery that interfered with man's 
(96) personal responsibility to raise himself before God. 
The pressure of depression circumstances quickly revealed the 
inadequacies of private charity in Queensland. Wasteful duplication 
of services was a major problem and in October 1930 the Anglican 
Archbishop of Brisbane, John Dixon, approached Hubert Sizer and 
convinced him that an umbrella organisation was needed to co-ordinate 
the diverse groups that were engaged in charitable work amongst the 
(97) tmemployed. Such a body was established at a public meeting, 
presided over by the Governor, in the Brisbane City Hall on 4 November 
1950. In his key-note address Sizer explained that the aim of the 
Queensland Social Service League, as the organisation was called, was 
to relieve distress in the community by rationalising the activities 
of the major charities. The minister stressed that the QSSL was to 
be non-political in nature and was not to be under the direction of 
his department. The State Government agreed to subsidise the 
league on the basis of one pound for every two pounds collected up 
to a maximum of £5,000. 
The QSSL set itself two principal objectives: 
1. To deal with the problems of distress resulting from 
financial depression and from unemployment. 
2. To co-ordinate the work of all existing bodies who 
are endeavouring to alleviate distress. (99) 
By 1931 there were twenty-seven metropolitan and thirty-one country 
branches of the QSSL. Branches were usually formed at public 
meetings but, because of their special nature, the Church of England 
Men's Society, the Central Methodist Mission and the Catholic 
96. RH Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, London, 1938, 
p 263. 
97. Annual General Meeting, QSSL Minutes, 23 November, 1932, p 190. 
98. Brisbane Courier, 5 November, 1930. 
99. QSSL Constitution. 1930, p 1. 
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Daughters' of Australia were permitted to affiliate as branches. 
The major function of the QSSL soon became a charitable rather than 
a co-ordinating one. Donations in cash and kind were received from 
individuals and business houses. A boot repair service was 
established for the unemployed and dances and card evenings were 
arranged to raise finance. The wife of the Governor, Lady Goodwin, 
organised a regular sewing circle to provide garments for needy 
families. A Social Service brass band was formed and a yearly 
fund raising ball was held at the Brisbane City Hall. 
Unfortunately the QSSL was tmable to achieve its co-ordination 
objective and tended to duplicate the services provided by the 
existing charities. The churches and service clubs continued their 
operations without any real direction from the league. Some even 
expressed open hostility to the QSSL because they feared it would 
(lO*^ ) 
usurp their traditional functions. The league would not become 
involved in controversy surrounding the Government's unemployment 
policies and was keen not to appear as a political pressure group. 
The QSSL was also hindered in its activities by internal sectarian 
conflicts. Soon after its inauguration, the league received the 
gift of an automobile from General Motors. A suggestion that the 
car be raffled to raise money was immediately opposed by represen-
tatives of the Methodists, Baptists and Salvationists who argued 
that 'gambling is an evil, and it cannot be called 'honest' just 
because the money raised is for the poor' ' The issue caused 
strong animosity within the league's executive and almost led to the 
resignation of the organising secretary. Colonel Stansfield. It 
was not resolved until March 1931 when a motion was carried by 
thirteen votes to twelve to sell the vehicle. 
100. QSSL Report, op.cit., 1931, p 1. 
101. ibid., p 3. 
102. QSSL Executive Minutes, 7 December, 1930, p 14; 20 August, 1931, 
p 128. 
103. QSSL General Council Minutes, 21 September, 1932, pp 507-8. 
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The QSSL reached the peak of its operations in 1952 but thereafter 
encountered serious organisational difficulties. Paradoxically the 
league's initial success contributed to its decline. As its exis-
tence became more widely known the demands on its services became 
crippling. Soon after the change of Government in 1932 the league 
asked Forgan Smith if he wished it to continue in existence. The 
Premier was most enthusiastic that it do so and pledged his 
Government's assistance. In 1933 the Government illustrated 
this support by sponsoring a major advertising campaign on behalf of 
the league. This had unanticipated results. At the league's 
general council meeting in August many branches pleaded with the 
chairman to ask the Government not to repeat the exercise because 
it had produced an overwhelming flood of applications for 
assistance. After 1932 the QSSL's financial situation steadily 
deteriorated. Bishop Dixon explained that funds were difficult to 
raise because the novelty of the organisation had worn off and 
because of the general economic situation. In an attempt 
to conserve funds, the league re-drafted its eligibility provisions 
to exclude all but the most deserving cases. Activities outside 
Brisbane were curtailed and top priority was now accorded to families. 
These last two developments provoked criticism of the league from 
(1 08) 
rural interest groups and the single unemployed. The decline 
of the QSSL is clearly reflected in its branch membership figures. 
In 1932 there were sixty branches throughout the State. By 1935 
this figure had declined to thirty-nine and in 1936 there were only 
fourteen branches in the Brisbane area and six in the remainder of the 
(109) 
State. The league managed to survive the depression, it is still 
in existence, but it failed to fulfil the co-ordination function for 
which it was established. Furthermore its ameliorative role was 
heavily constrained by an abundance of distress and a shortage of funds. 
104. QSSL AGM Minutes, 23 November, 1932, p I9I. 
105. QSSL General Council Minutes, 2 August, 1933, p 524-5. 
106. ibid., 2 May, 1933, p 517-
107- Set of Guidelines, QSSL Minutebook, I6 February, 1933, p 5l6. 
108. QSSL Executive Minutes, 30 January, 1934; 20 February, 1934. 
109. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry, ^ PP, l,1936,p 6O. 
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The effectiveness of the various public and private relief 
measures is difficult to establish because of the absence of the 
necessary social statistics. It was generally agreed that 
amelioration of unemployment via relief work and rations was 
undesirable and that a return to full-time employment was necessary 
The non-Labor parties and the business community believed that such 
work could be provided only by a revived private enterprise sector 
and demanded policies that would facilitate a business recovery. 
Labor in Queensland was s'-eptical of the capacity of the private 
sector to lead the State out of the depression. When he came to the 
Premiership in mid-1932, Forgan Smith was determined to promote an 
expanded public works programme to stimulate the economy and remove 
men from the relief work rolls. 
CHAPTER 9 
PUBLIC WORKS AND RURAL VALUES: 
A SOLUTION TO U^NEMPLOYMENT? 
212. 
Not surprisingly most of the relief schemes initiated by the 
Australian State Governments during the depression were aimed at 
the symptoms rather than the root causes of unemployment. This 
was because Australian policymakers were ill-equipped to cope 
effectively with the unprecedented level of tmemployment that 
accompanied the economic collapse. The ideas that provided the 
explicit or implicit foundation of the policies they devised were 
inappropriate and outmoded. Their response to the depression was 
to implement deflationary and contractionary measures and to reject 
suggestions of credit expansion or vigorous public works programmes. 
A later generation of economists has judged that these policies 
exacerbated rather than alleviated the situation. One has 
commented that: 
On the whole domestic recovery measures were 
reactionary and inadequate. Governments tended 
to concentrate their attention on bolstering up 
and protecting established producers instead of 
adopting expansionary fiscal policies which would 
have imparted a stimulus to the economy and revived 
business confidence, (l) 
In Australia such attitudes lay behind the Premiers' Plan which 
dictated the broad pattern of recovery after 1932. Some authors 
have argued that the improvement in the Australian economy after this 
(2) date can be attributed to the success of the Premiers' Plan. 
Schedvin is more convincing when he argues that Australia was merely 
responding to overseas developments. He goes on to criticise the 
emphasis policymakers placed on the need for expenditure reduction 
and their refusal to accept the fact that'the virtual cessation of 
public works' had caused most of the unemployment in the first place. 
1. DH Aldcroft, 'The Development of a Managed Economy before 1939', 
Journal of Contemporary History, 4;4, October, I969, p 123. 
2. WR Maclaurin, Economic Planning in Australia, I929-I936, London, 
1937, p 98; and BU Ratchford, Public Expenditures in Australia, 
Durham, 1959, p 42. 
3. CB Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, Sydney, 1970, 
P 317. 
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Mendelsohn,^ ' Kewley,^^ and Schedvin all allude to the low priority 
accorded to unemployment relief by the Commonwealth and most State 
Governments in the period 1931-35. The last concludes that: 
Nothing illustrates more clearly the inadequacy 
of Australia's recovery policy than the attempt 
to formulate means for the relief of unemployment 
in the years 1932-35. (6) 
Queensland again proved to be an exception to this national 
pattern. The Labor Government that was elected in June 1952 main-
tained the unemployment relief tax scheme, but differed from its 
predecessor in the conviction that Government activity could provide 
long-term solutions to the problem of unemployment. William Forgan 
Smith, the new Premier, did not believe in the efficacy of deflation-
ary policies. He grudgingly accepted some of the expenditure-
reducing provisions of the Premiers' Plan but was adamant that 
Governments should provide a stimulus to the economy. Soon after 
his election, he attended the 1932 Premiers' Conference and argued 
that 'a vigorous public works policy be adopted for the absorption 
(7) 
of the unemployed' He was not deterred by failure to win all 
his colleagues to this view and, over the next few years, initiated 
a wide range of public works projects in his own State. Partly as 
a consequence, Queensland experienced the second fastest recovery 
rate, measured in terms of the decline in unemployment, of all the 
States over the period 1932-35. 
In comparison with other Australian Governments of the period, 
Forgan Smith's public works programme can be judged one of the few 
economic policy successes of the depression. Y'et, in a related 
area, the Government's policies were misguided and counter-productive. 
4. R Mendelsohn, Social Security in the British Commonwealth, 
London, 1954, p 124. 
5. TH Kewley, Social Security in Australia, second edition, Sydney, 
1973, p 154. 
6. Schedvin, op.cit., p 329. 
7 ibid., p 330. 
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From 1932 to 1937 key Labor ministers held firmly to the view that 
the only long-term solution to unemployment was to settle the urban 
workless on the land. Hence, much time, money and effort was 
expended in devising schemes to establish the unemployed or their 
sons on small agricultural holdings. Despite the rui'al nature of 
Queensland's economy in the 1930s, these schemes were not successful. 
The major rural industries of the time were wool, sheep and sugar 
which were not organised on a small farm basis suitable for the 
(8) 
resettlement of 'city stiffs' Agriculture in Queensland simply 
lacked the capacity to absorb the tmemployed in economically viable 
numbers. The Government's own statistics showed that the labour 
absorption rate of agriculture was poor when compared with areas of 
secondary industry. Yet ideological commitments to agrarianism 
determined that rural resettlement and re-training policies were 
pursued long after their limitations had been revealed. 
During the worst years of the depression the Commonwealth Govern-
ment was extremely reluctant to provide funds for public works 
projects. The United Australia Party administration of Joseph 
Lyons, which was elected in 1931 and which ruled throughout the 
thirties, after 1934 in coalition with the United Country Party, 
pursued a very orthodox economic policy and was unwilling to initiate 
national unemployment relief schemes. The Prime Minister explained 
the situation in a radio broadcost in 1933J 
The Commonwealth Government has taken the view 
that there are definite limits to the capacity of 
Governments to provide full-time work, and further 
that unemployment cannot be permanently eased by a 
policy of relief schemes. The work provided would 
be largely of an tmproductive and temporary nature, 
and at the conclusion of it those who had been so 
employed would again be relegated to the ranks of 
the unemployed. (9) 
8. Contemporary slang for an unemployed man who was tmwilling to 
leave the city; Frank Hue 1 in. Keep Moving, Sydney, 1973, p 178. 
9. Quoted in Maclaurin, op.cit., p 177-
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In 1952 the Federal Government had established an Employment Council 
with branches in each State in order to co-ordinate the expenditure of 
Commonwealth loan money that had been earmarked for unemployment 
relief. The Queensland cotmcil was established in May 1952 
under the chairmanship of the Minister for Labour and Industry-
In the 1952/3 financial year Queensland received £310,000 from the 
Commonwealth for tmemployment relief, fifty percent of which the 
(11) Employment Council allocated to rural development works. The 
operations of the councils were limited by the relatively small 
amotmts of loan money that the Federal Government was prepared to 
make available to the States. The Commonwealth Bank was strongly 
opposed to the ftmding of extensive public works projects because 
it believed them to be unproductive. The bank's view held sway 
with the Commonwealth Government and on the Loan Council. The 
failure of an £8m public loan which was floated in November 1932 
lent weight to the bank's case. 
Not all the members of the Loan Council were prepared to accept 
the quiescent policies of the Federal Government. Maclaurin explains 
that from mid-1932 onwards the Commonwealth came under strong pressure 
from Forgan Smith and the UAP Premier of New South Wales, Bertram 
(12) Stevens, to increase expenditure on public works. Aided by a 
gradual improvement in the state of the economy and a shift in the 
balance of power on the Loan Cotmcil which was brought about by the 
election of Labor Governments in Western Australia in 1933 and in 
Tasmania in 1934, the two Premiers convinced the Commonwealth in 
1934 to relax its hitherto restrictive loan policies. Yet by the 
time the Federal Government was prepared to become actively involved 
in the fight against tmemployment the worst of the crisis had passed. 
The absence of Commonwealth involvement before 1954 meant that a 
10. Schedvin, op.cit., p 338. 
11. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry, QPP, vol 1 
1933, pp 23-24. 
12. Maclaurin, op.cit., pp 178-181. 
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national problem was confronted in a disjointed manner by six State 
Goverrmients which pursued tm-coordinated and sometimes contradictory 
policies. 
In Queensland, the Moore and Forgan Smith Governments were sharply 
divided on the question of using public works to solve the unemploy-
ment crisis. The CPNP cabinet believed that only private enterprise 
possessed the capacity to effect an economic recovery and that the 
role of Government should be restricted to aiding industry and to 
temporarily shouldering the burden of the unemployed. Forgan Smith 
took the opposite view. He argued that tmemployment could be ended 
only by Government initiated public works programmes designed to 
absorb relief workers into normal, full-time employment. The 
primary objective of Labor policy from 1932 to 1938 was to phase out 
the relief work scheme and replace it with normal public works. 
This they achieved in 1938 and became the first Australian Government 
to abolish its special unemployment relief programme. 
In his policy speech for the 1932 State election, Forgan Smith 
promised to raise a £2.5m 'Queensland Revival Loan' to finance a 
(13) public works programme. The new Premier was to discover that 
there was strong opposition to his belief that Governments could 
spend their way out of the depression. Maclaurin explains that 
there were three major reasons for the opposition to heavy public 
sector expenditure in the 1930s: an adherence to outmoded economic 
theories; the business community's desire to contain public spending; 
and the fear that workers would become too dependent on the public 
(14) 
sector and thereby create a labour shortage in private industry. 
Such views dominated the thinking of the Lyons' Federal Government, 
the Commonwealth Bank Board the majority of the Loan Council. Two 
13. Brisbane Courier, 28 April, 1932. 
14. Maclaurin, op.cit., pp 182-86. See also Arthur Moore, QPD, 
clxvii, 19 September, 1935, p 282 where he states that 'if the 
benefits are made too great for unemployment relief the farmers 
will not be able to secure labour'. 
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weeks after his election victory Forgan Smith attended a Premiers' 
Conference and Loan Cotmcil meeting in Canberra where he made an 
immediate impact by delivering a speech which criticised the 
Premiers' Plan. He argued, quoting Keynes in his defence, that 
'...Governments should give a lead. Governmental activity should 
be directed into channels which will increase employment and produce 
(15) 
more wealth for the nation.' Smith converted the non-Labor 
Premier of New South Wales, Bertram Stevens, to this view and they 
managed to amend a Commonwealth-sponsored resolution that expressed 
full support for the deflationary policies of the Premiers' Plan. 
They also convinced a somewhat reluctant Commonwealth Government 
to float an £18m national recovery loan over the following three 
years, the proceeds of which were to be distributed to the States 
(16^ 
for public works projects. The Queensland Premier was unable, 
however, to raise his promised £2.5m loan and received only £lm 
from the Federal Government in 1932/33. The Lyons Government, on 
advice from the Commonwealth Bank, resisted all attempts to force it 
to abandon the major principles of the Premiers' Plan and during 
the 1933 Premiers' Conference, Smith denounced the Loan Council as 
'an extra-constitutional authority not responsible to any one 
(17) parliament'. The Queensland Labor Government was not deterred 
from its public works policy by what it saw as Commonwealth indiffer-
ence. They augmented the funds they received from the Federal 
Government by utilising their own consolidated revenue and relief 
funds. Forgan Smith was also able to obtain loans for major works 
projects from private financial organisations such as the Australian 
Mutual Provident Society. Queensland's commitment to a vigorous 
public works programme in the face of Commonwealth indifference had 
two economically undesirable consequences. Because the State 
possessed a relatively small tax base, the need for funds to finance 
15. Forgan Smith to Larcombe and text of speech, 22 October, 1952, 
Larcombe Papers, M43, p 4, OML. 
16. Schedvin, op.cit., p 330. 
17- Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers, Canberra, June, 
1933, p 15. 
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public works led to a steady rise in the rate of personal taxation. 
By 1934/5 Queensland had a tax rate per head of population of 
(18) £6 13s.3d., which was the highest in Australia. This high rate 
of taxation has been cited often as a cause of the low level of 
(19) industrialisation in Queensland. A second consequence of the 
heavy commitment of funds to public works projects was that other 
Queensland public services such as education and health tended to 
lag behind the national average. 
It is impossible to compute precisely and to compare the six 
States' expenditures on relief and public works during the depression 
because, as Ratchford observes, '...of the way in which the projects 
(21) 
were handled and the accounts were kept' Nevertheless the 
data that are available do confirm that Queensland was a high spender 
in this area. In 1934/5 Queensland had a net loan expenditure on 
works and services of £3.1m which was exceeded by only one other 
State, New South Wales. On a per capita basis only Western 
Australia (£5 18s lOd) significantly outstripped Queensland (£3 6s Od) 
(22) 
and both were well above the national average of £2 15s 9d. In 
comparing these expenditure levels it should be remembered that West-
ern Australia, together with Tasmania and South Australia, was a 
claimant State under the terms of the Grants Commission and therefore 
received special funds from the Commonwealth which were not available 
to Queensland. 
The driving force behind the Queensland Government's public works 
programme was the Premier himself. Forgan Smith had first become 
convinced of the efficacy of public works during his occupancy of 
that portfolio during the period 1922 to 1925. When he was leader 
of the Opposition in 1929 he outlined his theory of public expenditure 
that was to guide him throughout his Premiership: 
18. Queensland Year Book, 1, 1957, p 265. 
19. £PD, clxxii, 25 August, 1938, p 127-
20. Gough, op.cit., p 11. 
21. Ratchford, op.cit., p 43. 
22. Commonwealth Year Book, 29, 1936, pp 899 and 900. 
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What I consider to be the proper policy of 
public finance is that a Government, .should 
carry out public works to a greater extent during 
periods of depression than during periods of 
prosperity. (23) 
On his return to Government in 1932, Smith was somewhat surprised to 
discover that the economic adviser bequeathed to him by Moore shared 
these views. Professor JB Brigden in a speech to a conference of 
engineers in 1933 argued that: 
The popular thing is to intensify booms by 
increasing public capital works. Then, and 
because there has been extravagance in good 
times, it seems equally sound policy to 
intensify the slump by contractions no less 
extreme . The contrary policies are econom-
ically sound. (24) 
This address heralded a major change in Brigden's economic thinking. 
He had been closely associated with the formulation of the Premiers' 
Plan but later began to articulate a recovery policy that involved 
the reduction of money wages combined with an increase in Government 
expenditure. While it is possible that his conversion to the second 
part of his policy was hastened by the change of Government in 1932, 
Brigden seems to have been successful in convincing Forgan Smith that 
wages had to be kept under control. Labor came to power in 1932 
with a promise to restore the basic wage which had been cut heavily 
during the terra of the Moore administration. Despite regular 
complaints from the trade unions, the basic wage remained at its 
/ (25) 
depressed level until the 1937/8 financial year-
23. gm, cliii, 22 August, 1929, p 29. 
24.JB Brigden, 'The Need for Co-operation between the Engineer and 
the Economist in the Consideration of Development Projects', 
Journal of the Institute of Engineers, 5, 1933, p 214. 
25. Colin Clark, 'JB Brigden', Economic News, 19;12, December, 
1950, p 2. 
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Brigden and Forgan Smith shared a common belief in the need for 
long-term planning of public works ventures. In his address to the 
1932 Premiers' Conference, Smith pointed out that haphazard and ill-
planned public works were harmful rather than beneficial because their 
(26) 
cessation merely returned men to the dole queue. Early in its 
term the Labor Government decided to establish a co-ordinating 
authority to plan public works within the State. This initiative 
was to involve Brigden. Brigden had come to Queensland to take the 
position as Director of the Bureau of Economics and Statistics which 
was established under the Industries Assistance Act of 1929. In 
addition to collecting and processing economic data, the Bureau 
also had the task of advising the Industrial Court of the possible 
economic ramifications of its wage decisions. This second function 
bought the Bureau into disfavour with the trade unions who blamed 
Brigden for the substantial wage reductions handed down by the 
(27) 
court in 1930 and 1931. During the 1932 election campaign 
Forgan Smith referred to the Bureau as 'this irksome imposition 
(28) 
on industry' and hinted that a Labor Government would abolish it. 
After the election Forgan Smith changed his mind and decided to 
give the restructured bureau an important place in the public works 
programme. In November 1932 legislation was introduced which 
transformed the Bureau of Economics and Statistics into the Bureau 
of Industry. This initiative involved major organisational and 
functional alterations. The old bureau had been a statutory 
commission with the director responsible to the Parliament rather 
than to any individual minister; the Bureau of Industry was 
established as a sub-department of the Treasury and thus was under the 
direct control of Forgan Smith, The new Bureau retained its 
statistical function and produced a monthly journal entitled 
26. Forgan Smith to Larcombe, op.cit., p 4; QPD, clxxii, 24 August, 
1938, p 124; see Economic News, 2;7, July, 1933, p 1 for 
Brigden's endorsement of the policy of forward planning. 
27. During the period of the Moore administration the State weekly 
basic wage for raales declined from eighty-five shillings to 
seventy-four shillings. 
28. Brisbane Courier, 29 April, 1932. 
221, 
Economic News, but its advisory relationship with the Industrial 
(09) 
Court was ended. Brigden was retained as director and rema 
in the position until he was replaced by Colin Clark in 1938. 
Wlien he introduced the new legislation the Premier explained 
that: 
One of the important purposes of the Bill is 
to provide a method of organised planning in 
the internal economy of the State. (30) 
In its first report the Bureau pointed out that the State's tmemploy-
ment relief scherae had been operating on such an ad hoc basis that 
substantial wastage of raoney and resources had occurred. The Bureau 
recommended that the long-terra objective of the Government should be 
to transfer men from intermittent relief work projects to full time 
(31) public works financed from loan money and the relief fund. 
(32) Initially the functions of the bureau were 'purely advisory' 
but after twelve months of operation its powers and responsibilities 
were greatly expanded. The Moore Government had established an 
Industries Assistance Scheme in 1929 for the purpose of extending 
loans to Queensland secondary industries. Because of the sharp 
contraction of Government revenue, the legislation became virtually 
a dead letter and only one grant of £3,000 was made in the three 
years up to 1932. Under the terms of the 1929 legislation only 
secondary industries were eligible for assistance. In 1933 Labor 
(33) 
amended the legislation to include any industry or works. 
During the period 1932 to 1935 the State Government, acting on 
advice from the Bureau of Industry, provided loans totalling £767,000 
(34) to various manufacturing and construction companies. 
29. BH Molesworth, 'The Bureau of Industry in Queensland', Economic 
Record, 9;l6, June, 1933, p IO6. 
30. ^PD, clxii, 17 November, 1932, p l621. 
31. Annual Report of the Bureau of Industry, ^PP, vol 1, 1934, p 18. 
32. Economic News, 2;7, July, 1933, p 1. 
53. .QPD, clxiv, 22 November, 1933, p I6O9. 
34. Annual Report of the Bureau of Industry, QPP, vol 2,1936, p 9. 
The 1933 amendments to the Industries Assistance Act also 
altered and expanded the powers of the Bureau of Industry which now 
became a constructing authority with power to borrow money, to issue 
debentures and to buy and sell land. The Premier claimed that 
these changes established in Queensland 'a system of the corporate 
control of industry', the overall objective of which was to marshall 
(35) public and private expenditure in the war against unemployment. 
The Opposition was not impressed with these initiatives and the 
former Minister for Labour and Industry, Hubert Sizer, argued that 
'the Bill establishes an economic council, and it will have the 
effect of promoting Communism. It has been conceived in Russia.' 
The legislation was, in fact, motivated by more mundane concerns. 
A decision had been taken by cabinet to proceed with the construction 
of a vehicular bridge across the Brisbane river at Kangaroo Point 
and the immediate purpose of the Bill was to establish the Bureau 
of Industry as the constructing authority- The original suggestion 
to build such a bridge emanated from Dorman, Long and Co who were the 
builders of the Sydney Harbour Bridge. They approached the Moore 
Government in October 1931 with an offer to build a bridge across the 
Brisbane river in return for a fifty-five year toll franchise. 
Negotiations were still in progress at the time of the 1932 election 
but the in-coming Labor Government broke them off. This action was 
taken because the cabinet was unwilling to grant a private company a 
toll franchise for such a long period. Nevertheless, the Premier 
was keen to build such a bridge. In June 1933 he received a 
deputation of local businessmen who urged an early start to construc-
(57) tion. Forgan Smith had already commissioned the Bureau of 
Industry to carry out an investigation into the proposal and in 
December 1933 was able to announce that the Loan Council had granted 
Queensland a £2m loan at three and three-quarter percent interest to 
(38) 
construct the bridge. 
35. .QPD, clxiv, 22 January, 1933, p I6O9. 
36. ibid., p 1629. 
37- Brisbane Courier, 1 June, 1933. 
38. Sunday Truth, I9 November, 1933; Clem Lack, Three Decades of 
Queensland Political Historv. Brisbane, I96O, p 154. 
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This decision was criticised by the CPNP on the grounds that it 
was a waste of valuable loan money; that it was unfair to require 
the people of the State to pay for a Brisbane luxury; and that the 
(39) predictable traffic flow did not justify such an expenditure. 
The Premier replied to these objections and defended the economic 
viability of the project. He did concede that under normal circum-
stances the Government would have entrusted its construction to the 
Brisbane City Council. There is no doubt that the Government 
saw the bridge as a major public work that would provide stable 
employment for a substantial number of workers over a lengthy period 
of time, and would have strong linkage and income multiplier effects 
(41) 
within the Queensland economy- The commemorative brochure 
published at the time of the bridge's opening in 1940 drew attention 
to these motives: 
The history of the Story Bridge (it was named 
after the public service commissioner, JD Story) 
began when the Queensland Government, faced with 
the relief of unemployment...and with prospective 
traffic congestion decided to proceed with the 
construction of a bridge although it was thought 
to be some little time in advance of the actual 
need for its erection. (42) 
The Story Bridge was the first of a succession of major capital 
works initiated or assisted by the State Government as part of its 
recovery policy. Others included: the construction of the Somerset 
Dam on the Stanley River which was to supply water for Brisbane, 
generate electricity and form part of a flood mitigation scheme. 
(This project was commenced in 1935 but the outbreak of war in 1939 
delayed its completion until 1954); the granting of a £100,000 loan 
to MR Hornibrook Pty Ltd to permit them to complete a one and three 
quarter mile viaduct across Moreton Bay linking Sandgate and 
59. .QTO, clxiv, 31 October, 1933, p 1085f. 
40. ibid., p 1612. 
41. Sunday Truth, 19 November, 1933. 
42. The Story Bridge - A Commemorative Book, 6 July, 1940, pa/s6l, 
p 2, FML. 
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RedclifA; the construction of a deep water harbour at Mackay; and 
the re-siting of the University of Queensland at St Lucia. Forgan 
Smith rounded off his activities in this area by establishing the 
position of Co-ordinator of Public Works in 1938. The Bureau of 
Industry was unable to devote sufficient attention to the task of 
co-ordinating the public works programme because of its heavy 
commitments in the area of construction. This responsibility was 
transferred to the Co-ordinator General's department. The new 
department was directed specifically 'to marshall public works in 
Queensland with a view to getting the maxim^ im public advantage from 
(43) both' The war prevented the immediate implementation of these 
ideals and the department did not commence to operate effectively 
until 1947-
The motivating force behind the Labor Government's recovery policy 
was the Premier's belief that well-planned public expenditure would 
solve the problem of unem-ployment. His almost single-minded 
dedication to a vigorous public works programme was not without its 
social costs. The high level of taxation, the slow recovery in wages 
and the diversion of funds from other public services were unfortunate 
by-products of the public works programme. Nevertheless the policy 
achieved what it set out to do. The projects undertaken were of 
lasting value to the State, in marked contrast to most of the inter-
mittent relief work which tended to be unreproductive. The real 
success of the policy can be seen in the fact that Queensland reduced 
its level of recorded tmemployment by fifty-three percent in the 
period 1932 to 1935. This was ten percent better than the national 
average and was surpassed only by the claimant State of Western 
Australia (fifty-four percent) 
43. For a brief history of the Co-ordinator General's Department 
see Queensland Year Book, 33, 1973, p 60f. 
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One general impact of the depression was to promote industrial-
(44) isation in the primary producing nations of the world. Schedvin 
explains that 'because imports fell much more heavily than did 
national expenditure, the depression encouraged the shift of 
resources to the manufacturing sector; and it was on the basis 
of import replacement of manufactures that (Australia's) recovery 
(45) 
was forged' Queensland, together with Western Australia, again 
provided an exception. 
TABLE 9:1 
Numbers engaged in factories per 
1,000 of population, by States, 
1904-45 
Year NSW f Q SA WA Tas Aust 
1904 
1911 
1921 
1929 
1939 
1945 
Source: 
47 
65 
67 
75 
84 
108 
Hughes, 
66 
87 
92 
92 
108 
129 
et al, 
40 
62 
50 
50 
57 
60 
Queens 
51 
69 
61 
65 
74 
105 
land:Industr 
55 
55 
49 
52 
53 
60 
ial En; Lgma, 
47 
56 
44 
50 
60 
79 
p 21. 
54 
71 
69 
73 
82 
102 
Table 9^ 1 reveals an actual decline in factory employment in 
Queensland between I9II and 1959. While the decade 1929-1939 does 
reveal an increase this was achieved in food processing industries 
rather than in normal manufacturing concerns. Between 1925/6 and 
1935/6 the number of persons employed in raanufacturing industry in 
Queensland declined from 49,003 to 44,768. (46) One reason why 
44. CH Lee, 'The Effects of the Depression on Primary Producing 
Countries', Journal of Contemporary History, 4:4, October, I969, 
pp 148-49 lists the following as examples of this phenomeraon: 
Chile, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Rumania, Greece, Hungary, 
China, Yugoslavia and Australia. 
45. Schedvin, op.cit., p 372. 
46. Queensland Year Book, 35, 1975, P 586. 
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Queensland deviated from the trend noted by Schedvin was that the 
continued buoyancy of the sugar industry protected Queensland's 
primary sector frora the full blast of the depression (see Chapter l). 
The Labor Government of Forgan Smith decided to capitalise on the 
apparent strength of the State's rural resources and attempted to 
alleviate urban unemployment by settling its victims on sraall 
agricultural holdings along the lines of the earlier soldier 
settlement schemes. 
Delegates to the 1952 Labor-in-Politics convention were in 
general agreement that the rural sector of the economy contained 
(47) 
the solution to unemployment.^ In his 1932 election speech, 
Forgan Smith promised that a Labor Government would pursue 'a 
vigorous land settlement policy' as part of its anti-unemployment 
campaign.^ The new minister for Labour and Industry, MP Hynes, 
translated this promise into the slogan 'One Thousand Farms for 
(49) One Thousand Workers', and argued that because secondary industry 
was unable to provide sufficient job opportunities, the Government 
had decided to settle as many unemployed families as possible on 
small farms. This decision marked a major shift in policy from 
that pursued by the CPNP Government. Moore believed that people 
should not be settled on the land unless they possessed sufficient 
capital and technical knowledge of farming to have a reasonable 
(51) 
chance of success. Furthermore, country representatives of 
the CPNP were not enthusiastic supporters of rural settlement 
schemes that could upset the political allegiance of their 
electorates by importing large numbers of hitherto urban unemployed. 
CPNP rural policy in the period 1929 to 1932 was designed to encourage 
established farmers to employ labourers from urban areas or to use 
relief workers on rural projects. In one such venture twenty-six 
47. Official Report of the 1952 Labor-in-Politics Convention, Brisbane, 
1932, pp 44-5; Murphy in Murphy, Joyce and Hughes, Labor in 
Power, op.cit., pp 194-5 eraphasises this point. 
48. Brisbane Courier, 29 April, 1932. 
49. ^PD, clxi, 28 September, 1952, p 549. 
50. Brisbane Courier, 19 June, 1953. 
51. .QPD, clxi, 28 September, 1952, p 557f. 
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five acre blocks of land at Mareeba were cleared and prepared by 
local unemployment relief workers. The lots were then made 
available as tobacco farms, but on the proviso that occupants possess 
(52) 
at least £300 realisable capital. The high level of capital 
required precluded any unemployed worker from acquiring one of the 
farms. 
The change in land policy after mid-1932 was brought about by 
political rather than bureaucratic inputs. Many who have commented 
on the pro-rural policies of successive Queensland Labor Governments 
in the 1930s and 1940s have argued that they were, at least in part, 
(53) inspired by the ruralist and agrarian ideas of Colin Clark. 
Clark was appointed director of the Bureau of Industry and chief 
economic adviser to the Government only on Brigden's resignation in 
1938. He had, therefore, no opportunity to influence Labor's 
tmemployment strategy which was firmly established by 1933. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that, in some respects, 
Clark was more influenced by Forgan Smith than vice versa. Jackson 
correctly observes that prior to taking up his Queensland appointment, 
Colin Clark's academic writings revealed little evidence of the 
(54) 
ruralist views he was to expound so forcefully in the 1940s. 
This suggests that perhaps Clark's views were altered by his changed 
position and environment. During the formative period of Labor's 
rural employment scheme Brigden was the Premier's chief economic 
adviser and he also had never revealed himself as a strong adherent 
of agarianism prior to his Queensland appointment. 
Two incidents reveal that it was the cabinet rather than the 
public service that determined both CPNP and ALP rural settlement 
52. ibid., 11 December, 195O, p 2966. 
53. Gough, op.cit., p 14; WJ Jackson, The Government and Economic 
Growth in Queensland, BA, Queensland, I968, p 108; KW Wiltshire, 
Portuguese Navy:The Establishment of the Department of Industrial 
Development in Queensland, Brisbane, 1973, p 13. 
54. Jackson, op.cit., p 75. 
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policy. In 1930 the Land Administration Board advocated a system 
of Government subsidisation of rural employers from the unemployment 
relief fund. The board argued that the major advantage of this 
proposal was that it would help to move the unemployed out of the 
city and that: 
Engaged in rural occupations many of the 
unemployed, or members of their families, 
would develop a rural sense, and become 
seekers after land frora which in future 
they would derive their livelihood. (55) 
Despite these recommendations, the Moore Government rejected the 
proposal on two separate occasions. Further evidence of the sub-
servience of the bureaucracy on this policy issue can be found in 
an examination of two successive reports of the Department of 
Labour and Industry for the years 1931 and 1932. 
In his 1931 report, the departmental under-secretary, WH Austin, 
gave lengthy consideration to the suggestion that the unemployed 
should be settled on the land. He pointed out that there existed 
three main obstacles to such a policy: first, the fact that most of 
the tmemployed lacked the necessary capital to maintain a property; 
second, that most of thera were innocent of basic farming methods; 
third, it would require prohibitively large expenditure on the part 
of the Government to overcome the first two problems. He 
concluded: 
In the present state of markets for primary 
products, closer settlement of unemployed persons 
on land remote from means of communication could 
end in nothing but disaster, especially as such 
settlement would necessarily begin on the 
artificial basis of Government assistance for 
every preliminary requirement, as well as the 
provision of a food supply in each case for an 
extended period. (56) 
55. Report of the Land Administration Board, ^ PP, vol 2, 1933, p 484. 
56. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry. QPP, vol 2, 
1931, pp 18-9. 
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This statement stands in stark contrast to the opinion expressed by 
Austin in his next report where he said that: 
I subrait that, for the supplying of the needs 
of the greater ntmiber of these (unemployed) 
people, the outstanding prospect appears to be 
the lands of Queensland - with all their 
resources. (57) 
The most plausible explanation for Austin's change in attitude is 
that he was responding to the policy pronouncements of the new Labor 
Government in general and wishes of his own minister, Hynes, in 
particular- After the change of Government the relevant public 
service departments expressed strong support for the cabinet's 
rural employment policies. The only dissenter was the Superin-
tendent of Technical Education who argued in 1934 that Government 
attempts to place and retain people in primary industry had proved 
ineffective and that more assistance needed to be given to 
secondary industry 
and he was ignored 
. Such views were, however, out of favour 
The Labor Government's land policies also received regular 
endorsement frora the business community and the Christian churches. 
The Brisbane Chamber of Commerce was a consistent advocate of 
closer settlement during the tenure of both the Moore and Forgan Smith 
(59) Governments. In September 1932 the president of the Chamber and 
CPNP meraber for Hamilton, HM Russell, called for a 'Back to the 
Land' raovement as a solution to the State's economic problems. He 
argued that the Roman Empire had collapsed because its people had 
deserted the countryside for the pleasures of the city. He 
concluded: 
57- ibid., 1932, p 40. 
58. Report of the Department of Public Instruction, Appendix E, 
£PP, vol 2, 1936, p 72. 
59. Brisbane Chamber of Commerce to Moore, 17 April, 1951, item 
31/2151, PRE/A1022, QSA; Brisbane Chamber of Commerce 
Submission to State Employment Council, 19 May, 1932, SEM/I, QSA. 
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I do not believe that capitalism has failed..., 
but I do consider (that) our salvation lies in 
the settling of our lands by a sturdy yeomanry 
that can be trusted to resist the forces of 
disruption. (60) 
Queensland in the 1930s lacked a strong organisation of manufacturers 
capable of providing a counter-balance to the Chamber of Commerce. 
The task of putting an alternative view was left to the Taxpayers' 
Association which regularly but vainly exhorted the Government to 
devote more attention to the development of secondary industry 
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane, James Duhig, was also 
an enthusiastic supporter of Labor's rural policies. Duhig was a 
devotee of the distributist ideas of Hilaire Belloc and GK Chesterton. 
He issued a pastoral letter in 1930 in which he advocated that 
available land should be alienated into small holdings and given to 
(62) the unemployed. Duhig later argued that the depression was, 
in at least one respect, beneficial because it had forced people 
to leave the city in search of work. He added that the Government 
should take advantage of this fortuitous event and do more to 
(fiZ) 
encourage the development of agriculture. The Church of England 
shared these views and the 1933 Synod requested that the State 
Government give consideration to settling the unemployed on the land 
by way of chartered companies. 
The key figure in the Labor Government's rural settlement policy 
was the Premier- He received the strong backing of two Ministers: 
MP Hynes, the Minister for Labour and Industry, and FW Bulcock, the 
Minister for Agriculture. The Labor party's ruralistic policies 
were motivated by ideological as well as practical considerations. 
60. Journal of Commerce, 29 September, 1932, 14;4, p 7-
61. Taxpayers' Association to Smith, 9 September, 1937, item 37/5666, 
PRE/A1187, QSA. 
62. Brisbane Courier, 3 March, 1930. 
63. Catholic Leader, 4 August, 1932. 
64. Anglican Dioscesan Secretary to Smith, 30 June, 1933, item 33/3576, 
PRE/A1075, QSA. 
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The ideological considerations were well summed up in the Premier's 
oft-quoted remark that: 
I take the view that, no matter how much 
secondary industries may be established in 
Queensland, this State will continue for all 
time to be a primary producing state. It is 
desirable that it should be so. Primary 
production is the natural occupation of 
mankind. No one would desire for this State 
the industrialized type of civilisation which 
exists in many countries today. (65) 
It became an article of faith amongst Labor members that there was an 
inherent superiority in rural life and values. Yet it would be 
superficial to characterise the Government's policy as the product 
of mere mythmaking. The primary objective of the Labor party when 
it returned to office in 1952 was to promote some form of economic 
recovery. Forgan Smith reasoned that it was preferable to attempt 
to capitalise on the apparent strong points of the State's economy 
rather than attempt a major restructuring of that economy- In 1933 
Queensland was one of the most rural States in the Commonwealth with 
32.8 percent of its workforce engaged in primary industry compared 
with the national average of 24.1 percent. Furthermore, it was 
widely accepted at the time that Queensland had been spared the worst 
of the depression because of the strength of its primary industries. 
The Premier explained the rationale behind the Government's policies 
to the Prime Minister in 1933: 
Queensland depends largely for its economic well-
being on the proceeds from its exports and being 
a relatively newly settled country it is considered 
that the best way in which to off-set the dimtmition 
in export prices is by an expansion of the volume of 
its primary production which would also have a large 
reflection on unemployment. (67) 
65. .QPD, clxi, 23 November, 1932, p 1731. 
66. Gough, op.cit., p 24. 
67. Premier to Prime Minister, 15 August, 1933, item 33/4325, PRE/A1077, 
QSA. 
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Marion Gough and others have been critical of what they argue was 
the economically counter-productive rural bias of the Forgan Smith 
and subsequent Labor Governments. Their contention that the 
persistent neglect of secondary industries led to the progressive 
impoverishment of Queensland in comparison to the other mainland 
States is difficult to refute. Less sound is their suggestion that 
Queensland could have followed the example of South Australia towards 
industrialisation. Under the influence of its Auditor-General, JW 
Wainwi'ight, South Australia in 1935 adopted a policy of industrial-
(69) isation as the basis of its programme of economic recovery. 
Gough's suggestion that Queensland could have done the same overlooks 
some fundamental differences between the economies and demographies 
of the two States. Much of South Australia is desert or semi-desert 
and by 1935 most of the available fertile land had been occupied. 
Table 9^ 2 shows that in the 1930s Queensland and South Australia 
experienced quite different patterns of population distribution. 
The lack of a concentrated market adjacent to the centre of produc-
tion had long retarded the development of an indigenous manufacturing 
(71) 
sector in Queensland. South Australia, on the other hand, was 
in the opposite position. The point that Gough and others appear 
to have overlooked is that there were more impediments to the 
industrialisation of Queensland than mere Government indifference. 
68. Gough, op.cit., Chapter 1. 
69. TJ Mitchell, 'JW Wainwright:The Industrialisation of South 
Australia, 1935-1940', AJPH, 8;1, May, I962, p 27-
70. Gough, op.cit., p 11 acknowledges this point. 
71. ibid., p 18 Jackson, op.cit., p IO6; MJ Thompson, The 
Political Career of William Forgan Smith, B Econ, Queensland, 
1965, p 13. 
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Year 
1920 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1940 
Percentage 
Australia 
43.1 
46.0 
49.0* 
46.8* 
47.3* 
NSW 
42.8 
45.2 
50.1 
47.2 
46.9 
TABLE 
metropol 
1920-
Vic 
50.0 
54.1 
56.6 
54.7 
56.1 
9:2 
itanisat 
1940 
Qld 
27.8 
30.6 
33.0 
31.5 
32.5 
ion Austra 
SA 
51.6 
55.0 
55.7 
53.7 
55.1 
lia 
WA 
47.0 
48.2 
48.6 
46.9 
48.6 
Tas 
24.5 
27.0 
26.2 
26.1 
27.4 
* Includes Canberra 
Source: Commonwealth Year Books. 
The Forgan Smith Government did, however, miscalculate the 
capacity of primary industry to absorb the urban unemployed. Sugar, 
sheep and wool were the vibrant elements of Queensland's primary 
sector, but the Government did not attempt to utilise these industries 
to solve the unemployment problem. Rathei' they attempted to settle 
the unemployed in small-scale agriculture holdings. It was this 
policy that was summed up in Hynes' slogan 'One Thousand Farms for 
One Thousand Workers' A major problem which faced the Government 
in its attempts to cope with unemployment was that the unemployed 
were disproportionately located within the Brisbane metropolitan 
area. In 1953 Brisbane accounted for thirty-one percent of the 
State's population but it contained within its boundaries almost 
(72) fifty-five percent of all registered relief workers. The 
Government was attracted to rural settlement schemes because they 
appeared to offer a solution to this problem. 
72. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry, QPP, vol 1, 
1934, p 12. 
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The 1932 Labor-in-Politics convention rejected a motion which 
(73) 
called for the establishment of communal farms lor the tmemployed,^ 
and all projects were organised on a share farming basis. Banana 
growing was given top priority and during 1933 6OO acres were divided 
(74) into six acre blocks for distribution to approved relief workers. 
The latmching of the scheme was accompanied by excessively optimistic 
prognostications on the part of Government officials. One relief 
worker was even moved to verse: 
Farewell to the lights of the city, goodbye 
to the races, the pubs. 
We're off to the mountains and valleys, 
the deeps of the vine tangled scrubs. 
Goodbye to the beer, and the barmaids, 
though soothing they be to the soul. 
And though there be hard times before us, 
farewell at last to the dole. 
We are strong with the spirit of freedom, 
the spirit of pioneers. 
Strong in the spirit of freedom, and 
faith in the future years. 
Let the past despair and its failure all 
go to a definite hang. 
We are off to grow great big bananas 
on the mountain slopes of Nerang. (75) 
Unfortunately this enthusiasm was not matched by results. By 1936 
the Government had sunk £52,000 into the banana settlement scherae but 
had managed to retain only fifty-nine of the original 100 settlers 
on their allotments. Equally disheartening results were 
obtained from the Government-sponsored ventures into tobacco growing. 
In 1933 ninety families of relief workers were settled on tobacco 
farms in the Beerburrtmi area of the near north coast. Administrative 
problems delayed the planting of the crop which was totally destroyed 
73. 1932 Labor-in-Politics Convention, op.cit., p 107-
74. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry, QPP, vol 1, 1934, 
p 33. 
75. Brisbane Courier, 20 June, 1933. 
76. gPD, clxv, 18 September, 1934, pp I89-9O. 
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by the then incurable disease known as blue mould. Most of the 
(77) 
settlers then deserted the farms. The rural unemployment scheme 
fell victim to the same problems that had earlier caused the collapse 
(78) 
of the soldier settlement scheme. The Government was embarrassed 
by the failure of the scheme and consistently refused to provide 
(79) 
comprehensive statements as to its cost. Apparently it proved 
very costly and absorbed only a small proportion of the registered 
unemployed. For these reasons the Premier announced in 1937 that 
the policy of settling the tmemployed on the land had been 
^. ^ A (80) abandoned. 
The placing of adult relief workers on small farms was only one 
aspect of the Labor Government's rurally orientated relief policy-
Even greater priority was given to the task of coaxing the sons 
of the urban unemployed to forsake city life and embark upon careers 
as farmers. The employment problems of school leavers were high-
lighted as a political issue by Moore during the 1929 election when 
(8I) he promised to 'Give the Boy a Chance' Labor strategists felt 
that this slogan had been particularly effective and that an 
(82) 
appropriate response was required for the 1932 election. The 
course of action decided upon was to develop agricultural training 
schemes to equip school leavers to gain satisfactory employment on 
the land. Here again the ideology of ruralism was to blind the 
Government and its advisers to the impracticality of the programme. 
Approximately 8000 school leavers entered the labour market each 
year in Queensland during the 1930s. Soon after its election, the 
Labor cabinet decided that primary rather than secondary industry 
(83) 
offered the best employment opportunities for these children. 
77- Stmday Truth, 5 March, 1933; Department of Agriculture and Stock 
to Smith, 8 March, 1933, item 33/1185, PRE/AIO87. 
78. Gough, op.cit., p 19 estimates that by 1927 the soldier settlement 
scheme had accumulated losses in excess of £lm. 
79. QPD, clxv, 18 September, 1934, pp 189-90. 
80. Department of Labour and Industry to Smith, and reply, 5 April, 
1937, item 37/2052, PRE/AII74, QSA. 
81. See Chapter 2. 
82. 1932 Labor-in-Politics Convention, op.cit., pp 44-5. 
83. Department of Labour and Industry to Smith, 22 November, 1933, 
33/6505, PRE/A1085, QSA. 
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One of the first initiatives taken by the Government was to establish 
a farm training school in the Brisbane suburb of St Lucia. The school 
provided a six-month residential course after which boys were placed 
with approved farmers at reduced rates of pay- Average attendance 
at the school was fifty, and 244 boys were placed in rural employment 
between 1933 and 1935. No accurate statistics are available on how 
many of these boys remained with their employers. The Christian 
churches again gave strong support to the Government's endeavours 
and participated in a programme whereby boys who could not attend 
St Lucia were placed with farmers to learn on the job. 
In 1934 the Government expanded its rural education programme by 
instituting 200 farm scholarships for city boys who studied approved 
subjects at a secondary school and then underwent twelve months 
training on selected farms. The major problem encountered by 
these various schemes was a shortage of willing participants. In 
1954 only fifty applications were received for the 200 farm scholar-
ships. Successive annual reports of the rural training programmes 
lamented the fact that so few boys were prepared to avail themselves 
of the opportunities provided by the Government. Parental opposi-
tion to their sons going onto the land was correctly identified as 
the cause of the scheme's unpopularity- The Government decided to 
mount an extensive propaganda campaign to convince parents of the 
value of the scheme. One of the chief ideologues in this campaign 
was the Public Service Commissioner, JD Story, whose annual reports 
were punctuated with florid exhortations in praise of rural values. 
The following is a typical example: 
84. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry, QPP, vol 1, 
1936, p 66. 
85. ibid., £PP, vol 1, 1954, p 28; Methodist Times, 9 February, 
1933, p 3; Presbyterian Outlook, 1 April, 1933, p 3; 
Brisbane Courier, 21 August, 1933; QSSL Conference on 
Unemployment Amongst Boys, 6 Februaiy, 1951, QSSL Minute 
Book, p 38. 
86. Report of the Board of Juvenile Employment, ^ PP, vol 2, 1936, 
P 93. 
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Clearly, it is not possible at present to absorb 
into vocations peculiar to the towns all those lads 
who desire employment in such vocations...The concern 
is still further intensified by the disinclination of 
many boys to proceed to positions in the country and the 
reluctance of their parents to permit them to leave home. 
The allure of the city grows magically; entertainers 
vie with entertainers in providing super-attractions. 
The artificial pleasures of the town are not found 
in the country; ..; cream is not associated with 
doubloons, nor milk with pieces of eight. Yet the 
merino fleece, if not the pig, helps to pay the 
Australian rent. The towns depend largely on the 
country; if the country stagnates, the stagnation 
will react upon the cities.. (87) 
City parents remained unmoved by this rhetoric and the education 
programmes remained imder-populated. 
The misdirected nature of the Government's rural youth policy was 
highlighted by the work of the Juvenile Labour Bureau which was 
established in 1935. The Bureau was divided into three sections: 
comraercial, industrial and rural. It operated as a labour exchange 
by keeping a register of unemployed boys and girls and matching these 
with suitable job vacancies. In its first year of operation the 
(88) 
Bureau found employment for fifty-three percent of its registrants. 
A breakdown of this figure reveals an interesting pattern. During 
1935/6 the commercial and industrial sections found jobs for 2469 
persons whereas the rtxral section placed only 7l6. And over 
the period 1955 to 1937 5000 were placed in secondary and tertiary 
industry but only 1000 in primary industry. Despite these 
figures, the Forgan Smith Government consistently deprecated the 
ability of the secondary and tertiary sectors to provide employment 
for school leavers. Agrarian ideology exerted a strong influence 
87. Report of the Public Service Comraissioner, QPP, vol 2, 1936, p 93. 
88. Report of the Department of Public Instruction, Appendix H, QPP, 
vol 1, 1956, p 92. 
89. Report of the Department of Labour and Industry, QPP, vol 1, 
1936, p 63. 
90. Forgan Smith in Brisbane Telegraph, I6 February, 1937-
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within the departments of Labour and Industry and Agriculture and 
encouraged them to pursue fruitless and wasteful juvenile 
employment policies. The official statistics revealed that, 
although they were relatively underdeveloped, Queensland's secondary 
industries had a greater capacity than primary industry to absorb 
juvenile labour- Had the Government capitalised on this trend by 
directed greater resources in the direction of secondary industry 
instead of attempting unsuccessfully to coerce urban youths to take 
up farming they may have achieved better results. 
CHAPTER 10 
TRADE UNION RESPONSES TO UNEMPLOYMENT 
AND THE UNEMPLOYED 
240, 
At no time during the depression did the Queensland trade unions 
formulate and articulate a coherent policy on unemployment around 
which both employed and unemployed unionists could unit*.. As a 
consequence, their influence on both Labor and non-Labor Governments 
was sporadic and slight. Trade union attitudes to the unemployed 
were produced not by callousness but by circumstance. The depression 
reduced the majority of unions to such a state of powerlessness that 
they lacked the capacity to protect even their employed members. 
Some of the unemployed were tmderstandably intolerant of what they 
saw as official tmion indifference to their plight. Misunderstan-
dings and ideological differences often combined to reduce trade 
union-unemployed relations to a condition of open hostility. 
When the economic collapse came in 1929/30, Australia was devoid 
of an effective tmemployment relief policy because of Government 
(l) indifference, and Commonwealth-State squabbling. The onset of 
the depression caught both Governments and tmions unaware. As the 
financial crisis deepened, neither proved capable of developing 
suitable programmes or schemes for dealing with the growing army of 
tmemployed. This is not to suggest that the tmions were delibera-
tely negligent in their dealings with the unemployed. Despite 
rapidly contracting budgets, most unions made a genuine effort to 
aid their out-of-work members. In 1928 the Queensland Trades and 
Labor Council (TLC) established an unemployment fund which was 
financed by regular donations from affiliated unions. Frora time 
to time, the fund' s administrative committee made small cash advances 
(2) to individual tmions to distribute among their tmemployed members. 
During the 1930s all Queensland's major unions established unemploy-
ment relief funds. However, the amounts of money raised and 
distributed were too small to be of real significance. Some unions 
1. See above Chapter 8. 
2. TLC Minutes, 28 February, 1928; AFULE Minutes, 4 March, 1928, 
E212/5 RSSSA/ANU; ARTWU Minutes, 15 December, 1933, p 20. 
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attempted to assist their tmemployed by employing them as poll clerks 
y ei 
(4) 
(3) 
and scrutineers at election time, and the TLC occasionall ngaged 
out-of-work carpenters and painters to renovate its offices. 
The unions and the TLC also ran art unions to raise money for the 
tmemployed; organised picnics for their families: and Christmas 
(5) trees for their children. 
The Queensland trade union which possessed the most elaborate 
unemployment scheme was the Printing Industries Employees Union of 
Australia (PIEUA). The PIEUA was advantaged in that it was a 
relatively wealthy tmion which covered a highly skilled group of 
workers. In 1931 the union declared its responsibilities to its 
unemployed members in the following terms: 
Cotmcil urges the general adoption of unemployment 
payments by Branches, believing that until adequate 
legislation is secured to ensure the maintenance of 
the unemployed as a social obligation it is an 
important part of the work of trade unions to assist 
in the relief of the unemployed, and because by such 
means the members of the Union will maintain contact 
with and interest in the Union, thus enabling it to 
sustain its strength and effectiveness when representing 
employee interests and when maintaining and protecting 
awards and agreements; (6) 
The union established an unemployment committee in 1927 which was 
charged with the task of administering a fund financed by a levy on 
(7) 
each employed member- ' This ftmd was augmented in 1930 by a 
further levy which required the payment of 6d per week by each male 
member earning a weekly salary in excess of £2. The impact of 
3. Worker, 2 December, 1930. 
4. TLC Minutes, 8 April, 1925. 
5. ibid., 10 December, 1928, 18 January, 1955, 25 September, 1935; 
ARTWU Board of Control Minutes, 9 January, 1934, p 45. 
6. Printing Trades Journal, 10 March, 1931. 
7- PIEUA Board of Management Minutes, I6 March, 1927, p 12, 
11 April, 1927, p 22, 26 September, 1927, p 70. 
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worsening economic circumstances was revealed in the narrow margin 
(8) (448 votes to 375 votes) by which the membership approved this levy. 
From 1930 to 1935 the PIEUA expended approximately £16,000 on relief 
(9) pajonents to its tmemployed members. This expenditure became a 
serious drain on the union's finances. Because of heavy demands 
on the relief ftmd, the Brisbane branch's expenditure exceeded its 
income in 1930. The imposition of the new levy temporarily 
alleviated the situation, but by 1931 the tmion was committed to a 
regular weekly payment to the unemployed of over £100. As a 
consequence, the Board of Management instructed the Secretary to 
prepare a list of members who drew heavily on the fund. The 
Executive then scrutinised this list and eliminated any undeserving 
(ll) 
cases. The difficulties encountered by the PIEUA serve to 
highlight the plight of less fortunate unions. The printers suffered 
a membership decline of only three percent over the period 1927 to 
1932, compared with the average for all Queensland unions of forty-
(12) two percent. Consequently, their financial situation was much 
healthier than that of most tmions. Because of the steep drop in 
membership subscriptions, the unions' main source of income, unions 
covering predominately unskilled and serai-skilled workers were unable 
to match the PIEUA's tmemployment relief scheme. 
The unions attempted to overcome this handicap by combining in 
co-operative ventures to provide some assistance to the unemployed. 
On the suggestion of Brisbane voluntary worker, Marion Steele, the 
Queensland branch of the Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation 
(ABTEF) marshalled their skills and resources to provide a boot repair 
service for the unemployed. The ABTEF engaged one of its out-of-work 
members to carry out repairs in a room provided free of charge by the 
TLC. In March 1930 the ABTEF Secretary wrote to thirty-nine unions 
8. Printing Trades Journal, 13 May, 1930, p 172. 
9. Compiled from PIEUA records 1930-35. 
10. Printing Trades Journal, 13 May, 1930, p 97-
11. PIEUA, Board of Management Minutes, 13 April, 1931, p 339-
12. See Chapter 5. 
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informing them of the scheme and inviting them to contribute 5/~ per 
(13) 
week to its maintenance. Thirty-seven tmions replied favourably, 
and over the period March to December 1930 £306 was subscribed and 
(14) 2124 pairs of boots repaired. A sound pair of boots was 
essential equipment for men required to traverse Queensland's vast 
distances in search of work, and the service proved so popular that 
(15) branches were soon established in the major provincial centres. 
The prolonged and widespread unemployment that was a feature of 
the depression presented the trade tmions with unforeseen 
administrative problems. Because most unions collected dues on a 
yearly or half-yearly basis, short-term unemployment rarely rendered 
a member unfinancial. The depression, however, raised the vexed 
question of the status of unemployed unionists who fell behind in 
their payment of fees. The 1929 Trades Union Congress (TUC) urged 
all unions to keep their tmemployed financial so that they would not 
be disadvantaged in their search for work by preference clauses in 
awards. Unfortunately, the TUC recommendation was ratified by 
only a handful of unions. The Colliery Employees (QCEU) was perhaps 
the most progressive union in this regard. Unemployed QCEU members 
were permitted to retain their financial status throughout the 
depression. Furthermore, members who managed to obtain temporary 
employment outside the industry were permitted to retain their QCEU 
ticket, provided they kept the Secretary informed of their activities. 
To preserve their privileges under the tmion's sickness and funeral 
funds out-of-work members were required to make a weekly payment of 
(17) 1/-. The Coopers' Union also managed to keep most of its 
unemployed financial by levying the employed members l/- per week to 
+, A (18) 
pay the necessary dues. 
13. Letter, 13 March, I93O, ABTEF Records, T49/5, RSSSA/ANTJ. 
14. Balance Sheet Boot Repair Service, 23 April, 1931, ABTEF, T49/5, 
RSSSA/ANU. 
15. Ipswich Unemployed Committee to ABTEF, 8 July, 1930, ibid. 
16. Workers' Weekly, 11 January, I929. 
17- QCEU Minutes, 12 April, I93O and 21 April, 1954, E165/45/5, 
RSSSA/ANU. 
18. Federated Coopers of Australia (FCA) Minutes, 19 March, 1931, 
T50/1/2, RSSSA/ANU. 
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These two unions were tmique in their attitude to their unemployed 
members. The Australian Road Transport Workers' Union (ARTWU) held 
a lengthy debate on the issue at its 1933 State Conference. A motion 
was moved to permit members who were unfinancial because of unemploy-
ment to stand for office and to vote at union elections. The motion 
was supported by the union President, but provoked strong opposition 
from a group of delegates who argued that the union would hold itself 
up to public ridicule if it allowed unfinancial persons to participate 
in its affairs. George Lawson, the union's Secretary, proposed, as 
a compromise, that unfinancial members should be granted speaking 
rights at tmion meetings, but should be denied the right to vote. 
While some members continued to oppose any such concession, Lawson's 
(19) 
motion was eventually carried by eleven votes to six. The issue 
of unemployed members' rights also caused much bitterness within the 
Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE). The 
AFULE's 1931 presidential election was declared invalid because a 
number of unemployed, unfinancial members voted. A somewhat 
contradictory situation arose in 1932 when the union came into 
conflict with the State executive of the Labor Party (QCE). The 
cause of the dispute was the union's insistence that both financial 
and unfinancial members should have the right to vote in ALP plebis-
cites. This demand was based on the claim that the union paid 
capitation fees to the party on its total, not its financial member-
ship. The QCE had decided, in 1930, that branch members forfeited 
all rights if they failed to pay their subscriptions in accordance 
(22) 
(21) 
with the rules. The party was not prepared to make any 
exceptions for the tmemployed, and the AFULE was advised accordingly. 
As well as presenting the trade unions with internal administra-
tive problems, the depression gave rise to a new element in working 
(23) 
class politics, the various tmemployed organisations. A major 
shortcoming of the Queensland (and Australian) trade union movement 
during the depression was its failure to integrate the tmemployed 
structurally with the Labor movement as a whole. With a number of 
19. Official Report, Third State Conference ARTWU, August,1933,pl5f, 
20. Headlight, 1 May, 1931. 
21. QCE Executive Committee Minutes, 10 November, 1930, p 2. 
22. AFULE Minutes, 6 March, 1932, E212/8, RSSSA/AMJ, pp 21-2. 
23. See Chapter 11. 
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notable exceptions, relations between the trade unions and the 
organised unemployed were less than cordial. Some of the more 
conservative unions, notably the AWU, believed that groups such 
as the Unemployed Workers' Movement (UWM) were dominated by 
communists whose only aim was the 'white-anting' of the union 
movement. Many of the unemployed regarded the unions as being 
self-centred and not interested in the welfare of those who had 
(24) been forced out of the movement by unemployment. In 1958 the 
Queensland Unemployed and Relief Workers' State Council complained 
of 'the shabby attitude of indifference to tmemployed organisation 
(25) 
that had been prevalent in certain trade union circles' Many 
trade union officials saw the unemployed as a potential threat to 
award wages and conditions. Direct industrial action was rendered 
inappropriate because of the widespread fear in union circles that 
the unemployed would be recruited as strike breakers. Both the 
1931 shearers' strike and a strike at the Brisbane breweries in 
1935 were undermined by the recruitment of volunteer labour from 
among the ranks of the unemployed. One brewery worker who was 
involved in the 1935 dispute recalled the moral dilemraa that faced 
those out of work: 
It's a hard thing to call a man a scab in those 
days when he's got four or five kids and can't 
get a job. He's got nothing and there's a job 
offering at £4 or £5 a week. You've got to 
look at the personal side of it. (26) 
The gradual expansion of the Government's relief work system also 
served to drive a wedge between the unions and the unemployed. 
Hard-pressed local authorities were eager to carry out projects 
under the unemployment relief scheme rather than as normal public 
works, because of the monetary advantages that the former offered. 
24. Transcript of Interview with Jack Read, 8 September, 1975, p 4. 
25. Organiser, 2 June, 1938. 
26. Read, op.cit., p 7 
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The unions believed that many local government bodies were taking 
unfair advantage of the scheme, and were getting jobs done 'on the 
cheap' by employing relief workers at under award rates and conditions. 
Unions in the building industry regularly complained to the State 
Government that their members were being denied full-time employment 
(•^ 7) by relief workers. The unemployed often interpreted these actions 
as clear evidence that the unions were attempting to deprive them of 
their meagre income. 
A continuing source of conflict between the trade unions and the 
unemployed bodies concerned the latter's attempts to gain formal 
representation on the TLC. Throughout the 1920s groups of unemployed 
workers were regularly granted permission to address the TLC on a 
(28) 
variety of subjects. On one such occasion in 1928 the tmemployed 
suggested that two of their number be admitted to the TLC as fully 
credentialled delegates. They received a sympathetic hearing, and 
a motion was foreshadowed to amend the rules to permit unemployed 
(29) 
representation. Partisan political considerations significantly 
influenced relations between the TLC and the trade unions in the late 
1920s. The One Big Union of Unemployed, at that time the major 
tmemployed organisation, shared the TLC's hostility to the McCormack 
Government, and the tmions were keen to exploit the uneraployraent 
issue at the expense of the Labor Government. The defeat of the 
McCormack Government combined with the return of the AWU to the TLC 
significantly altered the latter's attitude to the affiliation of 
the unemployed. The foreshadowed motion to admit the unemployed 
was put before the May 1929 TLC and was soundly defeated by forty-
two votes to eleven. 
27- TLC Minutes, 9 May, 1934- 24 August, 1936; 7 September, 1937; 
9 September, 1936; Brisbane Courier, 21 April, 1933. 
28. TLC Minutes, 13 August, 1924; 11 February, 1925. 
29. ibid., 22 February, 1928. 
30. See Chapter 2. 
31. TLC Minutes, 15 May, 1929. 
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During the next eight years the unemployed made frequent but 
tmsuccessful attempts to gain forraal affiliation on the TLC. In 
July 1950 a member of the Unemployed Workers Movement was in the 
process of addressing the TLC when a group of his supporters forced 
their way into the meeting and refused to leave until the Council 
agreed to their demands. The TLC President, SJ Bryan, responded 
(32) to this challenge by calling the police to clear the hall. 
This incident further poisoned relations between the two groups, 
and the unemployed were directed by the TLC executive to vacate the 
rooms they occupied free of charge in the Trades Hall. The unemployed 
then set up offices in the rooms of the Waterside Workers' Federa-
tion. While the majority of unions endorsed the actions of 
the executive, a dissident minority under the leadership of the 
Australian Railways Union (ARU) Secretary, Tim Moroney, continued 
to press the claims of the unemployed. Matters came to a head in 
March 1931 when the unemployed were refused the use of a meeting room 
in the Trades Hall because they would not pay the rental fee. 
Despite this decision, the unemployed served notice that they 
(34) intended to defy the executive and hold the meeting. Bryan 
regarded this threat as a challenge to the authority of the TLC and 
informed the police commissioner that the unemployed were not to be 
(35) granted access to the Trades Hall. On the afternoon of 18 March 
the tmemployed managed to hold their meeting, at which they decided to 
move in a body to the Government offices and seek an interview with 
the Minister for Labour and Industry. Subsequent to the interview, 
the unemployed attempted to conduct a street meeting which was broken 
up by the police. At 7 pm on the same day 400 members of the 
unemployed assembled outside the Trades Hall and attempted to gain 
admittance to the TLC raeeting that was currently in progress. Bryan 
instructed the police to deny them entry, and in the conflict that 
followed a number of prominent unemployed activists were arrested. 
32. ibid., 23 July, I93O; 4 August, 1930. 
33. W\\fF Minutes, 4 June, I93O, p 260; 27 August, 1930, p 282, 
E213/9, RSSSA/ANU. 
34. Police Report, 18 March, I93I, item 31/88I8, PRE/A1085, QSA. 
35. Police Report, 19 March, 1931, item 31/8993, ibid., p 1. 
36. ibid. 
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The events of 19 March produced yet another confrontation on the 
TLC, and the previous decision not to allow the unemployed free use 
(37) 
of meeting rooms was rescinded.^ This victory encouraged the 
ARU again to move that the unemployed be granted two delegates on the 
TLC and the permanent use of Trades Hall offices. The executive 
(38) lobbied strongly against the ARU and both motions were defeated. 
Further difficulties arose in the form of factionalism within the 
UWM. That body's executive was keen to acquire direct representation 
on the TLC, but a rank and file meeting rejected the executive's 
advice on the grounds that affiliation with the TLC would restrict 
(39) the freedom of action of the tmeraployed. 
Divisions among and within the unemployed groups were continually 
cited by tmion officials as reasons why none of them could be given 
representation on the TLC. Similar arguments were used to deny the 
unemployed representation at the 1934 Trade Union Congress. 
By 1938 this argument was no longer relevant since the Unemployed 
and Relief Workers State Council was the only such group still 
functioning. Between 1931 and 1958 the issue of unemployed 
affiliation was regularly debated on the TLC, but with negative 
(41) 
results. When the matter was again raised at the June 1938 
meeting the President, as he had done on all previous occasions, 
ruled it out of order on the grounds that only tmions could join the 
TLC. The ARU delegates immediately moved a motion of dissent from 
the President's ruling, which was defeated by forty-three votes to 
forty-two. A formal division was then demanded and the dissent 
motion was carried by forty-five votes to forty-two. The motion 
37- TLC Minutes, 18 March, 1931. 
38. ibid., 29 April, 1951. 
39. Workers' Weekly, 27 March, 1931. 
40. Official Report, Tenth TUC, November, 1934, pp 6-7 The motion 
was defeated by forty votes to twelve. 
41. TLC Minutes, 1 April, 1932; 27 April, 1932; 22 June, 1932; 
25 July, 1952, 7 December, 1952; 15 January, 1956; 20 April, 
1937 
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(42) 
to grant affiliation was then carried by the same margin. The 
voting figures reveal that the tmions were anything but unanimous in 
their support for unemployed representation. Furthermore, during 
the eight years since the unemployed first became an issue in TLC 
politics the level of tmemployment had declined significantly 
By 1938 the bonding of the TLC and the unemployed was of little 
consequence. With the outbreak of war in September 1939 the last 
vestiges of uneraployraent were removed and the URWSC ceased to function 
in 1940. 
While the TLC executive opposed formal representation for the 
unemployed, it regularly urged individual unions to organise their own 
(43) 
unemployed. Unionists and officials were particularly concerned 
that prolonged bouts of unemployment would bring about the complete 
alienation of workers from their unions. During a debate on the 
question at the 1934 TUC a delegate warned of ' the detrimental 
(44) 
effect the unorganised workers have on the organised'. Despite 
these sentiments, atterapts by the union movement to organise the unem-
ployed failed. In 1931 the TUC established a committee and charged 
it with the task of developing schemes to prevent the unemployed 
(45) drifting beyond the ambit of the trade union movement. When 
the committee reported to the 1932 TUC it was revealed that all 
convened meetings had lapsed for want of a quorum. The committee 
(46) 
was then disbanded. Some unions attempted to fill this gap by 
organising their own unemployed members. The ARU, in 1931, helped 
form a body called the Unemployed Railway Men as a means of keeping 
in communication with its out-of-work members. Again, the most 
progressive union in this regard was the PIEUA, which altered its 
constitution to allow two tmemployed members to sit as full delegates 
(47) 
on the Board of Management. From time to time some other tmions 
42. ibid,, 8 June, 1938. 
43. Tenth TUC, op.cit., p 7. 
44. ibid., p 13. 
45. Official Report Eighth TUC. November, 1931, p 19. 
46. Official Report Ninth TUC, November, 1932, p 4. 
47- PIEUA Board of Management Minutes, 2 October, 1930. 
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formed coordinating committees to aid their unemployed. The 
itinerant habits of many of the unemployed combined with the poor 
financial state of the unions to render such committees impotent. 
Much of the suspicion and mistrust that existed between the union 
movement and the unemployed movement was a product of the latter's 
relations with the Australian Workers Union (AWU). AS earlier 
chapters have explained, the AWU suffered a heavy membership decline 
during the early years of the depression. The union experienced 
an equally dramatic increase in membership between 1952 and 1935. 
The reasons for this were twofold: the Labor Government of William 
Forgan Smith restored the rural awards that had been abolished by 
Moore and required that unemployed relief workers operate under 
industrial awards. This meant that, since most awards contained a 
union preference clause, relief workers were required to join a tmion 
before they could commence a job. The union that covered the 
unskilled type of work engaged in by the unemployed was the AWU. 
The AWU was quick to take advantage of the rotational gang system 
which operated on most relief projects. Regardless of the duration 
of the project, gangs were regularly rotated on a six or eight week 
basis in order to spread the available work as widely as possible. 
As each new gang joined a project an AWU organiser would be on hand 
to sell the men a full year ticket for 25/-. As a result of this 
system, the AWU was in a position to sell three or four times the 
normal number of tickets for a single job. 
While this scheme greatly boosted the book membership of the 
AWU, it engendered intense bitterness within both the unemployed 
and trade union movements. Many relief workers found it impossible 
to outlay 25/- for a union ticket at the commencement of their 
employment. Yet if a ticket was not purchased the award permitted 
the dismissal of the men. At a relief project in Coolangatta in 
1934 the entire gang refused to purchase AWU tickets and were 
promptly dismissed.^ ' Strictly speaking the award provided that 
48. £PD, clxvi, 28 November, 1934, pp 1780-1 
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workers had up to one month frora the commencement of the job to 
join a union. However, some over-zealous AWU organisei's, who were 
paid a commission for the number of tickets they sold, chose to ignore 
this provision and demanded payment on the first day of a job. This 
attitude brought its inevitable conflict. A major relief project in 
Brisbane during the depression involved the widening of Breakfast 
Creek. When an AWU organiser attempted to sell tickets to a gang 
in 1936 he was pelted with mud and thrown into the creek. 
There were 150 men employed on the job and I36 of them emphatically 
refused to join the AWU and were disraissed. The unemployed 
organisations and a number of trade tmions immediately demanded 
that the men be reinstated. 
The AWU, in reply, denounced the campaign as ' coraTiunistic' and the 
President, JC Laraont, said: 'We are deterrained to fight the issue: 
(51) there will be no back down' In this and similar conflicts, 
the union was aided by the policy of the State Government which was 
outlined by the Minister for Labour and Industry, MP Hynes (who was 
also a Vice-President of the AWU) in 1935! 
It was made clear to constructing authorities 
carrying out rotational relief work that full 
award rates and conditions were to be observed, 
and as preference clauses constitute conditions 
of awards, they should be automatically observed 
by constructing authorities. (52) 
In the face of this opposition, the campaign against the AWU collapsed 
and relief workers were required to be financial members of a trade 
union until the relief scheme was terminated in 1938. 
49. Read, op.cit., p 1. 
50. Worker, 28 July, I936. 
51. ibid. 
52. £PD, clxviii, 6 November, 1955, p IO76. 
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Opposition to the AWU's recruiting policies was not restricted 
to the unemployed organisations. Other trade unions regularly 
complained that the AWU manipulated the uneraployraent relief scheme 
(53) in order to poach their raembers. A dissident faction within 
the AWU itself alleged that the tmion's officials cynically exploited 
the unemployed merabers to raaintain their own positions. The dissi-
dents claimed that the officials used the ticket number of those 
(54) tmemployed who were unlikely to vote to rig the union's elections. 
The AWU also used its considerable influence within the ALP to have 
the Unemployed and Relief Workers State Cotmcil declared a pros-
(55) 
cribed body by the QCE.^ Despite regular invitations, the ALP 
consistently refused to send delegates to unemployed conferences 
because it claimed these were dominated by communists. The 
alienation of the unemployed from the traditional working class 
organisations was not tmique to Queensland. Nadia Wheatley, for 
(57) instance, discovered a similar pattern in New South Wales. The 
basic structure of the Australian Labor movement was firmly established 
prior to the onset of the depression and that structure did not 
provide for the establishment of semi-independent organisations of 
unemployed unionists. The existence of such bodies during the 
1930s had no lasting impact on the structure of either the trade 
tmions or the Labor Party. 
As well as failing to form any lasting alliance with the unemployed, 
neither the Australian nor the Queensland trade union movements 
succeeded in developing credible unemployment policies. The common 
union response to the problem was either to restrict itself to 
53. WWF Minutes, 4 July, 1934, E213/10, RSSSA/ANU, p 46l; 
Official Report Fourth State Conference, ARTWU, August, 1936, 
p 13. 
54. Provisional Membership Rights Committee, Ballot Dodging in 
Queensland: The Case for a Democratic BtHot in the AWU, 
Innisfail, 1936, pa/Alll, FML, p 4. 
55. QCE Secretary to C Kelly, 15 December, 1936, ALP Archives, 
Brisbane. 
56. Organiser, 14 March, 1940. 
57. Nadia Wheatley, 'New South Wales Relief Workers' Struggles, 
1933-36', Am, vol 42, December, 1973, p 36. 
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criticisms of the administrative aspects of Government relief schemes 
or to invoke impractical panaceas. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s 
the tmions petitioned successive Queensland Governments on a host of 
(58) 
matters concerning unemployment. On some issues, such as the 
securing of a discount on Brisbane City Council rate payment for those 
who were in arrears because of unemployment, the unions achieved a 
(59) 
measure of success. But in the majority of cases they were 
rebuffed by the authorities. The unions also attempted to improve 
job opportunities by cooperating with local manufacturers to exclude 
from Queensland goods produced in other States. The depression 
also encouraged the unions to accelerate their long-standing opposi-
tion to assisted immigration. Both the 1928 and 1929 TUCs declared 
strongly against State-aided migration when unemployment was in excess 
of two percent of registered trade unionists. In 1953 the TLC 
unsuccessfully attempted to sponsor a major public carapaign against 
n • + ^ • • +• (62) all assisted immigration. 
Despite the intensity of these activities, the union movement 
lacked suitable policies to cope with unemployment on a State-wide 
basis. In 1924 the TLC convened a special meeting to develop some 
form of uneraployraent policy The programme that emerged called for 
the reduction of working hours, the abolition of overtime, the 
payment of the basic wage to the unemployed, and the imposition of a 
(6"^ ^  
super-tax of 15/- in the £1 on all profits in excess of ten percent. 
The unions failed to have any of these policies accepted by the 
Government. In the six years between 1924 and 1950 no further 
58. TLC Minutes, l6 November, 1927; 11 December, 1931; 29 January, 
1936; 8 March, 1937; 15 June, 1938; 21 September, 1938; 
2 August, 1939; Official Report Twentieth Annual Delegates 
Meeting AWU, Brisbane, January, 1933, p 39, FML. 
59. TLC Minutes, 26 February. I936. 
60. ibid., 19 May, 1926, ABTEF Minutes, 5 October, 1931, T49/1/9, 
RSSSA/ANU, P 100. 
61. Official Report Fifth TUC, November, 1928, p 3; Official Report 
Sixth TUC, November, I929, p 6. 
62. TLC Minutes, 31 July, 1933. 
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attempts were made to develop appropriate unemployment policies. 
The CPNP Government of Arthur Moore rejected totally union arguments 
that a reduction in work hours would create jobs, and increased 
weekly hours from forty-four to forty-eight. When Labor returned 
to office in 1932 it promised to restore the forty-four hour week. 
The TLC was not content with this promise, and filed a claim before 
the Industrial Court calling for a thirty hour week without any 
reduction in pay- The Court recognised the unions' argument that 
a world-wide reduction in hours would create employment opportunities, 
but stated that for Queensland to embark on such a policy independently 
would ruin her major industries. In dismissing the application, the 
Court intimated that the 'experienced advocates for the combined 
unions' did not believe that a thirty hour week was economically 
feasible, and that the case was brought as a tactical move to ensure 
some reduction in hours 'however slight'. 
The following two case studies illustrate that the trade unions 
generally achieved a low level of effectiveness in their attempts to 
influence Government policy in the area of unemployment. The case 
studies involve: a prolonged dispute in the railway service over the 
issue of work pooling: and the 1938 decision of the Forgan Smith 
Government to abolish the relief work scheme. 
In 1929, Queensland's railway industry was suffering the effects 
of a shortage of loan money- The AFULE executive met with the CPNP 
Minister for Railways, Godfrey Morgan, and the Minister for Labour 
and Industry, Hubert Sizer, in September in an attempt to clarify 
the employment situation within the service. They assembled amidst 
persistent rumours that widespread retrenchment of railway staff was 
imminent. The two ministers were keen to allay such fears, and 
expressed the view that the problem of labour surplus could be 
solved by not replacing staff who retired or resigned. These 
64. Queensland Industrial Gazette, 24 June, 1933, p 212. 
65. AFULE Minutes, 8 September, 1929, E212/7, RSSSA/ANU, pp 9-10. 
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views proved to be optimistic, as, by 1950, a large number of sackings 
had occurred. The Railway Department in late 1929 had introduced a 
system of work rationing into its workshops in an attempt to forestall 
further dismissals. Needless to say, the railway unions displayed 
an intense interest in this new policy. However, as on so many other 
issues of consequence, the AFULE and the ARU were at loggerheads over 
the question of work pooling. The ARU opposed all rationing on 
principle, while the AFULE saw it as a preferable alternative 
to dismissals. 
The Moore Government justified the work pooling system on 'equality 
of sacrifice' arguments. It provoked opposition from the railway 
workers because it operated in an inequitable fashion. Because of 
the differing needs of the department, it was introduced in some 
sections but not in others. Some single men on short time 
worked only four days per fortnight, which netted them a total pay 
less than that of an unemployed relief worker. A further cause of 
dissatisfaction was that men on reduced hours received only pro rata 
leave and were disadvantaged as far as promotions were concerned. 
The major argument against work pooling was that it failed to achieve 
its stated aim of preventing retrenchments. Despite extensive 
rationing, no fewer than 250 workers were laid off at the Ipswich 
railway workshops during 1931. In the boom years of the raid-
1920s the workshop employed 2,400 men, yet bj^  March 1933 this had 
slumped to 1,300. This situation led the ARU executive to 
approach the AFULE with a proposal that the two unions combine in a 
campaign against the work rationing system. The AFULE replied that 
while it was aware of the abuses that had crept into the scheme, it 
felt that any alternative would inevitably involve heavier 
(71) 
retrenchments. 
66. ARU State Council, Minutes, 26 September, 1929, p 119-
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The confusion and divisions that existed within the trade union 
movement were clearly illustrated during a debate on work rationing 
at the 1932 Labor-in-Politics convention. Participants in the 
debate were divided into three groups: those who believed that the 
system was working as well as could be expected; those who believed 
that the system was necessary, but in need of major amendments to 
remove abuses* and those who regarded the scheme as an attack on the 
concept of the basic wage, and who wanted it abolished forthwith. 
During the course of the debate, four separate resolutions were moved 
but, because of the lack of agreement araongst the union delegates, 
all failed to pass. This raeant that the Labor party eraerged from 
convention without a clear policy on this most important issue. 
The leader of the parliamentary party, William Forgan Smith, told the 
convention that he supported moves to regulate the rationing systera, 
but that he did not support its abolition because to do so would 
(7'^ ) 
aggravate the unemployment problem. The election of the Labor 
Government encouraged tmionists to expect a change in the work pooling 
scheme. A deputation of Ipswich workshop employees met the Minister 
for Transport, Jack Dash, and requested that work rationing be 
(73) 
abolished. Dash declared himself to be sympathetic to the 
request, but the cabinet subsequently decided that, since no further 
ftmds could be advanced to the Railway Department, work pooling was 
(74) the only practical alternative to further dismissals. The 
Ipswich railwaymen then decided to put their case before the Deputy 
Premier, Percy Pease. During a prolonged interview in March 1933 
he accepted the men's arguments, and stated at the conclusion of the 
deputation that: 'No one wanted pooling and the sooner it could be 
(75) 
avoided the better'. Despite Pease's optimistic tone, the 
Cabinet and the Railway Department would not be swayed from their 
72. Official Report Fourteenth Labor-in-Politics Convention, 
January, 1932, pp 47-8. 
73. Brisbane Courier, 6 March, 1933. 
74. ibid., 8 March, 1935. 
75. Deputation of Railway Workers, op.cit., p 19; TLC Minutes, 
12 September, 1934. 
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previous attitudes, and work rationing remained a feature of the 
service until the outbreak of World War Two. 
The second case study concerns the unsuccessful attempts of the 
trade unions to reverse the Forgan Smith Government's decision to 
abolish the unemployment relief scheme. The Queensland Labor 
movement had been highly critical of the unemployment relief scheme 
since its inception in 1930. Trade union attempts to effect reforms 
in this area were severely restricted by the high level of unemploy-
ment and the political complexion of the Moore Government. The 
election of the Labor Government and the slow improvement in the 
employment situation encouraged the unions to play a more active 
role in unemployment policy- At the 1934 TUC a motion was carried 
which called for the abolition of both the unemployment relief tax 
and the relief work system. The Government replied that while 
it agreed in principle with the motion, circumstances prevented its 
implementation. This reply did not satisfy the ARU, which 
attempted to launch a major campaign in 1935 for the immediate 
abolition of the relief tax. This campaign came to nothing because 
(77) 
of opposition on the part of other unions. But over the next 
two years the ARU position gradually won support in the union 
movement. Numerous attempts were made to convince the Government 
to replace the relief work scheme with an expanded public works 
programme which would employ men full-time at award rates. The 
unions argued, in support of these demands, that the relief system 
was a form of cheap labour which struck at the basic wage concept 
and which retarded the return of the economy to full productive 
(78) 
capacity. In the midst of their campaign for an expanded public 
works programme the unions committed a tactical blunder which severely 
damaged their credibility. The Government decided in 1932 to proceed 
76. Official Report Tenth TUC. November, 1934, p 31. 
77- ARTWU Minutes, 10 September, 1935, p 326; AFULE Minutes, 3 
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with the construction of a road bridge across the Kangaroo Point 
reach of the Brisbane River- This was a major project which 
promised prolonged employment opportunities for a large number of 
men. Yet when the plans for the bridge were announced the TLC 
denounced them in the following terms: 
...this council is absolutely opposed to the 
erection of a toll bridge across the river, believing 
that larido\\iiers contiguous to the proposed location 
are not concerned with employment, but the obtaining 
of unearned increment by increase of rents, and the 
exploitation of workers who will be compelled to 
cross the river- (79) 
The Government regarded these objections as trivial and vexatious, 
and proceeded with the construction of the bridge. 
Despite Forgan Smith's expansion of the public works programme, 
opposition to the relief scheme continued to gain mcmentura. When 
the Labor-in-Politics convention assembled in February 1938 the 
Labor raovement was united in the belief that the time had come to 
end relief work. In response to motions passed at the convention, 
Forgan Smith promised to abolish the relief system in the next 
session of the parliament. The Premier fulfilled his pledge with 
the passage of two pieces of legislation: the Income (State Development) 
Tax Act, and the Public Works Organisation Act. The former repealed 
the Income (Unemployment Relief) Tax Acts 1930 to 1935. It estab-
lished a development tax on a lower scale than that which existed 
under the old Act. The special unemployment relief fund was 
abolished, and all monies collected as development tax were paid into 
the consolidated revenue fund. The second piece of legislation was 
enacted to provide a mechanism for coordinating the expanded public 
works programme. With the passage of these two ats, the trade unions 
79. TLC Minutes, l6 March, 1932. 
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appeared to have achieved a significant victory. After six years of 
constant pressure the Government introduced a scheme that embodied 
the essentials of the unions' demands. However, instead of congratu-
lating the Government on its action, the tmions combined with the 
unemployed organisations to denounce the abolition of relief work. 
This remarkable volte-face was the result of intense lobbying 
within the trade union movement by representatives of the unemployed 
organisations. The unemployed had, in the past, been highly 
(8l) 
critical of the relief work scheme, but when major alterations 
were i^ umoured in 1938 they became more circumspect in their 
attitude: 
Whilst we can agree to the abolition of the 
Relief Scheme, nevertheless we must first of 
all be sure that our conditions are safeguarded, 
even if it means the retaining of the scheme 
imtil such time as this is done. (82) 
When the Government announced its new policy, the unemployed argued 
that the transitional arrangements would cause severe hardship to 
those of the 22,000 currently on relief work who did not immediately 
secure full-time employment. The Governor, Leslie Wilson, reported 
enthusiastically on the Government's initiatives in correspondence 
to the Dominions Office: 
The Legislative Assembly has been getting through 
some good work, especially about abolishing so much 
useless "Relief" work. .,this was a very courageous 
effort on the part of a Labour Government, and the 
criticism from the unions was severe. The Government 
offered the men on "relief" work, who were capable of 
full time work, full time jobs at full award wages 
and most of the work was in the country. If any 
refused to go, they were taken off relief work 
altogether, and went on old age pension or rations. 
81. Organiser, 25 November, 1937 
82. ibid., 25 August, 1938. 
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The result has been most satisfactory. Many 
in the towns, who refused to go, have found 
work for themselves and the majority of those 
sent to do useful and reproductive work in the 
country are doing well, and I hope will adopt 
country life for good, for this centralization 
into towns is a real danger to Australia, (83) 
The unemployed did not share Wilson's somewhat idealised sentiments, 
and the secretary of the URWSC, Tom Combey, wr-ote to all unions 
alleging that the new scheme would reduce the families of many 
relief workers to the level of 'coolies' 
In response to Combey's letter, the TLC decided to press the 
Government to retain the relief scheme until all the unemploj^ed were 
absorbed into normal employment. The unions suggested that 
funds for public works could be raised by the imposition of a super 
tax on high income earners. Forgan Smith declined to meet a 
trade tmion deputation on the matter, and referred all enquiries to 
the Minister for Labour and Industry. Hynes explained to the tmions 
that the decision to abolish relief work was not taken lightly, and 
that the imposition of a super tax was out of the question because 
it would force important industries out of Queensland. In the 
face of this rebuff the TLC joined the URWSC in a public campaign 
against the Government's policies. A number of meetings and 
demonstrations were held: but it soon became obvious that most 
tmions were prepared to lend only verbal support. Only twelve of 
the forty-four unions affiliated to the TLC contributed to a fighting 
83. Wilson to Dominions Office, 25 October, 1938, Wilson Papers, 
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(87) fund, and only £32 was collected. While complaints about the 
(88 I 
abolition of relief work persisted until 1940,^ the Government 
remained unmoved and the unions simply had to accommodate themselves 
to this fact. 
The failure of the trade unions to cope effectively with 
unemployment during the depression was understandable. Except 
for a few notable cases, the unions' financial positions meant that 
they could not implement and sustain adequate social welfare schemes 
for their unemployed members. In any case most unions had ceded 
their friendly society functions to Governments decades ago. The 
unions were restricted in their attempts to pressure the Government 
on the issue of unemployment by the fact that they could not agree 
among themselves on desirable policies and because their industrial 
weakness permitted Governments to ignore thera with impunity The 
organisations formed by the unemployed themselves fared no better 
in their attempts to influence the authorities. 
87- ibid., p 37-
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THE ORGANISED UNEMPLOYED 
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The spectacular growth in unemployment that accompanied the great 
depression brought with it the fear that the unemployed would 
constitute themselves into a revolutionary force dedicated to the 
overthrow of the existing social order- Proponents of this view 
were located at both ends of the political spectrum. Conservatives 
feared the collapse of the status quo at the hands of rioting 'sturdy 
beggars', while militant socialists were prepared to see in every 
tmemployed march or deraonstration the seeds of the coming revolution 
that would sweep capitalism into the dustbin of history- The 
experience of the depression in Australia disproved these hopes and 
fears. Given the extent of unemployment, there was remarkably little 
social disruption in Australia or Queensland during the 1930s. 
I\irthermore, as the activities of the New Guard in New South V\fales 
illustrated, not all the opponents of civil authority were unemployed. 
Isolated riots and disturbances occurred in all States, but these 
generally were short-lived and limited in scope. Prolonged unemploy-
ment did not foster a spirit of militancy amongst the majority of 
those who experienced it. On the contrary, unemployment robbed its 
victims of the confidence and self-esteem necessary for concerted 
political action and participation. In 1933 a group of social 
scientists carried out a study of the effects of unemployment in an 
Austrian town and concluded that ' .prolonged unemployment leads to 
a state of apathy in which the victims do not utilise any longer the 
(l) few opportunities left to them' Queensland provided a further 
example of this phenomenon. Very few Queenslanders were prepared 
to become actively involved in the unemployed organisations that were 
formed. The authorities, in the form of the State Government and the 
police, kept the unemployed organisations under close surveillance and 
were quick to move against thera if they engaged in militant political 
action. Unemployed activists were no match for the authorities. 
1. Marie Jahoda, Paul F Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel, Marienthal: The 
Sociography of an Unemployed Community, second edition, London, 
1972. 
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Since they did not occupy a strategic position in the economic 
structure, the unemployed were unable to bring to bear any cotmter-
(2) 
vailing power, such as a strike, against the Government. The 
only potential political resource available to the unemployed 
organisations were numbers and the induced apathy of the majority 
of the workless denied them access to this resource. 
Married men were particularly reluctant to become involved in 
any form of militant behaviour. The Queensland intermittent relief 
work scherae advantaged raarried raen in that it allowed thera more work 
days than men without families. On the other hand, the loss of 
relief work was a more serious matter for married men because their 
responsibilities did not permit them to travel in search of alter-
native employment. Many gangers on relief work projects zealously 
weeded out 'malcontents' and sometimes victimised militants by writing 
(3) 
on their relief cards 'Not wanted on this job again' 
The effect of such discrimination on the attitudes of married men 
is illustrated in an incident recalled by Frank Huelin in his 
autobiographical account of the depression. A Communist party 
activist was preaching the virtues of fighting the system to a 
married man when he was cut short by the following reply: 
Christ mate! I've got a wife and kids to think 
about. What happens to 'era if I start fightin' 
back and get slung inside? Who'll look after 
'em then, eh? No mate we're managin now an' 
stirrin' wouldn't help me missus an' kids. (4) 
Family ties were not the only obstacle to the establishment of 
stable unemployed organisations. Queensland Government policy frora 
1929 until 1935 prohibited tmeraployed single men who were not engaged 
2. Ray Brownhill, Unemployed Workers, Brisbane, 1979, p l66f makes 
a similar point about South Australia. 
3. Interview with Jack Read, 1975, p 2. 
4. Frank Huelin, Keep Moving, Sydney, 1973, p 137^ Interview with 
Mick Healy, 1975, pp 7, 29 and 50. 
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on relief work projects to draw rations at the same centre over 
successive weeks. Instead they were required to traverse the State 
to show that they were genuinely in search of employment. The 
Forgan Smith Government repealed this regulation in 1933, but many 
men persisted in their itinerant life style in the hope of finding 
stable work. Rumours of 'big jobs starting up' would produce an 
exodus of hopeful unemployed workers to distant parts of the State. 
Often these rumours proved to be unfounded and the disappointed men 
(5) 
would then drift on to another town. This migratory pattern 
was a serious obstacle to the establishment of viable unemployed 
organisations, many of which collapsed because their supporters 
had been forced to 'move on' 
A change in the composition of their membership could also 
radically alter the political complexion of unemployed organisations. 
This phenomenon was vividly illustrated when the Innisfail police 
received a deputation from the United Front Committee of the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement in 1933. This body had been operating 
in the area for sorae months and had gained a deserved reputation for 
militancy. Its officers made no secret of the fact that their 
sympathies lay with the Communist party. The sergeant of police 
was somewhat surprised, then, that the deputation was led by two 
local clergymen who quickly assured him that the committee ' .. was 
not a militant body, had no intention of doing anything that would 
militate against the Government, and they were not in favour of 
(7) 
strikes'. This dramatic shift in political stance was brought 
about by the departure of 200 unemployed who had come to Innisfail 
at the commencement of the sugar crushing season in a vain search 
for work. They had established a camp in the town which at its 
peak housed over 400 men. From this base they organised a series 
of meetings and demonstrations to pressure the local council to give 
5. ibid., p 30. 
6. Organiser, 4 November, 1937' 3 March, 1938: 4 August, 1938; and 
11 August, 1938. 
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them relief work. The men organised themselves into a committee 
(8) 
and published a weekly newspaper called the Unemployed Voice. 
The failure of raany of the raen to gain work in the sugar mills forced 
thera to leave the area. The organisation they had founded was then 
taken over by a less radical faction. 
Despite these obstacles, a large number of unemployed groups 
came into existence in Queensland during the depression years. The 
chief among these were: the One Big Union (OBU) of Unemployed, the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement (UWM), the Unemployed and Relief 
Workers' State Council of Action, the Unemployed Workers' Committee, 
the Committee of the State Relief Workers and Unemployed Movement, 
the Unemployed Club, the ALP Rank and File Committee and the 
United Front Committee. The membership of many of these groups 
overlapped, and some of them had only ephemeral existences. The 
OBU of Unemployed pre-dated the depression and had been particularly 
active in opposing the McCormack Government. It was primarily a 
propaganda group, and for a time was tmder the patronage of the 
(9) ARU.^ -'^ '^  After 1929, the OBU was supplanted by the UWM as the 
vehicle of Communist party organisation amongst the unemployed. 
The UWM claimed to have 31,000 members across Australia in 1931 
(11) 
and 68,000 in the three eastern States in 1934. These figures 
were almost certainly exaggerated. Queensland's tmemployed 
organisations persistently spoke in terras of 'supporters' rather 
than members. The unstable structure of the organisations precluded 
the establishment of large book memberships. Furthermore, raembership 
implied the payment of fees and very few of those out of work could 
afford such luxuries. 
8. ibid., p 2. 
9. Advocate, 15 September, 1928. 
10. Workers' Weekly, I7 July, 1931. 
11. Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, California, 
1969, P 60. 
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A major initiative in unemployed organisation in Queensland was 
taken in 1933 with the establishment of the Unemployed and Relief 
(12) Workers' State Council of action. The chronic instability of 
such bodies is illustrated by the fact that it changed its title 
three times over the next seven years: to the Committee of the 
State Relief Workers' and Unemployment Movement, to the Unemployed 
and Relief Workers' State Council, and finally to the Unemployed 
Workers' State Council. In 1934 the council established a modest 
weekly newspaper called the Organiser. It was first issued as a 
four page roneoed newsletter and was expanded to a printed newspaper 
in 1936. This decision proved to be premature, and inexperience 
and poor organisation brought about the collapse of the paper in 
October 1936. It was revived in August 1937 and Tom Combey, who 
was Secretary of the Council, was appointed editor. The declared 
aim of the paper was to foster solidarity within the unemployed and 
(13) 
with the trade tmions. It carried news of unemployed activities 
as well as more general reports of State and Federal politics. The 
Organiser was generally sympathetic to the Communist party, but was 
(14) prepared to endorse the ALP at election time. Despite the 
greater professionalism of the revived paper, it again ran into 
severe financial difficulties. The decline in unemployment brought 
about by the outbreak of the war caused the paper to cease publication 
in 1940. 
From 1933 onwards the unemployed held annual conferences in the 
Brisbane Trades Hall. The main aim of these conferences was to bring 
together the disparate organisations that were involved in the 
unemployed raoveraent and to formulate policies on issues of common 
concern. The 1937 conference was a rather ecumenical gathering 
with the following bodies being represented: the Combined Railways 
Union, the ARU, the Building Trades Group of Unions, the Moulders' 
12. Brisbane Courier, 26 July, 1933, 
13. Organiser, I6 June, 1938. 
14. ibid., 24 March, 1938. 
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Union, the Miners' Union, the Plasterers' and Painters' Union, the 
Seamen's Union, the Liquor Trades Union, the Sewerage Workers' 
Section of the AWU, the Methodist, Anglican, Presbyterian, Baptist 
and Congregational churches, the Peace Movement, the Temperance 
Union, the Society of Friends, the Commtmist party, and delegates 
(15) from sixty groups and thirteen branches of the tmemployed movement. 
This was an impressive gathering; but it must be noted that the 
conference committee was not very strict on the question of credentials 
and many of the 'delegates' were self-appointed. The State 
Government's tmemployment policies were the major topics of discussion 
^ +u • -P (16) at the various conferences. 
These conferences were the closest the unemployed came to 
establishing a single, representative organisation along the lines 
of the Federation of Unemployed Leagues of America that was founded 
(17) in 1952. The geographic dispersion of Queensland's unemployed 
was not the only factor impeding such a federation. There was a 
major schism within the tmemployed movement between those who 
supported the ALP and its affiliated trade tmions and those whose 
sympathies lay with the Communist party. Prior to 1933 the UWM 
endorsed the 'social fascist' line of the CPA and was openly 
contemptuous of the Labor party. After 1933 their policy 
mellowed, but the ALP and its affiliated unions remained suspicious 
of the communist connections of some of the office bearers of the 
unemployed groups. The ALP consistently refused invitations to 
send delegates to tmemployed conferences because it claimed that 
they were commtmist dominated. 
A factor that was both a cause and an effect of the weakness of 
unemployed organisations in Queensland was the failure of the raovement 
to produce a set of acknowledged leaders. Tim Moroney of the ARU 
15. ibid., 11 November, 1937-
16. ibid., 4 April, 1940. 
17- Frances F Piven and Richard A Cloward, Regulating the Poor, 
New York, 1972, p 107 
18. Healy, op.cit., p 7-
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and CPA barrister Fred Paterson were both highly regarded by the 
(19) 
unemployed,^ but they had loyalties and responsibilities beyond 
the confines of the unemployed movement. At no time during the 
depression did the tmemployed produce a leader or leaders from 
within their own ranks who could claim to speak with authority on 
behalf of the whole raovement. Local orators and organisers rose 
to prominence during specific disputes and campaigns, but none was 
capable of establishing a State-wide following or reputation. 
Had the various tmemployed groups been federated into a peak council 
the elected elite of that body may have produced such leaders. 
The absence of a federation meant that local activists were isolated 
from each other and unknown to most of the unemployed. This situa-
tion illustrated and confirmed the fragmentary nature of the 
unemployed movement. 
While most of the unemployed did not join formal political 
organisations, necessity forced many of them into a communal and 
co-operative lifestyle in one of the numerous unemployed camps that 
were established throughout Queensland during the depression. The 
large number of men travelling the State in search of work created 
an unprecedented accommodation problem which neither the Government 
nor the charitable institutions could solve. The unemployed soon 
took the situation into their own hands and spontaneously established 
serai-permanent camps in Brisbane and the major provincial towns. 
Most towns had at least one park taken over by the itinerant unemployed. 
Brisbane had seven out-door camps at Victoria Park, Dutton Park, 
Mayne Junction, the Grammar School Reserve, Kelvin Grove, Moorooka, 
and Tarragindi. The unemployed also occupied an old gymnasium in 
Turbot St. and a disused tobacco factory in South Brisbane which came 
(20) 
to be known as the Crystal Palace. The occupants were predora-
ina- ily single men and at times ntmibered up to 200 per camp. Each 
19. ibid., pp 15 and 25; Read, op.cit., p 4. 
20. The bulk of the factual material regarding the camps is taken from 
the Healy and Read interviews. 
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camp elected a governing committee which organised the bulk buying 
of food, the cleaning of the camp and the expulsion of undesirables. 
Sorae caraps also had a disciplinary committee which arbitrated 
disputes between inmates and, if necessary, meted out appropriate 
ptmishments to offenders. Drunks and petty criminals were 
excluded from the camps because they tended to attract the attention 
of the police. Many of the campers prided themselves on their 
ingenuity and flair for organisation. Shelters were constructed 
from old tarpaulins, waste wood, flattened kerosene tins and any 
other material available. The camp committee organised lending 
libraries, card evenings and cricket matches to keep the men 
occupied. Political activity and discussion do not appear to 
have played a major part in the life of the camps. 
Despite the good order that prevailed in most camps, successive 
State Governments viewed thera with raisgivings. In the last months 
of the McCormack Government the police sergeant at the town of 
Inglewood wrote to the Premier to seek guidance as to the attitude 
he should adopt to a group of unemployed who were encamped in the 
to^ ^^l awaiting the commencement of a railway project. In reply 
the tmder secretary, George Watson, advised that: 'I recommend 
that every effort be made to prevent the formation of a camp of 
(21) 
unemployed'- The in-coming Moore ministry endorsed this 
(22) policy but found it very difficult to enforce. Both CPNP 
and ALP Governments claimed that the camps were breeding grounds 
for crime and adversely affected the reputation of the localties 
(23) in which they were situated. 
Queensland's Government was not alone in its fears concerning the 
disruptive potential of the single unemployed, but it is ironic to 
21. Premier to Inglewood police, 11 February, 1929, item 29/368, 
PRE/A980, QSA. 
22. Moore to UWM, 7 April, I93I, 3l/l524, PRE/A1020, QSA. 
25. Courier Mail, 14 May, 1936. 
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note, in contrast, that the Canadian Government felt that the problem 
could best be handled by concentrating such men in camps to discourage 
(24) 
them traversing the country in organised bands. 
In 1937, a group of Brisbane residents suggested to the 
Government that all the existing camps be closed and that the 
unemployed be removed to some remote area of the city such as 
(25) 
Mt Cootha Park.^ -^' The police de 
such suggestions on the grounds that 
 ' partment consistently vetoed 
If all the tmemployed were housed together in Mt. 
Cootha Park there would be a grave danger of their 
becoming so well organised that they would be able 
to hold demonstrations on such a large scale that 
they would seriously inconvenience the Government 
and possibly become unmanageable with the few 
police in the area. (26) 
The high level of unemployment in the early thirties meant that the 
Government was forced to turn a blind eye to the illegality of the 
camps. However, the authorities were always on the look out for an 
opportunity to close down 'undesirable' camps. 
As early as 1932 the Crystal Palace hostel had attracted the 
attention of the police because, it was alleged, it had become a 
haven for criminals and that an illicit still was being operated 
(27) 
on the premises. The hostel was operated under the jurisdiction 
of the Ann St Presbyterian church, but its effective management had 
(28) been delegated to a committee elected from among the inmates. 
24. M Horn (ed). The Dirty Thirties; Canadians in the Great 
Depression, Canada, 1972, pp 306f and 320f 
25. Sunday Truth, 11 July, 1937 
26. Courier Mail, 14 May, 1936. 
27. Sunday Truth, 11 July, 1937 
28. Memo Home Secretary's Departraent, 5 August, 1935, itera 55/8495, 
HS0/A3780, QSA. 
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This committee interviewed the Mayor of Brisbane and vehemently 
denied the charges laid against the hostel. The committee argued 
that the allegations of criminal behaviour were a red herring and 
that the State Government and the police wished to retaliate against 
the hostel because some of its members had spoken out in support of 
(29) 
a group of relief workers who were on strike for better conditions. 
After further investigations, the Town Clerk informed the hostel 
comraittee that they raust henceforth raaintain a register of all 
occupants, and must facilitate any police investigations that might 
be deemed necessary. Failure to observe these conditions would 
result in the closure of the shelter under the City Council by-laws. 
A state of uneasy peace prevailed between the hostel and the 
authorities for the next three years. The issue flared again in 
1935 when the secretary of the hostel complained to the Home 
Secretary, EM Hanlon, that police persistently accosted men outside 
(31) the hostel and searched them for stolen goods. Hanlon forwarded 
the complaint to the police departraent whose officers took the 
opportunity to prepare a lengthy and extreraely unfavourable report 
on the hostel. They alleged inter alia that, contrary to the Town 
Clerk's directive, the inmates refused to cooperate with the police; 
that a shooting had occurred on the premises; that the hostel had 
become a haven for local and interstate criminals; and finally, 
that the secretary and his committee were 'notorious communists'. 
An inspector of the Brisbane CIB attached a note to the report in 
which he said that: 
. .a section of the underworld, communists and 
the like, appear to have taken control of this 
benevolent institution and...are constituting 
themselves into a band of lawless dictators.. (32) 
29. Advocate, I6 May, 1932. 
30. Town Clerk to Secretary Crystal Palace, 23 April, 1932, 
item 35/4142, HS0/A3780, QSA. 
31. Secretary CPA to Hanlon, 3 July, 1935, item 35/8493, ibid. 
32. Police Report, 24 July, 1935, item 35/4142, ibid. 
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The Government and the City Council decided to act on this report 
and, desjiite a series of protest demonstrations by the unemployed, 
closed the hostel. 
The Government failed in a later attempt to close the Victoria 
Park camp. In 1937 the Rotary Club of Brisbane suggested to the 
Government, as part of a city beautification scheme, that the 
tmemployed be removed from the park and resettled outside the city 
limits. The eighty raen who were resident in the park showed 
no willingness to move. Instead they formed a committee which 
began to organise an anti-eviction campaign. The campers won 
support frora the unemployed groups, the trade unions and some 
(34) 
religious bodies.^^ ' They were aided by the fact that the 
authorities could not agree on an alternate camp site, and after 
a month the Government decided to leave the raen where they were. 
The unemployed camps were tolerated by most of the surrounding 
(35) 
residents and relations between the two were generally harmonious. 
The same could not be said for relations between the uneraployed 
and sorae local councils. The itinerant unemployed were often 
critical of what they regarded as the indifference to their plight 
of local authorities. In the northern coastal city of Cairns 
in 1932 mutual animosities erupted into open warfare. At that 
time there were approximately 150 unemployed men camped at Parramatta 
Park near the centre of the town. Bad feeling had existed between 
the campers and the Cairns' City Council for sorae months. Matters 
came to a head as the date for the annual agricultural show 
approached. The Show Comraittee wanted the park cleared of all 
carapers as soon as possible. The unemployed agreed to move on 
the condition that the Cairns Council construct a perraanent shelter 
for thera in another part of the town. In Jtme the Cairns Council 
53. Courier Mail, 6 July, 1937, 
34. Organiser, 9 June, 1958. 
35. Healy,op.cit., p 0. 
36. Huelin, op.cit., p 66f. 
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contacted the State Government and indicated that it was willing 
to build such a structure providing that the Government render 
some financial assistance. Forgan Smith, who had only recently 
been elected Premier, replied that in other centres such structures 
had been financed by voluntary subscriptions and that Cairns should 
( ~ - i \ 
do the same. The Council then offered to build a temporary 
shelter, but, despite a conference presided over by the mayor, 
(38) 
the campers refused to move to temporary accc.,Tflicdation. 
Various Cairns' comraunity groups then coraraenced to pressure 
(39) the Government to evict the unemployed. The following telegram, 
which was sent by the local branch of the CPNP, accurately portrays 
the mood of the Cairns' business community: 
CPNP Party urge Government take immediate action 
remove Commtmist element..who are defying constitutional 
authority...This matter not political. It represents 
organised atterapt by eneraies of society to foment 
strife which if unchecked will have serious consequences 
here and embarrass Government. (40) 
The Government remained unmoved by these calls and would not instruct 
the police to disperse the campers. Forgan Smith appeared to adopt 
the view that the Council was over-reacting and that the situation 
would sort itself out. Subsequent events revealed that this 
optimism was misplaced. In response to the Government's 
inactivity the mayor Aid Collins convened a public meeting 'to 
ascertain what can be done to ensure the success of the show, free 
(41) 
of all interference' The campers stated that they would not 
57. Cairns City Council to Smith and Reply, 16-27 June, 1932, 
item 32/3106, PRE/A1046, QSA. 
38. Cairns Post, 1 July, 1932. 
39. Cairns Chamber of Commerce to Smith, 13 luly, 1932, itera 32/3IO6, 
ibid.; Cairns Sporting Groups to Smith, 13 July, 1932, 
item 32/3547, ibid. 
40. Cairns CPNP to Smith, 13 July, 1932, item 32/3548, ibid. 
41. Cairns Post, 11 July, 1932. 
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be intimidated that they would stand their ground until the Council 
(42) 
met their demands. Violence now loomed as a distinct possibility. 
On Sunday 17 July, two days before the show was due to commence, 
the issue was resolved in a manner described by the editor of the 
Cairns Post in the following words: 
The patience and forebearance that the citizens 
of Cairns had exhibited towards the large number 
of roving persons masquerading as 'unemployed' 
reached their (sic) limit yesterday forenoon, 
and a well and properly constituted contingent, 
supported by legal authority, proceeded to 
Parramatta Park, and issued to the malingerers 
a final notice to quit. (45) 
Early that morning a vigilante committee of 500 citizens had been 
assembled under the combined leadership of the mayor, the aldermen 
(44) 
and a number of prominent businessmen. This group marched to 
the park where they were confronted by about 100 unemployed men. 
The thirty-four police present were tmder instructions to keep the 
peace. Once the two groups came into contact this proved impossible, 
and a general melee ensued. Many of the antagonists were armed 
with pieces of wood, iron bars and cane knives and displayed no 
hesitation in using these. At one stage a home-made gelignite 
bomb was thrown but failed to detonate. The brawl, which lasted 
for over two hours, ended in a victory for the citizenry and the 
unemployed retreated into the surrounding scrub. One hundred 
people were injured, seventeen of whom required hospitalisation. 
The police made a number of arrests and four of the campers later 
were sentenced to four months in jail. One of those jailed was the 
leader of the unemployed, John McCormack, who had been jailed for 
his part in the Dobbyn strike in 1931. 
42. Read, op.cit., p 3; Healy, op.cit., p 9. 
43. Cairns Post, 18 July, 1932. 
44. The following account has been compiled from:ibid.: Brisbane 
Courier, 18 July, 1952; Organiser, 28 April, 1938; the Healy 
and Read interviews: and Police Report, 11 July, 1932, item 
32/5599, PRE/A1060, QSA. 
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The 'Cairns Riot', as it came to be known, was one of the few 
instances of violent confrontation between the unemployed and the 
authorities in Queensland during the depression. In this case 
the 'authorities' were largely self-appointed, and were able to 
act with such impunity because the restraining hand of the State 
Government was over 1000 miles away. The tone of their reports 
indicated that the local police were in favour of the direct action 
(45) inspired by the council. In September 1932 the Cairns' branch 
of the ALP wrote to the parliamentary party and complained about 
the Government's mishandling of the affair. Their complaint was 
noted, but neither the cabinet nor the caucus were prepared to 
initiate an inquiry into the incident. 
The level of violence involved in the Cairns' affair made it 
unique; but, in other respects it was symptomatic of the tensions 
that existed between the itinerant unemployed, the State Government 
and the local authorities. The abolition of the 'move on' clause 
in 1933 had the effect of slowing down the movement of the single 
unemployed. Some local councils did not welcome this change since 
it allowed the tmemployed to remain in the same town for an indefinite 
period. The State Government often received complaints from the 
unemployed organisations that local councils were ignoring the change 
(47) in the law and were attempting to enforce the old 'move on' clause. 
The refusal of the Mackay City Council to endorse the spirit of the 
new regulation almost produced a repetition of the 'Cairns Riot' 
In December 1932 the Mackay Council introduced new by-laws to 
regulate the town's unemployed shelter. The 100 occupants were 
required to register for relief work and to permit the free access 
of the police to the camp at any time. The council also declared 
that a man could remain an occupant of the camp for a maximum of 
45. ibid. 
46. Caucus Minutes, 6 September, 1952, p l6. 
47- Travelling Unemployed Association to Smith, 13 December, 1932, 
item 32/6856, PRE/A1064, QSA. 
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fourteen days only. The unemployed were served notice that failure 
to abide by the new regulations would result in the deraolition of 
the shed. In response to this decision, the unemployed wrote 
to the Premier warning him that if he failed to take action to 
restrain the Council he would almost certainly have another 'Cairns 
(49) 
Riot' on his hands. The uneraployed managed to enlist the 
support of the local trade union movement in a public campaign for 
"biie repeal of the by-laws. 
Faced with the refusal of the occupants to accept the new terms 
or to vacate the shelter, the Council decided to force the men out 
by withdrawing amenities frora the shed. Hitherto, the council had 
provided a truck and a driver to supply the unemployed with firewood; 
this was discontinued. The next evening the Cotmcil garage was 
broken into and a truck damaged. The police believed that 'there 
is little doubt but (sic) this offence was committed by one or more 
(51) 
of the Communists or UWM, ..., as a reprisal,. .'. However, 
the police could not gather sufficient evidence to lay a charge. 
A few days later a local store was burgled of three revolvers and 
(52) 
a quantity of ammtmition. This was followed by reports that 
the home of the captain of the Citizens Force Rifle Club had been 
entered in an attempt to steal the club's cache of firearms. 
The intruders were unsuccessful because the guns were not stored 
(53) 
at the residence of the captain. 
48. Police Report, 19 January, 1933, item 33/6648, PRE/A1068, QSA; 
Mackay Mercury, 19 January, 1933. 
49. Mackay UWM to Smith, 21 January, 1933, item 33/6648, PRE/A1068; 
Townsville UWM to Smith, 23 December, 1932, item 32/54 HSO/A36I6, 
QSA. 
50. Police Report, 27 January, 1933, item 33/514, PRE/A1068, QSA. 
51. Police Report, 15 February, 1933, item 33/4787, ihid. 
52. Statement by CP Dunne, 2 February, 1933, item 33/3732, ibid. 
53. Police Report, 27 January, 1933, item 33/430, ibid. 
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Rumours then began to circulate in Mackay that the uneraployed 
were engaged in military style drilling within the camp and were 
(54) prepared to resist with force any attempt to dislodge thera. 
(55) The unemployed denied these charges, but the police decided 
that the time had come to take the matter out of the hands of the 
council and to settle it themselves. First, they arranged, 
through the Home Secretary, for the local army installation to take 
charge of the rifle club's armory until the situation returned to 
(56) 
normal. Next, the police took steps to dissolve the Mackay 
unemployed organisation. They singled out the 'ringleaders' of 
the shelter shed and terminated both their work cards and their 
right to draw rations in Mackay- In his report the sub-inspector 
explained that this would compel the militants 'to travel to other 
centres for their work cards and rations issue, this would be in 
the best interests of public peace and good conduct of the unemployed 
(57) here'. This action had the desired effect and the carapaign 
in favour of the retention of the shed collapsed. 
From the outset the unemployed believed that the ultimate aim 
of the Mackay Council was not to regulate the shed but to demolish 
it. Their regular correspondence with the Premier expressed this 
(58) fear, and called on him to protect them from the council. 
The Commissioner of Police, W Ryan, informed the Government that 
such statements were a tissue of lies and that they were made with 
(59) the sole aim of eliciting undeserved sympathy for the unemployed. 
Subsequent events confirmed the fears of the unemployed. Early 
in March 1933 the Mackay police forwarded a detailed report on the 
shelter to the Home Secretary. The tone of the report was 
54. Police Report, 1 February, 1933, item 33/329, ibid. 
55. Police Report, 27 January, 1933, item 33/3213, ibid. 
56. Brigadier EM Ralph to Home Secretary, 17 February, 1955, 
item 33/858, HSO/A3616, QSA. 
57. Police Report, 1 February, 1933, item 33/329, PRE/AIO68, QSA. 
58. Police Report, 27 January, 1955, item 53/3215, ihid. 
59. Memo Ryan to Hanlon, 1 February, 1933, item 33/8526, HSO/A3616. 
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condemnatory and, as in the dossier on the Crystal Palace, alleged 
that the shed had become a haven for criminals and coinmtmists. 
The report drew attention to the collapse of the unemployed 
organisation and noted that the shed was now occupied by only 
forty men. It continued 'the existence of the shelter shed at 
Mackay is a menance..., and the time is now opportune for its 
demolition without further notice to the occupants'. When the 
report reached the commissioner of police he added the comment that 
'the demolition of the shelter-shed is entirely a matter for the 
Mackay authorities'. Meanwhile the Mackay authorities, in the 
persons of the Mayor and the Town Clerk, had visisted Brisb.ane to 
discuss the future of the shed with the Home Secretary- Hanlon 
agreed with the opinions of the police and the Mayor that the tirae 
(61 ^  
was opportune to demolish the shed. This task was accomplished 
by the carpenters of the council without opposition from the 
unemployed. 
Such incidents as the above encouraged the notion among some 
that the tmemployed were a lawless group who were eager to confront 
the forces of law and order and to overturn constitutional authority. 
This was not the case in Queensland during the depression. The 
unemployed expressed their grievances through traditional channels 
and their irregular clashes with the police were provoked by 
frustration and anger over specific and localised grievances; these 
clashes were not part of any co-ordinated, revolutionary prograrajne 
to overthrow the Government. Printed propaganda, not physical force, 
was the most popular method used by the tmemployed to air their 
grievances. Newsletters and leaflets were distributed at centres 
where the unemployed tended to congregate such as the Labor Exchange 
and police stations. Lack of finance restricted the quantity and 
quality of the printed raaterial produced by the unemployed. Mic'-; 
Healy recalls that when the UWM could not afford to purchase roneo 
60. Police Report, 2 March, 1933, item 33/2016, HS0/A3622, QSA. 
61. Gall to Hanlon, 13 March, 1933, item 33/2016, HS0/A3622, QSA. 
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paper for their leaflets they would collect scrap paper frora printin 
(62 
firms and trim each sheet to the correct size with a razor blade. 
The unemployed made regu t'r attempts to interview cabinet 
ministers to present their grievances. They invariably wished 
to see the Premier, but Forgan Smith refused to entertain such 
deputations and referred them to the Minister for Labor and Industry 
(l4P Hynes). The more militant unemployed saw this as evidence 
of Smith's callous disregard for their plight. Many of the clashes 
between the tmemployed and the police were the result of the former's 
marches to and from the Premier's office. Hynes was generally 
willing to listen to the uneraployed, but he warned one deputation 
that if they persisted in demonstrating outside his office he would 
refuse all further requests. Street marches were the main 
venue for conflict between the uneraployed and the police. Such 
marches were not as commonplace in Brisbane during the 1930s as in 
some other capitals because Brisbane did not have such a high 
concentration of the State's unemployed. The favourite dates 
selected for demonstrations were May Day and International Unemployed 
Day which fell on 27 February. The Moore Government in 1930 placed 
a blanket ban on street marches in the metropolitan area. 
Demonstrations that were held in defiance of this regulation were 
invariably broken up by the police. The Labor Government 
replaced this general prohibition with a perrait system in 1932. 
This change did little to minimize the possibility of conflict 
during demonstrations. In order to conduct a legal procession 
the unemployed were required to apply to the police for a permit 
62. Healy, op.cit., p 9. 
63. Petition, July, 1936, item 56/4498, PRE/A1151, QSA. 
64. Unemployed and Relief Workers State Council to Smith, 6 August, 
1937, item 37/5576, PRE/A1187, QSA. 
65. Brisbane Telegraph, 5 August, 1937-
66. Minutes of a Deputation of Uneraployed to Hynes, 6 June, 1933, 
item 33/4631, HSO/A3639, QSA. 
67. TLC to Moore, 20 February, 193O, item 30/ll46, PRE/A989, QSA. 
68. Daily Standard, 18 March, 1931, 
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fourteen days in advance. This was regarded as being unnecessarily 
restrictive and some unemployed groups held marches without bothering 
to apply for permission. The police invariably responded by 
(69) 
stopping the raarch and arrested the 'ringleaders'. 
The Labor Government generally was unwilling to grant perraits 
for unemployed marches because they disapproved of the left-wing 
sympathies of those who organised them. In 1933 the Merthyr Relief 
Worker's Welfare Association, which was a charitable body and was 
not connected with the militant tmeraployed organisations, applied 
for permission to hold a torchlight procession to raise funds for 
the suburb's unemployed. The under secretary of the Premier's 
Department, George Watson, contacted the QSSL to check the 
credentials of the association. The Secretary of the QSSL spoke 
highly of the group but added that he did not think it advisable 
(71) to allow relief workers to march in the street. Watson 
subsequently advised the Premier to refuse the request. He did 
this on two grounds: if a permit was given to one group the 
department would be inundated with requests; and that it 'would 
be almost impossible to keep Communist propaganda out of such 
(72) processions' The association appealed against this decision 
and was eventually granted a permit on the proviso that the march 
(73) be restricted to a small brass band and six collectors. 
The largest unemployed demonstration in Queensland occurred in 
1958 when 2000 marched through Brisbane to demand an increase in 
(74) 
relief work pay. The average attendance at most other marches 
was less than 100. Most of the chronic unemployed did not 
participate in protest demonstrations. Jack Read recalled that 
69. Healy, op.cit., p 8. 
70. Anderson to Smith, 11 Noveraber, 1933, itera 33/6266, PRE/A1084, QSA. 
71. Memo Premier's Department, 3 October, 1933, ibid. 
72. ibid. 
73. ihid. 
74. Organiser, 12 August, 1938. 
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he and his friends soon fell into a pattern of life that they 
retained throughout their unemployed years: 
We used to get up in the morning, get dressed and 
go down to the Labor Exchange in Edward Street. 
'Is there any call? No' We'd come up Queen 
Street and go into Coles for a cup of tea and two 
biscuits - a penny. Then we'd go up the public 
library and read the papers. We'd come home 
about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. (75) 
The Marienthal study showed that the unemployed did not utilize 
their newly acquired spare time in political activity. On the 
contrary, '...the workers of Marienthal lost the material and 
moral incentives to make use of their time' A similar 
phenoraonen appeared araong the uneraployed of Queensland. 
Conservatives feared that thousands of idle and destitute men 
would spontaneously seek violent solutions to their problems. 
In fact, the boredom of tmemployed life engendered a political 
quiesence which precluded the development of any mass, revolutionary 
movement. 
While the majority of the unemployed did not countenance any 
general onslaught against the capitalist state, some were prepared 
to break the law when circumstances required it. Government 
policy and financial necessity forced many single uneraployed to 
travel in search of work. Queensland's size raeant that the 
distances between towns often precluded walking as a regular means 
of transport. The uneraployed solved this problem by travelling 
as non-paying passengers on the State's goods trains. The narrow 
gauge track used in Queensland was a great help to the uneraployed 
because the slow moving trains were easier to board than those in 
the southern States. Sorae of the more adventurous unemployed 
stowed away on the coastal freighters that were a major part of 
75. Read, op.cit., p 9. 
76. Jahoda et alia, op.cit., p 66. 
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(77) Queensland's transport system in the 1930s. 'Jumping the 
rattler' was a common practice during the depression, but it was 
a criminal offence tmder Section 34 of the Vagrancy, Gaming and 
Other Offences Act. In the early 1930s approximately 3000 people 
(78) 
annually were convicted of illegally travelling on trains. 
In 1933 the unemployed organisations asked the Government to 
decriminalise the offence or to provide an extra truck on all 
trains for the exclusive use of the unemployed. Both requests 
(79) 
were refused. 
The Queensland Commissioner for Railways drew attention to 
the growing problem of illegal train travellers in his 1933 report 
to State parliament. He stated that those convicted represented 
only a small proportion of illegal travellers and that the railway 
department was suffering heavy financial losses through pilferage 
and damage to goods in transit. He also drew attention to the 
fact that five men had been killed in the previous year when 
attempting to board or alight from moving trains. The Commissioner's 
main complaint was directed towards magistrates who, influenced by 
the necessitous circumstances of those convicted, refused to impose 
the maximum sentence of a £20 fine or six months imprisonment. 
He concluded: 
Unfortunately, such penalties do not serve their 
object in acting as a deterrent, and, although 
every endeavour is being mad© by the Railway 
Department, in co-operation with the police, to 
minimize the practice, these endeavours to a large 
extent are rendered futile by the leniency shown 
by some magistrates when dealing with offenders. (8O) 
77. Healy, op.cit., p 12. 
78. _QPD, clxiii, 20 August, 1935, p 188. 
79. North Queensland UWM to Hanlon, 23 February, 1935, item 55/l760, 
HSO/A362O; Minutes of an Unemployed Deputation to Hynes, 6 June, 
1935, item 33/4631, HS0/A3659, QSA. 
80. Under Secretary, Department of Railways Annual Report, 
QPP, vol.ii, 1933, pp 26-27-
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In an attempt to provide the necessary deterrent, the Queensland 
Railway Department, in line with other States, hired its own 
security officers to keep the unemployed off the trains. The 
tactics of some of these officers gained thera a reputation as 
'basher gangs' and they were tmiversally loathed by the travelling 
J . (81) unemployed. 
One of the few examples of organised civil disobedience on the 
part of the tmemployed in Queensland involved the issue of illegal 
train travel. Throughout 1932 and 1933 many unemployed workers 
drifted to the north-western mining town of Mt Isa in search of 
stable employment. A slump in mineral prices forced the closure 
of a major section of the mine in late 1933 and a large number of 
employees were laid off. Mt Isa was a single industry town and 
the displaced workers had no alternative but to move elsewhere. 
During November and December a steady stream of non-paying 
passengers made the train journey from Mt Isa to Townsville. 
On 13 and 14 December police arrested a total of 112 men, one 
woman and one child and charged then under Section 54 of the 
(82) Vagrancy Act. The local press hailed the arrest as the 
largest single 'bag' of illegal train travellers in Australia's 
(83) history. In their reports the police explained that such 
offenders usually were not apprehended because the small number 
of officers at isolated stations could not successfully effect 
arrests. On this occasion the police made no premature attempts 
to halt the train. Instead they marshalled their forces at the 
train's destination and arrested the offenders on the outskirts 
. T •-.! (8^) of iownsville. 
81. Read, op.cit., p 2; and Huelin, op.cit., p 34f 
82. Police Report, 23 November, 1935, item 55/9116, HS0/A5662, QSA. 
83. Townsville Daily Bulletin, 14 November, 1933. 
84. Police Report, l6 November, 1933, item 33/210, HS0/A3662, QSA. 
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When confronted, the unemployed offered no resistance and 
did not attempt to escape. The train had made a scheduled 
stop at Charters Towers and the local police inspector advised 
the unei-nployed that they were committing an offence. Their 
spokesman replied that: 
We are quite aware that we can be arrested, but 
this matter has been fully organised, and it is 
our intention of travelling to Townsville,...We 
intend to stick together We have not caused 
any trouble along the line and we do not want 
any, but we intend to stick together tmtil we 
reach Townsville. (86) 
The inspector made no attempt to arrest them but wired ahead to 
(87) 
Townsville and warned of their imminent arrival. When the 
police met the train they offered the unemployed the opportunity 
to pay their fares. Only one man took advantage of this offer. 
(88) 
The remainder said: 'No, we don't want it. One in all in'. 
It appears that the unemployed held a number of informal meetings 
in Mt Isa and decided that the only solution to their predicament 
was to 'jump the rattler'. They correctly reasoned that if they 
maintained their solidarity they had a good chance of reaching 
their destination, even if that meant spending some time in 
Stewart's Creek jail. 
Those charged appeared before a local magistrate, GA Cameron. 
Cameron was not influenced by the earlier call by the Railway 
Department to 'get tough' with offenders and he adopted a 
sympathetic attitude to those before him. He conceded that 
'the department viewed this travelling in a rather serious light', 
but said that 'he was not going to read a lecture or homily to them, 
because he realized their position. .'. He did, however, 
remonstrate with one man who admitted that he had lost all his 
85. Townsville Daily Bulletin, 14 November, 1933. 
86. Police Report, l6 November, 1933, item 33/773, ibid. 
87. Police Report, l6 November, 1933, item 33/9116, ibid. 
88. Townsville Daily Bulletin. 14 November, 1933. 
89. ibid. 
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money in a two-up game in Mt Isa.^ The woman and child were 
discharged and the men were given the relatively light sentence 
of a £1 fine or fourteen days in jail. 
There is no evidence that the action of these unemployed 
workers had any overt political objective. They did not claim 
to represent any political group or persuasion. Their act of 
civil disobedience was not designed as a protest against the 
Government's unemployment policy. The unemployed decided on a 
collective solution to their personal predicament of being 
stranded in an isolated town with no prospect of work. They 
had little doubt that they would be arrested on arrival in 
Townsville, but they accepted this in a spirit of determined 
resignation. Their attitude was summed up by the young man who, 
when he was sentenced, said 'we will get a feed and a bath for 
f ^ A ^ (91) 
fourteen days' 
The Townsville train jumping incident revealed the relationship 
between the police and the tmemployed in a positive light. Frank 
Huelin, in his memoirs of the depression, examines the 'all-Johns-
are-bastards' theory and decides that it was not a true description 
(92) 
of the attitudes of most police officers towards the unemployed. 
The circumstances of the depression brought the police and the 
unemployed into regular contact. At an individual level the 
nature of these contacts depended on the personalities involved. 
However, when the unemployed engaged in political activity and 
when the police were fulfilling their function as agents of the 
State Governraent the relationship between the two was invariably 
taut. Under Queensland's unemployment relief scheme police 
stations served as distribution points for ration coupons and as 
pay offices for intermittent relief workers. In the Brisbane 
90. ibid., 15 November, 1933. 
91. ibid.; and Police Report, I6 November, 1933, item 33/9116, op.cit, 
92. Huelin, op.cit., pp 18,24,149,155 and I70. 
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metropolitan area an officer of the Departraent of Labor and 
Industry was usually on hand to render clerical assistance to 
the police. But in the country towns the local police sergeant 
had sole responsibility for relief adrainistration. The eligibility 
provisions of the relief regulations gave the police extensive 
discretionary powers. The Maryborough shelter shed dispute showed 
that the police were sometimes prepared to exercise these powers 
in a punitive way against unemployed militants. Sorae of the 
unemployed also took advantage of the relief provisions by assuming 
three or four names, culled from the electoral role or from 
(93) gravestones, in order to draw extra rations. Overworked 
police officers often reacted impatiently to the unemployed and 
the Home Secretary received a regular stream of complaints from 
men who claimed that they had been abused, assaulted or wrongly 
(94) denied relief by officious policemen. Most of these complaints 
were dismissed on the grounds that they were vexatious and/or 
(95) 
emanated frora comraunists. 
It appears that not all the tmemployed were dissatisfied with 
the treatment they received frora the police. In 1934 the Home 
Secretary received a petition signed by ninety-two relief workers 
of Clayfield attesting to the humane treatment afforded them by 
the local police sergeant. They were lavish in their praise; 
Acting Sergeant...has at all times treated us 
tmfortunates who have had to appeal to his and 
the Government's assistance. His treatment and 
attention, assistance and consideration and 
civility has at all tiraes been that of a man 
who understands the unemployed's plight...(96) 
93. Healy, op.cit., p 12. 
94. Paull to Hanlon, 20 February, 1933, item 33/1562, HS0/A3619; 
Sharpe to Hanlon, 7 February, 1935, item 33/1941, HSO/A362I; 
and Police Report, 18 May, 1934, item 34/29005, HSO/A3692, QSA. 
95. Ryan to Hanlon, 28 March, 1955, item 33/2014, HSO/A36OO, QSA. 
96. Petition to Hanlon, 24 February, 1934, item 34/1574, 
HSO/A36OO, QSA. 
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The tmemployed wrote in this tone because they had heard rumours 
that the sergeant was to be transferred to a country posting. 
They concluded their petition by imploring the minister not to 
victimise the sergeant in this manner. Unfortunately the 
authenticity of the petition was undermined by the fact that it 
was typed with the distinctive ribbon and on official paper 
usually reserved for police reports. The Police Department 
believed that the sergeant had played a rather too active role 
in the preparation of the petition and he was duly transferred. 
Members of the police force strongly objected to the requirement 
that they act as agents of the Departraent of Labor and Industry in 
the adminsitration of the relief programme. In August 1932 the 
Police Union asked the Home Secretary to relieve the force of these 
responsibilities and to transfer them to the local government 
authorities. The union argued that the large increase in the level 
of unemployment meant that many officers devoted more time to relief 
administration than they did to their normal duties. This 
adversely affected the morale and efficiency of the force as a crime 
fighting unit. Hanlon explained to the tmion that the Government 
faced a difficult financial situation and could not afford to engage 
additional staff to administer the relief programme; nevertheless, 
(97) he promised to raise the matter with the Premier. Forgan Smith 
reacted angrily to the proposal. He told Hanlon in a confidential 
memo that 'the contact of the police with the unemployed,.... 
should make them count their blessings, in being so much more 
forttmate' ^ The police 
regard to unemployment relief 
retained their responsibilities in 
Supervision of the tmemployed gave rise to other clashes 
between the police and the Government. Both the Moore and Forgan 
Smith Governments expected to be kept fully informed of the 
activities of the militant unemployed organisations. Police 
97. Deputation from Police Union to Hanlon, 1 August, 1932, 
item 32/8II3, HSO/A36OO, QSA. 
98. Smith to Hanlon, 27 October, 1932, item 32/8118, ibid. 
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officers regularly attended tmemployed meetings and twice a day 
visited the Labor Exchange, the Trades Hall and the CPA offices 
in order to obtain advance warning of planned marches and 
demonstrations. In the early hours of l6 December, 1932 a 
constable confronted two CPA and unemployed activists on their 
way home from a bill posting expedition. There was strong 
circumstantial evidence, both were carrying posters and pots of 
glue, that an illegal act had been committed, but the constable 
(99) did not actually observe these acts and no arrest was made. 
One of the suspects subsequently lodged a complaint with the 
Police Department in which he alleged that the constable had called 
him 'a commtmist bastard' and was constantly harrassing him. 
The police comraissioner initiated an internal inquiry and the 
constable was forraally charged with misconduct. He appeared 
before a departmental tribunal in February 1933. Both the 
complainant and his colleague submitted written statements and 
appeared before the hearing to give oral testimony- However, 
after the first morning's session they both declined to testify 
further. The inquiry then found in favour of the constable. 
Some months later the secretary of the Police Union, HP Talty, 
wrote to the Home Secretary and complained that the department had 
behaved negligently in the affair- He argued that the police had 
been issued with a clear directive from their 'superiors' to 'do 
all in their power to suppress the activities of those who play a 
prominent part in the Communist Party's activities', but that when 
a specific case arose the department was prepared to believe the 
(lOl) 
'Communists' rather than one of its own officers. The 
Government did not accept this criticisra gracefully and Hanlon 
wrote across the letter: 'I am getting the impression that the 
secretary of the tmion is a commtmist' Talty had, in fact, stood 
as a Lang Plan candidate at the 1931 Federal election. 
99. Police Report, l6 December, 1932, item 32/1004, HS0/A3640, QSA. 
100. Hurworth to Hanlon, 18 December, 1932, item 32/l020, ibid. 
101. Talty to Hanlon, 15 June, 1933, item 33/4859, ibid. 
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A regular cause of conflict between the authorities and the 
unemployed was the inconsistent policies and guidelines related 
to the granting of permits for street marches. Within the 
Brisbane metropolitan area the police had authority under the 
Traffic Act to grant such permits. In the non-metropolitan area 
the power rested with the local councils; the police merely 'assisted' 
the councils in the enforcement of the act. In practice the police 
played a dominant role and would not grant a permit to a 'questionable' 
group without referring the matter to the Home Secretary. 
Unemployed organisations fell into the 'questionable' category 
because the police regarded their activities as being communist 
inspired. In May 1932 the Rockhampton Unemployed Union lodged 
an application to hold a street meeting. The local police inspector 
informed them that he was not prepared to accept responsibility for 
(102) issuing a permit and that he would contact Brisbane. He 
communicated with the Home Secretary and informed him that, although 
the site applied for was available, those organising the protest 
were communists and 'as no useful purpose will be served by the 
holding of the meeting, I recommend that the application be not 
1^ (103 approved' 
investigation. 
Hanlon endorsed this decision without further 
The uncertainty that existed over who had the ultimate authority 
to issue permits produced inconsistent decisions and policies that 
frustrated and alienated the tmemployed organisations. In 1934 
the local Communist Party branch and a number of unemployed groups 
complained that Fred Paterson had wrongly been denied permission to 
hold an election meeting by the Gladstone City Council. The under 
secretary of the Home Office advised the complainants that: 'The 
control of traffic...is under the Gladstone Town Council. The 
police only assist the council in the administration of the Traffic 
Act' This pronouncement did little to clarify the situation 
102. Rockhampton Unemployed Union to Hanlon, 25 May, 1933, 
itera 33/4041 HSO/A3655, QSA. 
103. Police Report, 9 May, 1933, itera 33/3871, ihid. 
104. Gall to Healy, I7 October, 1934, itera 34/7476, HSO/A37II, QSA. 
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because it did not spell out a distinct sphere of responsibility 
between the councils and the police. Furthermore, it made no 
reference to the important de facto role of the Home Secretary-
An incident that occurred in Bowen in 1933 illustrated the 
complications that could arise in the area of permits for street 
marches. The Mayor of Bowen, Alderman Russell, was elected as a 
Labor candidate but was faced with an anti-Labor majority on the 
council. 
The local tmemployed organisation approached the mayor with 
a request to hold an open air meeting. He granted a permit and 
the meeting went ahead without incident. At the next meeting of 
council he was roundly criticised and a motion was passed restraining 
him from granting any further permits to 'communist' speakers. 
Russell gave notice that he had no intention of abiding by such a 
resolution. A few weeks later an unemployed organiser asked the 
town clerk for a permit and was refused. Nevertheless the raeeting 
was held and was interrupted by a council employee who demanded to 
know by what authority the tmemployed were occupying council property 
whereupon the speaker produced a letter of authority signed by the 
mayor- This infuriated the other councillors and an emergency 
meeting was convened and the mayor censured. The meeting also 
directed the Town Clerk to inform the Home Secretary of the details 
of the incident. Hanlon decided that the matter was sufficiently 
complex to require investigation by the Government's legal offices. 
The Crown Law office advised that the mayor had exceeded his authority 
and that he was bound to abide by and implement the resolutions 
f ^u -1 (106) 
ol the council. 
The rapid expansion of the intermittent relief work scherae after 
1930 introduced a new element into the pattern of industrial relations 
in Queensland - strikes by relief workers. Sub-standard working 
105. Bowen Town Council to Hanlon, 30 January, 1934, item 34/947, 
HSO/A3675; and Memo, 13 February, 1934, item 34/1191, QSA. 
106. Hanlon to Russell, 27 February, 1934, item 34/947, ibid. 
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working conditions and low rates of pay were the major causes of 
these diputes. The work itself was arduous and unrewarding and 
many of the men were undernourished and/or unused to heavy physical 
labour. Petty harrassment by officious gangers often produced 
outbursts of violence. One ganger in Brisbane gained notoriety 
by his practice of throwing stones at slow workers. This proved 
too much for one man who, armed with a trench shovel, chased the 
ganger from a job site. Most relief strikes ended in defeat 
for the workers because they did not possess the industrial 
resources that were normally available to employed unionists. 
Relief workers were not engaged by private employers who stood to 
lose financially from a prolonged dispute. Instead, they were 
employed by the State Government and local councils on non-essential 
projects for which a specific amotmt of raoney was allocated. 
Relief work was a form of charity, and if some chose to reject 
that charity by going on strike there was no shortage of men willing 
to take their places. 
Minor disputes were sometimes settled in favour of the workers 
(1 08 ) 
by a system of informal conciliation and arbitration. Relief 
workers never succeeded in winning a strike against the combined 
power of the State Government, the local authorities and the police. 
In 1953 a gang of relief workers in the Bulimba area declared a strike 
in favour of better pay and working conditions. The Government and 
the Brisbane City Council steadfastly refused to concede their demands 
and when a deputation met the Minister of Labor and Industry he told 
them that: 'I refuse to be intimidated by a few commtmists, who 
have led a lot of decent raen into an agitation against the Government 
(109) 
and its policy'. Hynes carried on the policy laid down by 
his CPNP predecessor, HE Sizer, who had raade it clear at the 
comnenceraent of the relief work progrararae in 1930 that 'those who 
cause trouble (araong relief workers) are to be dimissed immediately. 
107. Read, op.cit., p 2. 
103. Police Report, 5 January, 1933, item 33/238, HS0/A3612; and 
Police Report, 12 September, 1933, 33/8228, HS0/A3654, QSA. 
109. Brisbane Courier. 13 September, 1933. 
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and will be debarred from getting rations'.^ Wlien workers 
on a relief project at Breakfast Creek refused to purchase yearly 
tickets in the AWU the Labor Government dismissed I36 of them. 
On this occasion the tmemployed took the novel step of asking the 
(112) State Governor, Leslie Wilson, to intercede on their behalf. 
Wilson informed thera that his constitutional responsibilities did 
not permit him to take any independent action on the issue, but 
that he would convey their grievances to the Premier- Forgan Smith 
remained unmoved and insisted that if the men wished to be re-employed 
(113) they would have to purchase union tickets. 
Most relief work was organised on a rotational gang method. 
This was designed to distribute the available work as evenly as 
possible, but it also made effective strike activity extreraely 
( -i -t } \ 
difficult. Major relief projects would involve three or four 
separate gangs attending on different days of the week. This raeant, 
of course, that the completion of the project did not depend on the 
regular attendance of any one gang. In order to exert any real 
influence a striking gang had to win the active support of all 
other gangs on the project. The police broke relief strikes at 
Wynnum in 1933 and at Maryborough in 1934 by placing a guard on 
those gangs still at work and by preventing the strike leaders 
entering the job site. The lessons of these defeats were 
not lost on other relief workers and relatively few such strikes 
occured in Queensland during the depression. 
110. Queensland Industrial Gazette, 24 May, 1930, p 285. 
111. See chapter 10 for details. 
112, Masters to Wilson and Reply, 24 August, 1936, 
item 36/5758, PRE/AH57, QSA. 
113, Smith to Wilson, 15 September, 1936, item 36/5738, ibid. 
114. Police Report, 25 October, 1933, item 33/9120, HSO/A3658, QSA. 
115, Police Report, 19 October, 1955, item 33/1187, ibid.; and 
Police Report, 2 January, 1934, item 34/173, HSO/A367O, QSA. 
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The failure of the strikes by relief workers was symptomatic 
of the general impotence of unemployed organisations in Queensland 
during the depression. While they were able occassionally to win 
local victories, such as anti-eviction campaigns, they were easily 
out-raanoeuvered by the authorities on issues of consequence. It 
is perhaps surprising that frustrations engendered by constant 
political defeat did not drive the tmemployed to adopt more violent 
tactics. Yet rebellion is born of the belief that things can be 
changed and the general psychological effect of chronic tmemplo5Tnent 
was to sap the confidence of the workless that their situation 
could be improved. Instead, they accepted their lot with 
resignation and waited patiently for 'things' to return to normal. 
CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION 
THE 'DEPRESSION GENERATION' 
AND THE 
QUEENSLAND PARTY SYSTEM 
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The widespread unemployment and consequent impoverishment 
that were the hallmarks of the depression are often claimed to 
have exerted a deep and lasting influence on the people who 
lived through that era. 
Robin 3ollan's comment that 
It has become a truism that one of the clearest 
lines dividing the generations of people living 
today is the line which separates those who 
lived through, and those who were born after, 
the great depression (l) 
has been eagerly endorsed by depression commentators. The central 
concerns of this thesis have been the effect of the depression on 
groups, institutions and policies rather than directly on iniividuals. 
Yet the post-depression electoral behaviour of Queenslanders and its 
impact on the party system require some discussion. 
The commonly used expression 'the depression generation' was 
coined by Angus Campbell and his associates in their study of 
American electoral behaviour to refer to that group 'who were in 
their twenties and thirties during the depths of the Great Depression, 
a generation long assumed to have been strongly influenced by 
(2) 
economic events'. Popular portraits see this generation as 
being excessively cautious and security-obsessed because of its 
experience of the depression years. Campbell was specifically 
concerned with the generation's political allegiances, and he reports 
that as late as the mid-19503 the depression had a greater impact on 
voters who came of age in the early thirties than did World War Two 
(3) 
or the Korean war.^ Moreover, people who cast their first vote 
during the depression displayed a greater preference for the 
Democrats than did the electorate as a whole: 
1. R Gollan, The Coal Miners of New South Wales. Melbourne,1963, p 177-
2. Angus Campbell et alia, The American Voter, New York, I96O, p 197-
3. ibid.,p 21. 
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the Great Depression swung a heavy 
proportion of the young electors towards 
the Democratic party and gave that party 
a hold on that generation, which it has 
never fully relinquished. (4) 
The research of Campbell and others has relied heavily on an extensive 
pool of opinion poll data that generally is not available for 
Australia. However, in 1970 Don Aitkin, Michael Kahan and Sue 
Barnes drew on a sample of the Australian electorate to provide 
a brief glimpse of the depression generation in this country. 
They found that 'the people of the depression generation do not 
appear today to be distinctively different from those of other 
(5) generations in their broard outlook on politics and society'. 
But in the narrower field of party preference they discovered that 
those who had first voted in Federal elections between 1931 and 
1937 tended to support the ALP in much the same way as young Americans 
(6) had supported the Democrats. 
When applying these findings to Queensland electoral behaviour 
after 1932, it is helpful to relate them to the theory of electoral 
fluctuations developed by VO Key and the Michigan Survey Research 
Center. In 1955 Key published his 'theory of critical elections' 
to explain the major realignment from Republican to Democrat that 
occurred with Franklin Delano Roosevelt's election to the American 
(7) (8) 
Presidency in 1932. Key and others^ have argued that this 
'sharp and durable' realignment took place because new voters were 
impressed with Democratic policies to deal with the depression and 
unemployment. Their research produced a classification of elections 
4. ibid.,p 155. 
5. Don Aitkin, Michael Kahan and Sue Barnes, 'What Happened to the 
Depression Generation?' Labour History, 17 November, 1970, p 179. 
6. ibid., p 176: Don Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian 
Politics, Canberra, 1977, p 95f. 
7- VO Key, 'A Theory of Critical Elections', Journal of Politics, 
17, 1955, P 11. 
8. VO Key, The Responsible Electorate, New York, I966, p 18f. 
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that can be applied to Queensland's post-depression electoral 
patterns. They are summarised and expanded by Neil Blewett 
as follows: 
1.maintaining, in which the prevailing pattern of 
partisan attachments persists and the hegemonic 
party is successful; 
2.deviating, in which the prevailing pattern of 
partisan attachments persists but temporary 
defections cause the defeat of the hegemonic 
party; 
3.realigning, in which the partisan attachments 
of some segments change and a new hegemonic 
party is created; 
4.converting, in which the basic partisan attachments 
change but reinforce the position of the hegemonic 
party; 
5.inflating, in which the prevailing pattern of 
ai^tachments persists but short term defections 
inflate the victory of the hegemonic party (Blewett).(9) 
Blewett has chosen to use seats rather than votes in his 
application of these categories to Australian elections. Such 
a practice is not appropriate to a study of Queensland post-depression 
electoral bahaviour because of the distorting effect of electoral 
systems. In addition to problems of malapportionment, 
parliaments drawn frora single-member, geographically located 
constituencies produce exaggerated majorities in the legislature 
(ll) 
- the so-called cube rule. An example of the 'winner's bonus' 
was the 1935 State election where Labor won 75 percent of the seats 
9. Neil Blewett, 'A Classification of Australian Elections: 
Preliminary Notes', Politics,6;1., May, 1971,p 87; See also 
G Vaughan, 'The 1977 Election:Maintaining the 1974 Realignment' 
in MB Cribb and P Boyce (eds), Politics in Queensland; 
1977 and Beyond, Brisbane, 1980. 
10. Serious malapportionment was not a feature of Queensland's 
electoral system in the 1930s and the Dauer/Kelsay index never 
fell below 45 percent. 
11. See Douglas W Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 
revised edition, New Haven, 1971, P 27-
The cube rule states that in single-member electoral systems 
the relationship of seats between two parties will be not less 
than the cube of the ratio of their votes. It thus draws 
attention to the 'winner's bonus' phenomenon. 
299. 
in the Legislative Assembly on 53 percent of the primary vote. 
Finally, in order to estimate the impact of the depression on 
people's electoral behavio^ir aggregate votes not seats must be 
measured. 
In terms of the above classifications Queensland's 'depression 
elections' were as follows: 
1. 1929 DEVIATING 
2. 1932 REALIGNING 
3. 1935 CONVERTING 
4. 1938 MAINTAINING 
The central issues at stake in elections 1 to 3 were economic, 
with the last two favouring the ALP. In this Queensland duplicated 
the US pattern whereby the Government in power during the worst 
years of the crisis suffered electoral opprobriun as the 'depression 
party'. Queensland's longterm electoral alignment w.as, at the 
same time, significantly different^o ^ithat analysed by Key and his 
associates. American Federal electoral history was divided into 
two neat segments by FDR's 1932 victory. The years 1921 to 1932 
were dominated by a succession of Republican presidents and those 
from 1932 to 1952 by Democrats. In Queensland two lengthy period 
of Labor ascendancy were separated by a non-Labor interregnum of 
three years. 
The important question is what effect, if any, did the depression 
years have on the subsequent electoral history of Queensland? 
Answers to this question depend, at least in p.art, on whether one 
concentrates on votes won in the constituencies or on seats obtained 
in the parliament. If the second perspective is preferred, the 
depression raade an important contribution to the restoration and 
confirmation of Labor as the dominant political party at State level. 
At the 1935 poll Labor converted its relatively narrow 1932 majority 
of four seats into a massive thirty seat advantage over the CPNP. 
Nineteen thirty-five was the election that firmly established Labor 
as the Government and which produced the fracture of the anti-Labor 
parties that was to persist until 1957- The 1932 election was, in 
another sense, just as important because it was then that the ALP 
managed to recover the electoral support it had lost in I929 and to 
regain the Treasury benches. 
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As the 1930s progressed, the ALP benefitted from the electoral 
and organisational fragmentation of the non-Labor groups. This 
disintegration of the anti-Labor parties is reflected in the growth 
of the Rae electoral index after 1935 (See Table 12:l).^ ~'' This 
drift towards a multi-party system in the electorates was not 
reflected in the parliament where the Rae legislative index 
reflected an essentially dual-party alignment, but with occasional 
leanings towards a one-party dominant system. Labor remained the 
most successful legislative group because the single-member, 
non-proportional voting system advantaged whichever party was able 
to establish a simple majority over its several rivals. Only in 
1938 did the ALP suffer slightly from the effects of electoral 
multi-partyism when the Protestant Labour Party secured 8.75 percent 
of the vote and took a seat from the Governraent. 
A perusal of Table 12:1 and Graphs 12:1 and 12:2 illustrates 
these points. Labor experienced a quite dramatic electoral 
recovery between I929 and 1935. Thereafter the party's electoral 
performance reverted to its pre-depression pattern. In the six 
elections that were held between 1915 and I929 the ALP averaged 
48 percent of the priraary vote; and in the six elections between 
1952 and 1947 its average share was also 48 percent. Throughout 
the forty years 1915 to 1956 the ALP was regularly the single raost 
popular party in Queensland, but this electoral popularity exceeded 
50 percent at only half the number of State elections held over 
that period. 
12. The Rae fractionalisation index is a measure of party 
competitiveness. It is discovered by summing the square 
of each party's decimal share of the votes (or seats) and 
subtracting this amount from 1.00. It ranges frora a one-
party system (O.OO) through a pure two-party system (0,50) 
to a multi-party system (l.OO). See ibid., Chapter 5. 
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TABLE 12:1 
ELECTION 
1915 
I9I8 
1920 
1923 
1926 
1929 
1932 
1935 
1938 
1941 
1944 
1947 
1950 
1955 
1956 
QUEENSLAND PARTY 
ALP ic VOTES 
52 
54 
48 
48 
48 
40 
50 
55 
47 
51 
45 
43 
47 
53 
51 
SYSTEM 1915-1956 
ALP % SEATS 
62 
66 
52 
60 
60 
37 
57 
74 
70 
66 
60 
56 
58 
70 
68 
RAE ELECTORAL 
INDEX 
0.55 
0.51 
0.66 
0.62 
0.53 
0.54 
0.56 
0.59 
0.70 
0.68 
0.71 
0.71 
0.65 
0.64 
0.64 
RAE l^GISLATIVE 
INDEX 
0.52 
0.47 
0.62 
0.56 
0.51 
0.51 
0.47 
0.38 
0.46 
0.49 
0.59 
0.62 
0.57 
0.46 
0.48 
Table 12:1 shows why Labor remained the hegemonic party after 1932. 
The single member electoral system meant that simple and narrow 
absolute majorities of votes were translated into disproportionate 
legislative majorities. A comparison of the electoral and 
legislative indices reveals that while there was evidence of 
multi-partyism in the constituencies, this trend was not paralleled 
in the parliament. 
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The specific contibution of the depression to Labor's 
subsequent electoral success was that it accelerated the recovery 
of the electoral support that had been lost in 1929. Labor's 
narrow victory in 1932 placed the party in a position to reap the 
benefits of the quite substantial improveraent that occurred in the 
econoray between 1932 and 1935. The ALP, like the Deraocrats in 
the USA, became associated in the electorate's mind as the party 
of recovery, whereas the CPNT suffered the fate of the Republicans, 
The depression in Queensland did recruit voters to the Labor party, 
but not in the proportions that are sometimes imagined. Graphs 
12:1 and 12:2 illustrate that while the depression elections (1929, 
1932 and 1935) exhibited a high level of eSctoral volatility, they 
had little effect on longterm voting patterns in Queensland. 
Don Aitkin has provided an important corrective to a common 
misconception about Australian electoral behaviour: 
Governments may be slaughtered in depression 
elections, but such results follow from 
movements in electoral support that are 
only slightly greater than usual. (l3) 
In the United States these electoral movements took place mainly 
among 'new voters', that is, persons who came of age in time to 
cast their first vote in 1928, 1932 or 1936 or who had come of 
(14) 
age before 1928 but had not previously chosen to vote. 
Phillip Converse has argued that these 'markedly Democrat' new 
voters provided the New Deal majorities and that Republican converts 
T , . - • • • .n. , (15) 
were relatively insignificant. 
13. Aitkin, Stability and Change, p 13. 
14. Campbell, op.cit., p 153;Norman H Nie et alia. The Changing 
American Voter, Harvard,1976,p 9^;Key, The Responsible Electorate, 
p 18-21. 
15. Phillip E Converse, 'Public Opinion and Voting Behaviour', 
in Polsby,N and Greenstein,F,(eds), Handbook of Political 
Science, vol 4, Massachusetts, 1975, p 141. 
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VO Key has underlined the importance of new voters in determining 
( -I c\ 
electoral outcomes, and it is interesting to view Queensland 
electoral behaviour in the 1930s frora this perspective. 
A popular view of Australian electoral behaviour is that the 
fate of Governments is deterrained by a group of 'swinging voters' 
who possess weak party identification and who are prone to switch 
their allegiance frora party to party at regular intervals. There 
are a number of difficulties with this contention. First, the 
concept of electoral 'swing' itself is controversial and 
(17) 
methodologically hazy. Second, attempts to locate and describe 
the swinging voter have not been very successful. Finally, 
proponents of the swinging voter notion often overlook the fact 
that an electorate can undergo a substantial alteration in personnel 
from one polling date to the next. This occurs because existing 
electors die or emigrate from the electorate to be r^eplaced by 
voters who have come of age since the last election plus imraigrants. 
(18) 
Because of the phenomenon known as 'generational voting' these 
changes can produce an illusion of 'swing' without any voters 
actually changing their allegiance frora party to party. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to identify precisely the 
number and party affiliations of new voters in Queensland in the 
(19) late twenties and early thirties. Yet certain conclusions can 
be drawn from what data do exist. There is no reason to assume that 
the voting pattern of the 'depression generation' identified by Aitkin, 
Kahan and Barnes is not valid for Queensland and that they favoured the 
ALP in the ratio of 3:2. Because of the existence of compulsory 
voting and enrolment, it is possible to estimate approximately the 
number of new voters at each election by utilising the growth in 
enrolment and the adult death rate. 
By using this method it appears that approximately 5 percent of the 
16. Key, The Responsible Electorate,p 22. 
17. M Mackerras, Elections 1975, Sydney, 1975, Apprendix A. 
18. Aitkin, Stability and Change.p 95f.;Richard E Zody, 'Generations 
and the Development of Political Behaviour, Politics, 5;1, 
May, 1970, pp 18-29. 
19. Prinaipal Electoral Officer (Queensland) to Author, 21 April,I98O. 
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enrolled electorate in 1929, 1932 and 1935 were 'new voters'. 
It is immediately apparent that this group alone cannot account 
for the 32.5 percent growth (or 13 point improvement) in the 
ALP vote that occurred between 1929 and 1935. Clearly Labor 
won in 1932 and again in 1935 because it was also able to recruit 
converts frora araong the ranks of CPNP supporters. 
It seems that Labor assembled electoral majorities in 1932 
and after because the depression prevented the new supporters 
that the CPNP won in 1929 becoming set in their electoral habits. 
The years between 1926 and 1932 were expectional because of the 
substantial raoveraents that occurred in electoral support for the 
ALP in Queensland. Before and after this period the Labor vote 
remained relatively stable. Yet from 1926 to 1929 Labor's vote 
dropped 8 points from 48 percent to 40 percent, only to recover 
10 points to 50 percent in 1932. This uncharacteristic volatility 
of the electorate was depression induced and allowed Labor to 
recoup its 1929 losses in only one election. It was argued in 
Chapter 1 that economic factors were crucial in explaining the 
movement away from the ALP in 1929, and it is likely that had the 
world depression not occurred the CFWP would have proved much more 
difficult to displace as the State Government. The most important 
longterm political effect on the great depression in Queensland 
was the restoration and confirmation of the Labor party as the 
State Government. The years of econoraic crisis did not produce 
durable, new political creeds, practices or organisations to rival 
those of the 1920s. Labor returned to power as a moderate social 
democratic party committed to restoring the State to prosperity. 
In doing so it promoted few bold economic schemes and preferred 
to rely on traditional Labor notions of state intervention through 
public works and organised raarketing-albeit with an agrarian slant. 
The 'left' in the party had lost grotmd during the depression and 
authority lay with a conservative coalition of senior parliamentarians 
and A\Pi] officials. In a political sense, Queensland was back to 
normal in 1932 and was to remain so until the defeat of the ALI^  in 
1957-
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Queensland politics in the 1930s were less urgent and less 
dramatic than those of the Commonwealth or the States of New 
South Wales and Victoria. Queensland's period of drama and 
political change had occurred in the second half of the 1920s. 
Those years were characterised by economic stagnation, the 
fragmentation of the Labor movement and the resurgence of the 
non-Labor parties. The year 1929 was something of a turning 
point in Queensland political history - but not for the reasons 
that many contemporaries imagined. Labor's electoral defeat 
did not herald a stable realignment in the State's politics 
because the Moore administration was consumed by the world 
economic collapse, thereby allowing Labor to regroup and to 
return to Governraent after only one term in Opposition. 
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APPENDIX 
BIOGR.APHICAL NOTES 
WH AUSTIN Undersecretary Queensland Departraent of Labor 
and Industry 1926-1934. 
WH BARNES MLA Bulimba I9OI-I915, 1918-23, Wynnum 1923-1933, 
Treasurer in the Moore Governement; died 1933. 
SAM BRASSINGTON MLA Balonne 1927-1932, Fortitude Valley 1933-1950; 
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly 1944-1950; 
AWU official. 
JB BRIGDEN Director Bureau of Economics and Statistics 1929-1932; 
Director of Bureau of Industry 1932-1938; Financial 
adviser to Queensland Government 1932-1938; 
University professor. 
ANDREW BROWN Secretary Brisbane branch WWF 1926-1929; expelled 
ALP 1929. 
SJ BRYAN Secretary Electrical Trades Union 1918-1944; 
President TLC 1929-1937; QCE member 1923-1957; 
Secretary ALP 1940-1952. 
FRANK BULCOCK MLA Barcoo 1919-1942; Minister Agriculture and 
Stock 1932-1942; AWU official. 
JL CAMPBELL Retired judge of the NSW supreme court; selected 
by Moore Government to conduct Mungana royal commission, 
RJ CARROLL Secretary ASE/AEU 1913-1935; QCE member 1917-1940; 
Secretary ALP 1936-1940. 
TOM COMBEY Secretary Unemployed and Relief Workers' State 
Council 1936-1940. 
JACK DASH MLA Mundingburra 1920-1940; Minister for Transport 
1932-1939; AWU official. 
* The purpose of these notes is to help the reader to identify 
persons mentioned in the text. They are not intended to 
provide comprehensive biographies. 
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JW DAVIDSON 
WH DEM.\INE 
JAMES DUHIG 
JM DURKIN 
Queensland Commissioner for Railways 1918-1938. 
President ALP I916-I938; QCE member 1901-1938; 
editor Maryborough Alert. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane. 
AWL' western district Secretary; expelled AWU and 
ALP 1926; Left wing candidate State election 1929. 
CLARRIE FALLON Secretary AWU 1933-1950; Vice-President ALP 1933-
1938; President I938-I95O; QCE member 1928-1950. 
WILLIAM GILLIES MLA Eacham 1912-1925; Premier February to October 
1925; appointed Board of Trade 1925; died I928. 
JO:iN GOODWIN Governor of Queensland 1927-1932. 
EM 'NED' HANLON MLA Ithaca 1926-1952; Home Secretary 1935-1944; 
Premier 1946-1952. 
HAROLD HARTLEY ML\ Fitzroy 1915-1929; ARU official. 
MICK HEALY Active in Communist party and unemployed 
organisations in the 19303; Secretary TLC 1946-1952. 
FRED HUGHES AFUUE President in the 1930s> succeeded by T Kissick. 
MP 'MOSSY' HYNES MLA Townsville 1923-1939; Minister for Labour 
and Industry 1932-1939; QCE member 1926-1939; 
retained Vice-Presidency of AWU during his 
parliamentary career; died 1939. 
ALP branch official and parliamentary candidate; 
expelled from ALP 1932 as a Lang Planner. 
MLA Logan 1920-1935; Deputy Premier 1929-1932. 
President AFULE in 1930s ; joined Social Credit party; 
expelled from ALP 1934; later became a member of 
the CPA. 
AWU official; QCE member 1928-1941. 
MLA Keppel 1912-1929, Rockhampton 1932-1956; 
held various portfolios in the 1920s but did not 
return to cabinet until 1939. 
MHR Brisbane I93I-I96I; Secretary ARTWU 1907-1933; 
QCE member 1916-1932. 
VD KEARNEY 
RM KING 
THEO KISSICK 
JC LAMOiVT 
JIM LARCOMBE 
GEORGE LAWSON 
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JOHN McCORMACK Unofficial leader of Dobbyn strikers (1931), 
jailed for sabotage; prominent in 'Cairns Riot' 
1932, jailed for assault. 
WILLIAM McCORMACK H^.A Cairns 1912-1930; Premier 1925-1929; resigned 
from Parliament 1930; QCE member 1918-1930; 
AWU official. 
LEWIS MCDONALD secretary ALP 1910-1936. 
AD McGILL Barrister; Chairman CPNP; appeared for Crown in 
Mungana Case. 
NF MACROARTY MLA South Brisbane 1929-1932; Attorney-General 1929-
1932; defeated in South Brisbane 1932 by VC Gair. 
EB 'TED' MAHER MLA Rosewood 1929-1932, Moreton 1932-1949; 
Senator for Queensland 1949-1965; replaced AE Moore 
as Leader of Opposition 1936. 
ARTHUR EDWARD MOORE MLA Aubigny 1915-1941; Leader of Opposition 
1924-1929, 1952-1936; Premier 1929-1932. 
GODFREY MORG-AN MLA Murilla 1909-1935, Dalby 1935-1938; 
Minister for Railways 1929-1932. 
TIM O^RONTEY Secretary ARU 1918-1944; 'expelled' from ALP I926 
over anti-comraunist pledge issue. 
GA MORRIS MLA Kelvin Grove 1938-1941; member of Protestant 
Labour Party. 
FRANK NOLAN Central Queensland representative on ARU State 
Council; succeeded Tira Moroney as Secretary ARU 1944. 
MICK O'BRIKM Brisbane representative on ARU State Council; 
President ARU 1930-1952. 
EP 'POOGER' O'BRIEN North Queensland representative on ARU State 
Coimcil; Townsville district Secretary of ARU in 
the 1930s; later joined the CPA and North Queensland 
Labor Party; readnitted to ALP 1957-
FREO PATERSON MLA Bowen 1944-1950; briefly member of ALP in 
mid-1920s; prominent member of CPA; regular 
parliamentary candidate until election 1944; 
sometime salaried employee of ARU. 
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•JC PETERSON MLA Normanby 1915-1932, Fitzroy 1932-1935; Home 
Secretary 1929-1932; left ALP 1921 to join 
Country party-
GEORGE POLLOCK MLA Gregory 1915-1939; Speaker of the Legislative 
Assembly 1932-1939; QCE meraber 1932-1939; AWU 
official; expelled AWU 1930 readmitted 1932. 
DAVID RIORDAN MLA Burke 1918-1929; MHR Kennedy 1929-1936; QCE 
member 1928-1936; AWU official. 
WJ 'BILL' RIORDAN A W Secretary 1925-1933; QCE member 1919-1933; 
Vice-President ALP 1923-1933; member Queensland 
Industrial Court 1933-1953; brother of David. 
HM RUSSELL MLA Toombul 1926-1932, Hamilton 1932-1941; President 
Queensland Chamber of Commerce 1931-1933; Deputy 
Leader Opposition 1935; Leader of parliamentary 
UAP 1936-1941. 
GEORGE RYT^ IER President of ARU 1921-1930; deposed as {Resident 1930. 
WILLIAM FORGAN SMITH MLA Mackay 1915-1942; minister in the Theodore, 
Gillies and McCormack Governments; Leader of 
Opposition 1929-1932; Premier 1932-1942; appointed 
Chairman Sugar Cane Prices Board 1942. 
Private charity worker Brisbane; she was particularly 
concerned with unemployment among women. 
Queensland Public Service Commissioner 1920-1939. 
MARION STEELE 
JD STORY 
HUBERT SIZER MLA Ntmdah 1918-1923, Sandgate 1923-1935; Minister 
for Labour and Industry 1929-1932. 
Police Union Secretary; unsuccessful Lang Plan 
candidate for Brisbane 1931 Federal election. 
MLA Woothakata 1909-1912, Chillagoe 1912-1925; 
xMHR Dalley (NSW) 1927-1931; Premier 1919-1925; 
Treasurer in the Scullin Federal Government 1929-1931, 
JOHN VALENTINE AFULE Secretary in the 1930s. 
HP TALTY 
EG THEODORE 
FRANK WATERS NHA Kelvin Grove 1932-1938; member APWU executive 
1926-1932; Secretary APWU 1946-1972; expelled ALP 
1941 readmitted 1957-
311. 
GEORGE WATSON 
DAVID WEIR 
LESLIE WILSON 
Undersecretary Premier's Department 1928-1941. 
>rLA Maryborough 1917-1929; imsuccessfully contested 
leadership QPLP 1929; died later the same year-
Governor of Queensland 1932-1946; Unionist MP (UK) 
1913-1922. 
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